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MODERN EUROPEAN HISTORY

A GENERAL SKETCH

(1492–1924)

BY

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To

C. J. B. GASKOIN, Esq., M.A.,

AND HIS DISCIPLES

AT FITZWILLIAM HALL

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PREFACE

I have attempted to sketch the biography of modern Europe as nearly as possible in strict chronological sequence, hoping thereby to present a more truthful picture of how events happened than is attainable by a synthesis of chapters on separate movements or States. The reader of such histories as those of Lavisse et Rambaud or Stern, moreover, finds a difficulty in preserving through the several sections a time-sequence strict and accurate enough to perceive the reciprocal effect of the several contemporary forces, while he may often lose sight of the advance or retrogression of Europe as a whole.

The reader may or may not share in the conviction of the significance of the League of Nations with which this general sketch concludes. But the record of many fundamentally unnecessary wars pleads for some such method of averting struggle by conference, while it is difficult to suppose that Europeans with the smallest perception of their common interest might not in the last four centuries have driven back the Turks, assimilated the Russians, raised themselves to a far higher level of civilization and spread irresistibly over the temperate world. If this view is well founded and a League a logical necessity, it seems more likely that the new international organization will teach method to the jarring corporations within the component States than that it will again make way for anarchy.

My narrative, however, was not composed to support this or any other thesis. It has been brought down to yesterday with a full recognition of the inevitable lack of historical

perspective and of much knowledge that the future will disclose, but also in the hope that the point of view of 1924 may interest and inform students of later years. To prevent some of the later sections from becoming repulsively overcrowded with names, in a few cases only the significance of an event has been treated in the text, while the battle or agreement in question has been named or dated in the index. Frequently, though not in the case of Russian names, the orthography of the Cambridge Modern History has been adopted as a convenient standard.

W. F. REDDAWAY.

CAMBRIDGE,
May, 1924.

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PART I

THE REFORMATION AND THE NEW AGE (1453–1560)

§ 1. *The Transition to Modern Times*

History knows no fresh starts, but the closing years of the fifteenth century may rightly be regarded as the beginning of modern times. While the Turks were isolating and destroying Europe on the eastern side, Columbus and his colleagues on the western were preparing a mighty expansion. At the same time, in France, Spain and England, new national States were being formed, some of which were beginning at once to test and to display their strength by contending for the dominion over Italy. All these changes, accompanied as they were by revolutions in scholarship and in religion, produced within two generations a Europe that may be entitled new.

The Europe of modern history is not an area of land but a society of men. The Russians, who had once belonged to the European brotherhood, were at the close of the fifteenth century only shaking off the yoke of their Mongol conquerors, and they remained strangers to Europe for more than two hundred years. Spain, which at the same time was finally cleansed of anti-European tyrants, was fully restored to Europe, but the Balkan peoples and in great part the Hungarians were torn from her by the Turks. These struggles were inspired, and the unity of Europe was created, not by race but by religion. Europe was in effect the society of Christian people.

Judged by modern standards of size and power, that society appears strangely small and weak. Some of its

members, Michelangelo and Raffaelle, Machiavelli and Erasmus, have seemed to posterity to attain the highest that is possible to man. But their Europe was a mere fraction of one small continent, with its forests largely uncleared, its swamps undrained, its minerals unexplored, its few highways, whether by land or sea or river, insecure, and its food-supply uncertain. A Christian man who knew Latin might wander from end to end of Europe without arousing racial or religious hatred, but to travel there was to affront every other kind of peril. Save in Belgium and the Lombard plain, the European of the later fifteenth century sustained his short life by primitive agriculture, handicraft or fishery, alternately plagued and protected by a temporal or spiritual lord. Charles VIII set out with some 30,000 men to conquer Italy, and Columbus, with eighty to discover a new world.

Christian Europe, however, small and weak as it may now appear, seemed to the men of the Middle Ages almost equivalent to the known world, and its system of government divine. Within it, every Christian man had his appointed place. All classes were linked together by mutual rights and duties, and Pope and Emperor presided over the whole. This system had doubtless contributed to the progress of mankind. The local magnates had provided for order and justice at a time when these indispensable conditions of human happiness could perhaps have been secured in no other way. Pope and Emperor must by their mere existence check the aggrandizement of lesser rulers, and being two, had prevented the tyranny of the one. By the end of the fifteenth century, however, the mediaeval system had become honeycombed with decay. The Popes were often corrupt and even contemptuous of Christianity, and their failings were faithfully reflected throughout the vast hierarchy of the Catholic Church. The Emperors, long challenged by those who appointed them to office, now retained little dignity and less official power. Both Pope and Emperor were offensive to national monarchy, the institution towards which the inhabitants of great areas were gradually feeling their way. However divided by local prejudice and hatred, men of one race and language can

combine together more readily than men of several, and in France, Spain and England astute and forceful princes were profiting by this fact. Louis XI, Ferdinand and Isabella, and Henry VII could offer the people deliverance from local tyranny in return for their submission, and the boon was eagerly accepted. But the new royal power must in the nature of things begrudge the ancient rights of Pope and Emperor, and thus the main pillar of the mediaeval system was assailed. Feudalism, moreover, suffered in its essentials from that progress of which the national monarchies were both a symptom and a cause. International rivalries promote royal rule at the expense of the local magnates, and the growth of wealth and cities thrusts the self-contained village into the background. When the people were no longer compelled to remain tillers of the soil in one small area, when cannon had made the lord's castle a vain refuge against the king, and the well-trained royal infantry could overthrow the armoured horsemen, the influence of the aristocracy might remain but their ancient ascendancy had departed. Even without Columbus and Luther, the mediaeval system of Europe was doomed.

How then was Europe to be governed? Where there is a society, there must be a law, but who was to prescribe laws to the new monarchs? The problem presented by the collapse of the Emperor was made ten times more difficult for Europe by the collapse of the unity embodied in the Pope. Four centuries of turmoil culminating in the catastrophe of 1914 have borne witness to its vital importance and to the failure of mankind to solve it.

The European Question.

§ 2. *The Italian Wars*, 1494–1516

In the last decade of the fifteenth century, as not seldom since, the attention of Europe was claimed by the actors in the centre of the local stage while more momentous events were happening out of sight. The Turk, secure in Constantinople, was preparing to storm in upon Vienna; Columbus was giving a new world to Castile; Ferdinand of Aragon was

organizing a Spain that should dominate both the New World and the Old for a century; Henry Tudor was laying the foundations of a still greater power; but it was Charles VIII, "made of poor paste" and most impolitic, who fettered contemporary attention by beginning the Italian wars. The careless resolve of the French in 1494 to invade Italy did much to shape the modern history of Europe. Not only did widespread war rage with little interval until 1559, but the status and institutions of many countries and the framework of the European society emerged transformed by the forces which Charles VIII had unthinkingly set in motion. Their consequences within and without Italy give the Italian wars an importance in European history out of all proportion to their military scale.

Italy.

Italy was in 1494, and remained until near the autumn of the nineteenth century, a region rather than a State. Screened from the rest of Europe by the tremendous barrier of the Alps, proud of a civilization far more ancient and elaborate than any other, her sons despised and disliked foreigners without learning from their presence the lesson of fraternal love. United Italy, which might offer the Italians independence, long remained the dream of Machiavelli alone. Their civic life, far more eager and intense than that of other races, was filled with mutual hatreds. The cities, here predominant, were tyrants which strove to conquer one another by hiring professional soldiers or even by calling in foreign Powers. Within their walls raged the ceaseless strife of factions, and Italy became the classic land of political assassination. From this welter, some Powers emerged conspicuous by their success and by the attendant jealousy of the remainder. The aristocratic republic of Venice, with a coastal and island empire which straggled as far as Cyprus, and in Italy a conquered hinterland to the Adda, surpassed all others in wealth, capacity and general detestation. Milan, lord of rich cities and a fertile plain, and powerful as commanding three great passes through the mountains, was by right a fief of the Empire. In defiance of all right, however, and of the apprehensive opposition of Venice, the Sforza

family had ruled Milan as its dukes for more than forty years. Lodovico Sforza, surnamed the Moor, now steered the State by influence over his ducal nephew. In Florence, "the city of intelligence," the Medici family also governed by influence, and their skill and insight enabled this wealthy republic to rank with the great Italian Powers. Naples, a feudal kingdom which France might yet dispute with Aragon, was the opposite of Florence in all respects save the importance of the capital. The country-side, which extended over some two-fifths of Italy, nourished a turbulent nobility and a poor backward peasant population.

In a broad belt across the middle of the peninsula stretched the strongest of the five leading Powers—the newly-formed Papal States. The Pope, a reigning sovereign only in Rome, presided over a miscellaneous bundle of territories which in area surpassed that of any Italian State save Naples. This temporal dominion he defended and extended at all costs, sacrificing to its interests, when need be, the interests of the Catholic Church. As monarch, he lowered the prestige of the papacy; as Pope, he obstructed Italian unity and independence. In 1494 it was not yet clear whether the States should depend upon the papacy or the papacy upon the States, and the "nephew" of Alexander VI, Cesare Borgia, devoted his unique talents to rendering their ruler *ex officio* the head of Christendom. The anomaly of the Papal States completed the weakness of Italy.

The Papal States.

France, on the other hand, was strong. While Italy, a sprawling peninsula of seven hundred miles, suffered from her physical divisions as well as from those of history, France, fertile and compact, was achieving national unity. Much indeed remained to be accomplished. The upper Meuse, not the upper Rhine, formed her boundary on the east; Paris lay painfully near her northern frontier; Brittany was to her a Wales still unannexed; the Pyrenees had not yet become her unquestioned boundary towards the south. But Louis XI, following the lines indicated by his greatest predecessors, had made her a national rather than a feudal kingdom, and had carried further the work of attaining

France.

her natural frontiers. Populous, well-knit, and not, like Italy, over-civilized, she possessed strength enough for adventure, and a king who preferred adventure to a more profitable use of strength.

Charles VIII invades Italy.

The opportunity for adventure came in 1492, when rebels against the bastard line of Aragon which ruled in Naples asked the aid of a rival claimant in the person of the King of France. It was increased next year, when Lodovico Sforza, fearing that Naples would sustain his nephew's rights in Milan, urged a French invasion that would keep her occupied at home. Charles did not resist the temptation. Having sacrificed to England, the Emperor and Aragon by way of treaty, in 1494 he led a motley host across the southern Alps. The first use that the son of Louis XI made of his father's lifework was thus to threaten it with ruin. Strong monarchy wielded without a sense of duty must in France and many other lands prove only a less affliction to the people than the feudalism which it had overthrown.

The Italian foray of Charles VIII was lightly conceived, imperfectly organized and ill led. But the degeneracy of the Italians and a series of happy accidents gave it a dazzling success. Charles, it was said, had surpassed even Julius Cæsar, having conquered ere he saw. Milan, though itself endangered by the dynastic claims of the house of Orleans, did not dare to repudiate Lodovico Sforza's invitation. The Florentines were divided, but Piero, the degenerate scion of the Medici, capitulated to the invader. Florence became a conquered city, and in her shame flung herself at the feet of Savonarola. The prophet of asceticism now preached a republic like that of Venice while the French swept on towards Rome. The Pope adopted a kind of neutrality, and in February, 1495, the army of Naples fled. A seven months' promenade had won for Charles the Neapolitan crown.

In May, leaving a viceroy in Naples, the King began a retirement which soon became a flight. His triumph had shocked many Powers which had been well content to see France embark upon an unpromising and costly venture.

The Italians were outraged by the insolent excesses of the French. Lodovico Sforza, now his nephew's successor, feared their dynastic claim; the Pope, their patronage of a General Council; Ferdinand of Aragon, an attack upon his Sicilian realm. The Emperor Maximilian could not stomach the aggrandizement of a king who had robbed him both of his heritage and of his bride. Venice, which hated Naples, but hated still more a subversion of the existing order, took alarm. In July, at Fornovo, Charles had to cut his way through an army which represented a formidable hostile league. By the end of 1496, no trace of his expedition remained, save that Florence had lost three towns to her neighbours, and that a precedent of audacious conquest had been set up.

Upon that precedent, successive kings of France were eager to improve. Charles himself died childless before he could renew the attack. His successor, Louis XII, lost no time in prosecuting his claims to Milan and to Naples. As diplomatic as Charles was heedless, he confirmed the alliance with Florence and bought the aid of Venice and of the Pope. The Pope's price was a French bride for Cesare Borgia and French aid in extending the Papal States, while in return for two districts in Lombardy Venice undertook to share in conquering Milan. Whatever the wisdom of these bargains, their end was promptly attained. In 1499, the French crossed the Alps. Early in 1500, Milan was firmly theirs, and Lodovico their lifelong prisoner.

Louis XII and Italy.

Naples must be Louis' next objective, and this too was conquered by craft. At Naples, the bastard line of Aragon still ruled, but the lawful line, in the person of Ferdinand the Catholic, held Sardinia and Sicily. Ferdinand did not hesitate to sacrifice kinship to greed, and arranged for a partition. By the secret treaty of Granada (1500) Louis was to become King of Naples, Ferdinand to receive Apulia and Calabria, and the two monarchs to join in a crusade against the Turk. With the countenance of the Pope, Naples was conquered in 1501. The deposed king ended his life in France, and the Duke of Calabria in Spain. Louis' success in Italy seemed hardly less amazing than that of Charles VIII.

In Naples, however, the French power rapidly collapsed. The partition of the kingdom, being based on mere expediency, could not easily be defended against attack, whether by one of the partitioning powers or by the persons affected. In 1502, France and Spain were at war over the interpretation of their treaty, and in the war the preferences of the Neapolitans themselves counted for something. In statecraft Louis was a child by the side of Ferdinand. No French general could compare with Gonzalo de Cordova, the "Great Captain," whose military fame has eclipsed that of all other Spaniards born. Vanquished by land and sea, the French finally lost Naples in 1504.

Meanwhile events were taking place which were destined to issue in the loss of Milan also. In 1503, Pope Alexander VI died, and in Julius II the papacy gained an undaunted and untiring defender. Cesare Borgia's princedom of the Papal States collapsed, and Julius set out to recover every territory that the Pope as Pope could claim. Venice defied papal authority and held several papal towns, and Venice was detested in Italy and beyond the Alps alike. Julius therefore joined the League of Cambray against her (December, 1508). From this league of general spoliation Louis hoped for an aggrandized Milan duly confirmed to him by the Emperor, while Maximilian, Ferdinand, Julius and many petty princes counted on dividing the Venetian lands.

In 1509, at Agnadello, Venice seemed to have been destroyed by the French. When mercenaries had fled, however, her own sons dared to face her triumphant enemies, and she prudently made her submission to the Pope. Julius, a patriotic Italian, determined with her aid to drive the foreigners beyond the Alps. In 1511, however, the French captured his city of Bologna, and attacked him in his most vital spot by summoning a General Council to Pisa. He replied with a Holy League to avert the disruption of the Church, and enlisted Ferdinand, Henry VIII, and eventually Maximilian and the Swiss in a co-operative speculation which might cost France Navarre, Burgundy and Guienne, as well as Milan and Bologna.

The five years' war to which the Holy League gave rise was marked, both in Italy and beyond the Alps, by astounding fluctuations of fortune. While alliances suffered almost hourly change, the future of States seemed to depend upon the life, or even upon the whim, of a handful of high-placed men. On Easter Day, 1512, Gaston de Foix shattered the Spanish army of the League and gained Ravenna, only to fling away his own life and with it the fruits of victory. Soon the Swiss drove the remnants of the French across the Alps and the League was everywhere triumphant. At Florence the Medici were restored, and their scion, Leo X, succeeded Julius as Pope. The son of Lodovico Sforza entered a diminished Milan, and although the French attempted to reconquer it with the aid of Venice, they were routed by the Swiss at Novara (1513). France, expelled from Italy and invaded on three sides, seemed herself to stand in danger of partition.

She was saved, as Venice had been saved, by the fact that leagues created by a mere synthesis of dynastic appetites are not likely to be lasting. Ferdinand was jealous of Maximilian; Leo, of Ferdinand; the monarchic Powers, of the Swiss; and in Wolsey a real statesman had arisen who could rise to the conception of international well-being as a worthy aim of policy. Louis XII purchased peace with Spain by resigning Navarre, and with England by espousing the King's sister Mary. Since France, Spain and England were now inclined to moderation, the twenty years' struggle in Italy seemed likely to be discontinued.

The death of Louis in January, 1515, after only three months of wedlock, sufficed, however, to shatter the prospect of peace. Francis I, aged twenty, sought glory in the orthodox mediaeval fashion and swiftly found it. Allied with England and with Venice, he defied a league of all the remaining Powers, invaded Italy, and shattered the Swiss in the terrific battle of Marignano (September, 1515). This triumph, though in the long run injurious to France, placed her young ruler on the very pinnacle of glory. The vanquished Swiss, abandoning their ambitions, became the useful satellites of France. Milan was

Francis I.

regained, with Genoa, the watergate of Italy, to supplement the communications through the Swiss and Savoyard passes.

The Pope, by the Concordat of Bologna (1516), conspired with the King to partition Gallican liberties, the traditional corporate privileges of the French Church. Leo thereby reduced the probability of a schismatic Christian Council, won French support in Florence and the Papal States, and regained the first year's revenue of new benefices in France. Francis secured for himself and his successors the right to nominate the bishops and archbishops, subject only to the papal veto. The French monarchy thus became all-powerful and the independence of the French Church was destroyed. Ferdinand of Spain would not have looked on inactive at the towering aggrandizement of France, but in January, 1516, he had given place to his grandson Charles. The young and embarrassed King was neither rich nor strong enough to contest the possession of Milan. He therefore by the Treaty of Noyon (1516) engaged to marry Francis' daughter, and to restore Navarre, in return for peace and the surrender of the French claim to Naples. To this treaty Maximilian adhered, and in 1518 England also made peace with France. Christendom was now free to unite in a crusade for the deliverance of Constantinople.

§ 3. *National Changes*, 1492–1519

In place of uniting in the crusade of which all princes talked, some dreamed, but which only Charles V embarked on, Europe fell into dynastic and religious convulsions which the peace of 1559 by no means fully soothed. Since 1494, in spite of the Italian wars, the force of Europe had unquestionably increased. While the Turks did not renew their onslaught upon Christendom, the Cross had gained fresh triumphs both in Europe and in that outer world which Columbus and the other great explorers had mightily enlarged. All the Iberian Peninsula had at last come under Christian rule, and Ferdinand and Isabella, who won the title of the "Catholic Kings" by their conquest of Granada (1492), were at one with the rulers

The Iberian Peninsula.

of Portugal in aiming at ruling over a wholly Christian population. First Portugal and then Spain had set out to extend the borders of Christianity in Africa, India, America and other lands, and to make their new-found possessions adjuncts of Europe. In this spirit they accepted from the Pope in 1493, and next year modified by agreement, nothing less than a monopoly of the whole New World.

The age of discovery had conferred a transient and unwonted eminence upon Portugal. It was likewise adding mightily to the prestige and wealth of Spain. In conjunction with the development of the Turkish power, it was severing the sinews of Venetian greatness, and dwarfing for a time the importance of Italy as a whole. These disturbances further promoted change and expansion by driving fugitive Greek scholars into western lands, and thereby enlarging the mental horizon of Europe. It was the new learning, the "Renaissance," that gave Columbus the necessary instruments for navigation, and the desire to possess its treasures impelled educated princes to seize them in Italy by force.

During the Italian wars, however, the greatest changes had been those in the organization of the leading States.

France. In France, the successors of Louis XI had reaped the fruit of his labours, and the royal power now stood unchallenged by any feudal House. It was of immense importance that by the marriage first of Charles VIII and then of Louis XII with Anne of Brittany, her duchy became incorporated with the kingdom. Henceforward leagues for partitioning France were doomed to failure.

England, though still merely a fraction of a rural island with a hold upon conquered Ireland, had attained an unquestioned dynastic unity under Henry VIII. As in France, a national spirit was growing up. Endowed by nature with the power either to share in continental politics or to abstain, England chose to ally herself with foreign Powers by the usual road of marriage, and to take part in continental wars. Past history had left a tradition of antagonism to France to which Wolsey proved superior, and reasons of trade, as well

as dawning reasons of defence, gave England a special interest in the Low Countries. Hampered, however, by the Scottish alliance with France, thinly peopled, lacking in mineral or industrial wealth and with few possessions overseas, England could not yet compare in power with France or Spain.

The rise of Spain is, indeed, the outstanding fact of this age. In less than forty years, the genius of Ferdinand of Aragon transformed several discordant feudal kingdoms into the solid and imposing Spanish Empire. Aided by his devoted wife, Isabella of Castile, by Ximenez, the loyal and unwearied Grand Inquisitor, by Columbus and Gonzalo de Cordova, Ferdinand created unity, order in Church and State, a strong monarchy, an empire overseas, and an acknowledged primacy in the diplomacy of Europe. Favoured, it is true, by fortune, but undaunted by a mountainous land and a stubborn people, this astute, ungrateful state-builder bequeathed Spain and her dependencies as one whole to his grandson Charles, who was also the grandson and successor of the Emperor Maximilian I.

Ferdinand and Isabella.

Maximilian I, Emperor from 1493 to 1519, and husband first of the heiress of Burgundy, and afterwards of Bianca Sforza of Milan, was one of those men upon whose fitness or unfitness for their heritage the course of history seems to turn. He became titular lord of Germany at a time when change of some kind could not longer be delayed, and when in France, Spain and England strong monarchies were being formed. The Germans, though hampered by the fact that their royal head was also Emperor over Italy and other regions, might well have become a united nation at that time. If the geographical boundaries of their race were indistinct, their sense of national brotherhood was well developed. If the great princes severally approached the Emperor in power, and the robber knights plagued the country, there was at least no such obstruction in the way of order and fusion as had been overcome in France and Spain. Had Maximilian devoted his reign to the organiza-

Germany.

tion of Germany, western history might have run a different course. National institutions—a council, a supreme court, a sacred peace, common taxation and an army—surmounted by a monarchy at once resolved and contented to rule within the realm—such should have been Maximilian's gifts to the German people and to Europe.

His talents and energy were great; his imagination active; in every human activity he excelled, and he was surpassed by none of his Habsburg successors in winning his subjects' love. But he chose to spend his life in vague struggles to make the Empire a reality, and in dreams of presiding over Christendom in the dual rôle of Emperor and Pope. Always in desperate need of money for his endless wars, he accepted by reluctant stages much of the programme of reform demanded by Archbishop Berthold of Mainz and his associate grandees. But without sincere support from the monarch, national institutions were doomed to failure, and the social state of Germany went from bad to worse. She retained a division into ten circles or provinces for the preservation of order, while the new Supreme Court survived at least in form and the Imperial Council formed a precedent. When Maximilian died, however, the union of Germany had been delayed for 350 years. Religious division was imminent, and the bad effect of the Emperor's constitutional failure was augmented by his dynastic success.

For if Maximilian betrayed Germany he created Austria. The double marriage arranged by him in 1515 with the heirs of Bohemia and Hungary formed the foundation of the later Habsburg State. At the same time he consolidated the Netherlands, of which the seventeen provinces passed to his grandson Charles as one united whole. Thanks to the marriage of his son with the heiress of Castile and to the fortunes of birth and death, he had next year the satisfaction of seeing Charles also proclaimed King of Spain, a title which implied the crowns of Sicily, Naples and the Indies. If the Germans would elect his grandson also to the Imperial throne, Maximilian's bankruptcy and failures would be redeemed by a colossal triumph. An Emperor who

Austria.

disposed of resources so vast as these might become, in fact as well as theory, lord of the Christian world.

Charles had already found, however, that titles did not necessarily bring him power. Born in 1500, a Fleming by temperament and education, he lacked the brilliancy of Maximilian, though .shrewd observers might divine that he carried much more at the back of his head than in his face. That ability to conceal his thoughts, which ranks among the best gifts of a ruler, in him became a wooden inscrutability which could hardly win him friends. He had succeeded to the throne of Spain as a foreign youth, offspring of a demented mother, and so poor that he must borrow from England for his journey to Madrid. His reception there proved chilling, and Spain, as yet an ill-compacted aggregate of classes and kingdoms, stood on the verge of civil war. In these circumstances, it fell to him to contest the Imperial crown with rich and glorious princes, Henry VIII of England and Francis I of France.

Charles V.

The election of 1519 resembled a European conclave. Charles could count upon his brother-in-law of Bohemia, but the remaining six Electors were bribed by Francis far more heavily than was possible to Charles. Mayence, Trèves, Cologne and the Palatinate, moreover, lay too near to France for their rulers to balk with impunity the desire of the victor of Marignano. German feeling, however, proved decisive, the more so that the Medici Pope supported Francis. Since Frederick the Wise of Saxony refused to stand, and Charles forbade his brother Ferdinand to do so, the only German candidate was Charles himself. In June, 1519, he was unanimously elected.

The first act of Charles V was perforce to sign those "capitulations" which are the curse of elective monarchy. The Supreme Court and the Imperial Council, designed by the princes to check Imperial power, formed part of the price of his success. Next year the Emperor was courting England and the Pope in view of the inevitable war with France. Charles had, indeed, inherited with almost every portion of his dominions some grievance against France. Francis, for

his part, was outraged by his electoral defeat and by the general pre-eminence of Charles. As King of France, however, he had a more substantial complaint against a Power which lay on all his frontiers at once. The Habsburg possessions and ambitions threatened the independence of every State, and in opposing them France became the champion of her own rights and of European freedom.

§ 4. *Revolt against the Papacy*, 1517–1521

While hovering on the brink of a formidable war with France and embarrassed by the revolt of the Comuneros in Castile, Charles was compelled to intervene in person in Germany, which was seething with discontent. (The stirring of men's minds by many causes, want, tyranny, ambition, and the obvious failure of reform, had there produced a widespread dissatisfaction with the social system, and a particular impatience with anything that savoured of foreign rule. To many the Church presented itself as a taxing institution governed by foreigners, neglectful of the spiritual appetites of its flock, and often harmful to domestic life and true religion. In 1517 one of its institutions, the sale of indulgences, had been challenged, and the resulting excitement threatened a religious revolution.)

The prevailing discontent arose from no doctrine or practice essential to the Christian faith. The Eastern Church,

Religious Unrest.

cut off from intercourse with the West by Mongol conquest, prided itself above all else on having kept the faith, and by it indulgences were never known. In the West, however, the belief had grown up that the soul of a Christian passed after death into purgatory, there to be cleansed by torment from the stains of sin. This purging might be shortened by due penance during life, or, after death, by the good offices of Christians yet alive. (The Pope, it was believed, held the keys of a treasury of merits from which grants could be made to reduce the penalties of repented sin. Such grants might be obtained by Christians who gave proof of penitence and good works, and the good works might be commuted into money.)

Practised with purity on both sides, the system of indulgences might serve to deter men from sin and to exercise them in filial piety, for who could burden his descendants with the task of ransoming him from the flames and who could leave his parents to suffer? With corrupt ecclesiastics and ignorant laymen, on the other hand, the gravest abuse was certain. (Indulgences were bought as licences to commit sin, and sold as a mere business venture. (In 1517, some citizens of Wittenberg, in Saxony, purchased papal letters of which a Dominican monk, John Tetzel, was a salesman. Their money went in part to the Archbishop of Mayence, who farmed the Indulgence, in part to the great banking house of Fugger, which managed it, and in part to the building of St. Peter's Church in Rome. Their belief that by this purchase they had secured the forgiveness of their sins roused to action a stirring Wittenberg Professor, Martin Luther. On All Saints' Day, 1517, he published ninety-five Propositions attacking the existing theory. Quite without design, his academic exercise had split the Western Church.)

Martin. Luther.

(Luther himself was not a man of deep learning or great clarity of mind. No great leader was ever less of a statesman. In power of work, and in determination to be good, however, he has seldom been surpassed. His unique power as a religious reformer came from the fact that besides being bold, sincere and spiritually inexhaustible, he was a perfect representative of the better common people. The German masses could understand him, and in the coarse animalism which alternated with his serene devotion they saw only the reflection of themselves. Scholars and statesmen arose to defend and to exploit the popular revolt against Rome which Luther at once expressed and inflamed.)

The Propositions, however respectfully, had contended that religion was more spiritual than the existing practice and that in some ways the Pope was infringing the prerogative of God. A mass of German public opinion immediately declared itself on Luther's side. (This grew greater when, in 1518, the papal legate simply demanded that he should recant. Frederick the Wise of Saxony, though a passionate lover of the mass

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and a notable collector of relics, shared the general indignation at such treatment of an honoured German Professor. Instead of excommunicating Luther for persistent heresy, Leo sent Von Miltitz on a special mission, and thus secured a letter in which the meek reformer acknowledged his voice as the very voice of Christ.

All this time, however, was spent by Luther in feverish study and debate, and his views inevitably changed. A public disputation with Eck at Leipzig in 1519 drew from him the momentous admission that General Christian Councils might err. Christ's promise to His church that they should know the truth could therefore be fulfilled only by their possession of the Scriptures. In 1520 the Pope issued a bull of excommunication which Luther burned in public. At the same time, in three great treatises, he proclaimed Christian liberty based on justification by faith, and called upon the Germans to banish the corrupt hierarchy of Rome and to create a national church. In January, 1521, the Emperor interfered in person. Leaving Spain, he passed from the Netherlands into Germany and met the Estates assembled in the Diet of Worms.

The Diet of Worms.

Foremost among the many cares of Charles ranked at this moment the need of allies against Francis. Ardent in the cause of religion, he gave due heed to the warning that his position in Germany depended upon humouring Luther, now the prophet of the nation. To condemn him unheard would have been to offend the German people and to gratify the Pope for nothing. A safe-conduct was therefore issued, and Luther twice interrogated before the Diet. With the words "I can no other, God help me," he "broke the chain of authority and tradition at its strongest link" by declaring that a General Council could err and had erred. He therefore quitted Worms an outlaw and was for many months concealed in his master's castle of the Wartburg. There he translated the New Testament into a noble dialect which Germany made its own. The Empire, left to the care of a Council of more than twenty members, pursued no common policy towards religion, and both the Lutheran movement for reformation and the national move-

ment against Roman interference made enormous strides. The unsettlement of men's minds by the attack upon an authority which seemed almost as universal as space and as old as time issued in religious and social disorders of every kind. Baptism, marriage, education, monastic life, monogamy—all were rejected by bodies of people on conscientious grounds.

Knights' and Peasants' Wars.

In 1522, the knights or lesser nobility, Luther's firm supporters, rose against the princes, and their failure damaged both their Order and the Reformation. The Knights' War was followed by a great uprising of the peasants, who claimed a general emancipation, provided that the Scriptures were not against it. Luther denounced them with unmeasured brutality, and the princes cruelly repressed their tumultuous revolt. From 1525, the Reformation in Germany became more and more a political movement controlled by the ruling class.

Luther and Europe.

The Diet of Worms of 1521 formed a most momentous crisis in the history of Europe as a whole. While Cortés and his comrades were annexing the New World, the Turks under Solyman II (1520–1566) were preparing to annex the Old. At such a point in Christian history unity was essential, but Luther was driven to declare the existing unity pernicious. He indeed might believe that the papacy was on the point of falling, and that scriptural truth was clear enough to make all Christians one. No cool observer, however, could fail to see that private judgment must lead to religious disunion. While in Spain Ximenez had carried through a Catholic reformation, Zwingli among the Swiss was moving independently towards a breach with Rome. The cloudy theology of Luther made but slight appeal to the minds of the Latin peoples. If a General Council were in truth not infallible, Erasmus was warranted in seeing no end to the disturbance but the turning upside down of the whole world.

At Worms, however, the mischief had not spread beyond repair. The masses, it is true, supported Luther both in his new-found loathing of Rome and in his demand that faith, not works, should be the great test and token of a Christian

man. But both in Germany and in the neighbouring lands, in which the Lutheran teaching had begun to spread, the masses did not in the long run decide such questions as these. Power lay with the magnates, and at Worms not one of the magnates was a Lutheran. Many, the Emperor included, cried out for the reform of abuses; but, as Ximenez had proved, abuses could be reformed without a revolution in religion. Emperor and Pope were at one in desiring above all things the maintenance of Catholic unity. This, the foundation of the Christian world, had not been irretrievably destroyed by Luther's breach with Rome. There might be local varieties of opinion and practice, and discord between East and West, but throughout all Christendom the ideal of the seamless robe of Christ was reverenced, and the Seven Sacraments were to all men their acknowledged meeting-places with God. By wise reform and steady governance the Lutheran assault on unity might still have been repelled.

But the defence of Christian unity was committed to a Pope who was a feeble temporal prince and to an Emperor distracted by a thousand other cares. So alluring to the German princes was the power and wealth which the adoption of Lutheranism offered, that the heresy must be strangled in its infancy or not at all. And Charles, though resolved to stake upon this cause dominions, friends, body and blood, his very life and soul, must leave Germany to her own resources while he sought a settlement with France. Nearly five years went by before he found it, and the religious disunion in Europe had by that time advanced beyond recall.

§ 5. *Charles V and the Reformation*, 1521–1552

Since the establishment of a hereditary empire dominating Europe and based on religious unity was bound to be Charles' ideal, he lost by the progress of Luther in Germany far more than he could gain by victory over France. In 1521, however, the forces of Emperor and Pope again drove the French from Milan, and next year the victory of the Bicocca restored the Sforza line. The ascendancy of Charles in Italy was made clear when his

Struggle with France and the Papacy.

tutor, a Fleming, became Pope Adrian VI (1522), and when a Medici client, Clement VII, succeeded in 1523. He secured the English alliance also, and his forces repulsed the French from Milan in 1524. Francis, however, drove them in turn from Marseilles, and himself invaded Italy. Once again Milan fell, but in February, 1525, the invaders were crushed at Pavia. Francis, a prisoner in Spain, consented to the Treaty of Madrid (1526). All that Charles believed to be his by right was conceded, and Francis was to fetter himself by espousing Charles' sister. Having gained his freedom by promises which comprised not only Italy and the Netherlands but Burgundy as well, Francis when free denounced the whole arrangement, invited the Turk to attack his enemy in the rear, and joined in the League of Cognac with the Powers of northern Italy and the Pope. Since the European balance had been subverted at Pavia, England became the patron of the League.

The secession of Clement VII received a double chastisement. In 1527 the Imperial army, unknown to Charles, sacked Rome and made the Pope a prisoner. The Lutheran soldiery ravaged the hated city so ruthlessly that the inhabitants took to flight, and Roman pre-eminence in art and commerce was never regained. Further, by distracting Charles from Germany, Clement became in fact the protector of the anti-papal movement in that and in other lands. In 1526, at Speier, the Diet resolved that each constituent German State should manage for itself in matters of religion. Luther's marriage with a wife who had vowed herself to celibacy, and the secularization by his advice of missionary lands in Prussia, indicated to Pope and Emperor the onrush of revolt. And, in August, 1526, on the fatal field of Mohács the Christian realm of Hungary had been shattered by the Turks.

More than two years were yet to elapse, however, before the Catholic powers of Europe could free themselves from internecine strife. The sack of Rome revived the League of Cognac, and a new French invasion was foiled only by the defection of the Genoese admiral, Andrea Doria, which saved both Genoa and Naples. Next year (1529) yet another French

attempt to reconquer Italy suffered defeat, and at last Francis accepted his rebuff. The Treaty of Cambray repeated most of the terms agreed on at Madrid, but omitted the least possible of fulfilment—the immediate cession of Burgundy by France.

Charles was thus acknowledged master of Italy at the moment when the "Protestants" had declared at Speier that they could not agree to the measures which he proposed, while Solyman was sending an apparently irresistible army to besiege Vienna. Hope for the Catholic cause might, however, be drawn from the spectacle presented at Marburg, where Luther with more than papal rigidity rejected the hand of goodwill held out by the followers of Zwingli (1529).

The Protestants at Augsburg.

In 1530, Charles made his second great attempt to restore religious unity by presiding at a German Diet. At Augsburg, indeed, the task was infinitely harder than at Worms nine years before. The unbroken tradition against which Luther then rebelled had now, over a great part of Germany, passed into the category of bygone abuses. In Saxony, Brandenburg, Hesse and many other States and cities, the mass had been replaced by evangelical preaching, and the prince had succeeded to the regulating authority of the Pope. Monasteries and convents stood empty; pilgrimages had become a waste of time; the kissing of dubious rags and bones was now a silly superstition. Six princes and fourteen cities, the "Protestants" of Speier, had dared to defy the Diet when the new order was condemned.

Outside Germany, Protestantism had already made great strides. Foreign students flocked to Wittenberg, and the Lutheran teaching swiftly pervaded the circles of German burghers in other lands. Since 1523, Sweden, compelled by Gustavus Vasa, had embraced the Reformation. Denmark, also in rebellion against a Catholic king, was following in her steps and preparing to drag Norway after her. England was effecting a political breach with Rome which must inevitably imperil their doctrinal union. Switzerland stood divided between Catholic and Protestant cantons. Heresy was spreading in the Netherlands and was by no means unknown in

France. Charles, it was clear, must secure a faithful promise from the Pope to reform abuses and must then confound the heretics without a moment's delay.

In politics, indeed, he had many grounds for satisfaction. Italy lay at his feet, and the invasions by Charles VIII and his successors had gained them nothing. He was now in secure possession of Spain, and he had espoused the Infanta of Portugal (1526). Since 1526 the marriage schemes of Maximilian I had ripened into the harvest of the Bohemian and Hungarian crowns, which his brother Ferdinand now wore. The Turks, always the object of Charles' holy hatred, had been repulsed from Vienna. In England the fall of Wolsey tended to unbridle the ambition of the King, which could best be gratified by an alliance with the Emperor against France. Charles crossed the Alps to Augsburg as a conqueror.

The task before the Diet of Augsburg of 1530 was to discover some formula which would induce the Protestants to accept the decision of 1521, a rule relaxed in 1526, but reaffirmed in 1529. Either the Pope or a General Council could remove ecclesiastical abuses, but the Protestants were presuming to cut down the Sacraments to three. Their attitude, if maintained, must mean the loss of Christian unity or war.

To find a formula, moderate theologians on both sides were instructed to debate. Luther, debarred by the ban of the Empire from approaching the Diet, could only thunder against moderation from afar. It was the mild scholar Melanchthon who drew up the Confession of Augsburg, a treatise designed to show that the Lutheran doctrines were those which all Catholics held or ought to hold, and that the real breach lay between true believers and the followers of such as Zwingli. The greatest source of difficulty was the Eucharist. The Catholic doctrine taught that the bread and wine became by daily miracle the body and blood of Christ. Such transubstantiation Zwingli rejected, seeing only the hallowed instruments of a solemn commemoration. Luther, clamouring

The Doctrinal Problem.

for a literal acceptance of the words "This is My body," excommunicated those who rejected his doctrine of Consubstantiation, by which the consecrated elements were at once human and divine. Melanchthon, striving at every possible cost to avert violence, declared that the true body and blood of Christ was veritably present in the Supper under the form of bread and wine, and that the mass was celebrated among the Lutherans more devoutly than among their opponents. The Catholics retorted with a document tinged with moderation, and during the subsequent negotiations each party offered to extend its tolerance until a General Council could decide. No valid formula could however be discovered, and policy dictated a postponement of the dispute.)

Although he was far from applying it in practice, Luther had in fact proclaimed the principle of religious liberty, by which the individual is free to approach God in his own fashion or not at all. Between this and the prevailing doctrine that all men must approach God as directed by authority no compromise was possible. And the Lutherans, in deciding what their own directing authority should be, went far enough towards the individualistic principle to render a superficial and temporary concordat with the Catholics of highly doubtful value. The failure of 1521 and the diffusion of the Scriptures among the people had made true unity unattainable.

The Diet of Augsburg, therefore, could only reiterate the decree of Worms and Speier, and reconstitute the Imperial Court for the recovery of Church property. The Protestants, for their part, could only protest once more, and form the Schmalkaldic League for armed defence against aggression. This the Emperor might perhaps have crushed by force, the more so when Zwingli's fall at Kappel (October,.1531) deprived southern Germany of its chief source of Radical inspiration. Once again, however, foreign cares distracted Charles from Germany. Francis and Clement threatened mutiny, and, in 1532, a Turkish invasion must be repulsed. Always demanding from the Pope a General Council, Charles had established a Religious Peace at Nürnberg (1532), by which the Protestants

Religious Settlement Postponed.

received temporary protection against the Imperial Court. While he journeyed to Italy and Spain, the Schmalkaldic League began to act like an independent State, and the Reformation steadily extended the area of its conquests. The seizure of Münster by the Anabaptists in 1534, and the Habsburg humiliation involved in the dispossession of Ferdinand from Würtemberg by its Protestant Duke emphasized Charles' failure.

Once again the progress of Turk and Protestant was to be assisted by the action of France. The schemes of Francis were impeded by the death of Clement VII in 1534, who was succeeded by a Farnese, Paul III. Next year, Charles gratified his dearest ambition by leading a crusade to Tunis. There he defeated the formidable pirate, Barbarossa, and established a vassal prince upon the throne. In 1536, he had to face the onslaught of Francis, Solyman's ally. This new Italian war, the third that the king of France had forced upon him, roused Charles to one of the few dramatic actions of his life. Before the Pope and Cardinals, he challenged Francis to meet him in single combat, staking Milan against Burgundy, the victor to lead their united forces on crusade. He then replied to his enemy's futile invasion of Piedmont by an invasion of Provence which proved no more successful. Next year, Francis seized Piedmont but failed in Flanders. In 1538, an amazing though short-lived concord between the two monarchs developed as the result of a chance meeting. This enabled Charles to repress with a heavy hand the revolt of the great city of Ghent (1540) while he made use of the Truce of Nice (1538) with France to attempt the religious settlement of Germany and again to go upon crusade.

Charles V Victorious outside Germany.

The year 1541, which was to witness both attempts, opened prosperously for Charles' power. In addition to his successes in dealing with France and the Netherlands, he had humbled the cortes of Castile (1538), and at the same time gained at least a temporary relief from Turkish attack in Hungary. The Six Articles in England (1539) marked a welcome reinforcement to the

Checks to Protestantism.

cause of Catholic unity, and, in 1540, papal approval of the new Jesuit Order testified to the promise of a strong internal rally of the Church. Most valuable of all, however, was an amazing act of folly on the Protestant side. Philip the Magnanimous of Hesse had proved himself a notable factor in the success of the Reformation movement, both by the richness of his domains and by his inspiring courage. In an age when all traditions were shaken, he thought that, like Abraham, he might appease an untimely passion by espousing a second wife. His consort and her kinsman the Elector of Saxony consented, and it remained to secure the approval of the leading Lutheran divines. These, Luther and Melanchthon among them, allowed Old Testament precedent and political convenience to outweigh their sense of right, only urging that the marriage should be secret. Luther, indeed, counselled "a good plump lie" at such a crisis as the truest wisdom.

The bigamy of Philip of Hesse, which suggested that the Lutheran doctrine would subvert common morality, counted at the moment for more than the dynastic changes which had in 1539 brought Brandenburg and Ducal Saxony within the Reformation pale.

Charles fails at Ratisbon.

Charles came to the Diet of Ratisbon (Regensburg) in 1541 in high hope of securing a comprehensive formula on which, when sanctioned by a General Council, Christendom might be reunited. A conference of mediating theologians, indeed, went very far towards realizing an agreement. They found a formula for the crucial doctrine of justification by faith, and in their zeal for union the Catholics declared that free will had been lost at the Fall,—teaching against which the Council, when it met at Trent, uttered a stern anathema. Other theological cleavages, however, were beyond their power to bridge, while neither the Catholic nor the Protestant princes could now be disarmed by a mere theological accord. The Reformation had become part of the web of politics, and German Particularism, the fatal impulse of all princes towards independence, could now only be contested by force of arms.

The Emperor was not free in 1541 to pursue the question of religious reform to its conclusion. By secret negotiations with individual princes, however, he had disunited the Protestants and averted the danger of a Protestant league with France. Having enjoined mutual toleration until a Council could decide, he sailed in October for Algiers. In striking at Barbarossa he was at once shielding the coasts of Spain and Italy and championing Christendom against the aggressive Turks. It seemed impossible that he should fail, but a storm shattered the expedition. With diminished forces, but with the prestige of a Christian hero he had now to meet a new attack from France.

In 1542, Francis attacked both in the Netherlands and in Roussillon, the province which Spain, in defiance of Nature's frontiers, held northward of the Pyrenees. With France were now associated Scotland and the Scandinavian kingdoms; while she possessed the sympathy of Venice and of the Pope. A more active and formidable ally was Solyman, who had laid hands on Hungary in 1541, and now prepared to assault Vienna. The course of this, her fourth war with Charles, however, was distinctly unfavourable to France. All her invasions failed; Boulogne was lost to the English; German feeling revolted against the Turkish alliance; Solyman was held in check; and although in Piedmont the French won a rare victory over the Spaniards at Ceresole (1544), the results did not compare with those of the Emperor's conquest of Gelders (1543), by which the Reformation tide in north-west Germany was stemmed. Finally, Charles boldly moved on Paris, and at Crépy, within forty miles of the capital, made a conciliatory peace (September, 1544). He was prepared to give his daughter in marriage to Francis' second son, and with her Milan, the invaluable highway between Spain and the remaining lands of the House of Habsburg. Next year the intended bridegroom died, and Francis kept both Piedmont and Savoy.

Renewed Struggle outside Germany.

At last, in 1545, the way seemed clear for a deliberate settlement in religion. From France, Charles had, for the

moment, nothing to fear. Francis observed those provisions of the Peace of Crépy which engaged the signatories to restore the unity of the church, and spent his closing years in religious persecution. The Pope had at last consented to summon a Council, which met, in December, 1545, in the Imperial town of Trent. Early next year, the death of Luther removed a formidable foe to all accommodation. If the Pope and Council would reform abuses and grant reasonable latitude in dogma, it might yet be possible to reconcile reasonable Protestants and to subdue the recalcitrant by force. Charles might then hope to establish a hereditary Habsburg Empire and to lead united Christendom upon crusade.

Hopes of Settlement.

This fair hope, which was to have been realized by the Diet of Ratisbon of 1546, suffered a twofold blight. The small body, mainly of papal dependents, which met at Trent could in no sense be styled a free and general Council of the Christian Church. Its early measures, such as the declaration that church tradition equalled the Scriptures in authority, in no way compensated the Protestants for its defects. But more ominous still were the Protestants' assertions that their faith was founded not on Councils but on the Word, and their refusal to attend the Diet. Charles could reach Ratisbon only by Lutheran permission; Lutheran princes had lawlessly seized upon Brunswick; the Schmalkaldic League behaved like the Emperor's equal; four of the seven Electors now followed Luther. Charles, though he hated force, had no alternative but to strike down the League or to see Christendom permanently divided and the whole Habsburg structure overthrown.

In the summer of 1546, therefore, Charles signed a treaty with the Pope for aid in men and money, won the benevolent neutrality of Bavaria, and enlisted several Lutheran princes in his service. Most important of all was his detachment of Maurice, Duke of Saxony, from the Protestant side. His habitual reticence and his moderate treatment of the Lutherans for a quarter of a century now stood him in good stead. While the Pope treated the impending onslaught as a crusade, the Emperor was able to

Religious War.

represent it as an operation in support of law, and many Protestants believed him. The Schmalkaldic League had rejected recourse to the Diet, and designed to sweep Catholicism from Germany by force of arms.

The Protestants began the war by attacking with greatly superior forces. In southern Germany, however, as at Algiers, the physical and moral courage of Charles himself sustained his troops, and their opponents were divided by fear of losing Spanish trade. A sudden attack by Maurice upon the lands of his cousin, John Frederick the Elector, transferred the struggle to Saxony and gave southern Germany to Charles. But the Elector reconquered his domain; Bohemia and the neighbouring lands supported him; and the Pope, always dreading a strong Emperor more than heresy, withdrew his sympathy and his contingent. Only Charles' heroic resolution averted a disaster. In April, 1547, however, he invaded Saxony, and gained a crushing victory at Mühlberg on the Elbe. The rout of John Frederick's forces by some 25,000 men, mainly Spaniards and Italians, laid Germany at Charles' feet. John Frederick himself, and Philip of Hesse, his co-director of the Schmalkaldic League, were prisoners in the Emperor's hands.

Triumph over the League, however, did not mean power to extinguish heresy. In many parts of Germany the belief that the Pope was a convicted cheat and the mass a mummery now rested on long tradition. Germans as a whole resented the presence of Spanish troops and feared that Charles would use them to found a hereditary Empire. His imprisonment of John Frederick and Philip, and his transference of the Saxon Electorate to Maurice, roused widespread indignation, and, then, as always, the aggrandizement of the Emperor was a challenge to the inbred Particularism of every German prince. To cope with heresy, moreover, papal aid was indispensable, and in 1547 Charles was at bitter feud with the Pope. Paul III, unable to avert a Council, had made the assembly unserviceable at Trent, and then summoned the docile majority to Bologna, thus confronting Charles' appeal with the spectacle

Victory and Fresh Difficulties.

of a Council called into existence, but powerful only to perpetuate division. In September, the natural antagonism of the Pope to a reforming Emperor was heated into undying hatred by the murder of his nephew and the occupation of Piacenza. The victor of Mühlberg, therefore, came to the Diet of Augsburg of 1547 by no means as a dictator. His victory brought at least the grudging promise of the Protestants to obey a Christian Council held in Germany. But his scheme for a governing league of the ten Circles was rejected, and it was only the imperative need of including the Protestants in the Catholic Church, and the impossibility of attaining this end through the existing Pope or Council, that impelled him to proclaim the *Interim* (May, 1548).

Interim and Council fail.

The *Interim* of Augsburg embodied a scheme of doctrine authorized by the Diet during the interval before the promised Council met. At the Emperor's command, three moderate theologians had framed a careful compromise between the Lutheran and the various shades of Catholic belief, and their ambiguous formulæ could be accepted both by Melanchthon and by the Pope. But the ritual thus prescribed by authority was Catholic, and the enforcement of the *Interim* only upon Protestants made them regard it as a strait-waistcoat, and rebel. A new Pope, Julius III (1550), promised a new Council, which in fact met in 1551. This second Council of Trent, however, proved as ineffective as the first, and its decrees could only increase the Protestant irritation. Five years of peace had passed since Mühlberg, and the problem of religious reunion remained unsolved. Even the Catholic reformation which Charles had commanded at the same time as the *Interim* had not been carried out.

§ 6. *The Last Years of Charles V*, 1552–1556

In 1552, the unsleeping enmity of France again gave birth to war. On the eve of Mühlberg, Henry VIII and Francis I had been succeeded by Edward VI and Henry II, the one a symbol of aggression against the Catholics of England, the other, against the Protestants of France. The French king

had extended his influence over Scotland by the betrothal of Mary Stuart to his son, and a brief war with England had procured the retrocession of Boulogne.

Struggle with France.

He now endeavoured to extend his occupation of Piedmont, and to turn the dissensions of the Germans to the territorial advantage of the French. Posing as the champion of German liberties, he agreed at Friedwald with Maurice and a few lesser princes to pay them a monthly subsidy and himself to attack in Lorraine (February, 1552). He was promised in return the three Imperial bishoprics, Metz, Toul and Verdun, with permission to gain Franche Comté and to recover Cambray, Artois and Flanders. Such was the conspiracy which was destined to dictate the religious settlement of Germany and profoundly to affect the European Reformation.

In March, 1552, Henry struck hard in Lorraine and even threatened Strassburg. Two months later, the Emperor, having narrowly escaped capture by Maurice at Innsbrück, had taken refuge in Carinthia. Weak both in health and in resources, he firmly refused to concede on his own authority the rights which the Protestants demanded. Once again his courage restored a cause which had seemed to be lost. The Truce of Passau postponing the religious settlement appeased the Germans, and Charles, now reinforced, marched westwards against the French. Defying disease, he pressed on the winter siege of Metz, but incurred a bitter failure. The next campaign, however, brought him Terouanne and Hesdin, and in 1554 he closed his military career by himself saving Namur from the French. Maurice meanwhile had fallen in vanquishing a furious Hohenzollern, one of his former friends. Charles' final departure, it was clear, had left Germany to anarchy.

The Emperor's Downfall.

The closing years of the great Emperor were brightened by the marriage of his heir Philip with the new queen of England (1554) and by later victories over France. His public career, however, closed in gloom. In 1555, the religious Peace of Augsburg followed the lines laid down three years earlier at Passau, and indicated at the great Diet of Speier in 1526. The settle-

Religious Peace of Augsburg.

ment was in essence a surrender to the rising power of the princes, and cost both Pope and Emperor dear. "Whose the region, his the right to prescribe its confession" now became the law for Catholic and Lutheran German rulers, and since Lutheranism gave wealth and power, the Pope must make many sacrifices to keep Catholic princes loyal. Church lands secularized prior to the year 1552 were to remain in the hands of laymen, and the jurisdiction of the bishops, upon whose divine institution the *Interim* had insisted, was abolished in Protestant domains. Security for the future was conferred upon Protestants by the provision that in the Imperial Court they should have an equal representation with the Catholics. Against a corresponding security for the Catholics, the so-called Ecclesiastical Reservation, the Lutherans protested. This provided that the personal religious change of an elected ruler, such as a bishop or an abbot, should not alienate for all time the revenues of his institution from the church—a case which the conversion to Lutheranism of the Archbishop of Cologne had proved to be by no means imaginary.

After this triumph of disunion came the election to the papacy as Paul IV of the fierce Neapolitan Caraffa, who would tolerate no politic concession or infringement of papal rights. It was with a deep consciousness of failure that Charles renounced his lordship of the Netherlands (October, 1555) and prepared to resign Spain and the Empire also. This accomplished, he entered the monastery of Yuste in the heart of Iberia, there to end his life.

Charles V Abdicates.

Europe owes much to Charles V, her primate for four momentous decades. In an age of revolution it was no small advantage that half Christendom obeyed a lord renowned for honesty and moderation. To govern directly so disjointed an area as his dominions was impossible, and wisely recognizing this, he appointed well-chosen deputies. In Spain, his queen, Isabella; in Austria, his brother Ferdinand; in the Netherlands, his sister Mary—all these were admirably successful, while in Italy Gonzaga was at least vigorous and devoted, and in Germany the princes arrived at mutual toleration without protracted

Charles V and Europe.

war. Charles' wise choice of men extended to the innumerable counsellors, ambassadors and generals whom his immense empire needed, while his measures, stern in the Netherlands, mild in Germany, were chosen with equal skill. His wisdom was moreover attested by what he refrained from as clearly as by what he did. Honest to the core, he avoided vulgar conquests and scrupulously respected others' rights. His reverence for legal rights, indeed, extended to his own, clouding on occasion his view of the more prudent path. Since Burgundy was his by right, he could not realize in 1526 that no oaths or victories would induce France to yield it. A fine soldier, he refrained from any war save a crusade except in self-defence. With France, he strove long and earnestly for a true reconciliation, offering even Milan to a prince whose marriage should provide a pledge of peace. The ideal which he had realized in Spain and the Netherlands he desired to realize also in Italy and Germany—leagues of States all leaning upon the Emperor and by his authority restrained from war. A devoted son of the Church, he rejected many challenges to persecution. World empire was for the sovereign of so many States an inevitable tendency, if not a conscious aim, and Charles promoted the eventual succession of his son Philip to the Empire as well as to Greater Spain. But he never desired to force his way to any alien throne, and his assumption of the right to settle religion was a temporary measure of necessity, not an encroachment upon papal power. Every section of his vast dominions, America not the least among them, owed substantial benefits to his unselfish and laborious rule. Thanks to him, the next century of European history may be designated the ascendancy of Spain.

§ 7. *The Counter-Reformation and Calvinism*, 1536–1563

As later history was destined to disclose, the age of Charles V registered the tacit resolve of Europe to have done with unity in religion and with obedience to a single lord. The appearance of a dangerous pre-eminence on the part of any State or person has provoked the great struggles of which modern times are full. Unity of religion, on the other hand,

must always appeal as an ideal to those who hold that truth is one, and for a century after Charles V diversity was sharply opposed by force. In this conflict two new combatants appeared, the Society of Jesus and the followers of Calvin. To them the moderation of a Charles or a Melanchthon was feebleness or sin, and it was they who led and who withstood the so-called Counter-reformation.

Catholic Reaction.

The Jesuits were by far the most notable product of a general Catholic reaction against the Protestant attack. Endeared to men by a thousand memories of help and comfort, founded upon valid principles of unity and authority, fortified by immemorial tradition and the authority of ancestors and saints, the ancient faith was not to be shattered by the thunders of Luther or the claws of needy monarchs. The Popes ceased to be worldlings. Abuses were exposed, if not indeed everywhere abolished. Many congregations were stimulated to more regular and more devout observance. The new zeal found expression in church-building, in pilgrimages and in new Orders, formed of men self-devoted to a religious life.

The Society of Jesus.

Of these new Orders the foremost was the Company of Jesus, founded by Ignatius Loyola in 1534. A knight crippled in the wars, he taught the Spanish students who first followed him a chivalrous devotion to their holy cause and a more than military obedience. The Jesuit, like the brother in earlier Orders, renounced all earthly ties and bound himself by vows of poverty, chastity and obedience. But with him obedience was ingrained by a skilful scientific training of the will until he became as devoid of independent initiative as a corpse. Short of mortal sin, there was nothing that his Superior might not require. And the object of this perfect surrender was less the salvation of the Jesuit himself than the devotion of his every force, under the supreme direction of the General, to the service of the Pope. While the Jesuits furnished notable missionaries to the heathen and to the poor, they avoided the religious excesses of their precursors in the Middle Ages. They spent little time in church, wore no distinctive dress, did not

flee from mankind nor shun the society of the rich and great. Cultured and urbane, they acquired incalculable influence as the confessors and tutors of that tiny circle which the Catholic nations obeyed.

At the same time the Jesuits served the Catholic cause by wresting from its opponents their monopoly of the new learning. In controversy the Protestants could no longer count on victory, while the educational movement of which Wittenberg had been the centre was now rivalled by that proceeding from Catholic universities and schools. A few thousand men, whose careful training, practice of mutual confession and division of functions secured the Order against loss of force, thus became able to impress their stamp upon the Catholic reaction and to enlarge its sphere.

In 1536, when the Jesuits first went to Rome, John Calvin published his *Christianæ religionis institutio.* The persecuted French Reformers at once adopted its principles as their system, and its author, a young lawyer turned theologian, as their leader. It was, however, at Geneva, especially from 1541 to his death in 1564, that Calvin gave to Europe the pattern and the inspiration of his work. No less convinced than Luther that to every question there could be but one right answer, Calvin was far more logical and perspicacious in embodying truth in fact. Rejecting all church tradition, he rebuilt society on the precepts of the word of God. The congregation of Christian men chose ministers and elders, who governed with a mission to drive out everything that Christianity did not approve. Jewels were sinful and card playing led to the pillory. Men who believed that their fellows were predestined from all eternity to the unending torments of hell had small respect for human life if tainted with wilful sin. Executions and banishments were frequent and in 1553 the Spanish doctor Servetus was burned for heresy. The Calvinist, it was clear, respected the individual conscience no more than did the Catholic or Lutheran.

Calvin.

In an age of religious conflict, however, when man's eternal destiny often occupied him more than temporal affairs, Calvin inspired multitudes outside Geneva. His confident,

ruthless teaching, denouncing equally the ungodly prince and the ungodly cleric, formed the creed of militant Protestantism in many lands. While Luther's theology was of necessity limited to Germans and their kindred races, Calvin appealed to all men of clear mind and unflinching courage. In his followers the Jesuits found a barrier impervious to persuasion and rarely removable by force.

The Inquisition.

During the years in which Jesuits and Calvinists were making ready for the inevitable shock, the Catholic armoury gained new and potent weapons in the Inquisition and the Index. Both were perfected editions of devices earlier used, the one to seek out heresy, the other to shield men's minds against it. The creation of an Inquisition centralized at Rome to combat criminal error everywhere took place in 1542, at the instance of Cardinal Caraffa. Succeeding Popes developed the new Commission into a body of twelve cardinals, assisted by experts in doctrine, always on the alert to punish deviation from what Rome considered orthodox opinion. Something resembling martial law thus became permanent in the Catholic ranks, and the Counter-reformation received the hall-mark of intolerance.

The Index.

Soon after the establishment of the Inquisition, the party represented by Caraffa began to feel their way towards a general Index. Universities were encouraged to proclaim that certain books might not be read, and to punish those who produced them. The Inquisition, it was clear, could systematize this work, and as Pope, Caraffa published the first centralized Index (1559). The inevitable result of this war on thought, which the Council of Trent was soon to carry further, must be to cripple seekers after truth, and to break up the intellectual unity of Europe. Books from which the Protestant world drew non-religious inspiration all loyal Catholics must ignore.

Philip II.

The closing years of Charles V thus witnessed a general development of intolerance in religion. Even in Germany, where Lutheran and Catholic princes could agree to live side by side, the Peace of Augsburg excluded Calvinists from toleration. In 1556 the power of

Charles passed finally to the classic bigot of modern times. While as Emperor his brother of Austria, the moderate Ferdinand I, succeeded, Spain, Milan, Naples, Sicily, the Netherlands and the Indies became the vast inheritance of Philip II, his only lawful son. In the age of Catholic reaction, a fanatic who would torture or suffer without limit rather than countenance heresy became the destined leader of the world. The new king reflected only too faithfully the temper of his native Spain, where seven centuries of war against the infidel had taught the people to deem no price too high for purity of race and faith, and where Ximenez had reformed the church without disturbing doctrine. For more than forty years Philip toiled unendingly, confident that he was serving God by persecuting all who sought religious change. More nearly than any other, the King of Spain controlled the papacy and set his seal upon the Council of the Church.

In foreign affairs as in domestic, Philip began his reign by reaping where Charles had sowed. Sustained by a united Spain and allied with England, he was compelled to combat France by striking at the Pope. The aged Paul IV, whose head was likened to the Vesuvius of his native city, styled him the accursed son of the most pernicious plague from which the world had ever suffered, and presumed to deprive him of the Sicilian crown. Unsupported, a Pope who challenged Spain might be brought to reason without violence. Paul had, however, induced France to break the Truce of Vaucelles concluded earlier in the year. Again a French army crossed the Alps and traversed Naples. In 1557, the Duke of Alva drove them out, only to implore the vanquished Pope for absolution. Meanwhile the great victory of St. Quentin had been won by Philip's army, led by the expatriated Duke of Savoy, and Paris itself seemed defenceless against the victors. Philip, however, had inherited the caution of Charles without the martial instinct, and, owing to his interference, Paris remained unmenaced and Calais fell to France (January, 1558).

Struggle with the Papacy and France.

Still more ominous for Spain and England was the triumph of French policy in the marriage of the Dauphin Francis with

Mary Queen of Scots, while the failing health of Mary Tudor threatened their alliance. The victory of Gravelines, which he owed to the Count of Egmont and his cavalry from the Netherlands, was therefore used by Philip to make peace. At Cateau-Cambrésis, the Le Cateau of a later day, in April, 1559, the treaty was concluded which closed the Italian wars begun by Charles VIII, and which interrupted for many years the struggle between France and Spain. Savoy and Piedmont were restored to their exiled Duke; Calais remained French for the time being; Philip surrendered his few conquests and received back the many that the French had made; peace was buttressed by the marriage of the King of Spain with Elizabeth the daughter of the King of France. Thereafter Philip avoided all considerable wars on land.

Progress of the Reformation.

The attention of the King of Spain and indeed of every prince in Europe was at this time claimed by the clash of the religious forces. In spite of the Catholic revival and Philip's power, the Reformation continued to progress. The accession of Elizabeth of England quenched the fires of Smithfield and presaged at least a political breach with Rome. Next year, John Knox, in Scotland, inaugurated a Calvinist revolution. In the Scandinavian kingdoms, Protestant monarchies were now supported by the tradition of a generation. If Egmont and his fellow nobles were loyal Catholics, proof had been given that among the lower classes in the Netherlands heresy was rife. Poland, the home of magnates uncontrolled by central power, was permeated with anti-Roman doctrine. In Germany, the Peace of Augsburg had established Protestantism but failed to limit its advance. Austria was largely Protestant. In Switzerland Calvin, as the heir of Zwingli, claimed the chief cantons and towns. And in France, geographically and intellectually accessible to Geneva, royal persecution had only increased the heretics in numbers and in determination. The Protestant congregations scattered throughout the realm counted their members by the hundred thousand and included an increasing band of nobles. In 1559, a secret synod at Paris adopted a symmetrical

scheme of church government and a general confession of faith. The corruption in the French church due to the concordat favoured the response to the trumpet-call of Calvin.

In July, 1559, the accidental death of Henry II transformed the situation. The power which Francis II was incompetent to wield was seized by the detested Guises, uncles on the mother's side to Mary Queen of Scotland and of France. To those who became Protestants from religious conviction or from disgust with barbarous persecution there were now added those who resented the usurpation of royal power by a half-foreign clan. French Protestantism became more and more political, with the nobles in control. A clumsy conspiracy to kidnap the Guises failed (1560), but the movement now styled Huguenot became the pivot of French politics for many years. The Queen Mother, Catharine de Medici, aiming at independence of the Guises, and the Chancellor, Michel de l'Hôpital, aiming at the well-being of France, joined in protecting the Huguenots, and public demands for reform and toleration began to be heard. Charles IX, who succeeded his brother Francis II in December, 1560, was a child, and it was evident that for years to come French policy must depend on a balance of internal forces. In the interest of royal power, Huguenot opposition must be disarmed, and this could only be hoped for if religious reform were carried through. If the Pope would not summon a General Council, France was resolved to hold a Council of her own.

The Huguenots.

Impelled by the demands of France and Spain, and by the constant cry of the Emperor for deliverance from what seemed likely to be the triumph of Lutheranism throughout his dominions, Pius IV determined to convene a new session at Trent. His personal moderation contrasted sharply with the violence of his predecessor, and his papacy gained renown from the saintly reputation of his nephew and adviser Carlo Borromeo. Yet even a Pope so far removed from bigotry and corruption accepted a Council only as an inevitable evil. Such a body was bound to include in its agenda motions for the reform of

The Council of Trent.

the papal court and for the limitation of the papal power. Its mere existence proved that Christendom had more than one organ by which supreme authority might be claimed. Papal policy therefore was to render the Council short and ineffective, to appoint and instruct its presidents, to send to it a majority of dependent ecclesiastics and to win over the independent minority, to negotiate severally with the Catholic powers outside, and to secure the fullest possible admission of the sovereign authority of the Pope. This policy was realized, but only with infinite difficulty, by unscrupulous diplomacy, and through the untiring efforts of the Jesuit Laynez and his fellows.

Papal Victory.

The papal victory was achieved in part by reason of the membership of the Council. Voting was by heads, not by nations, and the heads were preponderantly those of bishops of small Italian sees, many of whom depended on the legates for their daily bread. Even bishops from beyond the Alps were not always proof against bribes, private appeals and hopes of promotion by the Pope. When therefore the papal President was compelled to put a question to the vote he might expect to find a papal majority ready-made. By such an assembly, in the midst of a struggle against heresy, the acknowledged primate of the Christian church could hardly be coerced. But his triumph owed its completeness to the disunion of the Catholic Powers. Philip, an unyielding fanatic represented by a band of eminent Spanish bishops, demanded that doctrine and ritual should remain unchanged, but that the papal administration should be reformed and the power of the Pope diminished. This session, he claimed, should continue the work of the two preceding, and the duty of bishops to reside within their sees should be declared divine. France and the Emperor, on the other hand, with whom the need for averting schism was paramount, demanded that the Council should start afresh, and that it should pronounce for mass in the vernacular, the grant of the cup to the laity and the right of priests to marry.

So severe was the conflict between these views that the question of continuity had to be evaded, while the grant of

the cup to the laity was defeated in a confused medley of cross-voting by a majority of only four. Many, however, were for referring this and other thorny questions to the Pope, who cut the ground from beneath the feet of his opponents by himself reforming his administration. The Emperor was disarmed by the promise that after the Council the Pope would grant the cup to the laity, while the private interest of the Cardinal of Lorraine sufficed to paralyse the action of France. Thus left alone, Philip failed to secure either a clear vote that the duty of episcopal residence was divine, or to prolong the Council until doctrine could be carefully considered. The Spaniards, however, succeeded in procuring the promulgation of thirty-six canons of reform, which other States were free to enforce or to immobilize at their discretion. Before the Council closed, in December, 1563, the Tridentine Index had been drawn up, together with many decrees on doctrine. One of the last acts of the assembly was to condemn the abuse of Indulgences but to uphold their institution.

PART II

THE WARS OF RELIGION (1560–1648)

§ 1. *France*, 1560–1574

The Council of Trent had organized the Roman Church for battle. Western Christendom was divided, but Rome, narrowed and purified, might yet regain the heretics by argument and by force of arms. Uncertainty was over; the Pope remained without a rival; the age of great Popes had begun. For nearly a century, the history of Europe is the history of the Counter-reformation.

It was soon evident that the Council of Trent had not solved the religious problems of France. There the violence of 1560 had been followed by a meeting of the States-General, the first since 1483. Thanks to their disproportionate strength among the lesser nobles and in the towns, the Huguenots appeared in a majority, and promptly demanded toleration. Meanwhile, more than forty years after Luther's great debate at Leipzig, Catholic and Protestant theologians met in the Colloquy of Poissy (1561). What Charles V had failed to accomplish in Germany was far too difficult for Catharine in France, and she fell back upon his policy of postponement. By the Edict of January (1562), the Huguenots were permitted to worship in the open country, until a General Council should decide.

Toleration.

France, however, was neither a collection of cantons, like Switzerland, nor of feudal principalities, like Germany, and her Protestants hardly anywhere formed a majority among the population. Toleration of heresy shocked the people, and in attacking their political enemies the Guises were assured of popular support. In

The French Civil Wars.

1562 the Duke of Guise massacred a Huguenot congregation at Vassy, defied Catharine and secured the person of the young King. Thus menaced, the Huguenots under Condé and Coligny took up arms, and while the Council sat at Trent, France sought to solve her own religious question by the first of a long series of dismal civil wars. The Guises looked for support to Philip of Spain; the Huguenots to Elizabeth of England, who sought to recover Calais and to protect herself against Mary Queen of Scots.

In the field the Catholics proved superior, but the assassination of the Duke of Guise gave occasion for the Pacification of Amboise (March, 1563), which extended the limits of toleration. The decrees of the Council of Trent left the political basis of French toleration unaltered, for to Catharine the collapse of the Huguenots would have meant her own dependence upon Philip and the House of Guise. To the Huguenots, however, this was but a slender basis of security, and in 1567 they strove in self-defence to seize the King. A second civil war proved indecisive, and in 1568 the Edict of Longjumeau merely re-enacted the grant of local and limited toleration. This the several *Parlements* of France declined to register, and the Guises attempted to kidnap their chief opponents, thus renewing civil war.

The Huguenots, ably led by Coligny, now brought in German mercenaries and negotiated with William of Orange. At Jarnac and at Moncontour they suffered severe defeats, but the Peace of St. Germain (August, 1570) gave them terms still better than before. They gained the right of worship in twenty-four cities, and received La Rochelle and three other fortresses as pledges. Coligny even dreamed of a national alliance with the enemies of the Pope and Spain which might win the Netherlands for France. The weak King, allured by the project, seemed to his mother to be passing under Huguenot influence—a state of things at once displeasing to God, offensive to the nation and destructive to her own position. In private life good-natured, as a Florentine she turned by instinct to political assassination and planned to slay Coligny. On August 22, 1572, he escaped with a wounded hand and

arm, and the King was prevailed on to allow a more far-reaching blow.

On the day of St. Bartholomew (August 24) a massacre began in Paris which was designed to purge France of the faith which her rulers could neither suffer nor subdue. Coligny and, in Paris alone, several thousands of his followers perished, while the number of the victims in other great cities is unknown. The young Henry of Navarre was forced to abjure Protestantism and remained in effect a prisoner. But the surviving Huguenots defended their strongholds with such indomitable resolution that the fourth civil war merely confirmed the verdict of the third in their favour. The Treaty of La Rochelle (June, 1573) gave them liberty of conscience throughout France.

The Saint Bartholomew.

Nothing was less likely, however, than that on the morrow of the Saint Bartholomew liberty of conscience would become the peaceful policy of France. The so-called *Politiques*, it is true, were prepared to purchase quiet by thrusting religion into the background. But Calvinism was not only a religion, and the Huguenots were organizing local republics in the very heart of France. A nation still nine-tenths Catholic and devoted to national unity could not sincerely tolerate such a crime. In 1574, civil war broke out anew, and for a quarter of a century France as an independent power scarcely existed. The Counter-reformation in Europe must proceed without help or hindrance from the most vigorous of Continental States.

§ 2. *Catholic Progress*, 1563–1572

The decade between the Council of Trent and the Saint Bartholomew had seen the Roman Church militant everywhere and on some sides triumphant. In 1564, indeed, the orthodox Emperor Ferdinand was succeeded by his son Maximilian II, to whom the Lutherans had the right to look for great concessions. The defence of the Catholic remnants in the eastern Habsburg dominions and the protection of Christendom against the Turk thus passed into wavering

hands, though the ambition to secure the Spanish succession helped to keep Maximilian true to Rome. In the same year the Heidelberg Catechism bore witness to the progress of Calvinism in the Palatinate, while from the Netherlands came rumours of opposition to Philip in religion. These developed towards organized resistance at a time when only the death of Solyman (1566) prevented a new Turkish advance from becoming dangerous.

The closing years of Pius IV were rather years of Jesuit penetration and of preparation for conflict than of actual Roman conquest. His successor, Pius V (1566–1572), however, proved a ruthless captain of the Counter-reformation. Rigorous in suppressing abuses at his own court, he urged on the Catholic sovereigns to slaughter heretics. In 1570 he declared Elizabeth of England deposed, and next year formed an alliance with Spain and Venice which led to the great victory of Lepanto over the Turkish navy. Although the death of Pius and the discord between Spain and Venice saved the Turks from disaster, and they actually laid hands on Cyprus, their naval power and prestige had received a severe blow at a time when their system was decaying. After Lepanto, the forces of the Counter-reformation were but little disturbed by the traditional peril in the east.

Lepanto.

In 1572, when Pius V was succeeded by Gregory XIII, the prospects of the Roman reaction appeared bright. In Spain, Philip and the Inquisition had gained a complete victory over heresy, and they were achieving a savage subjugation of the Christianized Spanish Moors. The French king and his people had by massacre dispelled the vision of their country as a Protestant State. In England only a minority favoured Protestant doctrine, and the claims of Mary of Scots to the succession encouraged Catholic hopes. Seven years earlier, the Jesuits had penetrated into Poland, and the Polish union in 1569 with Lithuania gave Rome a wide field for missionary activity among the adherents of the Eastern Church. The Protestants of Germany and of the non-German Habsburg lands

General Victory hoped for.

were breaking up into rival sects at bitter feud with one another. Half a century of disunion had brightened the memory of the fifteen centuries during which Christian unity prevailed. Rome, purified and united, might yet hope for universal rule.

§ 3. *The Revolt of the Netherlands*, 1572–1576

The crucial struggle of the Counter-reformation was fought out upon the narrow stage of the Netherlands. This region possessed an importance and a population out of all proportion to its size. Its seventeen component provinces, inherited by Charles V and by him in some degree consolidated, comprised the leading industries of northern Europe, with more than two hundred walled towns. Severed by no natural barriers from France and from the great Westphalian plain, active at sea and linked together by many waterways, they were permeated by an activity and public opinion unknown to rural Europe. Within their bounds, heretical doctrines of the most subversive kind readily made their way. Local power, however, in the last resort lay with the nobles, a high-spirited, convivial, loyal race of men. With them Charles V, a Fleming born, had been popular, and when, leaning on the arm of William of Orange, he announced his abdication at Brussels, many tears were shed besides his own. Philip they disliked, and his early measures, though suggested or initiated by his father, roused general discontent. The choice of his half-sister, Margaret of Parma, as regent was not unwelcome, but Cardinal Granvelle, her chief adviser, was detested, and a new and symmetrical scheme of ecclesiastical reform provoked the outspoken opposition of Catholics and Protestants alike. Their hatred was concentrated on Granvelle, who was supposed to be about to introduce the Spanish Inquisition.

Opposition to Philip.

William of Orange and the Counts of Egmont and Horn voiced the general opinion that the time was not ripe for a campaign against heresy, and that the nobles should receive a larger share in the government. Philip, after some delay, replied with a stern refusal (1565). This occasioned the signature by many of the

lesser nobles of the Compromise, a declaration that they would resist the Inquisition as "the mother of all iniquity and disorder." A sudden outbreak of iconoclasm, however, showed the peril of society, and rallied the upper classes to the side of order. William of Orange left the country, and a minor insurrection was put down.

Repression Generates Revolt.

To chastise the Netherlands and to extirpate heresy, Philip dispatched ten thousand Spanish veterans under Alva, the victor of Mühlberg. At the report of his coming tens of thousands fled to foreign lands. He acted as dictator, established the justly-named Council of Blood, and executed many thousands of persons, including Counts Egmont and Horn (1568). William of Orange vainly attempted armed intervention. Fourteen months of terror seemed to have crushed the Opposition. To render sovereignty over the Netherlands profitable to Philip, however, Alva imposed a ruthless system of taxation. Besides a capital levy of 1 per cent., and a 5 per cent. duty upon sales of land, the "tenth penny" was to be taken from the proceeds of every sale of goods. In 1571 the definite enforcement of the "tenth penny" produced a general stoppage of trade, and the whole community was stirred as never by religion. Alva himself confessed that he had failed, and at his own request a successor to his office was appointed. Before he could be relieved, however, emigrant freebooters, the so-called Beggars of the Sea, captured the town of Brille, and spontaneous revolt blazed up throughout the northern regions. Amsterdam indeed held back, but from Flushing to the shores of the Zuyder Zee, the towns of six provinces declared for the Prince of Orange.

Revolt in the Netherlands was formidable from its connection with revolt in France. William had been fighting for the Huguenots, and the Huguenots were prepared to fight for him. Under their joint protection the southern Netherlands might have defied Alva and Philip, but the Saint Bartholomew defeated this design. Only the wonderful defence of Haarlem and the mutiny of Alva's Spanish army saved northern Holland from the fate to which every other province had

succumbed. When, in November, 1573, Alva gave place to the more moderate Requesens, the revolt of the Netherlands seemed destined to extinction in the next campaign. In April, 1574, an Orange mercenary army was routed at Mookerheide near the frontier of Cleves, and two of William's brothers perished.

Had Leyden fallen, all was lost, but remembering Alva's massacres, the defenders cut the dykes. After more than four months' resistance, Leyden was rescued by the fleet, and Requesens turned to negotiation. Philip, however, would endure no toleration of heresy, and the death of Requesens (1576) removed the hand which could control the mutinous Spanish troops. These terrorized the cities which they held, until in November, 1576, the sack of wealthy Antwerp, and the massacre of eight thousand persons, stung all the Netherlands into secession. On November 8, four days after the Antwerp outrage, north and south combined on the terms of the Pacification of Ghent. According to this epoch-making treaty, the seventeen provinces were to be self-governed as one country, recognizing Calvinism in Holland and Zealand, and establishing everywhere at least a temporary toleration.

The Pacification of Ghent showed that, to save their lives and fortunes, Catholics and Calvinists might consent to acknowledge each other's title to exist. It further claimed for the inhabitants of a country the power of expelling, for sufficient cause, the troops of their unquestioned sovereign and of ruling in his name. Even within the Netherlands, indeed, these claims were far from being established, but it meant something for the future of Europe that they should anywhere have temporarily prevailed. While Philip was subordinating politics to religion, William, as he had proved by his own conversion, would subordinate religion to the interests of the State. In the distant future, when only bigots could deny that the State is best served by leaving religion free, men would recognize that to him they owed part of their emancipation.

Revolt assists towards toleration.

Toleration, however, was yet far to seek. Neither Catholic nor Lutheran nor Calvinist admitted the right of man to

uncontrolled relations with God, and the fourth quarter of the sixteenth century was filled with the ambitions of the Counter-reformation. Philip, the Jesuits and the Pope were resolved that Europe should be Catholic once more, and for many years, in many lands, the tide flowed in their favour.

§ 4. *Civil War in France*, 1574–1585

In France, the death of Charles IX (1574) recalled his brother Henry III from the throne of Poland, which fell to Stephen Báthory, the martial Prince of Transylvania. A persecutor in his own domain, Stephen Báthory proved tolerant as king, but he actively furthered the Jesuit educational mission in Poland, and encouraged Rome to hope that a great Catholic eastern State including Russia might arise. Henry, who had fled from Poland after a year of uneasy rule, did nothing in France to fulfil his earlier promise.

The fifth civil war (1574–1576) was remarkable for division between the sons of Catharine, as well as for an alliance between the Huguenots and the Politiques, and for the arrival in the heart of France of a mercenary force of Protestants from Germany. The Peace of Monsieur, which brought it to an end, outraged Catholic feeling by enlarging the privileges and securities of their opponents. Paris alone was shielded against Huguenot contamination. The Protestants secured eight cities of refuge, and adequate representation in every local *Parlement*. Alençon, the King's brother after whom the Peace was named, received Anjou, an appanage which might enable him to dictate to the Crown in any future war. Henry of Navarre had returned to his kingdom and to the Protestant faith, and the Protestant menace was increased by the return of Picardy to Condé. To save Péronne from Condé a League was formed, and all good Catholics roused by an appeal. The League threatened to invest the Guises with a dangerous power, and the King in self-defence placed himself at its head. Approved by the Pope and Philip, it became the recognized organ of Catholic France.

The League.

Thanks in part to royal intrigues, the States-General of

1576 declared almost unanimously for unity of religion. The nobles, indeed, favoured freedom of conscience without freedom of worship, and some members of the third estate declared that unity should be restored by gentle means alone. But the clergy rejected any limitation on their right to search the heart, while the majority of the third estate demanded that all the pastors and elders of the Protestants should be banished. Thus encouraged, and this time aided by his brother, the King embarked upon the sixth civil war. The nation, however, gave him small support, and despite some successes in the west and south, his ardour quickly cooled. The Peace of Bergerac (1577) reduced both the area of toleration and the security for its observance. The cities of refuge, none the less, were conceded for six more years, and except for a trifling outbreak in 1580, peace on these terms endured until 1585. During these years the King set an unworthy example of debauchery to the court and nation, while his mother jealously watched the House of Guise in the interest of the royal power. France, it was clear, had failed to seize the opportunity which the revolt of the Netherlands had offered.

Failure of Henry III.

§ 5. *The Dutch Resistance*, 1578–1585

Even without the help of France, however, William continued to defy the power of Spain. At the moment of the Pacification of Ghent, Don John of Austria, Philip's half-brother and the victor of Lepanto, entered the Netherlands as regent. Reinforced by the troops of the Guises, he scattered the Dutch army at Gemblours (January, 1578). His victory, following upon a year of prudent conciliation, went far to separate the southern Netherlands from the north, the Walloons and Flemings from the Dutch, the Catholics from the Protestants, the manufacturing regions from the maritime. The south turned away from William to Anjou, while Elizabeth, who would rather see the Netherlands Spanish in name than French in fact, incited German *condottieri* to step in. Baffled by the complexity of the situation and suspected by Philip, Don John untimely died (October, 1578).

His successor was his nephew, Parma, ex-regent Margaret's son, the first general of the age and a diplomatist of almost equal skill. He found the southern provinces disgusted both by iconoclastic Calvinists and by foreign mercenaries, and willing to resume their old allegiance if only they could be left in peace. In January, 1579, the Union of Utrecht marked the success of his diplomacy. Deserted by the southern provinces the northern seven set up a federal union, resembling the Swiss, but with individual freedom of conscience as its basis. It became a landmark in the history of toleration and the foundation-stone of the future Dutch republic.

Parma and the Union of Utrecht.

The Union of Utrecht, though supported by the chief towns of the south, was soon in grave danger from Parma's forces. With Holland and Zealand menaced and a price put upon his head, William declared Philip a murderer and a tyrant, and offered the sovereignty over the Netherlands to Anjou. The moment was highly critical for Europe and the international situation never more complex. William's revolt had developed from temporary self-defence against tyranny to the declaration that the ruler who plays the tyrant forfeits his crown, while the Calvinists, who were prepared to defend this declaration with their lives, had agreed to respect the freedom of the individual conscience. If they succeeded in maintaining their independence, a new type of State would have been born. If Anjou, as a tolerant Catholic, could rule both North and South, that State would be powerful, and freedom of worship might be hoped for.

The issue, however, depended upon a hundred factors, many of them transient and external. That the Dutch were Calvinists meant that only disorderly mercenary bands came from the Lutheran east to their assistance. That they were rebels meant that neither Elizabeth nor Henry could give them sincere support. Both England and France, however, had a lively interest in weakening Spain, while at this moment the Pope, Gregory XIII (1572–1585), had launched an Irish invasion and a Jesuit mission. Philip, on the other hand,

was fully occupied with the happy chance that gave him the throne and empire of Portugal (1580).

King Sebastian's death on crusade in Morocco in 1578 saved the Netherlands, for Philip required his legions nearer home.

Fluctuations of Fortune.

The tortuous matrimonial schemes of Catharine and of Elizabeth hourly confused history, but in February, 1582, Anjou, as the affianced bridegroom of England, entered Antwerp. Nearly a year was spent in discord and in failure, and in January, 1583, the garrisons attempted a *coup d'état*. The "French fury" at Antwerp only produced a mutual massacre, and Anjou left the country. Next year he died, and in July William fell to the pistol of a fanatic.

Parma was now confronted by a leader of seventeen, William's son Maurice, while the Dutch offered their allegiance to Henry III and to Elizabeth in turn. In 1585 Parma captured Antwerp and reconciled the south on moderate terms. Elizabeth, indeed, recognizing in the Dutch revolt a bulwark of England against Philip, promised some assistance, but her timid avoidance of an open breach with Spain, and the choice of the vain and intolerant Leicester as her agent, boded ill for the future. Adequately supplied and undisturbed, Parma could have ended the war in at the most a few campaigns. Sea-power alone could not have permanently outweighed his irresistible superiority on land.

§ 6. *The Counter-Reformation and the Armada*, 1585–1588

That the Dutch gained a new respite was due to the preoccupation of the forces of the Counter-reformation with France. The death of Anjou made the relapsed heretic Henry of Navarre beyond all controversy heir presumptive to the crown. Against such an outrage to its catholicity the people rose, and the Pope and Philip could not but support them. The conquest of the Netherlands and of England must be postponed to the rescue of France.

In December, 1584, Philip bound himself by treaty to support a new Holy League for the extirpation of heresy in France and in the Netherlands. Henry of Guise and his

brother Mayenne, who led the French Catholic peers, had designated as heir to the throne the Cardinal of Bourbon, an elderly and ridiculous uncle of Henry of Navarre. Paris, where the people had spontaneously formed a Catholic confederation, readily supported Guise, and the movement turned against the dependence of the reigning king upon favourites and his neglect to restore unity in religion. Guise openly armed, hiring Swiss and Germans, and only the South and West remained faithful to the King. Catharine, his sole resort, counted on disarming the League by surrender. In July, 1585, Henry took its troops into his own pay, gratified its members with offices and pensions, ordered all the Huguenots to change their faith or quit the realm, and deprived his heir of all his royal rights. The new Pope, Sixtus V, followed up this crushing blow with a bull of excommunication.

The eighth civil war in France, known as the war of the three Henrys, began with an apparently overwhelming preponderance of Catholic force. No real concord, however, existed between the Guises and the King, while the Politiques rallied to the support of the rightful heir. The intrusion of the papacy roused Gallican and legal opposition, and Philip, as usual, avoided vigorous action. While the King made war with every care to avert any success that could strengthen the Guises, Henry of Navarre proved himself an inspiring leader and gained the victory of Coutras (1587). Guise, credited with having repelled a German invasion, became master of Paris, and proceeded through the States-General to dictate remorselessly to the King. In a frantic effort to regain his independence, Henry turned to crime. In December, 1588, Guise was stabbed to death by the bodyguard in the royal palace at Blois, and next day his brother the Cardinal was slain by the royal pikemen. "Now," wrote Henry to the papal legate, "I am King."

The Murder of the Guises and of Henry III.

Henry, however, had gravely mistaken the religious fervour of his people. On the morrow of the crime (January, 1589), Catharine, who could have advised him better, was lost to him by death. Paris frankly revolted, with full absolution

from her theologians for deposing an enemy of the Catholic faith. Almost all the great towns followed, and Mayenne found himself lieutenant-general over all save a few fragments of the realm. The King, with no other hope of safety, made straight for power by agreeing with his lawful heir. Henry of Navarre, promising to grant to the Catholics the same freedom of conscience and of worship that he claimed for himself, joined him in arms, and thirty thousand men prepared to conquer Paris. On August 1, however, a Dominican fanatic stabbed the King to death, opening a new and deadly struggle for the succession to the crown.

Germany Wavering.

The war of the three Henrys had thus failed to range united France on the side of the Counter-reformation. Although the nation had shown itself fervently Catholic, it had by no means thrown itself at the feet of the Pope, and the popularity of the League did not extend to the League's protector, Philip. In Germany, meanwhile, the election of Rudolf II as Emperor (1576–1612) had favoured Particularism, and no general movement followed. The Archbishop of Cologne turned Protestant, and the Palatinate sent a stream of Protestant mercenaries into France, but across the eastern frontier of the Netherlands a huge block of territory, Münster, Osnabrück and Paderborn, was restored to the Catholic fold, and the bishoprics on the upper Main suffered a drastic Catholic reformation. The fate of vast regions in Germany, Poland and Scandinavia seemed to hang in the balance when Philip launched his greatest attack upon the Netherlands and England.

Elizabeth's Position.

In 1587, the tangled relations between Philip, Elizabeth and the Netherlands still remained obscure. It was clear, indeed, that the Dutch would be more easily subdued if England gave them no assistance, and that England would be more easily invaded if the Dutch coast and shipping were in Philip's hands. The execution of Mary Queen of Scots made Philip her Catholic legatee to England, since her son James persisted in heresy. This offered a powerful incentive to secure by open force a position invaluable alike to the Spanish empire and to the

Catholic cause, and Drake's destruction of more than thirty ships in the harbour of Cadiz had the air of a desperate blow in self-defence. Yet the instructions of Elizabeth had been to avoid force: she continued to negotiate with Parma, and in December Leicester was recalled.

In 1588, if not earlier, it became clear that Philip had determined on a decisive stroke. In May, his great Armada quitted Lisbon. He had planned to seize Margate, to convoy Parma across the Channel, and to add to the seventeen thousand veterans from the Netherlands the nineteen thousand who garrisoned the fleet. Neither Spanish ships nor sailors, however, proved competent to dispute with Drake and Hawkins for supremacy at sea. Not until July 19 did the Armada sight the Lizard, and it was then at once made clear that in mobility and fighting skill it was no match for the English fleet. Parma was blockaded by the Dutch, while the Armada, powerless to release him, suffered hopeless defeat off Gravelines. Philip thanked God that his power sufficed to send a second, but the English superiority in tactics and training had shown him how useless mere ships and soldiers would be. Until Spain could create a modern fleet, her connection with the Indies must be insecure, and England proof against the Counter-reformation. Next year she even landed a force in Portugal, in support of a pretender to the throne.

The Armada.

§ 7. *Henry IV of France*, 1589–1598

The destruction of the Armada left the Netherlands and France the main battle-grounds of the European struggle. In the contrast between the leaders the Protestants were fortunate indeed. While Philip paralysed his best subordinates by his irresolution, bad judgment, and suspicion of themselves, Henry IV and Maurice of Orange each united the ruler and the general in one brilliant personality. If any man could have induced the French to crown a Protestant that man was Henry of Navarre. Bred without luxury, wont to roam over the country-side, he had escaped the atmosphere of illusion which normally environs princes. Frank,

jovial and sympathetic, he embodied the true Gallic type, a fitting representative of a gay and martial nation.

In 1589, he won a hazardous battle with Mayenne near Dieppe, and, aided by supplies from England, made a dash for his capital, but in vain. In March, 1590, however, at Ivry, he ventured all upon an unequal contest and cut his way to victory. Threatening Paris, he thereby saved the Dutch. For Philip, who had openly proclaimed a crusade in France, peremptorily ordered Parma to assist Mayenne, and, after a siege in which thousands died of famine, Paris was relieved. This triumph of the League was followed by the election of a new Pope, Gregory XIV, who used every temporal and spiritual weapon against Henry. Philip, as Protector of France, and father of an Infanta who might claim the crown, began to send garrisons and mobile troops into the country, while the Dukes of Savoy and Lorraine increased the number of the pretenders. Henry, on the other hand, drew reinforcements from Germany and from England.

The ninth civil war surpassed its precursors in destruction, and it seemed impossible that either side should conquer.

War in France and the Netherlands.

The profits of the campaign of 1591 fell to the Dutch, for whom Maurice captured many towns. Early in 1592, Parma again invaded France and saved beleaguered Rouen. He returned to the Netherlands only to die, while Maurice profited by the diversion to regain most of the northern provinces. Inspired by hopes of winning both France and the Netherlands for his dynasty, Philip concentrated his efforts more and more upon France. He strove by bribery to win the crown from the States-General of 1593, but was foiled by Henry's re-conversion. During the remainder of his reign he had the mortification of witnessing the steady progress of his rival towards full royal power.

Henry's Success.

Henry's conversion, however, had not removed the immense difficulties which confronted any prince who should design to restore his own power and the prosperity of his people after a generation of civil war. He was still only a claimant to the crown of a country many of whose highways were lost in brambles and whose

trade and revenues were destroyed. But his acceptance of the communion meant that only Ultramontane fanatics or personal rivals would dispute his legal right. The League, formed to defend the throne against an enemy of the Church, lost its *raison d'être* when he became a friend. Early in 1594, at Chartres, since Rheims remained in Guise's hands, he was crowned as an anointed King, and proved his royalty and his Catholicism by touching successfully for the king's evil. In March he secured Rouen, almost all Normandy, and Paris, a miracle which for a moment almost over-taxed his faith. Few of his enemies were proscribed, many captivated or bought over, and, before the year was out, young Guise and Rheims submitted. Millions were lavished by the King to purchase union for France.

Henry's successes with individuals had the unlooked-for effect of promoting his peace with Rome. Clement VIII, faced with a most complicated situation, and indignant that French prelates should have absolved a relapsed heretic without reference to himself, at first stood firm against concession. The League, however, urged him to save them from unconditional surrender, and he therefore inclined to the Italian princes, who needed a revived France to deliver them from Spain. Even the banishment of the Jesuits by the *Parlement* in December, 1594, did not break off the negotiations. In September, 1595, the King's proxies, kneeling before the Pope, renounced the Gallican absolution and received after chastisement the only valid pardon. Henceforward no Catholic could believe that in assassinating Henry he was doing service to the Church.

Meanwhile, in January, 1595, the King had striven to rally all classes to his standard by declaring war on Spain. The first campaign added to his renown for intrepid captaincy, but his northern forces were severely defeated by the reorganized Spanish army of the Netherlands, who captured Doullens and Cambray. In 1596, Calais was likewise lost, but the Spanish garrison of La Fère was starved into surrender and Paris thus shielded against attack. Yet more valuable to Henry was the sub-

French War with Spain.

mission of Mayenne, for which he gave an enormous sum of money and the governorship of the Île de France. Money, indeed, was so scanty in the royal treasury that the King had to persuade an assembly of notables to grant 5 per cent. on sales of merchandise, while he took forced loans and created offices for sale. In 1597, the Spaniards cleverly seized Amiens, and for six months Henry must bend all his efforts to regain it.

Dutch and French Success.

The sufferings of France, however, had given the English and Dutch a breathing-space, and they were about to come to her assistance. In 1596, they had struck at a new Armada by destroying ships at Cadiz. If France was exhausted, Spain, in 1596, had publicly confessed herself bankrupt. The Pope saw with horror the Protestant Powers flourishing, while the Catholic decayed. Urged by him, the dying Philip accepted the Peace of Vervins (May, 1598), returning all his conquests save Cambray. Savoy, Philip's ally, was included in the peace, but England and the Dutch preferred that the profits of war should continue. Six weeks before peace was signed, the most stubborn member of the League, Mercœur, had come to terms with the King, who thus became master in Brittany, as in all the remaining provinces of France.

Henry's position and that of his allies was further strengthened by the temporary dissociation of the southern Netherlands from Spain. It was arranged that Philip's nephew, the Cardinal Archduke Albert of Austria, should marry the Infanta and receive the sovereignty over all the Netherlands and Franche Comté. The new State, though nominally at war with the Dutch rebels, could hardly be formidable to them or to France and England, and the great period of Dutch prosperity had plainly begun.

Master in his own kingdom, and assured of peace abroad, Henry at once endeavoured to solve the religious question which for nearly forty years had baffled the monarchy of France. Toleration, in the sense of the right of all his subjects to believe and worship as they pleased, had been clearly proved impossible. No

The Edict of Nantes.

Huguenot might reign, and there were parts of France where the mass or the conventicle would provoke bloodshed. Terms must be devised on which two parties might live side by side neither of which had been able to convert or conquer the other. Of these the Catholic was the larger and the more easily handled by a centralized monarchy. Henry's problem, therefore, was to make France Catholic as far as was consistent with Huguenot allegiance to the crown. He was confronted by old associates who regarded him as a deserter, and who had divided his kingdom into nine great provinces for self-defence. This situation gave rise to the Edict of Nantes of 1598.

In form a royal charter to the Protestants, the Edict was in fact a treaty acknowledging their power, and therefore limiting the power of the Catholic monarchy. Protestants might live anywhere in France, and in most places they might on occasion meet for worship. Paris and the country within five leagues of it was forbidden ground, and the King's presence suspended for three days the local freedom. But the Protestants and their ministers gained every civil right, and as security they received a mixed Chamber in the *Parlement* of Paris and about a hundred strongholds.

Such toleration of diversity of religion inevitably shocked Catholic feeling, and the *Parlements* at first refrained from according to the Edict the necessary registration. "I am more Catholic than you," thundered the King. "I am the eldest son of the Church. . . . I speak as King, and I will be obeyed." But he did not disdain also to plead for the common weal, and legal opposition soon died down. Public opinion none the less remained hostile to the psalm-singing Calvinists, while these resented the restoration of the mass in hundreds of their towns, and the duty of paying tithes to the idolaters. Without either the growth of "frank respect for the freedom of indwelling conscience" or the decline of interest in church matters, the religious future of France would not be cloudless.

§ 8. *The Counter-Reformation to* 1600

The Edict of Nantes, which made France a Catholic State comprising a Protestant element, was soon followed by the death of Philip (1598). In him the Counter-reformation lost its foremost champion, but after his death it continued to achieve success. This it owed in part to the work of education, but more to the steady exercise of power. For changing the religious complexion of Europe, a few Jesuit conquests among the reigning princes outweighed tens of thousands among the people. This was first conspicuous in Poland, a country honeycombed with Protestantism prior to 1570. Under Stephen Báthory, the Jesuits made steady progress, and after his death in 1587 their pupil, Sigismund III, a Vasa prince, ascended the uneasy throne. As Polish king, he found himself surrounded by a jealous circle of magnates who had robbed the monarchy of almost all its wealth and power, and like Henry of Valois he soon became wishful to resign. The Church bade him remain to serve her interests, and until his death in 1632 he faithfully obeyed. In 1592 he married a Habsburg, sister of the zealot Ferdinand of Styria, and his methods of propaganda were largely those of the Habsburgs of Vienna.

Poland.

Avoiding bloodshed, except when the nobles conspired against him, he applied that quiet pressure which even the feeblest monarch may exert. The king, if he could not coerce, could influence, by conferring offices upon Catholics alone, by neglecting to punish the misdeeds of Catholic mobs, by facilitating the legal redress of expropriated churchmen, by restoring Catholic worship, and by favouring the Jesuit mission. All this Sigismund did in Poland proper, while in Lithuania the Catholic cause was promoted by the creation of the Uniate churches—those which retained their married priests and Greek ritual but acknowledged the supremacy of the Pope (1595).

These blows for the Counter-reformation, it is true, were to the neighbouring States challenges which sharpened their antagonism to Rome. Sweden, where Sigismund succeeded

in 1592, rallied as one man to the Lutheran national church, and in 1598 declared Sigismund deposed in favour of his uncle Charles IX. Thus was initiated a dynastic struggle within the Vasa line which darkened northern Europe for generations and indirectly saved the Reformation. Many Orthodox Lithuanians, moreover, turned towards Moscow, now the headquarters of their Church, thus hastening the Russian onslaught upon Poland. For the moment, however, what appeared was that in the most powerful State of northern Europe "the King of the Jesuits" had championed that triumphant Catholic reaction which was soon to render Poland famous for its devotion to Rome. At Kirkholm, near Riga, his forces shattered the invading army of his Protestant rival, Charles IX (1605). In 1607, they beat down a formidable insurrection of the nobles directed against the Jesuits and the uncontrolled initiative of the King.

Sigismund III alienates Sweden.

Meanwhile disciples of the Jesuits had attained to the Imperial dignity and to the rule over the eastern Habsburg lands. In many of these Lutheranism was neither deep-rooted nor well-knit, and the mere preference and habit of the people gave no title to oppose the determination of their religion in accordance with the princely will. As a territorial ruler, Rudolf II simply closed the Protestant churches of Vienna and other towns and ordered the people to attend the mass (1580). Systematic visitations were undertaken which cleansed the corporations of heretic members, banished the pastors, closed Protestant schools, and removed offensive books, while only men of sound Catholic principles could expect favour from the court.

Catholic Reaction in the Empire.

At the same time the central institutions of the Empire were being turned against the Protestants. The Imperial Court, designed to protect their interests, was reduced in importance; the Protestant Archbishop of Cologne was deposed; and the right of Protestant administrators of ecclesiastical preferments to be represented in the Diet was disallowed. These changes boded ill for the Protestant

rulers who, since 1552, had increased the secularizations sanctioned by the Peace of Augsburg.

The pace of the Catholic reaction was quickened and the challenge to the Protestants emphasized when Ferdinand of Styria, brother of the Polish Queen, grew up to manhood. Like Maximilian of the rival Bavarian house, a devoted pupil of the Jesuits, he found his life-work in the Counter-reformation, and in three years (1597–1600) cleansed Styria, Carinthia and Carniola of heresy. He was zealous to render the same service to Germany and to Europe, and the growing probability that he would one day succeed to the childless Rudolf boded ill to the Protestant cause. When Philip died, Catholic preponderance in the south of Europe seemed to be secure and Protestant preponderance no more than dubious in the north. Their own recent progress and the growing hostility between Lutherans and Calvinists encouraged the upholders of Catholic unity to hope that the religion of private judgment might yet be done away.

Ferdinand of Styria.

Shattering of religious unity, however, remained the foremost contribution to history made by the first century of modern times. Whatever might be the triumphs of the Counter-reformation in the conquest of States, European mankind could hardly be driven to sincere and unanimous obedience to the Pope. Opinions which had for generations been held by a majority among educated men could defy even the union of the spiritual and the secular powers. And such a union could never in the long run be sincere. The sixteenth century had confirmed the experience of earlier ages that the papacy accorded ill with kingship, and had developed those national and dynastic rivalries which found in kingship their expression. States which had filled the century with wars and which had year by year failed to unite in a crusade would never agree in suppressing those religious differences in which some of them had found most powerful weapons.

Progress of Europe.

A hundred years of royal endeavour, moreover, had gone far towards replacing the mediaeval organization of Europe

by a system of independent national States, determined that no one of them should so increase as to overshadow the remainder. A third great achievement of the century had been the expansion of European power in other continents, and this again tended to preserve disunion in religion. The papal system for the New World was that of monopoly by Spain, and the importance of the object ensured the revolt of other States. In 1600, the English East India Company received its charter, while the Dutch had derived much of their ability to defy Spain from their trade with the Spanish possessions. Thus in all the chief political developments of the century, as well as in the widening of life, and the renaissance of the individual, the complete victory of the Counter-reformation would have meant retrogression, and so great a reversal of tendency could hardly be.

§ 9. *Henry IV*, 1598–1610

Spain after Philip II.

At the death of Philip II, Spain passed without question or local sectional revolt to his son Philip III, the grandson of Maximilian II, and the husband of a Habsburg bride. Such inter-connection suggested a family effort for world rule, but the eastern and the western branches were by no means sufficiently harmonious for a close compact in politics. Swayed by his favourite, Lerma, Philip plunged into extravagance at home and abroad strangely out of keeping with the state of his treasury. Expeditions to Ireland and crusades against Algiers failed, while the King, counting upon a dynastic reunion with the Netherlands, continued to support the unprofitable struggle with the Dutch. In 1604, indeed, peace was achieved with England, but Spinola waged war against Maurice until 1609, when with difficulty a twelve years' truce was concluded. In the same year, by the destruction of the Mediterranean pirates at Tunis, a great benefit was conferred upon Spain, but the gain to her coasts was far outweighed by the loss inflicted on Valencian tillage by the deportation to Barbary of 150,000 Christian Moors.

Under such men as Philip III and Lerma, however, Spain

could never dominate Europe. Far more turned upon the success or failure of Henry IV in his struggle to recondition France. A strong France would inevitably curb Habsburg ambitions, and a Henry of Navarre could hardly persecute. Enjoying a good understanding with England, the Dutch, Scandinavia, and some German and Italian princes, he seemed the destined protector of the religious settlement of Europe, and time might work for toleration. Imagination has indeed ascribed to him a Great Design of conquering and reorganizing Europe. Such was neither the natural ideal of the man, nor possible in his situation. Under a genial exterior, Henry was hard, selfish and ungrateful, neither a creative genius nor a willing martyr for altruism. He had accomplished an exhausting progress to the throne with a success which astonished himself, and his first care, in a reign punctuated with attempts at his assassination, must be to make himself secure. The establishment of his dynasty and the development of royal power were necessarily the main objects of his policy, and a decade after the Peace of Vervins passed by before his eyes gazed across the frontier. He made use of the politic friendship of Clement VIII to divorce his Valois queen (1599), and her successor, Maria de Medici, gave him an heir, the future Louis XIII (1601). It remained to restore the kingdom.

Henry IV and his Task.

After a century of waste and war, the finances of France seemed wellnigh ruined beyond hope. In an age when a king might borrow from his banker but a kingdom could hardly raise a loan, the public debt amounted to nearly ten times the nominal yearly revenue. Of that revenue so much remained with the collectors that the remnant served to cover only the tenth part of the expenses. More ominous still was the decay of the means of production and of those habits of industry and order upon which production rests. Many villages were deserted, the fields unsown, the nobles courtiers instead of squires, the wool exported to pay for foreign clothing. Filled with robbers and mendicants, harassed by wolves and pestilence, France was but a shadow

of her former self. In the great lords, the *Parlements* and the States-General, the King found rivals to his own power and members of castes that evaded taxation. It was high time to restore the habit of obedience, to organize a punctual and honest administration, to revive agriculture and manufactures.

All this, by skilful and pleasant autocracy, Henry steadfastly accomplished. His best ally was his own charm, his second, the Protestant Duke of Sully. The King, with the least possible shock or violence, sapped the power of his rivals, transacting the business of the State while walking with a few trusty agents. The Minister, proudest and most laborious of men, carried through relentlessly the normal programme of repentant monarchy, resumption of crown lands, abolition of useless offices, careful and economical collection of taxes, abolition of exemptions, reduction of expenses wherever possible, reduction, wherever indispensable, of taxes. By the close of the reign the debt had been reduced by more than one-third, and less than five years' revenue would have defrayed the uncovered portion, while the development of agriculture, manufactures and public works progressively relieved the burden. What was distinctive in this policy was only its vigour and lucidity, and the swiftness of its success. One new tax, the *Paulette*, levied annually upon seats in the *Parlement*, may, however, be regarded as unique, since it created a hereditary membership of that judicial corporation. At the same time France shared in the expansion of Europe, developing Marseilles and Toulon, and colonizing in Canada. Once again the nation rose through the increase of the royal power.

The Restoration of France.

Happily for France, the decade which followed the Edict of Nantes was one of unwonted peace in Europe. The feud within the House of Vasa was localized in the distant system of the north. Although the foundations of German tranquillity were crumbling, a new religious struggle might yet be averted or delayed. Philip III of Spain and James I of England were absorbed mainly in the internal government of their realms. Although

Success of the Dutch.

in religion the Lutherans were giving way before the Calvinists, and the more moderate Catholics before the more extreme, the only quasi-religious war in western Europe was that between Spinola and the Dutch. In 1604, Ostend fell to him at a great price, but the growing wealth and sea-power of the rebels frustrated hopes of conquest. Henry had merely to show quiet sympathy with the revolt, and in 1608 to conclude a defensive alliance. Desiring to keep the Dutch dependent upon France since they refused to become her subjects, he joined with England in negotiating the twelve years' truce of January, 1609. Dutch affairs had sharpened the antagonism between France and the Habsburgs just at the moment when the Evangelical Union of German princes formed for mutual defence in 1608 seemed to offer a new tool for Henry's service.

In March, 1609, the death of the Duke of Jülich-Cleves exposed a rich Catholic country to the chances of a disputed succession. Henry strove to derive profit from the inevitable clash of interests between the Emperor and the German princes. While the Catholics pitted a Holy League against the Evangelical Union, two Lutheran claimants, Brandenburg and Neuburg, occupied Jülich-Cleves with his support. Henry's prestige as a Protestant crusader was however dimmed by his past and his present, for the convert of 1593 was now notoriously impelled towards war by his lawless passion for the fugitive Princess of Condé. James I and the Dutch refused to break with Spain, and only the venal Duke of Savoy sold Henry his alliance. The King, none the less, prepared to engage three armies in a cause which France did not approve. On May 14, 1610, he was struck down in the streets of Paris by a Catholic fanatic. France, saved from disaster in the field, but robbed of a great king, passed into the feeble hands of the Queen Mother.

End of Henry IV.

§ 10. *Religious War in Germany*, 1618–1629

In Germany, the Union and the League remained in hostile confrontation. The gathering storm-clouds betokened the

weakening of the will-to-peace upon which the constitution of the Empire rested. The moderate Emperor and princes who made peace at Augsburg had now given place to pupils of the Jesuits and of Calvin, or to men who hated the Calvinists more than they loved religion. In half a century, moreover, the futility of attempting to draw for all time a line of confessional division had been made clear. Where both the prince and his people had become sincerely Protestant, the preservation and the endowment of Catholic worship were felt to be against all reason. Where a Protestant or tolerant prince gave place to an ardent Catholic, he might exercise his legal right to drive his reluctant subjects to the mass. Thus the Protestants secularized against law and the Catholics converted against justice, while the spirit of the age forbade Germany to find a remedy in full individual freedom. It became only too probable that she would seek it by way of war.

The Jülich-Cleves Succession.

The death of Henry IV, however, prevented the development of a German religious war from the Jülich-Cleves succession. Brandenburg and Neuburg, indeed, quarrelled sharply over the assignment of the territories in which French and Dutch troops had assisted them to joint possession. The Elector answered with a blow the Prince's proposal to become his son-in-law and take the whole succession, and each looked for support to the men of extreme opinions. The Elector, to the disgust of his subjects in Brandenburg, became a Calvinist, while Neuburg turned Catholic and married a Bavarian princess. None the less, by the Treaty of Xanten (1614) the two Powers arranged to occupy the territories jointly, excluding other claimants, while neither gave up his title to the whole. This compact illustrated the superiority of territorial to doctrinal motives among many German princes. On the Protestant side at least the official spokesman was all for moderation. John George, Elector of Saxony, a hard drinker and a sportsman who year by year compared his bag with Ferdinand of Styria, proposed in 1612 that Catholics and Protestants should have equal representation in the Imperial Council,

as a safeguard of mutual toleration. Next year, however, the failure of a Diet at Ratisbon showed that the constitution and the spirit of compromise which it embodied had definitely broken down.

The Bohemian Question.

While the Jülich-Cleves succession had threatened war in the north-west of Germany, a momentous struggle between Catholic rulers and Protestant subjects was being waged on the south-eastern side. Lusatia and Silesia contained many Lutherans, while Bohemia and Moravia were also the home of Calvinist nobles and of the so-called Bohemian Brethren. In Bohemia, it was believed, nine-tenths of the population was Protestant, while the Estates firmly believed that the long series of Habsburg rulers had not destroyed their right to choose their king. At a time when they might soon expect to find a Romanizing Habsburg on the throne they were solicited by Rudolf's brother Matthias, virtually in revolt against the tyranny of an Emperor whose mind was breaking down. The diplomacy of Christian of Anhalt and the newly-formed Protestant Union was also active and the general result of the agitated year 1608 showed itself in a strengthened feeling of independence. Matthias, feeble though he was, had become king in Hungary, ruler of Austria and Moravia, and heir expectant of Bohemia, but he had failed to win sincere Protestant support. Next year the threats of the Bohemians extorted from Rudolf a *Letter of Majesty* which secured freedom of conscience to all, together with wide powers for the building of schools and churches. Matthias in Silesia was compelled to follow suit, while to the southward Ferdinand sternly refused concession.

Ferdinand's attitude, indeed, was that which Rudolf would have adopted had he dared. The *Letter of Majesty* implied a conception of royalty far beyond that of the age, for whereas any intolerant Protestant among the fourteen hundred nobles might debar his Catholic tenants from public worship, the king must allow Protestant temples to be built on his domains. In Bohemia, moreover, royal domains comprised also the domains of the Catholic Church. Against

such servitude Rudolf attempted to rebel, and, in 1611, the Bohemians established the aged Matthias on their throne. Next year Matthias became Emperor also. He found the machinery of the Empire out of gear, and reconstruction far beyond his strength. Ferdinand of Styria, on the other hand, possessed the vigour requisite for translating militant Catholicism into fact. The Habsburg princes agreed to designate him as Matthias' successor. A Jesuit pupil thus became the rising hope of the Counter-reformation.

The Counter-Reformation in Europe.

In 1615, while the Bohemians still awaited the death of Matthias, the prospects of the Counter-reformation in Europe seemed bright. As Poland and South Germany proved, the Jesuit mission counted for much, while concord between the eastern and western Habsburgs might count for even more. On the old battlefields of religion forces were now in motion which might transform the general situation. Donauwörth, the scene of a legalistic aggression, despite the Union, remained Catholic, and the Catholics gained several legal victories. England, in 1613 allied by marriage with the Calvinist Palatinate, seemed likely to be drawn by James I within the orbit of Spain. The peculiar form which her Reformation had taken combined with her insular situation to estrange her from swift sympathy with Protestants abroad. A Church governed by bishops could not easily feel itself at one with churches from which the episcopal principle had been contemptuously cast out.

The Dutch, failing to gain their independence by the truce of 1609, had refused to grant toleration to Catholics. There the forces of the Counter-reformation must prepare in 1621 to encounter an enemy strengthened by years of peaceful trade, and reinforced by uncompromising emigrants from the Catholic south. Dutch strength, however, was menaced by internal division. The conclusion of the truce had been a party triumph and the strife between Arminians and the defenders of predestination was to lead in 1618 to the triumph of strict Calvinism at the Synod of Dort. Religious differ-

ences, it was clear, would hamper a sincere understanding between the foremost Protestant sea-powers.

France, the third in the trio that had vanquished Philip II, had fallen back into civil war as soon as the strong hand of Henry was withdrawn. In 1614, Condé strove to obtain the regency by force of arms, and the States-General met only to manifest their own impotence and divisions. Their meeting, the last before the Revolution, was memorable solely because Richelieu spoke for the clergy, and because the crown proved that it could dispense with any representation of the people. Next year, Condé and the Huguenots showed that thence-forward the struggle in France would be for the control of the absolute monarchy, and that the Queen Mother and her favourites were prepared to buy off competing claims. A double marriage with Spain further bound the hands of the French King. While the eastern Habsburgs could not yet be called strong, and the strength of the western had been undermined by financial errors, their cause at least possessed a unity of inspiration denied to their opponents.

Catholic Aggression in Bohemia.

In 1617, the Habsburgs in Bohemia carried through what resembled a *coup d'état*. Suddenly summoning the Estates, they declared that the crown was hereditary, and secured the acceptance of Ferdinand as its heir. He swore to observe the *Letter of Majesty*, but the Government, which he dominated, initiated a Catholic reaction. Martinitz and Slawata, two members of the regency, bore the blame. On May 23, 1618, in pursuance of a plan agreed on by the Protestant nobles, these men and a secretary were hurled from a lofty palace-window at Prague, escaping death, as the Catholics thought, by miracle. This brutal "defenestration" gave the signal for a formal revolution. Thirty Directors were appointed, an army assembled, and the Jesuits driven out. For the moment at least, the Bohemians were masters of their own land. It remained for them to find a king who could defend their religious freedom and his crown.

Since the Bohemian revolution kindled a conflagration

which tortured Europe for thirty years and determined the course of history, it may not be superfluous to raise the question of its right or wrong. One victim's plaintive demand, "What have I done to these gentlemen that they throw me out of window like this?" forms an unanswerable indictment of the crime, but hardly of the revolution. The crown, it is true, had been hereditary for many years, and the spectacle of Poland and the Empire served to warn mankind against mere legalistic claims that monarchy should be elective. But hereditary monarchy had bound itself by pledges which it had clearly and designedly set at naught. The imprisoned Protestants of Braunau, the razed temple of Klostergrab were symbols of the dawning Catholic persecution. The Bohemians had a moral right to change their ruler if they could.

The Bohemian Revolution.

History condemns them not as rebels, but as revolutionists who did not look before they leaped. Their leader, Count Matthias Thurn, was not a statesman, and no man of eminence rose from among their ranks. Yet although they had little discipline and no clear plan, and although the rebel nation could not bring itself to vote taxes for the defence of its liberties, the revolt possessed many elements of strength. Bohemia was almost surrounded by sympathetic peoples, while, in Transylvania, the rule of a half-savage enemy of the Habsburgs, Bethlen Gabor, promised a serviceable diversion in her favour. The Duke of Savoy, expelled in 1612 from Montferrat, sent 2,000 men, and the renegade adventurer Mansfeld appeared in Bohemia as the delegate of the Protestant Union. The first campaign closed with the retreat of the royal army.

But for the courage of Ferdinand, the second campaign would have begun with his own capture by Count Thurn and with the fall of Vienna. While war raged in Bohemia, and diplomacy everywhere was active, it was vouchsafed to the rash and bigoted Elector Palatine to determine the course of events. In August, 1619, Frederick accepted the Bohemian crown, while thanks to his impolitic conduct at

the Diet, Ferdinand succeeded Matthias in the Empire. Frederick's encouragement of revolution shocked Europe and made Maximilian and the League the Emperor's allies, while the invasion of Austria by Bethlen Gabor only strengthened the moral current in favour of Ferdinand and the reign of law.

No prince could indeed have been better fitted than was Frederick to promote a Catholic victory in Bohemia. Neither he nor his queen proved popular with their new subjects, while his father-in-law of England had discountenanced the adventure from the first. The aggression of a Protestant impelled the Catholic princes to forget their Particularism and to uphold the Emperor. The aggression of a Calvinist alienated the Lutherans. The fact that this Calvinist was the Elector Palatine further alienated John George of Saxony, the acknowledged leader of the Lutherans and the heir to a bitter feud with Frederick's House. If due security were given to Protestantism, he and many other princes were ready to repel this lawless attack upon the Imperial constitution.

Such security the Catholics were in 1620 prepared to offer. At Mühlhausen in Thuringia, Maximilian and the League promised to respect the lands of loyal Protestants, and this the Emperor confirmed. To John George Ferdinand gave Lusatia, to Maximilian he promised the Electoral dignity. Frederick was thus effectively isolated, while Spinola invaded the Rhenish Palatinate; the Bavarians, the Upper Palatinate; and the great Walloon general Tilly led the army of the League into Bohemia. While the Protestants had sat still, these armies came with the support and sympathy of Catholic Europe. In November, at the White Mountain outside Prague, Frederick's army was routed by Tilly, and he himself took refuge with the Dutch. Mansfeld held out for a time, but the resistance of his lawless forces only sharpened the sufferings of the Bohemians. The Jesuits returned; the Protestant pastors were banished; the lands of the rebellious nobles were confiscated; and in a few years Ferdinand was ruling by hereditary right over a depopulated but Catholic kingdom.

Catholic Success.

Bohemia might have been martyred unavenged, had victory elsewhere been used with moderation. From 1621, however, the spectre of Habsburg predominance again affrighted Europe. The expiration of the twelve years' truce coincided with the death of the childless Archduke Albert. The Netherlands thus returned to Philip III at a moment when he seemed strong enough to reconquer the rebel portion. This was unwelcome to France, whose apprehensions were increased by the conquest of the Rhenish Palatinate and the seizure of the safe Valtelline route across the Alps. The English nation, too, surpassed James I in zeal for the cause of his son-in-law. When, early in 1623, Frederick's Electoral dignity was transferred to Maximilian for life, many German princes felt as their ancestors had done when Charles V submitted John Frederick of Saxony to an equal degradation. "Restitution" became a cause which threatened to unite the opponents of the House of Habsburg.

The Protestant cause, however, lacked a leader. Tilly had shattered such *condottieri* and adventurers as Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick. The Dutch were hard pressed to provide for their own defence. France, where Richelieu was about to become supreme, was prevented from protecting Protestants abroad by the revolts of Huguenots at home. England abandoned the Spanish marriage project for the French, and vainly dispatched small expeditions. John George of Saxony and the Lutheran princes of north Germany, relying on the agreement of Mühlhausen, would require no little stimulus to dally with rebellion.

That stimulus was, however, furnished by the intrusion of Tilly in pursuit of Mansfeld, while the Emperor refused to guarantee the Protestant bishoprics further than by the agreement of Mühlhausen. The danger caused the Lower Saxon circle to invite one of its members, Christian IV of Denmark, to intervene. He had declared to James I his willingness to take the field if his army could be brought to a strength of 30,000 and England would pay monthly £30,000. His terms, far lower than

Danish Intervention.

those upon which Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden would have insisted, were accepted, and in July, 1625, Tilly crossed the Weser to attack him.

Christian's invasion might well seem irresistible. The Lower Saxon circle, a region overwhelmingly Lutheran, stretched from his own Duchy of Holstein down to the Harz mountains and from Magdeburg to Bremen. The second Protestant sovereign in Europe struck with the pledged support of the first, while the third, Gustavus, helped their common cause by continuing to conquer Poland. Although his enterprise was a dynastic attempt to secure for his sons Bremen, Osnabrück and Verden, rather than a national mission of the Danish and Norwegian State, the King could draw on their resources and command the Baltic with their fleet. Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick remained unsubdued, and Bethlen Gabor again threatened a diversion. Ferdinand's resources in men and money seemed exhausted.

Wallenstein.

At this crisis Wallenstein, a Bohemian pupil of the Jesuits; offered to raise an Imperial army and to support it by requisitions. Endowed with immense powers of organization, he had already gained from the ruin of his country a fortune which enabled him to support a considerable force. His new plan of an army self-supporting by chartered illegality proved most successful, and, when the campaign of 1626 opened, the Catholics outnumbered their opponents. The English subsidies upon which Christian relied remained unpaid, and he could not plunder the circle of which he was now the head. At the bridge of Dessau Mansfeld was routed by Wallenstein, who followed him into Silesia with 30,000 men. Christian might have joined Mansfeld and Bethlen Gabor, but Tilly barred the way and defeated him at Lutter. The year ended with Brunswick and Mansfeld dead, Christian driven back on Bremen, and Bethlen Gabor disarmed by the conclusion of a Turkish peace.

In achieving these brilliant successes, Tilly and his army had by far the largest share, but without Wallenstein they would have been beyond attainment. The position of a semi-independent military chieftain, who moved an army,

largely Protestant, at his pleasure, and exhausted the Catholic country-side, was bound to rouse opposition. For the time being, indeed, the Emperor might be satisfied with Wallenstein's promise to make him supreme in Germany by means of an unrivalled army, on condition that no attack was made upon the Protestants and that the Habsburg lands were not enlarged. To these conditions, however, a victorious Habsburg fanatic could not in the long run adhere. The Protestants held lands and revenues to which they were morally but not legally entitled, and the Emperor could not ignore the demands of the Catholics for the enforcement of the law. No Habsburg, moreover, would permanently sacrifice the aggrandizement of his House to the fulfilment of his duty to the Empire. Ferdinand must ere long find himself Wallenstein's opponent.

The princes of the League, on the other hand, disliked all that Wallenstein was or did, save only his victories in the field. Employment of Protestants, requisitions from Catholics, leniency towards the foe, diminution of their own importance, elevation of the Emperor's power—all were counts in their indictment. Early in 1627, the League, after rejecting a proposal to make peace with the Danes and check Wallenstein by means of Tilly, formally remonstrated with Ferdinand, but in vain. Wallenstein destroyed the remnants of Mansfeld's troops, reduced Silesia to obedience, drove Christian from Germany, and traversed Jutland in pursuit. The Danish population showed by disarming Christian's mercenaries how little his own subjects cared for his crusade. Of the allies upon whom he counted, England had accomplished little and France and the Turk were now at peace with his opponents. Denmark could trust only in her power by sea.

Sea-power became the object of the campaign of 1628. Wallenstein, maintained in favour by the Emperor against a further remonstrance of the princes, was now resolved to lay the Baltic at his master's feet. Thus Swedish intervention in Germany might be averted, Denmark perhaps deprived of her lucrative rights

Resistance of Stralsund.

over the Sound, and the wealth of the New World tapped by the Hanse towns acting on behalf of Spain. Rewarded with the splendid Duchy of Mecklenburg, of which Ferdinand deprived its Dukes as traitors, Wallenstein mastered the southern coast-line of the Baltic with the exception of Stralsund. While he besieged this fortress he received the title of General of the Ocean and the Baltic with complete control over his army. He was one of those who had dreamed of reuniting Christendom under the Emperor to shatter the power of the Turk. At Stralsund, however, the opposing principle prevailed. Aided by Danes and Swedes, the townsmen stubbornly resisted the compulsory reunion with Rome which might have followed the reception of Imperial troops within their walls. The League refused to succour the besiegers, and in August, having sacrificed 12,000 men, Wallenstein withdrew.

A new Danish invasion of Germany was beaten back, and early in 1629 terms of peace were agreed on. By the Treaty of Lübeck, "a golden peace" to Christian, Wallenstein's conquests were returned to Denmark and no indemnity exacted. The King abjured intervention in German politics and claims upon German bishoprics, recognized the deprivation of Frederick and the Dukes of Mecklenburg, and broke off his nascent *entente* with Sweden.

Peace with Denmark.

The situation which had given rise to the Treaty of Lübeck was that, for the moment at least, the Catholics enjoyed an unquestionable preponderance in Germany, and that no foreign Power was ready to step in. Ferdinand, indeed, enjoyed from Philip IV and the aggressive Olivares a sympathy far greater than that for which the German Protestants could look to any State in Europe. The moment for the triumph of legality seemed to have arrived. Having enforced without resistance in the south the restoration of church property secularized since 1552, the Emperor resolved to vindicate law also in the north. In March, 1629, he signed the Edict of Restitution. The Archbishoprics of Magdeburg and Bremen, twelve

The Edict of Restitution.

bishoprics, mainly in the two Saxon circles, and about a hundred and twenty conventual establishments, none of them inhabited by Catholics, were reassigned to the Catholic faith. Calvinists lost the recognition which had in fact been theirs for nearly eighty years. The restoration history in southern Germany suggested that not only would the Protestants forgo their churches, but that they might themselves be driven to the mass. Wallenstein, who himself granted toleration in Mecklenburg, declared such Restitution impossible.

§ 11. *Religious War in Germany*, 1629–1635

The triumph of the principles of the League and of Spain embodied in the Emperor's Edict must, it was clear, rally Protestant Powers to the defence of their threatened creed. Within the Empire it could not fail to shake the allegiance of Lutherans to the Emperor. At Magdeburg, an all-important pass across the Elbe, the citizens steadfastly declined to admit an Imperial garrison, while John George of Saxony declared that his son should continue to administer the archbishopric. At the same time France, though still hampered by Huguenots and court intrigues, composed her differences with England, and assailed Habsburg policy in Italy by relieving Casale. In 1630, the battle between Wallenstein and the League was fought out at the Electoral Diet of Ratisbon. The princes, who cried out against the exactions of the army, were supported underhand by Richelieu's agents. Both, for their several purposes, desired to paralyse the Emperor's power. To further the succession of his son, Ferdinand dismissed his general. The command was given to Tilly at the moment when the peril which Wallenstein had long foreseen called for a fresh Catholic effort.

Wallenstein Dismissed.

On July 6, 1630, Gustavus Adolphus landed in Pomerania with about 13,000 men. While the Danish King was making his ill-starred venture in Germany, the Swedes had been steadily pursuing their conquests in Poland and developing their military skill and power. To occupy them far afield, Wallenstein had sent

Swedish Intervention.

Sigismund 10,000 men, while the fear of their intervention had dictated his furious assault upon Stralsund, the generous terms granted at Lübeck, and the demand that Magdeburg should admit Imperial troops. Sweden was poor and thinly-peopled, but free and even democratic under a dynasty of her own choice. In a religious cause her king could muster an army which in composition was largely national and which was sustained by real enthusiasm for Protestantism and for himself. Aided by mercenaries under strict control, and with the way prepared by careful diplomacy, the Swedish intervention threatened to be no less formidable than the Danish had appeared to be, five years before.

In point of leadership, indeed, the Swedes in 1630 were far more formidable than the Danes in 1625. Christian IV, though he shared the drinking habits of his time, was a bold and active leader who believed that Christ had blessed in person a crusade which promised to be highly lucrative to the royal house. But Gustavus stands out as the greatest of the great Vasa line, a king of equal eminence in peace and war, an idealist who did not cease to be a statesman. By his side was the Chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna, Richelieu's peer, and behind him a nation with whom it was ever his happiness to speak face to face.

Every reason of statecraft made it the interest of both king and people to intervene. Sweden owed her independence to the Reformation; and the Vasa line, their crown. Both had been vindicated against the Counter-reformation in more than three decades of intermittent struggle with the Polish king. That struggle, thanks to Richelieu, had been laid aside by the truce of Altmark (1629), but only for six years. The aggressive Counter-reformation, it might be expected, would then endeavour to drive the Swedes across the Gulf of Finland. Wallenstein had revealed designs upon the Baltic. Spain cherished hopes of gaining the single outlet towards the North Sea that Sweden possessed at the mouth of the Göta river. In a future convulsion, no one could predict what part would be played by Denmark, her ancient rival, or by the Tsar, whom the Swedes, since

1617, debarred from access to the sea. "We are nowhere weaker," cried Gustavus, "than in Sweden," and if Mecklenburg and Pomerania became Catholic, that weakness would surely be explored. The remedy, he maintained, was a Swedish bastion in Germany. Thus, while its leader was a young warrior-king with the instincts of a crusader, the offensive of 1630 had a solid purpose of defence.

Although Richelieu gave help by attacking Italy, while the sympathy of half Europe favoured the invaders, Gustavus was bound by no alliance. For months his army stood alone. Magdeburg braved a second siege, but to assist an intrusive foreigner no great German prince would defy the Emperor's power. The campaign of 1630 must therefore be devoted to conquering a base of operations. It was marked by no great battle, though it contained the most admired strategy of the King's career. His opponents lacked a Wallenstein, while Tilly remained inactive on the Weser. By the winter Gustavus disposed of Pomerania, his natural base.

The year 1631 began with a promise of aid from France. Gustavus steadfastly declined to become the mercenary of Louis XIII, but he accepted annual subsidies, and promised to restore the pre-war German status. While Saxony and Brandenburg dreamed of standing neutral, and vainly implored Ferdinand to abandon Restitution, the Franco-Swedish treaty of Bärwalde stung Maximilian into action. Tilly was dispatched eastward to drive the invaders into the sea. He was himself driven back upon the Elbe, while Gustavus stormed Frankfort-on-the-Oder and forced his brother-in-law of Brandenburg to place Küstrin and Spandau in his hands. The obstinate refusal of Saxony to join him, however, prevented him from relieving Magdeburg. In May, the city fell, amid horrors which embittered the remaining phases of the religious war. Although Brandenburg yielded to a threat to bombard Berlin, without Saxon help Gustavus could not advance; while the Treaty of Cherasco between France and Spain

Fall of Magdeburg.

enabled Tilly to reinforce his army with veteran troops from Italy.

At this crisis, the Emperor forced Saxony from her neutrality and indecision. Having summoned the Elector to disarm, Tilly invaded his dominions and seized Leipzig. This violence at last gave Gustavus Saxony and drew him swiftly southward. In September, in the greatest battle of the war, at Breitenfeld, north of Leipzig, Tilly's forces were shattered. "God has turned Lutheran," ran the saying at Vienna. Restitution had received its death-blow.

Breitenfeld.

Having thus destroyed the main force of the enemy, Gustavus was free to advance in any direction. Recruits were wont to flow in from soldiery without employment, not excepting those who had lately suffered defeat. Wallenstein himself offered service on good terms. Armies lived upon the country, and the greatest tragedy of the war was that many of them exhausted and depopulated the regions through which they passed. Gustavus elected to follow Tilly towards the south-west, to free the Palatinate and the suffering Protestant towns and to prey upon the lands of the great ecclesiastics.

Although his conduct challenged Spain and affronted even France, he kept Christmas at Mainz, on the left bank of the Rhine. In the new year (1632), the Protestants of southern Germany were likewise visited and set free. At the passage of the Lech, Tilly perished amid defeat. Augsburg swore fealty to Gustavus, who entered Munich unopposed, while John George traversed Bohemia. Men asked whether the King of Sweden would march down the Danube to dethrone the Emperor, or across the Alps to dethrone the Pope.

The danger could be met immediately only by re-enlisting Wallenstein on his own terms. The Emperor consented to abandon Restitution, and to make him a dictator in the war. On these terms he swiftly drove the Saxons from Bohemia and crippled Gustavus at Nürnberg by encamping to the northward in an impregnable

Wallenstein Recalled.

position. The baffled King turned against Austria, but Wallenstein knew well that by harrying Saxony he could protect his Imperial master. Gustavus marched with all speed to rescue his ally and fell on the victorious field of Lützen (November, 1632).

His death left only two men great enough to rise above the war and to control it. Wallenstein, acting as an independent power, negotiated on all sides for peace, on the basis of toleration, strong monarchy and compensation to the Swedes. Richelieu, on the other hand, though tolerant at home, supported in Germany whatever would cripple Spain or the allies of Spain. And since Spain could influence the Emperor, while several military forces subsisted by the war, the prospect of German peace appeared remote.

In Sweden, where Gustavus had left a foolish wife and an infant daughter, power fell to the nobles, and policy was shaped by Axel Oxenstierna. The army was brilliantly led by Horn, the field-marshal of Gustavus, and by Bernard of Weimar, a Saxon prince who aspired to become Duke of Franconia at the expense of the Catholic Church. While Sweden continued to produce great generals, the native contingent in her army, together with its ideals and its conduct, steadily declined. In 1633, the League of Heilbronn united the Swedes with the German Protestants, John George standing aloof. The income at the disposal of Oxenstierna fell painfully short of the expenses, but the bold capture of Ratisbon by Bernard threatened the Emperor and revived the drooping spirits of the Heilbronn League.

Death of Gustavus Adolphus.

Next year Wallenstein, who, while claiming more and more to direct policy, had failed to save Ratisbon, was abandoned by the Emperor and murdered. His army passed to Ferdinand, the Emperor's heir, and the control of policy, to Spain. In September, young Ferdinand, advancing to aid Bavaria, gained a great victory over Horn and Bernard at Nördlingen. Horn was captured; South Germany saved for the Catholic cause; the Heilbronn League broke up, and

the leadership of the Protestants passed into the hands of France.

The Catholic triumph at Nördlingen, balancing the Protestant triumph at Breitenfeld, came within an ace of ending the German war. To the vast majority of Germans it was clear that the seventeen years of torture that they had undergone had only made improbable the victory of either side. In 1631 and 1632, the deaths in Saxony were reckoned as 900,000. The year 1633 began with six Swedish armies, in all some 85,000 men, preying upon the Germans, and 12,000 French troops were now to be called in. Nördlingen had been won with the aid of a Spanish force on its way to Belgium, and without Tilly and Wallenstein the Catholics had no prospect of annihilating their opponents.

Check to Protestantism.

The only escape from civil war was a compromise, on the basis of a return to the pre-war status wherever possible. John George of Saxony was vigorously negotiating with the Emperor in this sense, and by November he had attained to an agreement which became the Peace of Prague (1635). The Edict of Restitution, which Ferdinand could neither abandon nor enforce, was suspended for forty years. Secularizations made down to the year 1627 enjoyed the benefits of this delay. Saxony retained Lusatia. In Silesia, which the Swedes had conquered, the Protestants were assured of toleration. The Palatine House and the remnants of the League of Heilbronn were excluded from the Peace, but other princes and towns might embrace it.

Peace of Prague.

Their swift adhesion, indeed, showed how well John George had spoken the German mind. Bernard and the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel refused the terms, but Brandenburg, Mecklenburg, and a host of other Powers accepted. Only the appeal of a few members of the League of Heilbronn had prevented Oxenstierna from yielding to the cry of Sweden for peace, on the eve of the expiration of her truce with Poland. Within a few months she found herself at war with Saxony and Brandenburg, the Emperor's new allies.

§ 12. *The Thirty Years War*, 1636–1648

In the meantime Richelieu had adroitly ranged the German war among his other instruments for achieving victory over Spain. France and Spain were now openly at war, and France secured firm alliances with Sweden and the Dutch and a new League of Rivoli with Savoy, Mantua, Modena and Parma. To make the Swedish alliance valuable, Richelieu aided her in prolonging her truce with Poland for a period of six-and-twenty years. In 1632, Ladislaus IV had been elected to the throne of his father Sigismund III. The young King claimed the crown of Sweden, and prepared to contest the Swedish occupation of Livonia and Prussia, regions with customs dues nine times as great as those which Sweden and Finland brought in. Thanks to French diplomacy, however, he was induced to desist, the Swedes returning Prussia.

Struggle of France with Spain.

Poland, like the Turk, Denmark and England, thus refrained from sharing in the struggle, now primarily political rather than religious, which convulsed the rest of Europe. A few German Protestants fought on for their individual rights; the Swedes, for due compensation; the Dutch, for their independence; but the main cause of the war was now the determination of France to bridle Spain, and the main objective, the Rhenish highway between Italy and the Netherlands. Meanwhile Germany became a forage-ground in parts of which civilization was destroyed.

In 1636, France whose huge armies had in the last campaign accomplished little, found herself invaded both from the north and east. Two years thus passed without a conspicuous French success. In the autumn, however, the Swedes, under Banér, regained at Wittstock the prestige which they had lost at Nördlingen, while the Dutch recaptured Breda, the last of their strong places held by Spain.

Richelieu's Difficulties.

Early in 1637, Ferdinand III succeeded to his father, whose death therefore strengthened his opponents. Both in the north and west, however, the campaign favoured the Imper-

ialists, and only the firm will of Oxenstierna kept Sweden in the war. Next year the tide turned. The almost miraculous birth of the future Louis XIV shattered the importance of the untrustworthy Orleans and made Richelieu secure. Bernard, now a French auxiliary, captured Breisach, the key to the Upper Rhine, thus nearing his goal of a principality of Alsace. The French and Swedes could look forward to that combined attack from east and north upon Ferdinand's possessions which became the rough ground-plan of the subsequent German war and, in the absence of any hope of intervention, perhaps the only road to peace.

France and Sweden against the Habsburgs.

In 1639, the good fortune of Richelieu continued. The accidents of the succession enabled him to lay firm hold upon Savoy. The timely death of Bernard relieved the French crown of a formidable competitor for Alsace. A strange series of events brought about the annihilation in English waters by Tromp of the last Armada of Spain. Banér ravaged Bohemia, Silesia and Moravia, while the French for the first time crossed the Rhine. The Allies might yet hope to detach the signatories from the Peace of Prague. In 1640, the new Elector of Brandenburg, Frederick William, relapsed into neutrality; Catalonia threw off the galling yoke of Spain; and Portugal resumed her independence.

Allied Progress.

The next year, 1641, brought a sensible loss in the death of Banér, whose genius, wild carouser though he was, had alone sustained the Swedish arms since Horn's misfortune. Torstensson, "the Swedish lightning flash," however, proved a brilliant successor. After outmanœuvring the Imperialists over all Silesia, he crushed them at Breitenfeld and captured Leipzig (November, 1642). Meanwhile, a second Imperialist invasion of France had failed; a conspiracy to supplant Richelieu had cost Cinq-Mars his life, and the submission of Roussillon had brought the French frontier to the Pyrenees. In December, 1642, triumphant on all sides, Richelieu died. His master survived him less than half a year.

In 1643, the war underwent more than one dramatic

change. Although the Queen Mother, who now ruled France, was a Habsburg, and her minister, Mazarin, an Italian, French hostility to Spain remained unaltered. But the campaign began with a wholly unprecedented success. At Rocroi, on the frontier of Champagne, the young prince known to fame as Condé shattered the Spanish infantry, and broke the spell which Gonzalo de Cordova had cast over fields of battle. Under Condé and Turenne, French generalship was to rival Swedish, but on a grander scale. Thionville was taken, and its formal annexation to France began a long series of frontier gains by conquest. In Southern Germany, however, lesser French generals suffered defeat, and Austria stood in no danger from the west.

Rocroi.

Meanwhile the cause of peace had gained a modest victory. For some years intermittent negotiations between the Emperor, France and Sweden had been carried on, and it had at least been arranged that the Catholic Powers should meet at Münster, and the Protestant at Osnabrück. Torstensson's shrewd blows brought Ferdinand, in 1643, to yield to the demand of all Germany for a discussion of the terms of peace. Discussion was bound to reveal the difference of interest between the Emperor and the League, and the fact that the so-called war of religion had become a war for the aggrandizement of Bavaria and of the Habsburg House. In the first three years of their continuance, these conversations established the claim of the German Estates to share in the future Congress, and to include the religious question, as well as the territorial, within its scope.

Negotiations.

The year closed with the most striking change of all. Christian IV had not passed fourteen years of peace without giving some rein to his restless ambition, and on all sides he found Sweden in his path. Each Power desired to dominate the Baltic, and Denmark, lord of both shores of the Sound, showed by her ruthless extortion of the dues on transit the danger of permitting her aggrandizement. Faced with such imposts as an *ad valorem* 77 per cent. on the mere transport of saltpetre, the Dutch and English came gradually to the

Sweden against Denmark.

opinion that Sweden would be preferable to Denmark as the owner of the eastern shore. Christian intrigued with the Emperor and with Poland for the expulsion of the Swedes from Germany, and failing participation in the war, pressed to become arbiter of the terms of peace. In May, Oxenstierna prevailed with the Swedish Council to launch Torstensson against him. Torstensson, campaigning in Moravia, received the summons in September. In December he crossed the Holstein border, five days before the news of war reached Copenhagen.

The campaign of 1644 showed that Denmark was isolated beyond the Emperor's power to save her, and defenceless both in Jutland and beyond the Sound. Christian, however, rose to the height of the occasion, and braved the Swedish power by sea. By withdrawing Torstensson from the Habsburg lands the Danish war hindered a German peace, and Turenne and Condé were forced to make a desperate struggle in the South. Near Freiburg they gained the bloodiest battle of the war, but failed to recover the town. The next campaign threatened to overwhelm the Imperial cause. Acting in concert with the Dutch, the Swedes forced Denmark to concede, by the Peace of Brömsebro, a great remission of dues and a mass of frontier provinces and islands. Meanwhile Torstensson, having routed a relieving army, shattered the Imperialists at Jankau, south of Prague, and swept on to besiege Vienna. His victory quickened the negotiations. But Rakoczy from Transylvania proved a futile ally : the French onslaught failed : and in December Torstensson, baffled and broken in health, transferred the command to Wrangel.

Swedish Triumph.

The campaign of 1646 did much to stimulate the sluggish diplomatists in Westphalia. Wrangel, whose motto was "Who takes, has," joined Turenne in a masterly campaign in Bavaria. No battle was fought, but Maximilian was brought by the ruin of his country to detest the Spanish influence which obstructed peace. In March, 1647, he signed a truce to which other Estates acceded. The movement towards

Catholic Resistance Broken.

separate agreements, begun by Brandenburg, and followed then by Saxony, spread to the Dutch, who now forsook France to gain their own ends from Spain. In January, 1648, they secured their independence by the Treaty of Münster, Spain thus safeguarding her own Netherlands against the danger from being crushed between two allies. The truce with Bavaria having long expired, Turenne and Wrangel repeated their achievement of two years before, driving Maximilian to seek shelter with the Archbishop of Salzburg. Condé, in an epoch-making battle, defeated the Spaniards at Lens. Meanwhile the western half of Prague had fallen to the Swedes, who pillaged the palace of the defenestration. The war ended with their troops, commanded by the future Charles X, vainly attempting to storm the former capital of Frederick the rebel King.

In October, 1648, after some six years' negotiation, the Peace of Westphalia became law. For Germany, the religious settlement, while falling far short of true freedom, marked an advance upon the Peace of Augsburg. Calvinists gained equal rights with Lutherans, and secularizations made prior to 1624 received endorsement. To guard this arbitrary provision, the Imperial Court was reconstituted with Catholics and Protestants in equal numbers. Princes still possessed the right to banish from their dominions subjects whose faith differed from their own, and Bohemia remained a Catholic country.

The Peace of Westphalia.

After infinite bargaining, a territorial settlement acceptable both to Germans and to their auxiliaries was arrived at. Maximilian retained the Upper Palatinate and his Electoral dignity, while an eighth Electorate and the Lower Palatinate were assigned to Frederick's son. Saxony gained Lusatia and part of Magdeburg. Brandenburg, whose Elector threatened to revive the war, gained Eastern Pomerania, with valuable bishoprics as compensation for the loss of the western half. Western or Hither Pomerania, including Stettin and the mouth of the Oder, formed the coveted bastion of Sweden, while Bremen and Verden enriched her with the customs dues of the Weser and the Elbe. France retained

Metz, Toul and Verdun, her old conquests, and of her new, the Austrian possessions in Alsace, with Breisach, Philipsburg and Pinerolo, as those "gates into her neighbours' dominions" which Richelieu had desired. Although the King did not incorporate Alsace with France, and Strassburg remained a free city, France thus reached the Rhine, while from Basel to Philipsburg no fortresses were to be built upon its further shore.

The Peace also registered the formal independence of the Swiss cantons and of the Netherlands from Imperial control, and the right of German princes to make treaties with foreign Powers so long as they were not directed against the Emperor or the Empire. The kings of France and Sweden were now German princes in virtue of Alsace and Pomerania, while the kings of Denmark had long been Dukes of Holstein. The Empire thus became a loose federation in the affairs of which they had a vested right to interfere. The German people, ruined in many sections for a century, saw Particularism triumphant, while Catholic and Protestant followed different calendars, and the mouth of every great German river was controlled by some alien Power.

Settlement of Europe.

While the Peace of Westphalia thus conspicuously dismembered the Empire to the profit of the German princes and of several foreign States, it stands out as yet more prominent in the history of Europe as a whole. For wellnigh a century, since the failure of Charles V had shown that the dual control of Christendom was past reviving, her sons had been groping after something to take its place. Then, as always, their common interests far outweighed their differences, and the basis for an organized society was theirs. The tendency of the Habsburgs to impose their will upon the world, and the active campaign of Rome to restore religious unity, had helped to keep the Continent in a state of conflict which reached its climax after the Peace of Prague. Exhaustion had procured an agreement denied to victory, and Europe had at last attained to certain positive conclusions.

Religious reunion now lay beyond the horizon of hope.

Full toleration was yet far distant, but the acceptance of religious diversity for princes must in the long run help the individual to become free. The general disregard of the Pope's protest against the terms of peace proved that the influence of religion upon politics had largely passed away. But while the papacy retained vast possibilities of influence through its spiritual oversight over men, the Empire had become a mere ghost. The Emperor now retained only a formal primacy among sovereigns and in Germany a few prerogatives which his fellow princes did not share.

While thus proclaiming the downfall of the mediaeval governance of Europe, the Congress of Westphalia had gone far towards replacing it with something new. That it had met, deliberated and framed a peace was in itself no small achievement. For the first time in history, the States of Europe as a whole assembled to discuss their common interests and devised a general settlement. A secular Congress thus usurped the rank previously held by spiritual Councils, and thereby rendered 1648 a great landmark in the relations between Church and State. The settlement was firmly based on the existence of a society of independent territorial communities, equal one with another, as dwarfs and giants are men of equal rights. These communities were sovereign States belonging to the great white race. They must indeed be Christian, and Christian of the Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, or Anglican organization. There appeared, however, no reason why the modern society symbolized by the Congress should not in time include States whose rulers held other forms of Christianity, or which belonged to other creeds or other branches of the human race.

By what law would the new Society of Nations be governed, and what would be the form of intercourse between its members? These questions, weighty for the future of Europe, received no spoken answer. But, since the existence of a society compels the provision of a law to regulate mutual relations, the proof given in Westphalia that a society of nations existed powerfully advanced the demand for an international code.

The European Question.

And, since 1625, the *De jure belli ac pacis* of Grotius had synthesized the existing fragments of such a code. Future development must depend upon the frequency and the intimacy of the relations between the States. In the middle of the seventeenth century these were insufficient to warrant the maintenance of permanent embassies at the several courts, still less to suggest the establishment of a permanent Congress. Nothing but a check to the progress of civilization, however, could avert such institutions for all time. An international league was indicated in 1648, as clearly as the religious freedom of mankind.

PART III

LOUIS XIV AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE NORTH (1648–1721)

§ 1. *Europe to the Settlement of* 1660

Momentous and far-reaching as was the Peace of Westphalia, it by no means ended all contemporary war. No less than thirteen distinct struggles were either latent or raging at the time. In the British Isles the convulsions which Richelieu had helped to excite approached their climax in the execution of the King (1649). To the French nobles the Peace of Westphalia gave the signal for a revival of the rebellions known as the *Fronde*. The rule of Mazarin was punctuated with revolt. The Scandinavian kingdoms had been left in a state of suspended conflict by the stern terms settled at Brömsebro. With Poland, Sweden had made only a truce, and already Polish weakness was prompting Russians, Cossacks and Tartars to attack her. While war between Venice and the Turks pointed towards a new Turkish onslaught upon Europe, Southern Italy was famished and restless under Spanish rule. In 1647, the rising of Masianello at Naples had issued in a short-lived republic. Portugal, in a long-drawn war of mutual incursions, was defending her independence against Spain. The Dutch, now at the height of their fame, were on the eve of bitter internal struggles and sharp wars with England. It was thus against a stormy background that the duel between France and Spain was fought out in the centre of the European stage.

When Richelieu died, his system and his war lived on, and "the Peace of Westphalia is really of his making." Mazarin,

his pupil, dictated the policy of the Queen Mother, whose unacknowledged husband he may have been. His suppleness contributed to victory in the field and in the Congress, but encouraged the constitutional opposition of the *Parlements* against autocracy, and the factious insurrections of the nobles. Condé's great victory at Lens, crowning a war of sieges which had made the French masters of Courtrai and Dunkirk, powerfully impelled the Emperor to make peace, but before the Treaty was signed in Westphalia, the Court had fled from Paris (September, 1648). In 1649, the Government had to face Spain, Paris and the *Parlement*, while more than doubtful of the fidelity of Turenne.

The Fronde.

Only the nobles of the *Fronde*, however, were willing to prostrate their country before Spain, and the *Parlement* and people were disarmed by timely concessions. In August, the young King returned to Paris, but Condé, moved by mere self-importance, broke with the Court, and Turenne was seduced into an alliance with Spain. The danger seemed great, but early in 1650 Mazarin arrested Condé and his fellow leaders. The King was carried through the mutinous provinces; Mazarin practised every art of statecraft; Bordeaux fell; and the year closed with the defeat of Turenne and the invading Spaniards at Rethel.

The year 1651, in which Louis XIV was declared of age at thirteen, was conspicuous for immense confusion in France. Mazarin, detested both by the nobles and the *Parlement*, released the imprisoned leaders and took shelter in Cologne. He thus gave Condé the opportunity to alienate his allies and to raise a new revolt in Guienne. Revolt and leader seemed doomed, when Mazarin, jealous of a rival with the Queen, returned with a German army. This rekindled the war and exposed France to invasion. Next year, Turenne, won over by Mazarin, defeated the Spaniards and Condé in the north of France, but the daughter of Gaston of Orleans rallied Paris against Mazarin and the Crown. The minister again retired, and the King intervened with vigour, strengthened by the demonstration of the incompetence of rival Powers.

In 1653, Mazarin returned, the *Fronde* collapsed, and Turenne stemmed the tide of Spanish successes. Five years of folly had ruined the finances of France and had cost her, besides many other losses, Casale, Catalonia and Dunkirk. Weary of the light-hearted treason of her grandees, she was ready to fling herself at the feet of an absolute King. The treason of Condé, indeed, which enabled the Spanish army to face Turenne, was first to bring about an alliance between Mazarin and Cromwell.

The stern figure of Cromwell, who in 1655 granted the aid of England to the embarrassed monarchy of France, may well stand for the decade of brusque change in Europe which followed the Peace of 1648. New forces, sometimes short-lived, arose, and visions of further revolutions for a moment dazzled men's minds. While England was being transformed into the military republic of Great Britain, and France was painfully rejecting the idea of a constitutional monarchy, Holland, Brandenburg, Sweden, and Poland were suffering rapid change.

Cromwell and the Dutch.

The death of William II of Orange, in 1650, perhaps prevented an agreement with Mazarin to divide the Spanish Netherlands and to restore the House of Stuart. It left the Dutch leaderless and divided, at a time when their commercial and colonial wealth was immense, and their alliance of vast importance to England. Next year, therefore, Cromwell made overtures to them for union and avenged his rebuff by the Navigation Act against their shipping.

Already a considerable power on land, England rapidly became formidable by sea, and in 1652 she dared to make naval war against the Dutch. Blake, a mature soldier turned sailor for the occasion, proved no match for Tromp, and to maintain their war-time supremacy unchallenged, the Dutch arranged with Denmark to close to British ships the Sound, through which their indispensable hemp, tar and timber were wont to pass. The threat to the British navy was averted by the naval victories of 1653, and again Cromwell pressed for an Anglo-Dutch union. De Witt, elected

Pensionary of the province of Holland, began his long career of authority based upon influence and efficiency rather than upon sword or sceptre. The House of Orange was excluded from the highest office, and in 1654 Cromwell closed the war.

Meanwhile, in the backward and wasted State of Brandenburg, a client of the House of Orange, Frederick William of Hohenzollern, was taking the first steps towards autocratic power. Lord of provinces scattered from the Niemen to the Rhine, yet lacking troops, revenues and the willing obedience of the people, this irascible, iron-handed prince began by taming his own nobles, and in 1653 suppressed the Diet. His rigorous economy and diligent development of his scanty resources enabled him to create the nucleus of an army, which he was always ready to employ without scruple, though preferably in a Protestant cause. As a Calvinist ruling over Lutherans in Brandenburg and Prussia, and over Catholics in Cleves, he stood pledged to toleration, while as a prince whose interests comprehended both Germany and Poland, he looked to the Emperor for patronage and protection. His immediate ambitions were to gain full sovereignty over the duchy of Eastern Prussia which he held as a Polish fief, and to win the mouth of the Oder and all Western Pomerania, over which he had been compelled to relinquish his reversionary rights in 1648.

The Great Elector.

Both Sweden and Poland were undergoing transformations which made the question of their future, and therefore the policy and fate of Brandenburg, deeply obscure. With the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia, the authority of Axel Oxenstierna gave way before that of the young Queen, Christina, who, gifted with great ability and little wisdom, steered Sweden straight towards shipwreck. Scorning luxury for herself, she lavished the possessions of the crown upon luxurious favourites and exotic works of art. In a few years the financial state of Sweden became desperate, while wealth and power passed to the swollen *corps* of the grandees. The daughter of Gustavus, however, could still coerce her Diet. Declining to

Christina in Sweden.

marry, she compelled them to choose as her successor her cousin who had led her troops to the walls of Prague. In 1654, when she abdicated in order to turn Catholic and to live in Rome, this vigorous young warrior succeeded her as Charles X.

From the salutary task of forcing the nobles to make restitution to the crown, Charles X was soon drawn away by the aspect of affairs in Poland. There the feeble John Casimir Vasa ruled in name, while the fact that the great nobles reigned became year by year more apparent. In 1652, one of them had vetoed a war of defence, and since a single veto could bring to naught the work of a whole session, the Diet became a phantom. The King still preferred a harmless claim to the crown of Sweden, but he was far more closely occupied in endeavouring to defend his own crown against the new and formidable attack of Russia. The tragic convulsions of the Middle Ages, indeed, had left great masses of Russian men and the metropolis Kiev itself within the confines of the Polish State, while the free exiles known as Cossacks were likewise nominally her subjects. Early in the seventeenth century, when the dynasty of Moscow failed, the Polish Vasa had come near to securing the succession, and, as lately as in 1634, the border fortress of Smolensk had been yielded by the new Romanov line. Given peace and vigorous rule, however, Russia must always regain her strength, and now both Tsar and Cossacks turned against their oppressive Catholic neighbours. An onslaught which historic memories and territorial ambition were certain to provoke came the sooner for the Jesuit propaganda.

Charles X and Poland.

Besides the chronic feud with Poland, Charles X inherited with his crown the aspiration to dominate the Baltic. Lord already of Finland, Estonia, Livonia and Western Pomerania, Sweden overshadowed Denmark and barred out Russia from the sea. By seizing once more Kurland and West Prussia from Poland, and at least curtailing the dominion of Brandenburg over East Prussia, her aspiration would be realized. By sitting

The Dominion of the Baltic.

still while Russia moved, she might endanger her existing Empire. Charles was not blind to the fact that Denmark was disaffected, that her Dutch allies held their Baltic interests vital, and that Brandenburg valued above all else her access to the sea. But he possessed the fullest confidence in the sword and in himself. The prize was the right to tax the commerce of half a continent. In 1655, excusing his breach of the truce on the ground of John Casimir's claim to the crown, he began a series of easy victories on Polish soil. While the last scion of the rival Vasa sought strength from pilgrimage and papal blessing, his two capitals, Warsaw and Cracow, submitted to the Swede. One campaign seemed to have laid Poland and Lithuania, not unwillingly, at Charles' feet. Only Danzig, contented with her real freedom under Polish suzerainty, threatened serious resistance.

Meanwhile Frederick William of Brandenburg, in keen alarm for his whole position on the Baltic, negotiated on every side. In Polish Prussia he found support against Sweden, and he enlisted some 27,000 men to dispute the King's return. At Königsberg, however, he, like his father, was overawed into an alliance with the invading Swedes (January, 1656). His holding in Prussia was to be enlarged by Ermeland, but this bishopric and his former duchy must become fiefs of the Swedish crown.

Charles had thus driven John Casimir from his kingdom by force, and had by force secured the reluctant connivance of Frederick William. He was soon to learn that in a huge country which the spring sun and the autumn rain turn into a morass armed force is not omnipotent, and that there are risks attaching to a subversion of the European balance of power. Outraged by the plunder of their churches, the Poles made sacrifices for religion which they had refused to make for the State, and threatened by a general uprising to overwhelm the scanty army of the Swedes.

Exploits of Charles X.

Charles, however, fully faced the danger. By astounding manœuvres from Przemysl to Danzig, the army was kept in being. A fierce decree attempted to divide the people,

promising to the nobles half the estates of the rebels whom they surrendered, and freedom and land to the peasant who seized or slew a hostile noble. Frederick William was bribed into activity with large territories, including Posen. Had he consented to surrender Ermeland and Eastern Prussia, he might have taken a larger share of Poland together with its crown. In June, when, after long hesitation, he flung himself into the arms of Charles, Danes, Russians, Tartars and Imperialists were moving, and Warsaw stood within a week of her surrender to the Poles.

Warsaw surrendered late in June, after an amazing defence by a few hundred Swedes. Charles must retake the capital, or admit that his enterprise had failed. With a small army, dragging after him Frederick William with a greater, he put to flight a huge force under John Casimir, and recovered Warsaw one month from its fall. The exploit had been brilliant, but the former neutrals were becoming enemies, and a Dutch fleet arrived to succour Danzig. Sweden purchased a respite by lowering her claims to customs, but the Russians had broken through their fortress barrier, and were only driven from Riga by report that Charles himself was on the march. John Casimir entered Danzig ; and Frederick William, detesting the Swede even more than his former suzerain, prepared to sell his alliance to the highest bidder. By the Treaty of Labiau (November, 1656) the Hohenzollern gained East Prussia in full sovereignty on condition of an eternal alliance with Sweden and aid in securing West Prussia, Kurland and Livonia for Charles.

To this ambiguous ally Charles added another in the person of Rakoczy, of Transylvania, who rushed across the Carpathians in winter to seize great Polish territories in the South. His greedy hordes, however, gave but little help, while spring brought the Imperialists and the Danes into the field. Weary of endless marches after an elusive foe, Charles seized upon war with Denmark with the same relief as his precursors in 1643. But Frederick William, wooed on all sides, found that the time to end the eternal alliance had already come. In September, 1657, he accepted the

full sovereignty over East Prussia from Poland and agreed to support her against Sweden.

Charles, meanwhile, by mighty marches, was drawing near to the danger zone in Denmark. When Frederick William betrayed him, he stood victorious in Southern Jutland, recruiting his small war-hardened army from the Germans in Danish pay, while the captured Danes were forcibly enlisted to serve against the Russians. All Jutland was plundered, and Charles determined on a ruthless dismemberment of the kingdom. Defeated by sea, he utilized the terrible winter to march into the Danish islands. Seven times his little army faced the risk of perishing or being interned by Nature. By February 11, 1658, after a fortnight of incredible adventure, the Swedes could dictate peace to Copenhagen. By the Treaty of Roeskilde, Denmark gave up her provinces beyond the Sound, with as much of Norway as the Swedes desired to make themselves secure. If Livonia and West Prussia could be held, Charles had gone far towards winning the dominion of the Baltic.

Triumph of Charles X.

In three years of war (1655–58) the northern system of Europe had been largely transformed or prepared for transformation. A renascent Russia, a dismembered Poland, an armed and ambitious Brandenburg, a Sweden lord of the great Scandinavian peninsula had been successively displayed. This northern system, however, scarcely influenced the main current of European affairs, save by the intrusion of some army in times of struggle, or by trade with the naval Powers. While Charles X was performing his great exploits, the West had proceeded at a gentler pace towards the settlement of its affairs. There the new factor, Cromwell, might hope to hold the balance, to the profit of the English Commonwealth, between France and Spain, wearied by twenty years of open war. Both bid for the sword which had conquered Scotland and Ireland, but Spain once more sacrificed profit to pride and to the faith. Philip declined to sanction English trade with the West Indies and refused the Bible to Englishmen in Spain. Mazarin,

Western Europe.

on the other hand, did not begrudge the conquest of Jamaica (1655), or of Channel ports, and obeyed the behest of the Protector to end the persecution of the Protestant Waldenses in Savoy. In 1656, the declaration of war against England cost Spain another fleet, while Condé's victory at Valenciennes over Turenne led to a definite alliance between France and England (March, 1657). In return for the assistance of her fleet and of 6,000 soldiers, England was promised Mardyck and Dunkirk.

The English alliance outweighed Condé's treason, and enabled France to win the war. In 1658, Turenne defeated Condé at the Dunes; fortresses fell; and it was clear that in Flanders Spain must relinquish hope. In other regions, too, French policy was in the ascendant. The Portuguese maintained their independence. The Dutch and English admitted France to a share in determining the status of the Baltic. She failed, indeed, to secure for her king or for a client the Imperial crown, which fell to Leopold I, a sluggish and unwarlike Habsburg (1658). But Mazarin retorted with a new League of the Rhine, by which the three Ecclesiastical Electors joined with Sweden, Brunswick, Hesse and Neuburg for mutual defence, of course against the Habsburgs. This League severed the communications between Spain and the Netherlands, thereby helping to convince the Spaniards of the hopelessness of continuing the war. Their pride yielded, although slowly, to the logic of facts and the blandishments of Mazarin, while the death of Cromwell removed a combatant whose interest might have required its prolongation.

Triumph of France.

Adroitly feinting a Savoyard marriage for his master, Mazarin hurried Philip into sanctioning peace and a marriage with the Infanta. The year 1659 was spent in negotiation. After five months' haggling on an island near the frontier, Mazarin emerged with the Treaty of the Pyrenees, which garnered in the fruits of nearly a quarter of a century of war. Condé, indeed, was reinstated and France abjured further interference in Italy and Portugal. But she carried her southern frontier to the Pyrenees, acquiring Roussillon and

Cerdagne ; her eastern, to the Rhine, Alsace being confirmed to her ; and her northern, almost to the further limits of Artois ; while she secured also many fortresses and a firmer hold upon Lorraine. Next year, Maria Theresa became Queen of France, having formally renounced her claims to the Spanish succession in consideration of a dowry which in fact was never paid. By securing the Infanta for France, Mazarin had prevented the Eastern Habsburgs from closer union with their Spanish cousins. From the Peace of the Pyrenees Europe begins to experience the ascendancy of France.

While the great conflict in the West was thus extinguished, the northern struggle, jealously regarded by the Sea Powers, was brought to an end by the diplomacy of many States. Early in 1658, Charles X had, almost by miracle, forced Denmark to conclude a humiliating peace. The Swedish Napoleon took literally the promises of mutual brotherhood made at Roeskilde, and dreamed of conquering his eastern foes with Denmark as his rearguard. Balked of an intimate alliance, he stealthily flung himself on Copenhagen. The nobles fled, but the King declared that he would die in his own nest, and the Danes checked the invaders by setting the suburbs on fire. The newly-ceded provinces rebelled ; Frederick William marched westwards from Berlin ; the superb Dutch fleet forced its way to the relief of Copenhagen ; in February, 1659, an attempt to storm the city was repulsed with heavy loss.

The End of Charles X.

The indomitable Charles refused to abandon his design, and spent months in preparing for a new attack. The Sea Powers and France had, however, resolved to end the war on terms neither of historic title nor of the reward of victory, but of general convenience. This was palpably attacked by Denmark's promise at Roeskilde to keep hostile ships out of the Baltic, nor would it be promoted if Sweden were to hold both shores of the Sound. By the so-called Concerts of the Hague they prescribed terms of peace, and their command of the sea enabled them to overwhelm the recalcitrant Charles on a Danish island. Before

the year closed, most of the Swedish Empire beyond the Livonian frontier had been lost.

Charles, none the less, did not give up the struggle. He negotiated with his more distant foes, awaited a conflict between Dutch and English, and counted, after the Peace of the Pyrenees, upon receiving help from France. In February, 1660, however, he died, and the settlement of the North by peaceful negotiation followed. Already the diplomatists of Sweden, Poland, and Brandenburg were in conference at Oliva, a monastery not far from Danzig. There John Casimir renounced that claim to the Swedish crown which had disturbed Europe for nearly seventy years. To Sweden he confirmed the cession of Livonia made to its conqueror, Gustavus, and to Brandenburg that of Eastern Prussia. Soon afterwards the treaty of Copenhagen with Denmark confirmed her main concessions at Roeskilde, but restored Trondhjem, the cradle of the Norwegian State. Next year, at Kardis, a peace of mutual restitution with Russia was concluded. Russia had done something to break down the wall between herself and Europe, but she abandoned all claim to Livonia.

§ 2. *The Ascendancy of Louis XIV*, 1661–1685

The year 1661, which opened with the death of Mazarin, might well seem destined to inaugurate an era of peace. After exhausting wars, both the North and the West of Europe had been settled reasonably, and in the main the settlements proved lasting. It was in conformity with the physical structure of the regions concerned, and in the interest of Europe, that the Pyrenees should divide France and Spain, and the Upper Rhine, France and Germany; that Artois should be French rather than Spanish, and that Sweden should reach the Sound and lose Trondhjem beyond the mountains, while Poland was far too weak and Russia far too barbarous to rule Livonia, where no contending party could base its claims on race.

The disappearance of the Commonwealth in England, the death of Charles X and the reinstatement of Condé removed

disturbing factors. Spain, Holland, Sweden and the Empire were in weak or peaceful hands, while Frederick William of Brandenburg had now to repeat in East Prussia that victory over the nobles which he had already achieved in his Electorate. The Danes, it is true, had converted Frederick III, the hero of Copenhagen, from a limited monarch to the most absolute in Europe, but he was a pacific prince of no great power. The Portuguese remained in arms for their independence, and the Turks, under the Grand Vizier Kiuprili, showed a new vigour, but otherwise the sky seemed clear. The nations of Europe, enriched by the bounty of the New World, might repair the ravages of war, and develop in peaceful intercourse along the lines laid down in the Peace of Westphalia.

The year 1661, none the less, is rather a landmark in the history of European strife. Louis XIV, electing to wield with his own hands the sceptre which Richelieu and Mazarin had made powerful over France, proceeded to substitute his own will for the public law of Europe. The inevitable reaction produced a general struggle almost as protracted as the War of Thirty Years and far more fruitful of battles.

Louis as King.

The young King, though endowed with matchless grace, was not, like his grandfather Henry IV, conspicuously French in type. For royal models Europe then looked to Spain, and Louis by descent was more than half a Spaniard. His stately reserve was heightened by a certain shyness, due to his solitary position, and to the rude trials of his early life amid the Fronde. In the ability to say and to do what was appropriate and regal he has never been surpassed; he was the punctual centre of a resplendent court; and, as years went by, he became more and more the human deity that he deemed himself to be, and that all around assured him that he was. But, though sincerely benevolent, and resolved to be the father of his people as well as to perform every other royal duty, he never loved mankind, and was happiest in retirement. Mazarin's devoted disciple, he turned at Mazarin's death to realize his own motto, "Less than God, but greater than the world."

Mazarin had reconciled and tamed the unruly nobles, and had trained up such instruments as Colbert with which his royal successor could govern France. But the finance of the realm had become almost the private affair of Fouquet, the Superintendent. Possessor of boundless wealth and of a private fortress, perhaps in secret league with foreign States or with the yet more dangerous nobles of the Fronde, he seemed to challenge the King and the challenge was promptly accepted. With every refinement of preparation and of treachery, Louis suddenly hurled him from power. The omnipotent Superintendent was banished for his lifetime to a distant prison, and his office done away. Supported by the laborious and servile Colbert, the King then proceeded to make the wealth and the will of France his own. This he did by the assiduous practice of the art of government, based on the ideas that all initiative came from the royal cabinet and was carried into effect by royal officers, that it must be the pride and duty of every Frenchman to follow the example of the King, whose will should be carried out by unrestricted force. Bound, as he believed, to give his people the same tokens of paternal kindness as he daily received from God, he expected them to receive with due submission whatever he might choose to send.

Although Louis toiled in person at the business of State, he could not dispense with colleagues. These must be able, diligent and inconspicuous. Men like Colbert, who completely reorganized the finances, and Louvois, who created a new army, met the King quietly day by day and posed as the mere agents of his will. The machinery of government was clumsy and confused, but these very defects favoured absolutism by rendering it possible for a Colbert, without open trespass, to penetrate into every department of the State. Louis filled all posts with his own nominees, and placed the dangerous nobles in the court and army under his own eye. In the ancient and miscellaneous provinces of France, as yet far from being fused into one kingdom, the royal power was exercised by the Intendants, each ubiquitous in a "*généralité*" or district of his own. As the reign went on, and the memory

of the Fronde became obliterated by the resplendent vision of the King, the distance between Louis and the greatest of his subjects increased, and opposition became impossible.

Colbert.

Colbert, indeed, designed to make the crown rich as well as supreme. Beginning with enormous confiscations of the public debt and moderate remissions of taxes, he proposed to acquire wealth by the organization of industry and commerce. Much was accomplished by the active intervention of the crown, but the King's tastes for building, for munificence and for war debarred himself and his people from prosperity. In taking glory as the goal of all his actions, Louis proclaimed an ideal which was shared by the upper classes of his people, whose opinion alone could make itself heard. He and they, however, formed but a tiny fraction of the population, and the masses suffered from his rule. It was upon their shoulders that the crushing burden of taxation fell, for, although the King claimed that all within the realm was his, he followed the traditional practice of exempting most of the rich from payments to the State. In striving to render France as prosperous as she was fertile, Colbert found himself obstructed by the belief of the exempted classes that labour was only fit for slaves. His work demanded not only peace but also progress in ideas, and Louis rejected both.

The European Situation.

While Colbert with inexhaustible energy set about the economic regeneration of France, Louis quietly and firmly grasped the reins of foreign policy. None of his ancestors could have dreamed of so brilliant an opportunity. Spain, contemptuous of labour, exhausted by war and overweighted by her ecclesiastics and her bureaucracy, already seemed doomed to decay. Only a sickly infant, the future Charles II, stood between Louis and his hope of the Spanish succession. Portugal, the client whom France had abandoned at the Pyrenees, only to help her secretly through London, was now on the point of securing her connection with England by the marriage of Catherine of Braganza to the newly-restored King Charles, a monarch who regarded Louis as the patron of his House.

Savoy, the Scandinavian States, Poland, the Turks, the Swiss, Mantua and the Princes of Tuscany formed an outer circle of Powers allied with France or at least susceptible to her influence. The Dutch, commercially and intellectually at the head of Europe, were her ancient and natural allies. If an estrangement came about, they would be found unpopular in Europe and governed by pacifists. In divided Germany the League of the Rhine gave Louis a strength surpassing that of the Emperor. Austria, if the eastern dominions of the Habsburgs may be comprised within that title, was a miscellaneous aggregate of provinces and races, with little unity either physical or of tradition, and with no outstanding men. Austrian weakness, indeed, invited Turkish attack, and thus laid Germany at the feet of France. Europe, traversed by the adroit and devoted ambassadors of Louis XIV, seemed likely to share her fate.

In 1662, Louis regained Dunkirk from his cousin of England, at the price of £200,000. He then sought glory by humiliating other powers—Spain, by claiming precedence over her ambassadors; England, by refusing to salute her flag in the narrow seas; the Pope, by courting a quarrel and exacting an immoderate apology; lesser States on all sides, by extorting unwonted ceremonial salutations. Europe was not slow to mark this challenge to the fundamental equality of nations, but Louis' wealth and power made opposition impossible. At the same time the King manifested his disapproval of the survival among his subjects of a faith which differed from his own. In 1661, commissioners inquired into the administration of the Edict of Nantes, and a policy was inaugurated towards the Huguenots which breathed the spirit of Ferdinand's Edict of Restitution. Urged on by the Catholic clergy, Louis turned first to legalistic persecution, and afterwards to breaches of the law.

Louis' Aggressive Policy.

The King next took occasion to sacrifice at once to religion and to glory by attacking the Barbary pirates. His forces proved the stronger, but failed to uproot the evil overseas. They were more successful in Europe, where Louis, as a

member of the League of the Rhine, sent 6,000 men to Western Hungary to repel the Turkish invaders. In August, 1664, their valour largely contributed to the victory of St. Gothard whence the Turks would have advanced upon Vienna. Eager to conclude the war, Leopold made a truce for twenty years, which left the suzerainty over Transylvania to the Sultan, and confirmed the Turkish hold on Hungary.

The contrast on the field of St. Gothard between French valour and German panic had hardened Louis in his design to renew the ancient struggle with the Habsburgs. The Spanish branch obstinately refused to annul the renunciation of the right of succession to their throne which Maria Theresa had made on becoming Queen of France. Louis, therefore, aided the Portuguese against them, and the victory of Villa Viciosa (1665) made the House of Braganza secure upon the throne.

At this juncture Philip IV died, and the Spanish succession depended on the feeble life of his little son, Charles II. If, as seemed likely every hour, this sickly King died childless, the vast empire of Spain would devolve by strict hereditary right upon Louis' son. The succession of the Dauphin, indeed, would be obstructed by a threefold barrier. His mother's renunciation might be in fact annulled by the non-payment of her dowry, which had been specified as the consideration for making it, while in any case it was not clear that unborn children could be deprived of their rights in such a way. More formidable, since it was based upon broader grounds of public welfare, was the objection that the union of the French and Spanish dominions would be detrimental to both. Louis, indeed, did not desire to add other crowns to that of France, or to carry the boundaries of his kingdom beyond the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees. He felt no reluctance, however, to accept a hegemony or an empire, nor to see some other of his descendants upon the throne of Spain. Such a Bourbon predominance, however, would be unlikely to please Europe, which had welcomed the overthrow of a less formidable Habsburg combination in 1648.

The Spanish Question.

From his first assumption of power, the Spanish succession problem remained foremost in Louis' mind, although its elements and the solution that he desired must necessarily vary from year to year. The births and deaths in the Bourbon and Habsburg families, the possibilities of other prizes, the strength or weakness of rival States, the current reputation of France—all these factors affected Louis' policy at any moment, and the prospects of its success. His principles, however, remained constant, and for many years his power steadily increased. Outside France, as within her boundaries, he believed, it was just and right that his will should prevail over that of all others, since God had designed this when He made him so great. Treaties, especially with Spain, must not be allowed to defeat the divine purpose. The glory of the House of Bourbon and the safety of a properly expanded France should be the foremost aims of his ambition.

To realize these principles became the daily endeavour of a monarch whose unrivalled diplomatists made him the best-informed person in the world, as the Cardinals had left him the most powerful. From the centre of France, which had become the centre of Europe, Louis studied what was passing everywhere, and, when the moment came, sent out the expedition on the side where glory or booty seemed to wait. Such tactics had been practised with great success by Sweden, and were commending themselves to Frederick William of Brandenburg and the Hohenzollern House. Their acceptance by the French nation resulted from the feeling that only autocracy could avert anarchy or the tyranny of the nobles, a feeling shared by many contemporary States.

England against the Dutch.

At the moment when the death of Philip IV inaugurated a new phase of the Spanish succession question England and Holland were at war. In June, 1665, the Duke of York won a signal victory off Southwold Bay, while the marauding army of the Bishop of Münster assailed the Dutch on land. To Louis, the war was doubly unwelcome, both as threatening the recall of the Orange family to power, and as occasioning an application from De Witt for the aid which he had promised by treaty.

War against England, moreover, would take place upon the sea, an element which placed royal dignity in peril and offered no hope of conquests. Constrained by his public pledge, however, in 1666 he made a show of joining in the war, while preparing with far more enthusiasm to assist Portugal against Spain. Having guarded by careful diplomacy against the intervention of the Emperor, the King of England, or the German princes, he utilized the preoccupation of the Dutch and English to invade Flanders (May, 1667).

This "war for the rights of the Queen," the so-called War of Devolution, owed its origin to Louis' thirst for glory.

The War of Devolution.

Deprived for the time being of the hope of a wider inheritance from Spain, he reverted to the familiar task of improving the French frontier on the north-east. Aware that his Dutch allies already regarded the French as better friends than neighbours, and that the English nation resented French conquests along the coast, he seized the moment of their mutual struggle for asserting his more than doubtful claims. By a local custom in Brabant and some of the neighbouring lands children succeeded to the estates of a deceased parent, the surviving spouse retaining only a life interest which was extinguished by re-marriage. Therefore, Louis maintained, his queen had been owner of much of the Netherlands since 1649, and was now entitled to full possession. While these transparent sophistries were expounded at Madrid, Turenne and the King, with 60,000 men, moved slowly through the almost defenceless region. Within five weeks of the Spanish declaration of war, the campaign was crowned by the reduction of Lille. It had discovered Vauban, the engineer whose genius was to make France almost impregnable, while the defence works of neighbouring nations could seldom cope with his attack.

Europe was shocked by the success of this cynical robbery, as Spain had been by the King's pronouncement. The Habsburgs, however, shrank from even such obvious steps as to fill up the Imperial army and to make peace with Portugal. Leopold, indeed, concluded with Louis a treaty for the eventual partition of the

The Triple Alliance.

Spanish dominions (January, 1668). But the Dutch, faced with the prospect of the French upon their frontiers, if not across them, hastened to make peace with England, and, in January, 1668, created the Triple Alliance. England and Holland, with Sweden as their supporter, agreed to settle the affairs of Western Europe as a decade earlier they had agreed to settle those of Scandinavia. Spain was to make peace with Portugal and to receive their protection against the aggression of France and her claims to the succession.

The Triple Alliance gained an immediate and amazing success. Spain recognized the independence of Portugal. France gave up Franche Comté, which Condé and the King had conquered in a few weeks. Spain ceded a dozen towns, including Douai, Courtrai and Lille. By the end of May, 1668, when a few months of resolute warfare promised to make Louis King of the Spanish Netherlands, the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle had been proclaimed. In war, as in the chase, Louis loved to show himself brave but superior to passion.

Every instinct, none the less, prompted him to seek revenge upon the Dutch. Although indebted to France for their political existence, they had thwarted her in a movement designed to protect her capital. They maintained a government, republican and Protestant, which outraged every instinct of the King. They sheltered exiles and allowed scribblers to print insults with impunity. In commerce, Colbert found them in the way. Irreverent and obstructive, they were doomed by Louis to annihilation.

Louis against the Dutch.

In 1670, the Duke of Lorraine, who had offered his services to the Allies, was exiled and his duchy occupied by the French. The old road from Spain to the Netherlands was thus for the moment closed. While the Dutch negotiated with the unstable Emperor, and took some measures of defence, Louis blotted out England by the secret Treaty of Dover (December, 1670) and purchased from the venal aristocrats of Sweden a promise of eventual intervention (April, 1672). Without assigning reasons, but relying on an army 176,000 strong, Louis then attempted to overwhelm the Dutch

as he had lately overwhelmed their Spanish neighbours. Allied with England and with many German States, he turned the barrier of the neutral Netherlands and attacked Holland by marching down the Rhine. William of Orange, to whom the Dutch had grudgingly confided the command, had neither troops nor skill to oppose Condé and Turenne, supported by Louvois, the ruthless Minister for War. Amsterdam seemed defenceless, when the opening of the dykes turned the surrounding country into a lagoon which the invaders could not cross. Louis then offered peace upon terms which would have left the northern provinces as a servile protectorate of France.

To save their liberty the Dutch people flew to arms. William of Orange was made Lieutenant of the Republic and the brothers De Witt were murdered. Spain, Brandenburg and the Emperor promised help. In December, William threatened for a moment to cross the frontier of France. Turenne, however, in a masterly winter campaign repelled the advancing Germans, and Frederick William of Brandenburg accepted a subsidy and made peace. As the year 1673 advanced, the French added to their successes on land, and, together with the English, struggled against Ruyter at sea. But the prolongation of the war beyond the first campaign was in itself a victory for the Power which was fighting near its own country and struggling for its existence with unquestionable right upon its side.

While Louis' prestige suffered and his funds were failing, a formidable coalition came to the rescue of the Dutch. An Imperial army, with the support of Spain, Denmark and Saxony, drove the French from the Rhine, and compelled their German allies to make peace. Early next year, Parliament forced Charles to make peace with Holland, while the Coalition continued to gain recruits among the German princes. In the summer, Frederick William again appeared in arms. The Dutch, once more masters of their country, and filled with hatred against the French who had laid it waste, now declined to grant Louis terms of peace.

Coalition against France.

In 1674, none the less, the French easily reconquered Franche Comté, thus bringing their frontiers to the Jura, while Condé checked the northern invaders at Seneff, and Turenne, with inferior forces, brilliantly drove the Germans across the Rhine. The Spaniards had vainly attacked on the side of the Pyrenees; Hungary distracted the Emperor; and the Swedes were marching into Brandenburg. Now that the French stood on the defensive, the superiority of their military machine and of their unity of command became clear. For his country's sake, William of Orange would have done well to end the war.

The two following campaigns, which witnessed the disappearance of the greatest generals on either side, changed the situation but little in the West, but transformed it in the north of Europe. At Fehrbellin, in June, 1675, Frederick William began a series of successes against the Swedes which gained him the title of the Great Elector. The Danes, meanwhile, had reconquered their lost provinces beyond the Sound. In 1676, however, the young Charles XI won a hard-fought victory at Lund, which made him in a few years absolute master of his kingdom. In 1677 and 1678, while the Great Elector expelled the Swedes from Pomerania and England drew ever nearer to war with France, the French were steadily successful on land. William of Orange, now the husband of Mary, Charles' niece, stubbornly opposed accommodation, but the Dutch sent envoys to negotiate at Nymegen. In 1678, after two years' negotiation, they came to terms, and Spain quickly followed. Next year the Emperor signed a treaty, followed most reluctantly by the Great Elector and by Denmark.

France had defied Europe through a seven years' war, and had gained Franche Comté and many towns in the Spanish Netherlands. Her frontier was now protected by a line of fortresses stretching from Dunkirk to the Meuse, while in return for Philipsburg she had secured the right to cross the Upper Rhine to her new stronghold of Freiburg. The ægis of Louis, moreover, had been thrown magnificently over Sweden, to whom the Great

The Peace of Nymegen.

Elector was forced to surrender all his conquests west of the Oder. In boundless rage against his ex-ally the Emperor, he turned thenceforward towards France.

The decade which followed the Treaty of Nymegen beheld Louis at the climax of his power and immeasurably the foremost potentate in Europe. "Le Roi Soleil" and France had become the centre of the universe, and their manners and language were everywhere accepted by the ruling class. The new Society of Nations, however, had fared ill in the generation which succeeded to the Great Peace of 1648. In place of a family of equal States, co-operating for the advantage of all, there had developed one predominant Power, claiming in virtue of its strength the right to make its will prevail in all disputes.

Zenith of Louis XIV.

This predominance was the more dangerous that the current of the age set strongly towards autocracy. Not only in France, but in Spain, among the German princes, in Denmark, Sweden, Russia—everywhere save in England and a few waning republics—the doctrine was now accepted that rule by a King responsible only to his own conscience was the order prescribed by God. Christianity, tradition, common sense provided some canons for international intercourse, but these fell far short of a valid international law. To the hostility of the Protestant States against Pope and Emperor, the relics of the old system, was now added the mutual jealousy of the diplomatists, the agents of the new. Without either a common superior or an established league of nations, the passions of royal men and the native appetities of States promised Europe a doleful future.

Eighteen years of Louis' personal rule had passed by without abolishing. his initial advantage derived from the exceptional weakness of other Powers. Spain now possessed an imbecile King and a decaying people. In England, the dynasty was discredited but no alternative had yet been found. The Emperor was a weathercock, and of the German princes the strongest were Louis' allies. The Pope had been constrained to accept successive humiliations. The Scandinavian volcano seemed extinct, and from the Slavonic

world nothing need be apprehended. True to his principles, Louis seized the opportunity to acquire fresh glory for himself and for his people. While the flight of many Huguenots marked the progress of France towards compulsory uniformity in religion, Versailles was rising, at vast cost in money and in lives, to become the classic monument of the Great King. At the same time legal commissions were set up to determine the misty rights conceded to France by the treaties of 1648 and 1679. The work of these Chambers of Union was aided by the movement of French troops, and in a few years Strassburg and Luxemburg, the northern Gibraltar, had become French possessions. Casale was also acquired, while the Emperor was prevented from interfering by a formidable Turkish invasion. No force in Germany seemed likely to prevent Louis from extending, by bribery and show of force, his frontiers at his pleasure.

William of Orange.

William of Orange therefore became more and more the rising hope of Europe. His personal moderation and the greatness of his services to the country in the war enabled him to retain power in Holland, while in England the opposition counted upon him to check the subservience of the dynasty towards France. If, through his agency, England could be brought back to her normal position of arbiter between conflicting Powers upon the Continent, liberty might yet be saved. The prospect would be far brighter if William could thus win England before Louis disposed of part or all of the vast inheritance of Spain.

In 1681, on the eve of Louis' most conspicuous robbery, William had brought about a renewal of the defensive understanding between Sweden and the Dutch. That these powers were in league to uphold the settlement made at Westphalia and Nymegen was the more important that in Sweden Charles XI was giving proof of high organizing capacity and strength of will. Next year, thanks to the unceasing exertions of William, Spain and the Emperor gave their adhesion, while several German princes united to defend the established order. Louis was disturbed but not dismayed by these hostile symptoms. Brandenburg, with which he formed a closer union,

and Denmark, the other natural enemy of Sweden, with which he made a treaty, would go far towards preventing intervention from the north. In Holland he supported the peace party, headed by Amsterdam, and thus paralysed his opponent. The Declaration of the Four Articles displayed him as the champion of Gallican liberties, and contemptuous of the power of the Pope. And the superiority of France to the nascent Coalition became complete when the Turks once again moved on Vienna.

At the news of the Turkish movement, for which he had prepared the way by aiding revolt in Hungary, the Most Christian King could not do less than suspend his attacks upon Luxemburg and other Imperial possessions in the West. He hoped, indeed, that the new peril would induce the Emperor to acquiesce in the seizures already made. John Sobieski, however, convinced of Louis' treason, led a Polish army to relieve Vienna, and Louis hastened to attack the Spanish Netherlands. The war, waged gently so as not to alarm the Dutch, was prolonged into the year 1684, but ended with a complete victory for France. By a skilful mixture of bribery, threats and moderation, Louis secured with Spain and the Empire a truce of twenty years, during which he was to hold Luxemburg and the districts, including Strassburg, "united" up to 1681. Triumphant over Pope, Emperor, the Dutch and Spain as fully as over the Huguenots and the Fronde, with this Truce of Ratisbon Louis reached the brilliant climax of his reign. The advent of an embassy from Siam showed the world-wide character of his renown.

The Truce of Ratisbon.

Signs were not wanting, however, that the future would not be cloudless. Wars and extravagance had ruined the French finances beyond even the power of a Colbert to restore them, and in 1683, Colbert himself had died. The most vigorous of Louis' ministers thenceforward was Louvois, whose name stood for war brutally carried on. The steady flight of Huguenot families could not fail to impoverish France. The enormous standing army further drained her resources. Her alliances were

Louis past his Meridian.

for the most part purchased at a high price, and in spite of all her expenditure, she possessed several implacable enemies and no firm friend. The Imperial House had been insulted beyond measure, and the Emperor was now victorious over the Turks. Spain, of all Powers the proudest, had been treated as of no account. William of Orange and the Pope could neither forget nor conscientiously forgive. Poland and Sweden, ancient allies of France, were alienated; Brandenburg, Denmark, and Savoy had learned to expect nothing but galling tutelage and gold in return for their alliance. Louis, it seemed, could maintain his conquests unchallenged only by self-effacement. His conduct on the morrow of the Truce of Ratisbon formed an insensate challenge to Europe.

In 1684, Genoa suffered a destructive bombardment for having leaned towards Spain. The ostentatious endeavours of France to become supreme in the Mediterranean aroused the jealousy of the naval Powers. The new King of England, James II, was incited to make himself absolute. On the death of the Elector Palatine, Louis claimed a share in the succession for the Duchess of Orleans, and Germany expected a revival of the Chambers of Union. October 22, 1685, was made for ever memorable by the most fatal act of all—the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The conversion of Huguenots by hundreds of thousands had indeed been proceeding for years past, by way of influence and pressure, culminating in the quartering upon them of dragoons. Such measures, however they might debase the moral currency of the nation, remained the domestic affair of France. But the prohibition of Huguenot worship and the destruction of Huguenot temples, coupled with Louis' palpable efforts to make England Catholic and to drive the Protestants from Savoy, suggested a design to destroy the Reformation and to enforce religious uniformity in Europe.

The Revocation.

§ 3. *The Decline of Louis XIV*, 1685–1713

While the Pope and the Catholic sovereigns resented Louis' usurpation, the Protestants feared for their religion. The

defence of the Palatinate gave William of Orange a focus for a great coalition in restraint of France. In 1686 and 1687 he united almost all Europe save England in the defensive League of Augsburg. Meanwhile the Turks, the traditional allies of France against the Emperor, were driven from Hungary, Croatia and Transylvania with a speed that seemed almost to promise their impending eviction from Europe. While the Imperialists prepared to take Belgrade, the Venetians seized upon Southern Greece, and the vanquished and mutinous troops deposed the Sultan and pillaged Constantinople. This was the hour which Louis deemed appropriate for compelling the Pope to respect the right of the French ambassador to shelter fugitives from justice and for attacking the commercial privileges of the Dutch.

The League of Augsburg.

Next year (1688) came the inevitable rupture. Europe could not permanently acquiesce in the dictatorship of the King of France, nor could Louis remain inactive while the League of Augsburg gathered strength. That war came this year must be attributed partly to the downfall of the Turks, but chiefly to a crisis in Cologne. There Louis pressed for the election of a protégé as Archbishop, while the Pope assigned the see to a Bavarian prince. Louis had occupied Cologne and installed his own nominee, for whom a majority of the chapter had voted. He declared to the Pope that he would not retrace his steps, and proceeded to seize Avignon.

The English Revolution.

Meanwhile the birth of a son to James II in June had given rise to a conspiracy between William of Orange and the English opposition. Louis vainly sent warnings and offers of assistance to his kinsman. Since the more pliant Charles II had failed to make England his tool, and since James might even prove hostile to France, it seemed politic to allow William to embark upon his difficult and dangerous enterprise. Civil war would doubtless render England impotent for some considerable time, while removing, in William of Orange, the greatest obstacle from Louis' path. Late in September, therefore, the French moved eastwards to secure their claims. In less than two months

they had mastered the greater part of the Palatinate and almost all the left bank of the middle Rhine. Avignon offered no resistance.

Louis supposed that this show of power would reduce Pope and Emperor to peace. Late in November, he declared war also against the Dutch, who had laid aside their party quarrels to support the enterprise of William, declaring that the close relationship between James and Louis imperilled their religion and their independence. The Empire, however, resolved on armed resistance; James fled to France; and in 1689 Louis found almost all Europe ranged against him.

The war of the League of Augsburg, styled in virtue of the Treaty of Vienna (1689) the War of the Grand Alliance, arose directly from Louis' political mistakes. He had thought fit to break the Truce of Ratisbon, believing that the vacillating Emperor would be paralysed by the renown of his arms and the reviving menace from the Turks. The new Kiuprili might prove as formidable as the old, and Louis had never yet failed to secure allies within the Empire. He ignored, however, the rising tide of indignation against his violence in Alsace and in Cologne, while the year 1689 began with a ferocious devastation of the Palatinate.

Europe against Louis XIV.

In ordering the destruction of Heidelberg, Mannheim, Worms and Speier, Louvois doubtless calculated on assisting the defence of France. His ruthlessness, which left scars hideous after two hundred years, swung the German princes to the side of the Emperor, and made resistance certain. Brandenburg, where in 1688 the shallow Frederick had succeeded to the Great Elector, resolutely took the German side, and even Bavaria was deaf to Louis' appeals. The Revocation, which provoked a stubborn revolt in the Cevennes, gained no Catholic support and alienated every Protestant. So long as the King stood by the Articles of 1682, the Pope must remain his enemy. The sustained aggression on the frontier caused even decadent Spain to take up the cause of the Dutch. Savoy, resenting the contemptuous suzerainty of France, joined what seemed the stronger side. As William

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III of England, Louis' lifelong enemy, endowed the Grand Alliance with a soul.

The obvious course for France was at all costs to recover England. Her command of the sea enabled her to restore James in Ireland, whence she might hope to strike at William's novel power. So long as he was fully occupied in self-defence, and the Emperor battling with the Turks, the remnants of the Grand Alliance could give Louis little trouble. He withdrew his preposterous claims upon the Court of Rome and restored Avignon to the new Pope, Alexander VIII. In 1690 his armies on the Continent held the upper hand. Spain was invaded, the eastern frontier guarded with fair success, that of the north-east brilliantly cleared by Luxemburg's victory at Fleurus, and Savoy chastised at Staffarda. The command of the sea was maintained against the combined Dutch and English off Beachy Head, while the Turks retook Belgrade. All this, however, was outweighed by the rout of James' army on the Boyne. Master of the Three Kingdoms, William could hope in the next campaign to lead the Allies into France. They proposed to restore the territorial arrangements of 1659 and to make the Emperor heir of Spain.

France, though weakened by the deaths at this juncture of the heads of her naval and military administration, showed in the uneventful campaign of 1691 the advantages of a single military Power against a bulky coalition. For the most part encamped on foreign soil, her armies inflicted far more harm than they received. If, however, the resolution of the many Powers proved equal to that of the one, their superior resources might enable them to triumph by her exhaustion, without victory in the field. The untiring diplomacy of William and the memory of Louis' unexampled insolence, formed the cement of the Grand Alliance.

To dissolve it, Louis with sure instinct struck at the bases of William's power. In 1692, however, the adverse naval battle of La Hogue and the financial needs of his armies put an end to his hopes of restoring James by conquest. On land he was more fortunate, humiliating William by the capture of Namur, followed by

Louis foiled by England.

the victory of Luxemburg at Steinkerke. Next year, although the French made progress in the Netherlands, and at Neerwinden won a great success, the campaign was robbed of decisive effect by Louis' over-prudent interference with his marshal's plans. In France, supplies were failing, and among the Allies the will to make further sacrifice.

Louis, victorious in the Netherlands, Piedmont and the Mediterranean, suggested moderate terms of peace, but would not renounce his claim to the Spanish succession. The war therefore dragged on uneventfully through 1694, peace being again postponed by the refusal of Louis to cede Ypres and other northern towns. In 1695, the death of Luxemburg weakened the French, who lost Namur to William, while their revenue no longer sufficed to maintain the fleet. Exhausted and discordant, however, the Allies were incapable of pursuing their advantage, and in 1696 they were deserted by Savoy. Menaced by Catinat and bribed by Louis, the Duke set out to conquer Milan from his late allies, undertaking if successful to cede Savoy itself to France. His treason drove the Habsburg troops from Italy, and diminished the willingness of Louis to make concessions.

The evacuation of Italy strengthened the French nearer home, while a new Turkish revival weakened their opponents.

A Moderate Peace.

While Spain, none the less, demanded a return to 1659, and the Emperor to 1648, the Dutch and English had nothing to gain by further sacrifice. France proved in 1697 that she could strike with effect in the Netherlands and in North America. While at Ryswyk, near the Hague, the customary long-drawn negotiations were proceeding under the mediation of Sweden, Portland and Boufflers quietly sketched out an agreement. Spain was coerced by the capture of Barcelona; the Emperor, by the unanimity of his allies. Louis at the same time was weakened by the election of Augustus of Saxony to the throne of Poland (1697) and by a double disaster to the Turks. In 1696, the Russian Tsar, Peter, with a new navy had deprived them of Azov, and Prince Eugene had embarked upon a

career which included the victory of Zenta (September, 1697).

The Peace of Ryswyk in the main restored the settlement made at Nymegen,—a result which might have been arrived at without the last four campaigns. Besides great trading concessions, the Dutch gained the right to garrison a barrier of Spanish fortresses on the frontier towards France, while in England William was recognized as King, and Anne, the late Queen's sister, as his heir. To the Empire, Louis conceded all his acquisitions beyond the Rhine and his claims upon the Palatinate and Cologne. West of the Rhine he retained of his later "unions" only Strassburg, Landau, Longwy and Saarlouis.

Such a settlement, after a war in which France had gained many victories on land while incurring very few defeats, might well be represented as a triumph of law, and a renunciation of Louis' provocative domination over Europe. His abandonment of the Stuart cause amounted to an admission that Kingship might be based not on a commission given by God, but on a contract made with men. Such a Kingship, established in Protestant England, would ill accord with the France of the Revocation, and without English connivance the French could hardly hope to impose their will upon their neighbouring States. Whether prompted by the dire need of his people or by the design of disarming opposition to his hopes from Spain, Louis showed notable moderation in thus concluding the war. The nine years of its continuance had cost France her foremost men both in civil and military administration, while the ageing King took upon his own shoulders a heavier share in the burden of government than any man could safely bear. After the death of his Spanish queen in 1683, Louis had secretly married Madame de Maintenon, the guardian of one of his illegitimate families of children. Her quiet influence pervaded his later years, undoubtedly increasing his powers of work, but also influencing in some degree his decisions, which were often taken in her presence. Her dominant desire was that all men should embrace the Catholic faith.

From the conclusion of the Peace of Ryswyk, Europe

breathlessly awaited the catastrophe of Spain. Lord of the fairest empire in the world, Charles II, a melancholy and impoverished invalid, interposed only his waning life between his subjects and the horrors of a wellnigh insoluble dispute. All that appeared certain was that no Spaniard could expect to win the crown, and that no expatriated member of the royal House could produce a claim clearly superior to that of others, while the proudest nation in the world would bitterly resent partition. How far the reigning King could dispose of his dominions by will was a legal question to which the answer was unknown. Charles II hated Louis without loving any other aspirant to the succession. His queen, a detested but dominating German, favoured Austria. It might well happen that at the close of the King's life the decisive word would be spoken by the Church, and that it would express the preference of a moment which could not be foreseen.

The Spanish Succession Question.

The Spanish succession question, however, was too wide and weighty an affair to be decided by the momentary impulse of a dying man, or even by a "diligent reckoning of great-grandmothers" on strict hereditary lines. Resolved in one way, it might place Europe at the feet of France; in another, a second Charles V would be created; in a third, the prosperity of the Dutch and English would become secure. With no tribunal to invoke, and no clear law to follow, the several Powers therefore attempted in their own individual interests to anticipate events by intrigues and by negotiation. While the King of Portugal and the Dukes of Savoy and Orleans were descendants of Philip II, their claims appeared notably inferior to those of the Houses of Austria, Bavaria and France. Apart from renunciations made by the Spanish princesses at their marriage, strict hereditary right would give the twenty-two crowns of Spain to Louis' son. If renunciations imposed by Spain were valid but those imposed by the claimants upon one another were void, the Electoral Prince of Bavaria had the better claim. If, however, the Emperor Leopold had been well advised in granting his daughter's hand in

return for a renunciation, then he was himself the natural heir.

But for her Austrian queen, Spain would have sought continued unity and safety in the succession of the Electoral Prince. The Queen, however, forced on a connection with the Emperor, whose cause the Sea Powers were bound by the Grand Alliance to support. In 1698, she weakened his position by an unsuccessful *coup d'état*, while two most politic moves by Louis opened his campaign. Harcourt, an ambassador as skilful as the Austrians were clumsy, was sent to Spain, and he was instructed that the rights of the Dauphin might be transferred to whichever of his sons the Spaniards should freely choose. Spain was surrounded by the fleet and armies of France, ready to defend her for a Bourbon or to deny her to a German King.

At the same time Louis showed unexpected modesty in negotiations with England and the Dutch. Since the natural preference of the Sea Powers was for a King of Spain who would grant them the commerce of the world, and for arrangements that would everywhere curb France, an agreement seemed unlikely. They were, however, in the stage of reaction after a long war, while Louis at this moment deliberately preferred the repose of Europe to the humiliation of the Habsburg House. In October, 1698, therefore, a secret Treaty of Partition was subscribed. The three Powers agreed that the bulk of the Spanish succession, Spain, the Netherlands and the New World, should pass to the Electoral Prince, while the Dauphin would receive Naples, Sicily, the Tuscan ports, Finale and Guipuzcoa, and the Emperor's son Charles the rich duchy of Milan.

The Partition Treaties.

The Emperor, whose belief in his claims was absolute, was furious at the news, but his fury fell upon Bavaria. France had reserved to herself chiefly points which would strengthen her in the distant Mediterranean, while the Electoral Prince presumed to rob him of Spain and Belgium. The blow fell, moreover, at the moment when he had brought to a triumphant close his long-

Position of the Emperor.

drawn struggle with the Turks. By the Peace of Carlowitz, in January, 1699, the victories of Eugene and Sobieski, of Peter the Great and the Venetian fleet were translated into terms of land. To the Habsburgs, the Sultan yielded Hungary and Transylvania, with much of Croatia and Slavonia, retaining only the Banat of Temesvar. The Tsar, his new rival, kept Azov at the mouth of the Don, thus menacing the Black Sea, that pure and undefiled virgin of the Turkish Empire. Poland regained Podolia, and the Morea was ceded to Venice. Leopold, master of victorious armies, could now turn his undivided attention to the West.

Within a fortnight, death freed him from his presumptuous rival, and Europe expected war. Louis, however, again negotiated with conspicuous moderation, claiming only modest additions to the existing territories of France. The heated opposition to William in England and the fury of the Scotch at the failure of the Darien scheme helped to make the Sea Powers more tractable, and, in March, 1700, a second Treaty of Partition was concluded. The Archduke Charles now replaced the Electoral Prince as the chief heir, while the Dauphin was to add Milan to his portion and to exchange it for Lorraine. The arrangement was firmly rejected by the Emperor, and the Duke of Savoy would not consent to the extinction of his hopes of Milan. The Dutch and English merchants, moreover, feared that the French at Naples would destroy their trade with the Levant. The King of Portugal accepted the Treaty, but its unpopularity in Germany and Italy proved the wisdom of Louis in not demanding more. His reign had replaced the old idea of France the Liberator by that of France the Tyrant.

If, as in the summer of 1700 seemed inevitable, the death of Charles II would occasion a new struggle between Bourbon and Habsburg, it was of high importance to know whom each could count on as allies. France had lost the Turks and the Emperor refused to believe that the Sea Powers would come to her assistance. Savoy might perhaps be bought over once again. The Swiss and Venice would stand neutral. In Germany she could count on Bavaria and Cologne. The

North had become involved in a widespread war through the attempt of the rulers of Denmark, Poland and Russia to partition the dominions of Charles XII, since 1697 the King of Sweden. Brandenburg had been left by the Great Elector in a state far different from its helplessness in the days of Gustavus and of Charles X. His son Frederick, master of a powerful army, could now choose either to seek territorial profit from the northern war, or to preserve neutrality on the Baltic and speculate in the troubles of the West. Devoured by longing for a crown, he turned to the Emperor, whose eagerness for the Spanish succession blinded him to the danger of rendering Berlin independent of himself. In return for the promise of 8,000 men and of the Brandenburg vote at elections, he permitted Frederick to become King in Prussia, and in January, 1701, the new monarch crowned himself at Königsberg with most elaborate pomp. But for some unexpected turn in the northern war or new revolt in his unruly eastern dominions, the Emperor would enjoy unwonted security in his flanks and rear.

Leopold counted likewise upon help from Spain, the secular foe of France, and the Power whose monarch had given him the most flattering assurances. Louis shared this view, but the summer of 1700 witnessed a total revolution. Outraged by the idea of partition at the will of the despised Dutch and English, Court and people forgot their ancient hatred of the French, and embraced the hope of averting dismemberment by placing a Bourbon on the throne. The approval of the Pope, who feared to see Naples in the Emperor's hands, helped to overcome the reluctance of Charles II to favour the rival House. At last the approach of death, the unanimous opinion of the Councils, and the exhortations of the Church brought him even to defy his queen. In October, he bequeathed the undivided succession to the Dauphin's son, Anjou, with the proviso that the crowns of France and Spain should never be united. If neither Anjou nor his younger brother accepted the terms, the inheritance passed to the Archduke Charles, and failing him, to the House of Savoy. On November 1 he died.

Louis, at sixty-two, was confronted by a terrible dilemma. A few weeks earlier, his ambassador at Madrid had reported that the will appointed the Archduke. Five days before the great news came, he and his advisers had decided to stand by the Partition. Now, however, the whole succession was theirs to accept or to reject; and, failing immediate acceptance, it would pass to their hereditary foes. To oppose the will would be to renounce every dynastic principle, and to deprive the Dauphin of an inheritance which he claimed both by hereditary right and by the choice of the Spanish King and people. This renunciation, humiliating for any Bourbon and for Louis XIV wellnigh impossible, would bring France an appreciable gain of territory, provided that the Sea Powers stood firm and helped her to fight down the resistance of the Emperor and of Spain. But Louis might well be doubtful whether William, his lifelong enemy, would enlist the peace-loving merchants of London and Amsterdam in a war for French aggrandizement. To accept the will was to be sure at least of Spain, and since Spain and France were never to be united, the balance of European power need not be overthrown. The object of the Partition Treaty might thus be attained, and the Sea Powers would have nothing to contest. Without them the Emperor might safely be defied.

Louis' Choice.

After two days of anxious debate, Louis resolved to take the bolder course. With his wonted magnificence, he called upon his courtiers to behold in his grandson Philip V of Spain. "His birth summoned him to that throne, and all the nation insists that I should send him thither. I fulfil their desire with pleasure; it was the decree of heaven." The new King he exhorted to be a good Spaniard but to remember his French birth and to maintain the union between the two nations, both for their mutual happiness and for the peace of Europe. The Spanish ambassador rejoiced that the Pyrenees were overthrown. Early in 1701, Philip made a triumphal progress from one enraptured country to the other.

For some months Louis' calculations appeared well-founded. While the Emperor furiously prepared for war, the

Sea Powers were not to be moved from their love of peace. Portugal preferred the French alliance to the English. The Pope recognized the new King of Spain. Savoy accepted the situation. To Bavaria and Cologne, clients of France, might be added if necessary other German princes who resented the promotion of Frederick of Brandenburg to be a king. In April, the English Tories compelled William to recognize Philip V. In May, the Emperor's troops invaded Milan, while the Sea Powers were still negotiating on his behalf with France.

So far as the directing heads of England and Holland were concerned, negotiations with Louis were merely a prelude to war. William and Heinsius entertained no illusions with regard to the future moderation of France or her respect for Spanish independence. Both, however, had to reckon with their people, and had Louis promptly made politic concessions, the people might well have kept the peace. The key to the situation lay in the Spanish Netherlands. So long as these were in their own keeping or in that of a strong enemy of France, the Dutch could feel secure. Philip V on their frontiers meant Louis XIV, and they remembered the ruthless devastation of the war of 1672. They demanded a barrier of fortresses against Louis; he gave them fortified lines directed against themselves. Their appeal to England roused a popular response.

Impolicy of Louis XIV.

Whatever concessions might be made thereafter could hardly allay the suspicions which Louis' natural action had aroused. A weak State under a docile grandson could not conceivably be treated as an equal by the Great King of France. Louis, in fact, treated Spain as a vassal kingdom, defending her provinces, instructing her ambassadors, ordering her monarch to lose no time in carrying out his commands, turning the commerce of her colonies into a monopoly of the French. The merchants, who had preferred the will to the Treaty because the Treaty threatened to close the Mediterranean, now saw themselves excluded from the ocean and ceased to cry out for peace.

While the Emperor, thanks to Eugene, gained the advan-

tage in Italy, England and Holland formed with him the Grand Alliance of the Hague (September, 1701). This formed in effect a third Partition Treaty, to be imposed by force upon France and Spain. Whereas Louis had reserved the rights of Philip to the eventual succession in France, the Allies decreed that the two crowns should never be united. The Emperor was to receive great compensation in Italy for his loss of the Spanish succession. The Netherlands were to be conquered for the safety of the Dutch. The commerce of the Sea Powers was everywhere to be safeguarded against the designs of France. For such advantages, it might well be expected, the Dutch would fight until their own safety was assured; the Emperor, as long as his allies would bear the expenses; England, until the cost of the war plainly outweighed its profit. Before the month was out Louis had strengthened the Alliance in its weakest place by recognizing the Old Pretender as *de jure* King of England. This concession to his own conception of royal duty cost him all and more than all the advantage which he would otherwise have gained from the death of William in March, 1702. The tide of public indignation carried England into the War of the Spanish Succession, which was declared by the three allies in May. She recognized this as a war of English Independence, and as campaign succeeded campaign her exertions grew greater instead of less.

Europe against Louis.

The new war differed from that which closed at Ryswyk in that Spain now fought on the side of France, while the northern struggle kept armies on foot which might at any moment intervene. Whereas William of Orange had by unwearied exertions linked together the former Coalition, three men were now pre-eminent—Heinsius, the Grand Pensionary of a State in which no Stadtholder succeeded William; Eugene, far surpassing any native Austrian in talent; and Marlborough, flawless alike in diplomacy and war. Against these men and their States, which could maintain an enormous host of Germans, France could set the ageing King, who at least gave unity to her exertions;

Prospects in the War.

ministers and generals, some good, some bad, as Court influences and flattery might decide ; and an economic strength already impaired by war and destined as war continued inevitably to decline. Although the fortresses of Vauban might guard her against invasion, her recruiting-ground was far smaller than that of the Allies, and her inferiority at sea forbade the hope of material succour such as they enjoyed. Using her superior unity and preparation, she must therefore disintegrate the Coalition in the first campaigns or expect to lose the war.

French hopes of rapid victory were damped by the advent of Marlborough. His genius, it is true, was fettered by the Dutch, who were determined that the army which they had hired should remain between the French frontier and themselves. But in 1702, while Villars defeated the Imperialists at Friedlingen, and Vendôme drove them from Mantua, Boufflers in the north suffered a series of reverses culminating in the loss of Liège. In Vigo Bay a rich convoy fell to the English fleet. In 1703, Villars continued his successes, but the opposition of his Bavarian ally prevented him from marching on Vienna, and drove him to resign. Meanwhile blow after blow fell upon Louis' cause. Huguenots, called from their white shirts Camisards, rose in the fastnesses of the Cevennes. Savoy, changing sides in the hope of enlarging her dominions, darkened the prospects of Vendôme. Marlborough drove the French from the Electorate of Cologne. Portugal, seduced by the Methuen treaty of commerce with England, opened the way into the Peninsula. The Allies now resolved to make the Archduke King of Spain.

War of the Spanish Succession.

When the campaign of 1704 opened, the French still retained a hold upon Italy, Southern Germany and Spain. A Hungarian revolt distracted the Emperor and Villars was strong enough to cripple the Camisard rebellion. The recovery of Peter the Great after his signal defeat at Narva promised at least to postpone any hostile move by Charles XII of Sweden. But on land alone Louis must provide for five theatres of war, against

The Allies and Marlborough.

opponents stronger in men, money and, as it now appeared, in genius for war. In August Gibraltar fell to Rooke, being guarded, it was said, by fifty men with one gun fit to fire. The English could now aspire to command the Mediterranean. Nine days later, on the Danube, the combined French and Bavarian army was shattered by Marlborough at Blenheim. Her sole ally fled to France for shelter ; the sequence of sixty years of victories was rudely broken ; henceforward the war might well become a siege of Louis' realm. In November, Marlborough, as the heir to William in diplomacy, journeyed to Berlin to compose the differences which continually hindered the Allies and to prevent Frederick I from passing from the western to the northern war.

Louis saw more and more clearly that only by merging the two struggles into one could France hope for a successful issue, and the son of the Great Elector could hardly fail to suspect that he might gain more from the overthrow of Sweden or of Poland than from the possible humiliation of France. The Sea Powers, his paymasters for the time being, had the liveliest interest in preventing that commercial expansion which the Great Elector had attempted, and England was likely to uphold the neighbouring House of Hanover against its Hohenzollern rival. In dispelling by personal graciousness and timely corruption the influence of these considerations, Marlborough may well have rendered the Allies a service as great as that of Blenheim. The two wars remained mutually independent, and a solid Prussian corps was assigned to the Italian field.

In 1705, none the less, the successes of the Allies were confined to Spain and to the sea. The death of Leopold in May placed his less conciliatory son Joseph at the head of the Coalition. Dissensions between the Allied authorities foiled the bold plan of Marlborough for the invasion of France. In Italy, Vendôme conquered all Piedmont save Turin. With French assistance the Hungarian insurrection was maintained, while the Emperor also suffered embarrassment and humiliation from the intrusion of Charles XII into Silesia. Gibraltar, however, was firmly held, and the exploits of the eccentric

Peterborough issued in the capture of Barcelona and in the adhesion of Catalonia and parts of the neighbouring provinces to the cause of Charles III. Louis, unable to win the war, but confronted with a band of mutually jealous foes, offered a new Partition, which would leave Spain and the Indies to his grandson, and give France and the other claimants moderate compensation. He was foiled by the genius of Marlborough who, in a second winter journey, reconciled the Allies, kept Frederick from adventure in the north, and recalled the Emperor to his duty in the western field of war.

Louis could only attempt to conquer peace by a supreme effort on land. In 1706, he arrayed eight armies, three on the frontier, two in Spain and one in Italy, in Portugal and in the Netherlands. The fleet, moreover, was dispatched to assist in regaining Barcelona. Nowhere, however, was his cause victorious, and the failure of his arms caused the failure of his negotiations. In May, Peterborough saved Barcelona, while Marlborough's great victory at Ramillies won the Netherlands for Charles III. Next month, the hated English, Catalans and Portuguese bore the new sovereign in triumph to Madrid. In September, Eugene, aided by a corps of Prussians, crushed his French opponents at Turin. The Spaniards, indeed, had restored Philip to his capital, but by the close of the fifth campaign three of the original theatres of war had been abandoned by the French.

Unable further to contest Southern Germany, the Netherlands and Italy, and distinctly overmatched at sea, Louis must concentrate on the defence of a narrower field and again attempt negotiation. He resigned himself to a drastic Partition, but not to Philip's dethronement. Marlborough, however, steadfastly opposed any such termination of the war, and so long as the Sea Powers did not compel a peace, the Emperor would never relinquish hope of Spain. Early in 1707, when the triumph of the Allies appeared imminent, he found himself King of Naples, while Milan fell to his brother, the so-called Spanish King.

One hope, apart from that which Vauban's fortresses and

the martial nature of his people might inspire, Louis still retained. Charles XII, after eight years of victory, was encamped in the heart of Saxony, with Germany at his feet. Sweden might rescue France as at Nymegen France had rescued Sweden.

Charles XII and the Northern War.

The war which in 1707 had thus made Charles XII the arbiter of Europe, and which was destined to transform the North, was one of the strangest in history. The shy young viking, Charles XI, after saving the Swedish mainland from the Danes and accepting from Louis XIV the salvation of Pomerania, had devoted his manhood to the consolidation of his power and kingdom. As ruthless as the Great Elector, though more honest, he bequeathed to his son in 1697 strong forces by land and sea and a revenue sufficient to maintain them. Charles XII, whom his subjects insisted upon making absolute at fifteen, also inherited the dislike of all his neighbours for a Swedish empire based on force, and the particular hatred of the nobles of Livonia which Gustavus had annexed from Poland. These men, largely the descendants of German crusaders against the northern heathen, clung desperately to their almost sovereign rights, and resented the attempt of Charles XI to reduce them to the level of his Swedish nobles. Their spokesman had been John Patkul, now a fugitive from justice and determined to compass his and their revenge.

Thanks to Patkul, the latent hostility of the neighbouring Powers was organized into a league of spoliation. Tempted by the youth and inexperience of Charles XII, the new King of Denmark, Frederick IV, joined with the Tsar Peter and Augustus of Poland and Saxony in a far-reaching plan. By a combined attack on the boy King, they would tear from Sweden the conquests made by Gustavus and by Charles X. Russia might thus win access to the sea; Poland, Livonia; Denmark, her lost possessions; while all would be rid of the preponderance of an ambitious military State. Brandenburg, they might well suppose, would be more likely to join them in hopes of Swedish Pomerania than to oppose them for anything that a trans-Baltic Power could give.

The conspiracy of 1699, however, met with an unexpected

and amazing resistance from its victim. In 1700, while his lieutenants drove the Saxons from the walls of Riga, Charles suddenly descended upon Denmark and compelled her to make peace. This daring feat owed something to the assistance of the Sea Powers, who upheld their own settlement of 1660 the more readily that they desired no rival struggle to that which was imminent in the West. Then, crossing the Baltic into Estonia, he made a dangerous march across the province to rescue Narva from the Tsar. At Narva, recklessly hazarding his own life, he won against fivefold odds a victory which tempted him to despise the Russians and their Tsar Peter who fled from the battle.

A matchless captain, Charles imitated the exploits of Charles X through nine successive years. Although the Polish nation had little interest in the conspiracy of its Saxon King, Charles seized Courland in 1701, and, after four victorious campaigns, made Poland his ally, under Stanislaus, a king of his own choosing. Peter, meanwhile, had bent all the force of a nature far mightier than that of Charles to the task of forming a successful army. Overwhelming the scanty garrisons, the Russians steadily devoured the Swedish Baltic lands. As early as 1703, Peter dared to found upon a swamp wrested from Sweden the great city that until the death of Lenin bore his name. In 1705, while Charles was pursuing a Saxon army into Silesia, Peter was seizing Courland. The winter saw the Russians in disastrous flight from Grodno, but Charles again turned from them to seek out Augustus in Saxony (1706).

Augustus and Peter the Great.

The Swedish incursion into the Empire staggered Europe, but no Power could oppose it. Having occupied Leipzig, Charles pitched his camp at Altranstädt near by, and there received Augustus' feigned submission. In December, 1706, since no chance of evasion had arisen, Augustus abandoned the Russians and returned to Saxony. Peter, with whom Charles scornfully refused all communication, could only send bribes to English statesmen in hope of peace. He was willing to restore all his

Charles XII in Saxony.

conquests except Petersburg, but Charles determined to dictate terms of peace in Moscow. Only the King's resolve to make sure of Germany and Poland protected Russia from invasion.

To attain security to rearward, however, cost Charles a year, and the delay may well have cost him victory. Between August, 1706, when he defiantly marched through Silesia into Saxony, and August, 1707, when he received the Emperor's acceptance of his terms, the fate of Europe turned upon his choice. The mere presence in Saxony of an army which Germans hardly dared to face tamed the Allies. Although a monarch who owed everything to the Reformation would hardly side with the author of the Revocation, the Catholic Joseph had given him great offence. Charles, Louis hoped, might offer mediation in the West, and either negotiate or impose a peace.

To avert this danger, and if possible to divert the Swedes towards the east, Marlborough journeyed to Altranstädt in the spring of 1707. He found the King favourable to the Allies, Austria alone excepted, and eager to strike down the Tsar. Marlborough, of course, encouraged the design, and helped to make the Emperor complaisant. Only the direst need, however, could have brought about the Habsburg surrender that Charles demanded and obtained. Augustus, everywhere defeated, had renounced Poland to Stanislaus, and had surrendered Patkul to be broken on the wheel. The Emperor, merely threatened, not only assigned the bishopric of Eutin to Charles' kinsman, but actually consented to restore to the Silesian Protestants all that they had been deprived of since 1648. More than a hundred churches were thus returned to them and they secured full religious freedom.

Meanwhile, the campaign of 1707 proved everywhere successful for the French. In April, Berwick, who was Marlborough's nephew and James II's son, crushed Portuguese and English at Almanza, and thus regained all Spain save Catalonia. While in the north Vendôme held Marlborough in check, Eugene and the Duke of Savoy failed to take Toulon. The Camisards

A French Recovery.

were vainly incited to insurrection. Villars crossed the Rhine, and even threatened to march upon Vienna. Louis renewed his attempts to gain peace, but no longer at the price which he had offered in 1706.

Next year (1708) the French attempted a double offensive, in Scotland and in the Netherlands. Both failed, the one because the Scots did not rise for the Pretender; the other, because Louis gave his grandson a share in the command, thus hampering Vendôme. The victory of Marlborough and Eugene at Oudenarde was followed by the conquest of Flanders and the capture of Vauban's greatest fortress, Lille. Villars, indeed, frustrated the invaders in the east, but the British fleet conquered the islands of the western Mediterranean and cut off the Levantine corn. The Hungarian insurgents suffered defeat: the Swedish King was deeply engaged in Russia: the schemes of Brandenburg for aggrandizement in Franche Comté had not divided the Allies. Louis, it was clear, must make a higher bid for peace.

Decline of France.

The King's eagerness to end the war was heightened by the horrors of the winter. While the English roasted oxen on the Thames, the French were dying of starvation, and in Russia even the iron Swedes lost limbs and lives from the unnatural cold. Moved by the sufferings of his people, Louis besought the Dutch for terms. To the amazement of his ambassadors, he consented not only to abandon Philip, to expel the Pretender, to destroy Dunkirk, to give the Dutch a barrier of fortresses including Lille, to restore Savoy, and to make Newfoundland British, but even to return Strassburg to the Empire—all this in return for only a two months' truce. One demand only he refused—that unless Spain and Sicily were surrendered to the Habsburgs within that time he would join with the Allies against his grandson. He chose rather to appeal to the nation, not directly, nor through their representatives, but by a letter to the archbishops and the local agents of the crown. The nation answered as the authors of the outrageous terms deserved. While the great nobles, like Louis himself, turned their plate into contributions,

ragged and famished recruits flocked in thousands to the colours. Villars and Boufflers, the heroic defender of Lille, could therefore oppose a new army to the onslaught of Marlborough and Eugene.

The campaign of 1709 turned on the protection of the northern frontier against invasion. Tournai emulated the valour of Lille, but shared its fate. To save Mons, the chief remaining bulwark of northern France, Villars gave battle in September at Malplaquet. After a desperate resistance, the French were forced to retire. They had lost 10,000 men and had failed to save the fortress. But their stand had cost the enemy some 23,000 casualties, and France was once more herself.

Malplaquet and Poltava.

Two months before Malplaquet, the Russian adventure of Charles XII had reached its tragic close at Poltava in the Ukraine, and the wounded King sought shelter and alliance from the Turk. His Baltic provinces lay at Peter's mercy; Sweden herself was in peril from the Danes; Augustus regained the throne of Poland, while Stanislaus fled to France. Although the invincible obstinacy of Charles forbade peace in the east and north of Europe, there was small prospect of any intervention that could aid the Bourbons in the west. When Villars counselled peace at any price and the Spaniards threatened to make separate terms with the Allies, Louis so far yielded to the Dutch as to offer subsidies towards dispossessing Philip. Further he would not go. Swayed by Marlborough, whose greatness peace would destroy, and by the Emperor, who feared that Spain would escape him, the Dutch declined to abate their demands. France therefore fought on, and the campaign of 1710 justified her resolution.

The active theatres of war were now reduced to two, the northern frontier, across which the Allies hoped to march on Paris, and the Peninsula. In the north they captured Douai and other towns, but were held in check by Villars. Thanks to Stanhope's victories, Charles III kept Michaelmas in Madrid, but he could not maintain himself among the hostile population of Castile. The arrival of Vendôme completed his dis-

England quits the War.

comfiture. In December, Stanhope and the English division were captured at Brihuega, and Charles retired to Catalonia. Spain, it was clear, would remain in Bourbon hands, and the Allies had failed to conquer France. Louis, too old to renew his dreams of empire, would never again endanger Europe. For what public interest could the war continue?

The English, who had 240,000 men in their pay, and whose public debt was fast increasing, could find no good reason for fighting on. The fall of the Whigs in 1710 ended the despotism of Marlborough, and in January, 1711, the Tories made secret overtures to France. In April, the death of Joseph changed the whole situation, for Charles III of Spain was destined to become the Emperor Charles VI. While on all frontiers the war languished, France and England arrived at an understanding. In November, Heinsius was therefore compelled to treat. If a reasonable and necessary agreement had been procured by a shabby conspiracy, the fault was largely that of Marlborough, who had vetoed a just and necessary peace. He was now deposed from all his offices, and Eugene could make no headway in his mission to convert the English to the views of Charles VI.

Early in 1712, eighty diplomatists assembled at Utrecht. Collective bargaining having failed, the Allies presented separately their demands upon France and Spain.

The Settlement of the West.

The Emperor asked not only for the whole of the Spanish succession, but also for Alsace and the three bishoprics, Metz, Toul and Verdun, which Charles V had failed to reconquer in 1552. Louis, on the other hand, reduced to a single army and chastened yet further by a series of untimely deaths within the royal circle, offered every reasonable concession, and in particular provided for the exclusion of the Spanish Bourbons from the throne of France. In July, therefore, the English troops were withdrawn, and Villars immediately inflicted upon the Allies the resounding defeat of Denain. Eugene could not prevent the fortress-barrier upon the frontier from reconstruction, while Queen Anne dashed the hopes of the intransigents by recovering from an illness which might have given

George of Hanover her throne. In April, 1713, therefore, the Tories succeeded in bringing all the Allies save the Emperor to make peace with France and Spain.

The great settlement of Utrecht, completed in the following year by treaties made at Rastatt and at Baden by Charles VI, recorded and confirmed the changes which Europe owed to the reign of Louis XIV. France, whose language had become the accepted medium of diplomacy, was confirmed in the possession of her expanded frontiers, and a French prince gained Spain and the Spanish colonies. These great advantages, however, were bought by notable concessions, after a war which had proved that even a Louis XIV could not dictate to united Europe. England, the initiator of the war and peace, claimed and obtained much of French America and great trading rights with the Spanish colonies, as well as Gibraltar, Minorca, the dismantlement of Dunkirk and the abandonment of the Stuart cause.

The Dutch, who had exerted themselves beyond their powers of recovery, gained commercial privileges from Spain and also the right to garrison against France the southern fortresses of the Netherlands, which, with much of Italy and Sardinia, were to accept Austrian rule. Prussia was recognized as a kingdom, and the restored Duke of Savoy became also King of Sicily. Portugal received San Sacramento, north of the river Plate. Spain, in return for the sacrifice of outlying dominions in Europe, was confirmed in the possession of her colonies, and might look forward to a family understanding with her great neighbour across the Pyrenees, while she had exchanged the worst administration in Europe for the most efficient. In the Netherlands, Naples, Mantua, Sardinia, the Tuscan ports and part of Milan, the Emperor received a rich compensation, and a direct incitement to aspire to commercial power. In making peace, France did not forget her allies, Bavaria and Cologne, who were restored to their lands and dignities, Hanover retaining a new Electorship. Had all the Utrecht renunciations been sincere, Western Europe might have looked forward to many years of peace.

§ 4. *The Settlement of the North*, 1710–1721

In the North, no peace was yet in sight, and the contempt of Charles XII for statesmanship was hastening the intrusion of Russia into the circle of European Powers.

Russia.

The Tartar invasions of the thirteenth century had submerged the Russians for 240 years, and the new Russia which slowly spread outwards from Moscow was barbarous and unprogressive. To hold it back became the policy of its neighbours, while in the West its very existence was hardly known. Hatred of Latin Europe was likewise the creed of the Greek clergy, who for centuries formed the only source of its scanty illumination. Early in the seventeenth century, when the line of sovereigns failed, the Polish Vasa threatened to establish their House at Moscow, while their Swedish kinsmen barred Russia from the sea. Led by the Church, however, the Russians survived the Time of Troubles, and in 1613 established the Romanov dynasty upon the throne.

After nearly eighty years, during which Russia quietly grew stronger, while Poland, Sweden and the Turks chose paths that led towards downfall, the new dynasty produced a Tsar whose tremendous personality remains unparalleled in Russia or in any other land. Endowed with almost incredible virility, and entirely free from scruple, Peter the Great set himself to annihilate every domestic rival and to drive his people along the path to power. To these aims he sacrificed swiftly and brutally every obstructive sentiment or institution. The mutinous standing army was swept away. The Church was made subservient to the State. The nobles became a corps of royal functionaries. The people, who detested foreign ways, were forced to follow Western fashions and to tolerate hordes of alien instructors. To advance Russia, Peter eschewed the easy policy of conquering Asia, and refused to make his main endeavour at the expense of Poland or the Turks. He deliberately preferred to force his way to the Baltic by the shortest but most toilsome route, that of wresting the coastal

Peter the Great.

provinces from the formidable Swedes. There he founded a city such as he had seen in Western Europe, free from the traditions alike of Moscow and of the German towns near by. Petersburg, his new capital, he defended at all costs, and Poltava made it safe.

Poltava naturally ranged Augustus on the side of the Tsar, and with Poland as his ally he completed in 1710 the conquest of the Baltic Provinces. Sweden meanwhile had repulsed a Danish invasion, and Charles had prevailed upon the Turks to declare war on Russia. His plan of attack included an expedition from Swedish Pomerania, but in the interest of their war with France, the Allies imposed neutrality upon the Scandinavian provinces in Germany and upon the peninsula of Jutland. In 1711, none the less, Peter narrowly escaped disaster on the Pruth, and was compelled to restore Azov to the Turks and to abjure the alliance with Augustus.

Charles XII after Poltava.

Sweden still ranked as an important member of the European family; Russia, as an upstart barbarian; and the approach of peace in the West offered Charles the opportunity of ending the war with honour. He preferred to await a new onslaught by the Turks, and in his absence his German possessions melted away. Prussia and Hanover shared the spoil with Denmark, while before the close of 1714 Peter had mastered Finland. At last the threat of his subjects themselves to negotiate for peace compelled the King to pay them some attention. In November, 1714, he marched hastily across Europe and entered the unconquered Baltic fortress of Stralsund.

The resurrection of the greatest captain of the age gave rise to general alarm. Germany swarmed with veterans, unemployed since the peace, who were ready to follow Charles in any undertaking. Unhappily for Sweden, however, the Elector of Hanover, who coveted Bremen and Verden, was now King of England, while in Prussia Frederick William, a true successor of the Great Elector, had replaced Frederick I. While these men drew Denmark, Saxony and Poland into a league which was presently reinforced by Russia, Charles

knew no wiser policy than to alienate the Sea Powers by declaring the Baltic Provinces closed against their ships, and by concluding a defensive alliance with Louis XIV. The failure of the Jacobite rising cemented the league against him, and, in December, 1715, Stralsund surrendered to the Prussians. The death of Louis in September had left France to the guidance of a Regent who had no desire for adventure. Charles must prepare unaided to defend his famine-stricken realm against the Russians and the Danes.

True to his ancestry, the King thought only of compelling the hostile Coalition to sue for peace. Now he would cross the ice to Copenhagen; now, invade Norway. Funds were to be supplied by Görz, a minister from Holstein, who ground down the people with exactions of every kind, while Charles claimed the surviving young men as recruits. The vigour of King and minister at least helped to save the country from invasion. Early in 1716, an inroad into Norway distracted the Danes, and the Tsar alienated George I by attempting to make Mecklenburg his client. In September, when all was ready, Peter suddenly lost heart, and next year the Allies were on the verge of mutual war. Charles made no better use of the occasion than to offer Petersburg to the Tsar if all his other conquests were returned intact.

The year 1717 revealed France as the peacemaker of Europe. Thanks to the labours of Dubois, the disreputable minister of the disreputable Regent, England and Holland were induced to join her in a Triple Alliance for the maintenance of peace. At the same time, English suspicions of Charles' relations with the Pretender were dispelled, and negotiations with Russia and Prussia brought to a successful conclusion. Sweden was likewise in constant communication with the Tsar. Only Charles' contempt for statesmanship prevented an agreement, and perhaps a joint enterprise to aggrandize themselves at the expense of Mecklenburg and Denmark. In the complicated relations between States which characterized Europe after the Peace of Utrecht, the triumphant Peace of Passarowitz made by Austria with the Turks (July, 1718) helped

The Triple Alliance.

to prolong the war between Charles and Peter. Austria, now at the summit of her power, was thus set free to enlarge the Triple Alliance. England therefore ceased to have need of Sweden, and Russia, with an isolated enemy before her, was enabled to raise her terms.

In 1718, however, Charles disposed of 60,000 men, and could look forward to conquering Norway. By November, his lieutenant threatened Trondhjem, while the King himself pressed northwards towards Christiania. As he took his usual reckless part in the siege of a frontier fortress, a bullet pierced his brain and the last hope of Swedish empire perished.

Downfall of Sweden.

To Europe, the death of Charles XII meant that the northern question could be solved forthwith, rather than that the terms of its solution were greatly changed. Sweden had done wonders with the sword, but the limit to the possibilities of her military action had long been passed. After Poltava, it was idle to suppose that her scanty population could again imprison the Russian millions, while Prussia, the natural heir to Pomerania, had become far stronger than the obsequious Brandenburg of Charles X. Had Charles XII lived longer, he could only have embarrassed and perhaps delayed the liquidation of an adventitious empire, while the conquest of Norway could only have produced new strife. Europe, thirsting for peace and disturbed by the ambitions of Spain, was bound to welcome the extinction of the intractable storm-centre of the north.

Sweden, indeed, hastened to abdicate the eminence to which she had been raised by her amazing line of kings. The father of Charles XII had created an autocracy by seizing the revenues of the greater nobles. The lesser, who filled the administration, now bridled the monarchy in the person of his sister and successor. The crown became again elective; Görz was executed; and the factious and venal bureaucracy steered the State. In the same year (1719) Bremen and Verden were assigned to Hanover; and, in 1720, much of western Pomerania to Prussia, in each case against a moderate payment. The control of the Weser,

Elbe and Oder thus passed into the hands of German Powers, and the Swedish bastion was reduced to a crumbling ruin. Even this, Westernmost Pomerania with Rügen and Wismar, she must buy back from Denmark. Her hopes of saving some of the Baltic Provinces by these concessions were dispelled when Peter, by a series of devastating raids upon her coast-line, forced her to make peace at Nystad in 1721. East of the Baltic, Finland alone remained to her, and the policy embodied in Peter's city proved triumphant for two hundred years.

PART IV

THE AGE OF FREDERICK THE GREAT (1721–1783)

§ 1. *Europe after the Wars*, 1714–1740

In 1725, when Peter died, Russia had thus become a member of the European circle. To prevent her escape he had slain his reactionary son, and nothing in the decade which followed the Peace of Utrecht is as momentous as his success. That decade and the next formed for Europe as a whole a time of manifest discomfort. A general wish for peace was in constant collision with the selfish aspirations of individual States, and a haze of negotiations, congresses and still-born wars obscured the greater issues. The direction of European politics had turned for so long a time upon obedience or resistance to France that, when the Regency abandoned the initiative, Europe knew not where to look for guidance.

From 1715 to 1723, indeed, Orleans and Dubois were occupied in ensuring peace by an *entente* with England, and in attempting to save the finances from utter ruin. Their support of a Scotchman, John Law, who attempted to take over the management of the currency, the debt and the commerce of the kingdom, led to financial convulsions like those of the contemporary South Sea Bubble. In England, the new dynasty desired peace for its own consolidation, and found in Walpole a leading minister to whose strong common sense adventure was abhorrent. In Prussia, the traditional Hohenzollern policy of opportunistic aggrandizement without shame or scruple was incarnate in Frederick William I, whose devoted labours for the enrichment of his dominions and the formation of an enormous army were facilitated by a drastic simplification of the Civil Service.

While France, England and Prussia sought for peace, and Holland became a mere mirror of English policy, Europe was agitated by a long-drawn duel between the Emperor and the Queen of Spain. Charles VI had never ceased to believe that the Spanish succession was rightfully his own, while Elizabeth Farnese, dominating her husband Philip V, was bent upon regaining the Emperor's Italian compensation for her sons. No Spaniard, moreover, could refrain from the wish to see Gibraltar restored by England, while no English or Dutch merchant could view with indifference Charles' determination to base upon his new possession of Ostend a rival East India Company. Handled by stubborn autocrats, these matters might easily give rise to war.

Charles VI and Elizabeth Farnese.

The situation was further complicated by the dynastic position of Charles VI. From 1717 onwards, he had a daughter, Maria Theresa, but no son. The office of Emperor could not conceivably be held by a female. In default of his own male heirs, moreover, the Habsburg lands would pass to the daughters of his brother Joseph I. To avoid this, in 1713 he made a new family law by which these dominions should descend as an undivided whole to his eldest surviving daughter. To secure the endorsement of this so-called Pragmatic Sanction by all who could possibly be concerned became the great object of Charles' life. On their marriage with the heirs of Saxony and of Bavaria, his nieces renounced their claims. The Estates of his various dominions, Hungary included, formally recognized the arrangement. It remained to purchase the guarantee of foreign Powers. In all important European negotiations, the Emperor could therefore be influenced by promises to support the Pragmatic Sanction or by threats that such should be withheld.

The Pragmatic Sanction.

At first the conflicting ambitions of Elizabeth Farnese and the Emperor drove them into war. Spain had been rehabilitated by more than fifteen years of Bourbon administration when Alberoni, a really great minister, took the helm. In 1717, she conquered Sardinia; and in 1718, Sicily. Then, however, British

Spain and Europe.

sea-power intervened, and the new Quadruple Alliance prepared to insist on peace. The war was ended in 1720, the Emperor receiving Sicily in exchange for Sardinia, which henceforward gave a royal title to the ducal House of Savoy. The settlement of the disputes was relegated to a future Congress of the Powers, and the unnatural struggle within the House of Bourbon was to be ended by a double marriage.

When, in 1724, the Congress met at Cambray, its only result was to precipitate an alliance between the two Powers which saw no hope of gaining their desires from assembled Europe. By the First Treaty of Vienna (1725) the Emperor undertook to satisfy the Queen's son, Don Carlos, in Italy, and to aid in the recovery of Gibraltar; while Spain, still the lord of the Indies, recognized the Ostend Company. A closer identification of Austria and Spanish policy followed. By the influence of Bourbon, a great-grandson of the Condé of Rocroi, Louis XV had broken faith with the Infanta to marry the daughter of the exiled Polish monarch, Stanislaus. Now, while France joined with England and Prussia in the hostile League of Hanover, Austria and Spain arranged to connect themselves by marriage and to take the lead in Europe. Spain thus became the first of the Powers to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction.

In 1726, the Emperor followed up his diplomatic advantage by securing guarantees from the Palatinate, Prussia and Russia. In Russia, indeed, now governed by the unworthy successors of Peter, he secured a commanding influence which lasted many years. To prevent any Power from attaining undue predominance, and to restrain the Muscovite advance, Poland and Germany in the centre of Europe should have confronted Russia and France upon the wings. Now, however, the Emperor allied himself with Russia against the Turks, and their connection was destined to survive when the common enemy was Prussia.

At this juncture, it was momentous for the peace of Europe that power in France passed to the aged Abbé Fleury, who held it to his death in 1743. Thanks to his pacific policy,

and to the failure of Charles VI to fulfil his engagements, a new onslaught by Spain against Gibraltar was prevented from developing into a considerable war. In 1727, the false grouping of the Powers created by the intrigues of adventurers in the cabinet or upon the throne became more clearly comprehended. The alliance between Spain and the Emperor, so far as its object was commercial, involved the hostility of the Sea Powers, which robbed Spain of the profit from her colonies. In so far as it was political, aiming at the marriage of Maria Theresa with a Spanish prince, it formed a new challenge to Europe, and especially to France. These grave dangers were in no way removed by the adhesion of Russia, then the most incalculable of Powers, and of Prussia, the most shifty. And all that the Emperor could hope to gain from the Spanish alliance would be outweighed by his corresponding loss. If Spain guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction and favoured the Ostend Company, her opponents, with greater power, would endeavour to destroy them both. For this he must compromise his new-born authority in Italy by assigning Parma and Tuscany to a Spanish duke. Abandoning the Treaty of Vienna and the Ostend scheme, Charles turned to his opponents, thus compelling Philip to make peace. A congress was to meet at Soissons for the settlement of all disputes.

In 1728, the Congress met, and the presence of a Russian delegation showed that Peter the Great had widened the boundaries of Europe. The dynastic element was, however, far too strong, and subterranean diplomacy far too prevalent, for a Congress to prove effective. While at Soissons nothing was accomplished save a demonstration of the futility of collective Europe, at Berlin a secret treaty with Frederick William pledged the Hohenzollern to support the Habsburg arrangements in return for advantages of succession in the West. Next year the birth of the Dauphin extinguished Philip's dreams of ruling France, and thus paved the way for a family understanding between the Bourbon Powers. In November, these joined with the Sea Powers in the Treaty of Seville, which attempted, at the Emperor's expense, to

remove all fear of war. The new Allies guaranteed the succession of Don Carlos in Parma and Tuscany, while Spain in return withdrew from the Ostend Company the privileges without which it was futile.

Charles VI, furious at this counter-desertion by Spain, seized Parma on the death of its Duke in January, 1731. The Treaty of Seville proved delusive, since neither Fleury nor Walpole would make war. The relations between Spain and England, indeed, were strained by the dangerous question of Gibraltar, and by colonial disputes such as prompted customs officers to cut off Captain Jenkins' ear. Walpole, however, skilfully employed the Pragmatic Sanction to maintain European peace. In return for their guarantee, the Sea Powers secured the definite abandonment of the Ostend Company by the Emperor and the occupation of Parma and Tuscany by Spain. These arrangements, known as the Second Treaty of Vienna, made Don Carlos an Italian sovereign, the founder of a dynasty which finally succumbed to Garibaldi. Elizabeth Farnese could now scheme for her younger son; and the Emperor, for his daughter. Next year, the Diet accepted the Pragmatic Sanction.

The relative tranquillity achieved in 1731 was disturbed in 1733 by the War of the Polish Succession. On the death of Augustus, the Saxon King in Poland, France, for no solid reason, determined to install his old rival, Stanislaus, the father of her Queen. Her decision implied a challenge to Austria and Russia, and general war against Charles VI. The theatre would be not only their common frontier and Poland, but also Italy, where Sardinia and Spain could not remain unconcerned. Sardinia was won by the promise of Milan, while with Spain a more far-reaching family compact was concluded. The two great Bourbon Houses pledged themselves to an intimate and permanent alliance, and the policy of Louis XIV began to be justified at last. England was thus directly challenged, but Walpole steadily restrained the warlike George II.

The Polish Succession.

In 1734, war raged in Poland and northern Italy, and

beyond the eastern frontier of France. Driven by the party of action into a struggle which he did not desire, Fleury avenged himself by preferring the profit to the honour of France. To Stanislaus in Poland he sent little help, and the capture of Danzig, after 135 days' siege, placed a new Saxon Augustus firmly on the throne. On the Rhine, where Frederick the Crown Prince of Prussia served under the aged Eugene, the French held their own with ease and occupied Lorraine and Trèves. Their opponents adopted the new and dangerous expedient of summoning auxiliaries from Russia.

New European Settlement.

In Italy, although Sardinia was interested only in the north, and Spain mainly in the south, the Allies gained sufficient military advantages in two campaigns to justify the terms of the Third Treaty of Vienna, drawn up in 1735. Sardinia thereby received Tortona and Novara as compensation for her efforts, and France solaced the Emperor by guaranteeing the Pragmatic Sanction. Don Carlos exchanged Parma and Piacenza for the Two Sicilies, and surrendered to Stanislaus his expectations in Tuscany. Tuscany, however, was to be exchanged for Lorraine, of which France was to become the heir. Fleury thus skilfully provided for the extension of his country towards the east, at the doubtful sacrifice of abandoning northern and central Italy to the Habsburgs. It might well be contended that, with a neighbour so opportunistic as Sardinia, France was more likely to gain future profit and to avoid unpleasant surprises by establishing on his further flank a strong and usually hostile Power.

In 1736, while the Third Treaty of Vienna proceeded towards ratification, its importance was increased by the marriage of the Emperor's heiress with Francis Joseph of Lorraine. By his election, if it could be brought about, the Habsburg succession to the Empire would be preserved as nearly as the failure of male children would allow. Soon afterwards, the death of Eugene robbed Austria at once of her greatest general, and of her only statesman. The result was painfully apparent when, as the ally of Russia, she plunged into an extensive war against the

Decline of Austria.

Turks, and so conducted it as to lose by the Treaty of Belgrade (September, 1739) almost all that the Treaty of Passarowitz had brought in. The demonstration of Austrian and Russian weakness did not pass unmarked by the heir to the Prussian throne.

Recovery of France.

The consistent efforts of a quarter of a century, however, had procured for Charles VI the acceptance of the Pragmatic Sanction by every important Power save Bavaria and Saxony, while from almost all he had purchased a guarantee. Fleury also had secured for France a commanding position so far as this could be effected by agreements. Her alliance with Spain, in which she must of necessity predominate, implied an ascendancy over the Two Sicilies, and she retained her old *clientèle* of Sardinia, Bavaria and Cologne. To these she had lately added Sweden, and in 1739, by a secret treaty, Prussia had also pledged her its doubtful faith. Her mediation of the recent Treaty of Belgrade suggested that she might secure one of the Powers of eastern Europe in addition to the Turks, and no prejudice hampered Fleury in his choice. Had the life of the Emperor been prolonged, France might again have become formidable to Europe. The colonial war between Spain and England, precipitated by the outrage upon Captain Jenkins, offered her the opportunity for profitable intervention, and common action by the Bourbon fleets was imminent.

§ 2. *War of the Austrian Succession*, 1740–1748

In 1740, however, "death ventured upon many crowned heads," and the times were swiftly changed. The Prussian crown, and an army of more than 80,000 men, passed in May into the unfettered hands of Frederick II. In October, at the age of 55, Charles VI succumbed to a surfeit, and, eight days later, the Russian Empress Anne followed him to the grave. Frederick had long foreseen that the Emperor's death would cause a European revolution. That it came at a moment when the prolonged *entente* between France and England was dissolved, and when Russia must for a time be paralysed, multiplied many times the probability of an up-

heaval. To the ambitious head of a new and rising Power, the opportunity of gain appeared indeed unique.

Frederick was known to Europe as an enthusiast for French culture, and for the ideas of the so-called Philosophers of France: an heir whom his father had therefore wished to execute, and whose hero was Voltaire, the foe to war and superstition. His advent to the throne of Prussia, it was supposed, would initiate an age of freedom. Although he had an immense respect for French literature, however, and delighted in philosophical discussion, his royal instincts were entirely Hohenzollern, and he was beyond all precedent free to give them rein. Restrained by no human weakness, no binding alliance, no constitutional check, the young lord of a well-drilled army and of a full treasury might gratify at his own discretion the hereditary impulse towards the unscrupulous advancement of his House. "The question of right," he instructed his minister, "is your affair, it is time to work at it in secret, for the orders to the troops are given." Disdaining the inheritance in the West which for years had been the objective of his father, he resolved to seize Silesia.

Frederick of Prussia.

The world-wide struggle which grew out of the First Silesian War had its origin in the rivalry between France and England overseas, and in the rivalry between Habsburg and Hohenzollern in Germany. When he seized Silesia with an impudent pretext of hereditary right, Frederick was avenging that contempt and dislike of Vienna for Berlin which his ancestors for a century had resented. In April, 1741, his infantry proved at Mollwitz that their elaborate training had made them really strong, while the Queen's failure to defend one fertile province encouraged a host of claimants for the rest.

The Silesian Adventure.

Under the guidance of Marshal Belleisle, great-grandson of Louis XIV's victim Fouquet, France turned aside from her task of humbling Britain to destroy her ancient Habsburg foe. To this end she devoted all the power which Fleury had built up. Sweden was induced to divert the Queen's Russian allies by an attack. Sardinia, with help from Spain, was incited

Coalition against Austria.

against Austrian Italy. Bavaria and Saxony, opponents of the Pragmatic Sanction, moved on the Danube and in Bohemia. Maria Theresa, indeed, rallied the Hungarians to her cause, and secured the good offices of England, but her refusal to buy the sword of Frederick had involved her in seeming ruin. By the end of 1741, the Pragmatic Sanction had not prevented the apparent dissolution of the State, and early next year the Elector of Bavaria became the Emperor Charles VII.

Austrian Recovery.

The campaign of 1742, none the less, witnessed a striking Austrian recovery. The untiring labours of Charles VI had at least brought his daughter's subjects and Europe as a whole to regard her cause as righteous, while the members of the Coalition were obviously self-seekers. The Queen's resources, though undeveloped, were considerable, and in Carteret, who now succeeded Walpole, she found a vigorous ally. While British sea-power checked the Spanish designs on Italy, and Russia repelled the Swedes, her troops overran Bavaria, and in Moravia drove Frederick back. In July, at the price of almost all Silesia, Prussia deserted the Coalition. Saxony followed, and Belleisle was forced to make a disastrous though heroic retreat from Prague.

The third year of the war thus found Maria Theresa mistress of Bohemia and Bavaria, and well provided with allies. Russia, where Elizabeth, a daughter of Peter the Great, now ruled, imposed upon Sweden the surrender of a strip of Finland as the price of peace. Holland fulfilled her guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, and helped Austria by offering to the French a tempting field of battle nearer home. Sardinia found it more profitable to desert the Coalition. England contributed to the victory of Dettingen against the French, and in defiance of public opinion, formed an alliance with Austria, Holland and Sardinia. Their treaty, made at Worms, provoked the new family compact of Fontainebleau. France undertook, without equivalent advantage, to assist Spain in reconquering what she had lost to England and Sardinia at Utrecht, and in acquiring Milan, Parma and

Piacenza for Philip's youngest son. The year closed with a marriage linking Denmark to England, and an Austrian treaty with Saxony.

In 1744, therefore, Frederick rejoined the war. By marrying his sister to the heir of Sweden, and to the heir of Russia, a poor protégée, the later Catharine the Great, he strove to gain future allies. For the present, he sought to curb Austria by a Union of Frankfort with the Emperor and other German princes, and by himself invading Bohemia. France, now openly at war with Austria and England, accepted his alliance, and repelled the Austrians from Alsace, while a brilliant soldier, Maurice de Saxe, began a career of victory in the Netherlands.

The Second Silesian War.

In 1745, the death of Charles VII enabled the Queen to make peace with Bavaria and to secure the election of her husband as the Emperor Francis I. Her skilful marshal, Traun, manœuvred Frederick from Bohemia and gave him a costly lesson in the art of war. Overseas, the English profited by the destruction of the French in Europe, and the Young Pretender failed, but in Italy and in the West the Bourbons were successful. At Fontenoy, victory fell to Marshal Saxe, and the King of Sardinia was brought near to capitulation. Meanwhile in four battles the Prussians had made good the earlier disasters of the campaign. At Hohenfriedberg, their cavalry had proved itself the equal of the infantry, and Frederick could boast that his State rested as firmly upon the army as the globe upon the shoulders of Atlas. Having thus succeeded in defending the possessions which he had failed to increase, he again deserted his allies and ended the Second Silesian War by the Treaty of Dresden (December, 1746).

Frederick's defection convinced the King of Sardinia that Austria after all would be victorious and made him eager to prove his fidelity. His negotiations had deluded the enemy, who swiftly succumbed to the vigorous thrusts of his army and the reinforced army of Austria. With the aid of an English squadron, the French and Spaniards were driven from northern Italy,

End of the Austrian Succession Question.

and the campaign of 1746 witnessed even an invasion of Provence. South of the Alps, the bitter sacrifice of Silesia had brought victory to the Queen. In Scotland also, Culloden marked the downfall of the enemy of her ally, while her progress towards a firm alliance with Russia outweighed the French success in making Saxony a client State. In the Netherlands, however, Marshal Saxe proved completely triumphant over the Allies. The Dutch had lost their former valour, and within eight months Brussels, Louvain, Antwerp, Mons, Charleroi and Namur fell to the superior forces of the French. In October, a victory at Roucoux gave them Liège, leaving only the walls of Maestricht between Holland and the invader.

In 1747, despite a great effort by the Allies, French troops crossed the Dutch border. The people turned once again to the House of Orange in their need and made William IV both Stadtholder and Captain-General. The failure of their contingent, however, helped the French to fresh victory in the field, but Maestricht remained untaken. As a last expedient, the Allies arranged to bring Russians to the Rhine. All Powers, however, save Austria and Sardinia, were weary of a war the cost of which far outweighed any probable advantage. England had crushed the Jacobites and regained supremacy at sea. France, victorious but exhausted, was ready to renounce her pretensions in Italy in return for tranquillity at home. The Dutch desired only safety and the end of sacrifice. In Spain, the long rule of Elizabeth Farnese had ceased with the death of Philip in 1746. Without foreign subsidies and sea-power, the Queen was powerless to fight on.

The War of the Austrian Succession was therefore ended in 1748 by a Peace made at Aix-la-Chapelle. This guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction ; save that Silesia passed to Prussia ; and Parma and Piacenza, to the younger prince of Spain. The Sardinian frontier was advanced to the Ticino. Frederick had thus succeeded in his aggression, while the Queen was compelled to make sacrifices in Italy to pay for the French victories in the Netherlands. By transferring the German

province of Silesia to the Hohenzollern, the war had compromised the Habsburg future in Germany. It had, however, made of Austria a united and improving Power, with a position greatly strengthened by the new *entente* with Russia. It was momentous for her that the ancient and fettering alliance with England had plainly broken down.

§ 3. *Europe*, 1748–1756

The lassitude which inevitably follows a great war pervaded Europe for some seven years from the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. In America and India, indeed, hostilities took place between the French and English, without involving a general declaration of war.

Rivalry of France and England.

In 1751, Clive's great feats at Arcot mark a turning-point in the rivalry of the two great competitors for Indian empire. Not until four years later, however, did the seizure of the *Alcide* and the *Lys* by Admiral Boscawen without warning render war with "perfidious Albion" certain. Meanwhile continental diplomacy had been active everywhere in anticipation of fresh strife in Europe. While in France a profligate King was upholding religious reaction, and men of letters were publishing an Encyclopædia which proved that there was much in life besides religion, French agents were busily intriguing in Poland, Sweden, Russia and Turkey to reconstitute the hegemony of France. The real interest of their country lay across the sea, but America and India were made secondary to the tradition of glory consecrated by Louis XIV. The unquestioned ascendancy of French literature in the age of Voltaire, and the widespread imitation of the royal pageantry of France, helped to divert French policy from its true objective. Colonies, commerce and social well-being became secondary to European combinations, while even these were confused by the rivalries of high-placed cliques and by female influence upon the King. Indolent and apathetic, Louis sought excitement by pursuing a foreign policy of his own, without his ministers' knowledge or consent.

While French policy was wayward and uncertain, that of

the eastern Powers was dictated by clearer aims. That Frederick the robber and hypocrite should enjoy a Habsburg province revolted every instinct of the Queen. In resenting the erection on her frontiers of a new and predatory Power she had the hearty sympathy of her sister autocrat, Elizabeth of Russia. These two and Augustus of Saxony and Poland, whose peril was more immediate, were firmly resolved to strike down Prussia on the first convenient occasion. They might hope for the support of the Empire and of Sweden, which were also threatened by Frederick's rise.

Austrian Revenge Policy.

In an age, however, in which policy was uncontrolled by the peoples, while kings could secretly pledge themselves to give limited assistance to one another in time of war, it was hard to isolate a quarrel. In the projected Third Silesian War, France would scarcely stand aloof, and her action might well decide the issue. The Austrian Netherlands, with their futile barrier of Dutch garrisons, lay open to her attack. Now that Lorraine was practically hers, she and her German clients could more readily assail the Empire. A timely bribe to Sardinia would lay Austrian Italy at her feet, while Spain and the Turks might well be stirred to action. The Sea Powers, it is true, would probably oppose her, but the Queen had recently experienced their failings as allies. She could not count upon Protestant merchants to humiliate Protestant Prussia, and when their *bourgeois* needs were satisfied they clamoured for dynastic sacrifice and peace.

The countenance of France was therefore almost essential to the success of the undertaking. In Kaunitz, a statesman whose apparent insolence was equalled by his real ability and devotion, the Queen found a servant whom not even the long-standing enmity of Bourbon and Habsburg could deter, and who was prepared to sacrifice the Netherlands to procure the assistance of France. The hatred of Madame de Pompadour for Frederick helped on the plan, but in 1755 the traditional combination of the Powers seemed to have survived all negotiations. England and Russia were in close association, and when Boscawen attacked

Kaunitz.

the French at sea, Frederick believed that this heralded an Austrian movement against his old ally. He was not ignorant that Elizabeth proposed to reduce him to the level of a Margrave of Brandenburg, but he had confidence in the ability of England to restrain her. Counting upon this, and upon the ineradicable enmity between Austria and France, he turned for security to England.

Hanover and England.

The policy of England was complicated by the Hanoverian position of her King. George II could not share the outspoken indifference of his subjects to the fortunes of his electorate. The imminent war with France would expose Hanover to invasion. Austria could no longer be counted on as an ally, and Russia drew back, the better to preserve her freedom of action against Prussia. The King therefore turned to Frederick, who showed his usual cynical indifference to the feelings of France. By the Convention of Westminster of January, 1756, the two Powers bound themselves to keep the Empire free from war. England would defend Silesia; and Prussia, Hanover; against attack from any side. Thus safeguarded, England in May declared war against France.

To France, the Convention of Westminster meant that on the eve of war her ally agreed with her enemy to tie her hands.

The Revolution in Alliances.

Such an outrage stung her sluggish government into reluctant agreement with the Habsburg. In May, the Treaty of Versailles pledged the two Powers to mutual defence, and in consequence Russia gravitated towards the new potential enemy of Prussia. Throughout the summer, it was England and France who were at war, and while the tragedy of the Black Hole was enacted at Calcutta, Minorca fell to the French. To marshal a coalition against Frederick must take time, especially when distant and barbarous Russia must be one of its directing heads.

§ 4. *The Seven Years War*, 1756–1763

Frederick, proved wrong in his calculations, but confident in the military machine known as the Prussian State, realized that attack was the best defence, and saw in a well-directed

attack the possibility of a coveted extension of his power. Saxony, fertile, rich and Protestant, was severed by no natural frontier from his dominions, while neither there nor in Poland had Augustus any force that could be matched against his own. In the last days of August, therefore, when the harvest had been gathered in, the Prussians seized upon Saxony, demanding to pass freely to Bohemia and to occupy the country during war. Augustus refused and fled to Poland, while his troops defended the passage through the mountains into Bohemia. They were compelled to surrender, and to join the Prussian force, but their resistance had robbed Frederick of the value of surprise. While the Austrians prepared to defend Bohemia, he turned Saxony into a tributary and a base, claiming on the strength of documents drawn from the Saxon archives that he was acting in lawful self-defence against a dangerous aggressor.

Frederick's cynical hypocrisy and his success cemented and enlarged the hostile coalition. In January, 1757, the Empire declared war against him. Its conglomerate army was contemptible, but its condemnation still possessed some weight. Next month, Austria and Russia abjured a separate peace and bound themselves to fight on until Silesia was reconquered. Sweden, long subsidized by France and maltreated by Frederick, agreed in March to uphold the Westphalian Treaties. May brought a closer alliance between Austria and France, with a plan for dividing the Netherlands.

Against such a world of enemies, Frederick could look with greater confidence to England, where Newcastle joined with Pitt early in June. In a war in which foes from every quarter might move on Breslau, Dresden and Berlin, it would mean much if England, guarding Hanover, would hold the western gate. The main hope for Prussia, however, lay in Frederick's sword. Her capital was in reality his tent, from which her every movement was dictated by a single will. There dwelt a captain who could match Gustavus and the Charleses, and who had Saxony and England to support him, besides his own estates. Might he not destroy the armies of the Coalition before they could unite?

In 1757, therefore, he struck swiftly at the heart of Bohemia, and, after a desperate battle in the neighbourhood, laid siege to Prague. Daun, who preferred manœuvring to fighting, advanced to its relief, and Frederick himself moved eastwards to drive him off. A bloody defeat at Kolin, due to his rash contempt of the Austrians, ruined the whole campaign, and the loss of Bohemia was followed by the collapse of Cumberland in the West and an irresistible invasion of Saxony. In Prussia proper, Frederick's lieutenant was overwhelmed by the Russians, while the Swedes, counting on a promenade to Berlin, entered Prussian Pomerania.

Such a crisis only displayed the vigour and valour of the King. Leaving the ill-found Swedes to a lieutenant, and the West to Ferdinand of Brunswick, he led his own command to rid Saxony of the Franco-Imperialist invaders. On November 5, at Rossbach, west of Leipzig, he crushed them with such speed and ease as to cover them with contempt. A month later, he drew near to Breslau, and at Leuthen routed a strongly-posted army more than twice as numerous as his own. All Silesia was regained, and the moral effect upon the Prussian and Austrian forces went far to counteract the numerical preponderance of the Allies.

In 1758, none the less, Prussia was to feel the weight of a long war against superior resources. Greater skill and valour in the field, unity of command as contrasted with the cumbrous councils and divergent interests of the Allies, promotion by merit instead of by family favour—all could not atone for the loss of Prussian veterans and the drain upon Prussian supplies. Although the Swedes had proved contemptible, and the French were no longer what Marshal Saxe had made them, the Austrians and Russians had hardly reached the climax of their power, and both Queen and Empress were inexorably bent on victory. Frederick must again strive to destroy the two armies before they could unite.

The third campaign opened ill, with the failure of an onslaught upon Moravia. While Ferdinand triumphantly defended the West, however, Frederick confronted the

Austrians, until he was compelled to protect his capital against the Russians. At Zorndorf, beyond the Oder, he experienced the fatalistic tenacity of the Russian rank and file, but his blows compelled the invaders again to retrace their steps. Autumn brought a severe defeat by the Austrians at Hochkirch, but the King, whose contempt for the enemy had cost him dear, marched into Silesia as though he had been victorious, and relieved a threatened fortress.

Prussia in Defeat.

After the swift changes of the last campaign, fortune in 1759 seemed to have forsaken the Prussian cause. Frederick's waning power allowed of no offensive. At Minden, indeed, Ferdinand brilliantly foiled a French inroad through the Westphalian gate, but neither Frederick's lieutenant nor the King himself could stay the advancing Russians. Aided by an Austrian corps, they met him at Kunersdorf beyond the Oder, and inflicted a defeat so crushing that he came near to abdication. The disaster was deepened by the loss of Dresden to the army of the Empire, but neither of the Allies seized the opportunity, and again the Russians retired. The loss, through the King's misjudgment, of a Prussian army at Maxen closed a most disastrous campaign, while England was in full career of victory in America, in India and on the sea.

The campaign of 1760 effected little change. Enemy forces pervaded Silesia, and even occupied Berlin, but accomplished nothing decisive. At Liegnitz, Frederick gained a brilliant victory, and at Torgau a hard-fought battle ended in his favour, but for which side Time was fighting no man knew. The year 1761, however, seemed to predict the victory of the Allies. Frederick could no longer venture on battle, nor prevent the Austrians and Russians from wintering in Silesia, while Pitt, who would never make a separate peace, gave place to the less chivalrous Bute. In 1762, it became clear that England would not fight on indefinitely because a defeated ally chose to imitate Charles XII. An almost incredible change of fortune, however, relieved Frederick from further need of her assistance.

In January, Elizabeth of Russia died, leaving her troops

in possession of Eastern Prussia and victorious over her new and dangerous neighbour. Every national and dynastic interest demanded that the victory should be pressed home. Her nephew and successor, Peter III, was a grandson of Peter the Great, and a kinsman of Charles XII, and his consort Catharine, now a devoted Russian, has also been surnamed Great. The death of Elizabeth, none the less, caused the reward of five costly campaigns to be lightly flung away. Drunken and degenerate, yet obstinate, the new Tsar thought only of reinstating the Dukes of Holstein-Gottorp and of propitiating the King of Prussia.

Russia and the End of the War.

Frederick, now reduced to hopes of Turkish intervention, surmised that the accession of Peter might bring him the feeble aid of Denmark, which was menaced by the Gottorp claims. He received in amazing succession a request for the Order of the Black Eagle, the gift of peace, and an offer of the Russian alliance. After six months, indeed, the Russians made an end of their Prussianizing Tsar, but his intrusion had destroyed the Coalition. Sweden had followed Russia in making peace, and Catharine, who succeeded her murdered husband, would not expose her trembling throne to an interminable foreign war. Freed from anxiety for his rear, Frederick struck with renewed vigour in Silesia and Saxony, while England gained new triumphs at the expense of Spain. All combatants save the Queen were weary of the war, and February, 1763, witnessed a general peace.

Prussia and Austria, aided by the exiled King Augustus, made peace in his pillaged château of Hubertusburg on very simple terms. Saxony was surrendered by the one, and Frederick's former dominions by the other, without territorial or financial compensation. Frederick, however, readily promised to vote for Joseph as his father's successor in the Empire. At Paris, England concluded with the House of Bourbon a most triumphant peace. France practically abandoned both America and India in her favour, and, yielding Minorca, placed the Mediterranean again under her control. Although she

The Peace of 1763.

decided to keep Canada in place of Guadaloupe, and to return Cuba and the Philippines to Spain, she acquired also valuable islands in the West Indies, and, with Florida, a commanding position on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico. Senegal also became hers, and, more important than specific acquisitions, she had gained the unchallenged use of every ocean in the world.

The settlement of 1763 has for Europe a twofold weight. By its final sanction of Frederick's conquest of Silesia, it went far to proclaim "the unblest gospel that whatever policy may demand justice will allow." Europe had allowed to Frederick what she refused to Louis XIV. If one State might ravish territory from another, merely because it was the stronger, then the Society of States was no more than anarchy temporarily disguised. Such egotism unrestrained by law must produce a Europe always under arms. Palliatives might be found in the resolve of all States to maintain a balance of power, and in the capture by the inhabitants of a voice in the government of their country. The former, involving incessant watchfulness and suspicion, would at least tend to ease the burden of defence by mutual alliances against aggression; while the latter would terminate the treatment of provinces by sovereigns as mere hereditary estates. Neither, however, could supply the most crying need of Europe, a means of imposing in international relations the unquestioned rule of law. To attain that high ideal, those who directed the several States must create a true society, bound together by conscious common interest and by mutual regard. The society would be far stronger if the constituent States were directed by men whom their inhabitants had freely chosen. For moral disunion, no perfection of machinery could atone, but whatever disclosed a common interest or promoted a mutual regard would favour the growth of a Society indispensable to the well-being of mankind.

Retrogression in Europe.

Tried by this test, the settlement of 1763 was merely retrogressive. In Europe, Prussia continued to watch for fresh opportunities of conquest, and Austria for the recovery

of Silesia. France, balked of the Netherlands, remained the ally of Austria, since no more profitable combination offered. Russia, with an equal lack of conviction, continued her connection with Prussia. Weak States strove to avert partition by becoming the clients of the strong. With the passage of three centuries, Europe had grown less social than before.

The Peace of Paris, moreover, added to the discord of Europe the menace of a French revenge for her disasters in the wider world. "Not Pavia," a Frenchman has declared, "not Malplaquet, Rossbach, Waterloo or Sedan was for France the first irretrievable misfortune. That was Quebec. There England tore from us the mastery of America, and perhaps the mastery of the world." Bourbons and Habsburgs were resolved to seek compensation: Romanovs and Hohenzollerns to continue their predatory career, and already three great wars had affirmed the tendency of the convulsions of Europe to extend beyond the seas.

§ 5. *The Partition of Poland*, 1764–1772

Prussia and Russia.

After the Seven Years War, the exhausted Powers for a time sought their aggrandizement at the expense of the defenceless. In 1764, Frederick and Catharine agreed to preserve the existing constitutions of Poland and Sweden, which filled Warsaw and Stockholm with intrigues carried on by every considerable State. The ruler of Petersburg, indeed, must always covet Finland, while the demand of the Great Elector for Pomerania had not yet received full satisfaction.

Poland, a Slavonic country in no way fenced off from Russia, still held West Prussia, and the persecution of Greeks and Lutherans by the Poles gave Catharine and Frederick a pretext for intervention. While England was occupied with Wilkes and the Stamp Act; France, with autocracy and the Jesuits; and Austria with the succession of Joseph II to the Empire; Prussia and Russia secured a firm hold upon their neighbour. In 1764, the Poles were bribed and frightened into electing as their King Stanislaus Poniatowski, Catharine's discarded lover. Joint action in Poland thus

cemented an alliance which in 1767 was extended to mutual defence against Austria and the Turks.

The connection between Russia and Prussia was soon tested by war. Catharine's ostentatious domination in Poland had roused resistance not only among the Poles but also among the secular enemies of Russia at Constantinople. The nobles of southern Poland formed a rebellious Confederation at Bar (1768), to which both France and Austria accorded secret help. To support a weak foe against a strong one, the Turks made war on Russia, thus raising the value of the Prussian alliance to an Empress who without it stood alone. As victorious Russia threatened to absorb the Crimea and the Danubian Principalities, Austria, which had seized Zips, a Polish country, drew nearer to a declaration of war.

Turkish War.

In 1771, this danger was averted, at the instance of Frederick, by the ruthless sacrifice of Poland. Russia was prevailed on to forgo aggrandizement on the Danube for aggrandizement on the Düna and the Dnieper, while Austria and Prussia preserved the balance of power by exacting rough equivalents from the Poles. Austria, crossing the Carpathians, added a new kingdom of Galicia to her heterogeneous dominions, while Frederick gained the coveted West Prussia, with the exception of Danzig and Thorn. East Prussia was thus firmly linked with Pomerania and Brandenburg, while Danzig, the rich and independent mistress of the Vistula trade, found herself enslaved in Frederick's dominions and exposed to his peaceful coercion. While Austria's gain was dubious and Russia renounced to her confederates what she might have expected in the future to acquire, Prussia sacrificed neither prestige nor ambition, and gained a rich reward.

The First Partition of Poland.

Upon Europe the effect of the Polish Partition was disastrous. Without provoking a protest from the world outside, three of the five chief Powers had robbed a Christian neighbour on pretexts which only blackened their offence. Poland, indeed, had fallen behind the times and her social state was wretched.

Effect upon Europe.

In an age of benevolent despots, she obeyed venal feudatories and ecclesiastics prone to persecution. Russia and Prussia, however, had combined to frustrate her efforts at reform, and therefore could not seriously defend their intervention as indispensable to order. The success of their conspiracy lowered the morality of Europe to that of Frederick the Great. With the fate of Silesia and of Poland before their eyes, princes must find their only safety in armed force, knowing that if their forces were sufficient no law forbade them to prey upon the weak. The time might come when each of the partitioning Powers, confronted by a stronger, would find the new morality inconvenient.

Progress of the Powers.

For the moment, however, the leaders of eastern Europe seemed to have reaped the fruits of a war of conquest without its cost, and the digestion of the captured provinces went briskly on. Russia at least had thus recovered lands which had once been Russian, and which were still largely peopled by men of her own race and faith. Prussia could apply to her new possessions the orderly government and the methods of economic development which had already bound Silesia to the State. Austria under Maria Theresa had made great strides, and the Power to which Galicia now became subjected was approximating to the level of the West.

§ 6. *Europe and America*, 1772–1783

For four years after the Partition of Poland, Europe was chiefly concerned with events in her northern and southern extremities and across the sea.

Struensee in Denmark.

Denmark, under the German minister Bernstorff the most conventional of States, aroused unwonted attention by her eccentricity under Struensee, his successor. In a career of less than two years, which showed how an adventurer, by influence over an autocrat, might dominate even an alien State, this young German doctor transformed the government and policy of Denmark by a flood of reckless decrees inspired by the philosophers of France. His attempt thus to realize in fact the ideas which

influenced Catharine of Russia, Joseph of Austria, Frederick the Great and a host of lesser rulers, brought him to the scaffold in 1772, after he had estranged England and Denmark by ruining the Queen, a sister of George III.

In Sweden, meanwhile, a would-be benevolent despot, Gustavus III, had prepared a monarchical revolution, which, to the delight of the French, frustrated the schemes of his uncle, Frederick the Great, for the partition of his dominions (1772). The autocracy created by Charles XI and shattered after the death of Charles XII was thus revived by a brilliant and capricious king, and Sweden ceased to be the Poland of the north.

Gustavus III in Sweden.

In southern Europe, the Russian fleet and army mastered the Turks, and the Peace of Kutchuk-Kainardji was glorious (1774). The Sultan released from their allegiance all the Tartars who lived on the northern shores of the Black Sea and on the shores of the Sea of Azov, and it was not doubtful under whose rule these nomads would eventually fall. Russia received the mouths of the Don, the Bug, and the Dnieper, with the peninsula known in the nineteenth century as the Crimea. Within a few years, the whole of the Black Sea coast from the Dniester to the foot of the Caucasus passed firmly into her possession. Odessa and Sevastopol were soon to stand for that extension of civilization which Europe owed to Catharine and her minister Potemkin, as well as for their design of further conquests.

Russia and Turkey.

No less ominous were clauses in the treaty which Russia might twist into a licence to protect her co-religionists in Turkey. As these formed the vast majority of the Sultan's subjects in Europe, a protectorate over them would amount to a practical suzerainty over the Balkan peninsula. In 1775, Austria claimed her reward for facilitating so considerable and so promising an expansion of Russian power. This she found in the Bukovina, a sally-port beyond the eastern Carpathians, looking towards the Danubian Principalities which might soon be Russia's goal. Barred by the renaissance of Sweden from rapid expansion in the north, Catharine

turned to dreams of a reanimated Empire of Constantinople, and Austria, rather than Prussia, became her desired ally.

While in south-eastern Europe Catharine was developing the gains of 1774, a new struggle in America prepared the way for a fresh contest between France and England. French statesmen, when they signed the Peace of Paris, had consoled themselves with the calculation that the removal of their power from North America would abolish the need of the English colonies for the armies of the mother-country whose commercial system they would therefore have no motive to endure. Twelve years sufficed to bring about an Anglo-Saxon civil war, in which France perceived a hope of regaining her lost position in the world. The desire of the Colonists for her help impelled them on July 4, 1776, to declare themselves an independent State, to which other States might grant a recognition such as mere rebels could not lawfully receive. The adventure of Lafayette in 1777 expressed the real mind of France, and, early in the following year, Louis XVI lent his sea-power to aid the American cause. While the naval struggle and the success of the revolt were alike doubtful, and France and England were thus engaged elsewhere, central Europe was suddenly plunged into a new Succession War.

American Independence.

The War of the Bavarian Succession, which in 1778 threatened to renew the long-drawn horrors of the Silesian wars, formed, indeed, their natural sequel. Joseph II, though restrained by his mother and by Kaunitz, sought restlessly for some aggrandizement which might compensate Austria for her lost province or restore it to her sway. When Frederick fell ill, an Austrian army concentrated in Bohemia, but so long as he survived reconquest seemed too hard. Union with Bavaria, however, would at least restore the Habsburg preponderance in Germany, and for this the Netherlands might well be offered up. In January, 1778, by a partition treaty with the new Elector, more than one-third of Bavaria was assigned to Austria, in consideration of her recognition.

Prussia against Austria.

Indeed a worst-

Had France promised her support, the whole of Bavaria might have been exchanged for Belgium. Despite the pleadings of Marie Antoinette, his Austrian queen, Louis, however, resolved to stand aloof, and Joseph and Kaunitz were left to face Frederick as best they could. Only the unique attraction of the prize induced them to defend it by force of arms. To the lord of Vienna, Lower Bavaria stood as Finland to the lord of Petersburg or as Flanders to the lord of Paris. To deny to future invaders the valleys of the lower Isar and the lower Inn, and to enlarge her hold upon the Danube, Austria was prepared again to hazard her existence.

Early in July, Frederick crossed the Austrian frontier. The goodwill of England and the support of Saxony were his. In the name of the German constitution, he now attacked an Austria unsustained by Russia or by France. The Prussian military machine, however, like its royal leader, had aged since the days of Leuthen, while the enemy had drilled his polyglot masses into a modern army. During the summer, the two forces manœuvred and counter-manœuvred in Bohemia, but neither ventured upon battle.

Although the harried territory was Austrian, Frederick was venturing his prestige, and his retirement in September lowered the Prussian place among the nations. The stillborn war cost him some 25,000 men, one-seventh of his total force, but in diplomacy he proved triumphant. Russia, freed from the fear of a Turkish invasion, was skilfully induced to force upon Austria a humiliating peace. At Teschen it was agreed that Bavaria should remain undivided, the Queen receiving only a district between her western frontier and the river Inn. Frederick had thus posed successfully as the defender of public law against the Emperor's unprincipled attack.

For the moment, indeed, it seemed that Austria was isolated not only in Germany but in Europe. The Bavarian war had drawn England nearer to Prussia, her bitter enemy since 1762. France was immersed in the naval struggle which promised to revive her empire overseas. Russia had threatened interference by force of arms. Soon, however, the two

Austrian Alliance with Russia.

restless autocrats, Joseph and Catharine, came to an understanding which left Prussia in the cold. While Joseph courted Catharine's favour with a charm impossible to the aged King, he, and not Frederick, could be her invaluable ally against the Turk. Towards the close of 1780 the death of Maria Theresa made him sole ruler of the Austrian dominions, and in 1781 he made Russia his ally.

Alliance with Catharine the Great meant association with a policy which shrank from no adventure in pursuit of Russian grandeur. Timid at home, the princess who had quitted Germany almost a pauper set no bounds to her imperial designs. In 1780, she challenged English power by sea, drawing Sweden and Denmark into the First Armed Neutrality for the restriction of belligerent naval rights. In 1781, when French sea-power secured American success at Yorktown, the Armed Neutrality included also Spain, France, Holland, the United States, Austria and Prussia—a world-wide triumph for its creator.

At the same time, Joseph embarked upon schemes in which his new ally could give little aid. The English war, which dalliance with her enemies had brought upon the Dutch, he utilized to obtain the withdrawal of their garrisons from the barrier confronting France. In defiance of the power and wealth of the Catholic Church in his dominions, he issued an Edict of Toleration, and strove to unify his motley provinces into a centralized modern State. Ostend and Trieste alike became free ports. Many monasteries were dissolved and the Emperor proved his contempt for the religious and anti-religious prejudices of the age by exchanging visits with the Pope and by rejecting his intercessions.

Reforms of Joseph II.

In 1783, the American struggle, which had drawn France, Spain and Holland into war with England and had reacted upon the fate of Germany and even Turkey, was closed by the Treaty of Versailles. The Colonists had failed to conquer Canada and to vanquish in pitched battles the British and German troops. They had, none the less, proved it impossible to subdue a large and

Triumph of France.

undeveloped country without unchallenged sea-power. By denying this to England, the French fleet had caused her to lose the war, atoning for this injury by disaster at the hands of Rodney (1782). Yet the later stages of the struggle witnessed the virtual abandonment by the Americans of their allies, and the negotiations at Versailles found the Anglo-Saxons in mutual support against the Continental Coalition.

After the usual bargaining and sacrifice of those who could not hope for revenge, it was agreed that France should withdraw from Indian politics while regaining her Indian posts, that she should return to England many of the West Indies at the price of Tobago and the Senegal Valley, and that other adjustments of territory should be made for the advantage of her fisheries and commerce. Spain obtained Minorca and Florida, but returned the Bahamas, and once more acquiesced in her failure to retake Gibraltar. Holland paid with Negapatam for her lapse from the Orange policy of dependence upon England. The United States, of course, achieved their independence, and were exempted from providing any indemnity for those loyal colonists who had been exiled for adhesion to the mother-country.

The settlement of 1783 left the rivalry of France and England undiminished, and Gibraltar as a blister to inflame the pride of Spain. The new nation which it established must for some time remain too remote and undeveloped to exert a powerful influence upon Europe. In the Americans, England lost for the moment an embarrassment rather than a source of strength, while her trade with them soon surpassed the dimensions reached under the Colonial system. To Europe, the immediate importance of the American triumph lay in the region of ideas. Thirteen democratic communities had claimed with success to throw off the allegiance into which they were born, and had asserted the title of man as man to enjoy a freedom incompatible with the rule of kings. To the delight of progressive Europeans, they had performed what Rousseau had eloquently preached, and their example must encourage

America and Europe.

captive populations to attempt to break their chains. Frenchmen, in particular, whose king had aided the Americans, could hardly fail to inquire why they must be taxed to defend across the ocean a liberty denied to themselves at home.

Mustapha Renal Pasha

The first dictator in Europe. He can be a General or a diplomat as occasion is

PART V

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND NAPOLEON (1783–1815)

§ 1. *The Last Years of the Old Europe*, 1783–1789

Until the death of Frederick the Great in 1786, the surface of Europe was agitated chiefly by Joseph II. Foiled by Frederick in Bavaria, and merely exploited by Catharine in the East, he sought in the Netherlands an outlet for his energy and ambition, demanding in 1784 that Maestricht should be restored to him as Emperor, and that Antwerp should no longer be debarred from commerce for the benefit of Amsterdam. Next year, he attempted to bring about the exchange of the Netherlands for Bavaria. The new design was defeated by Frederick, who formed a league of German princes to defend the constitution, while France, hoping to make Holland her client, enabled her to resist. At the price of small concessions, Antwerp remained cut off from ocean-going trade, while Holland, on the verge of civil war, accepted the French alliance. The replacement of Frederick on the Prussian throne by his fatuous nephew Frederick William II introduced a new element of adventure into politics. Joseph could not know whether he would next be challenged by his old enemy in Poland, Bohemia or the Netherlands, or whether the attack would be made indirectly by inciting the Turks to try conclusions with his Russian ally.

Resistance to Joseph II.

In 1787, while Joseph and Catharine paraded their alliance in a progress through the newly-won region of the Dnieper, the inevitable storm broke in the north. The Austrian Netherlands were weary of government by royal decrees which,

in conformity with the new philosophy, disregarded their religion, their history and their prejudices, and treated them as a mere province under an autocrat at Vienna. While Brussels and Louvain were in uproar, Utrecht and Amsterdam were the scene of armed strife for and against the House of Orange. Whereas the lower classes and the English minister supported the feeble rule of William V, the so-called Patriots fought for the principles of Rousseau and looked to France. The scene was turned by the addition of a Prussian army. When the Patriots dared to arrest the Princess of Orange, her brother Frederick William sent 20,000 men under Brunswick to her relief. France, fearing bankruptcy, refused not move, and the humiliation proved more damaging than that of Rossbach. The Orange dynasty was triumphantly restored; the Patriots by the thousands left the country, and, in 1788, Holland joined with Prussia and England in a Triple Alliance for the maintenance of European peace.

The Triple Alliance.

Europe in 1788.

Europe in 1788, however, offered a gloomy prospect. In England, where the King's mind had given way, the loss of America was followed by the indictment of Hastings, the symbol of Indian dominion, for abuse of power. France, disgusted with her queen, her ministers, her *Parlement*, and her nobles, turned in despair to the States-General, which since 1614 had never been assembled. Austria, united by the skill of its monarchs, was threatened by the *doctrinaire* violence of the Emperor with disruption. Poland was meditating reforms which must be regarded as a challenge by neighbours swollen with her spoil. In the north and east, the intrusion of Russia had resulted in further war. This war, ardently desired by Frederick for the furtherance of his new designs on Poland, broke out in 1787, when the Turks determined to anticipate the coming Russian attack. Early next year, Austria was drawn in, while Prussia, by becoming the ally of England, had insured herself against an inconvenient onslaught on the part of France. The favourable situation of 1772 thus promised to recur, and Prussia might again demand compensation in

Poland for accepting the aggrandizement of the exhausted conquerors of the Turks.

An unexpected complication, however, was caused by the ambition of Frederick's nephew Gustavus III of Sweden.

Northern War.

Dreaming of a swift advance on Petersburg while Catharine was struggling against the Turks, Gustavus suddenly declared war, only to be surprised in turn by an irruption of the Danes. Both strokes failed, the Swedish through the mutiny of the nobles and disaster by sea, the Danish through the response of the Swedish people to a dramatic summons by their king, while the Triple Alliance brought about an unrevengeful peace. Gustavus, posing as the protector of his people, actually enhanced his autocratic power, but Russia had received a fruitful lesson in the danger of leaving Finland in possibly hostile hands.

For the time being, however, she was fully occupied with the Turkish struggle, in which Austria gave but little help

Eastern War.

during the first campaign. Catharine possessed a power of inspiration which, coupled with her considerable resources, promised eventual victory in an undisturbed war against Russia's hereditary foe. With Potemkin, who dreamed of Constantinople, as her minister, and the eccentric Suvórov, whom Russians would follow anywhere, as her general, she needed only time, but time might well influence politics to her disadvantage. The year 1789, indeed, brought victory to the Allies. Belgrade and Bucharest fell to the Austrians, Bender and Akerman to the Russians, and a triumphant advance across the Danube might be expected in the next campaign.

The value of Joseph as an ally, however, was lowered by the palpable disaffection of the Galicians and Hungarians and by

France and Europe.

the Belgian revolt, while Prussia was manifestly preparing to impose her will upon Austria by diplomacy or by force. In France, moreover, the States-General had failed to extricate the monarchy from its embarrassments. The Bastille had fallen; Lafayette, the hero of American independence, commanded a citizen army; the delegates of the nation were discussing

the Rights of Man; the Church had passed under the control of the State; nobles were fleeing from the country. All this spelt encouragement for the Belgian rebels, a free hand for hostile Prussia, and a blow to the absolutism which both Catharine and Joseph represented.

§ 2. *Europe and the Revolution*, 1790–1792

The critical year 1790 began with a strengthening of the forces which were threatening a general war. In France, the attacks upon Church and Crown threatened to provoke a civil war, and in any case rendered the monarchy powerless to influence eastern Europe. The Belgians proclaimed a republic, to which Prussia accorded recognition. Hertzberg, the ambitious minister of Frederick William, courted the alliance of the Turks and of the Poles. All seemed ready for the overthrow of Austria, while Russia, her only possible ally, was struggling against Sweden and the Turks.

Austria, however, was saved by the timely death of Joseph, and by the moderating influence of Pitt. At the end of February, 1790, Leopold II became Emperor, and applied at Vienna the statesmanship which he had learned as an Italian prince. Abandoning both the *doctrinaire* endeavours of Joseph to legislate the racial differences of his subjects out of existence and his quest of union and aggrandizement by foreign war, Leopold prepared for a better understanding between the two great German Powers against dangers from west and east. He therefore appealed to Pitt, whose instinct warned him that the Turks were no longer the tools of France, but a potential bulwark against Russia. The Emperor could still spare or destroy the Turk, and either hold Belgium against France, or use it to purchase her assistance. Pitt, already threatened with a war with Spain, had every inducement to hold Prussia back, and thus to avert a struggle which would have facilitated revolution at either end of Europe. Supported, as was now customary, by the Dutch, he procured the Treaty of Reichenbach (July, 1790) between Austria and Prussia, which went far towards establishing a general peace. Frederick William

Efforts for Peace.

abandoned his attempt to make Prussia the mistress of Germany with the aid of Belgium, Sweden, Poland and the Turks. Austria renounced her alliance with Russia, and undertook to grant an amnesty in Belgium. The way seemed open for restraining Catharine by overwhelming force.

Catharine Resolute.

Catharine, however, faced the danger with equal fortitude and skill. Deprived of her Austrian ally, she immediately divested herself of her Swedish enemy. Gustavus, eager to champion the cause of monarchy in France, readily accepted peace, and Suvórov, on the Danube, gained a timely success by storming the strong fortress of Ismail. With the aid of the reconstructed fleet, Suvórov might contemplate a march on Constantinople. Spain, meanwhile, unsupported by France, had given way in her dispute with England, and in Belgium the authority of Leopold was now completely re-established. At the close of 1790 aggressive Russia and revolutionary France were each in isolation.

The Eastern Question.

In 1791, while Louis XVI became practically the prisoner of his people, and the death of Mirabeau removed the only statesman great enough to control the Revolution, England and Prussia pressed on their advantage against isolated Russia. To their demand for the complete restoration of Turkey, Catharine replied that Ochakov on the Black Sea could not be given up. War seemed imminent, but Pitt found that public opinion would not tolerate war for such a cause. The recall of his threats against Russia cost England the confidence of Prussia, but contributed to peace in the east. By the terms finally confirmed in the Treaty of Jassy (January, 1792), Catharine kept Ochakov, and advanced her frontier from the Bug to the Dniester. Her next advance would undoubtedly lie in the direction of Poland.

Reform in Poland.

Inspired by the example of France, the Polish reformers had prevailed with the Diet to legitimize a new constitution without even a debate. Poland thus declared herself a monarchy hereditary in the Saxon House, and abjured persecution and many of her ancient feudal abuses. The reform, which must lead to a

demand for restitution of the provinces torn from her in 1772, was carried through in reliance upon the protection of Prussia. At the crisis produced in Europe by the progress of revolution in France, the Poles challenged both the present and the future Russia. Until Prussia was ousted from her new predominance in a Russian preserve, Catharine could spare only lofty expressions for the cause of royalty in Paris.

The French Question.

Russia, where monarchy was peculiarly sacred and indispensable, came thus to be absorbed in Poland at the moment when the treatment by France of her own monarchy could no longer be ignored by foreign Powers. During the earlier phases of the French Revolution, these had found little to resent in a movement which promised to render impossible the recurrence of a Louis XIV. Whatever might be the future outcome of her adoption of the Rights of Man, its present effect, they judged, was to make France powerless. The overthrow of the Church and nobles accorded with the attitude of many benevolent despots towards their own ecclesiastical and aristocratic competitors for power. The threatened absorption of Avignon, indeed, challenged the Pope, and the Empire was outraged by the abolition of the feudal rights of the German princes in Alsace. These proceedings were, however, in no sense propagandist, and did not contain the seeds of war.

More dangerous were the denunciations of the French by Burke in England, and by the Emigrants all over Europe. The one went far to convince the governing classes that the cause of the Bourbons was their own, while the other formed an ardent and persuasive diplomatic *corps* of counter-revolution. Cautious and pacific as was Leopold, the brother of Marie Antoinette could hardly fail to take the lead in marshalling Europe to enjoin moderation upon France. A false report that Louis and his family had escaped from Paris impelled him, early in July, 1791, to decide upon supporting him with all his force. The news that the flight to Varennes had only tightened their captivity occasioned an Imperial appeal to the Powers to join in a collective remonstrance. Finally, late in August, he joined with Frederick William in

signing at Pillnitz in Saxony a Declaration which called upon the Powers to re-establish the rightful authority of the King of France.

Since the Declaration of Pillnitz contemplated force only if the Powers were unanimous, while Leopold already knew that England would not move, the menace to the Revolution was by no means great. French feeling was influenced, however, by its publication together with a threatening manifesto from the emigrant brothers of the King. These documents, following on the unsuccessful flight to Varennes, and accompanied by the menacing gestures of the emigrant nobles on the frontier, neutralized Louis' acceptance of the Constitution, and impelled the Legislative Assembly in the direction of war. Before the year closed, many Frenchmen regarded war as necessary to humble the Austrian enemy and to overthrow the King of France.

Movement towards War.

§ 3. *The War of the First Coalition*, 1792–1797

In February, 1792, Austria, invoked by Marie Antoinette, signed a treaty of alliance with Prussia, which might serve as the basis of a European coalition against France. Sweden was notoriously eager to strike a blow for monarchy, and the treaty contemplated the adhesion of Russia, the Sea Powers and Saxony. The shadow of the Polish question was perceptible in the resolution of Austria and Prussia to guarantee only "*a* free constitution" in Poland instead of *the* free constitution proclaimed in the preceding year. While Leopold lived, it was always possible that his statecraft would avert a war. His sudden death on March 1 placed the unformed Francis on the throne, and Prussia, eager for territorial compensations, clamoured for violent measures. At the same time the warlike Girondins gained power in the Assembly, and Dumouriez procured a declaration against Austria from the pacific King. At the end of April, the French invaded Belgium and discovered that Prussia and Austria stood side by side.

Urged on by Catharine in order that she might gain a free hand in Poland, Prussia and Austria had already resolved

on the invasion of France. Their slowness in carrying out their resolve, however, may well have saved the Revolution. England stood firmly neutral, and both Spain and the minor German States followed her example. The assassination of Gustavus III paralysed Sweden. While the existence of a state of war inevitably lowered yet further the power of a suspected king, the Allies were slowly gathering a force of scarcely more than 80,000 men. Before the vanguard entered France, Louis had been made a prisoner (August 10, 1792). Early in September, indeed, the Allies occupied Verdun, but, before their check at Valmy, it was clear that nothing decisive could be expected even from victory in the field.

Invasion of France.

Austria and Prussia remained at heart jealous rivals, and the thoughts of their rulers turned rather towards Poland than towards France. There Catharine had established as her vassals the nobles who opposed reform, but she was prepared to allow compensation. Poland, indeed, might be compelled to pay for a French war as for a Turkish in 1772, but a clear-cut scheme for such an object could hardly be discussed between Francis and Frederick William or their advisers. The Prussian army, moreover, which bore the brunt of the campaign, revealed those defects in intelligence which such a system as that of Frederick must in no long time produce, and Brunswick, its reluctant chief, was not the man to make them good. Valmy, however, was no second Malplaquet. Revolutionary France was saved by the well-trained artillery of the royal army in an engagement which cost the combatants less than a thousand men. Two days later, on September 22, the new Convention proclaimed her a Republic.

The First Republic.

The Republic began its course with victory in every field. In disease and in the new ideas it possessed two strong allies. October saw 30,000 Prussians, including 20,000 sick, fleeing from France to Germany. Encouraged by German believers in the Rights of Man, the French followed, and captured Frankfort. In the Netherlands, meanwhile, where the Austrians had

France against Europe.

failed to capture Lille, Dumouriez was proving what revolutionary *élan* could accomplish. When he aimed only at Mons, his defeat of some 13,000 Austrians at Jemappes laid all the Netherlands at his feet. French troops crossed the adjacent German frontier. Holland was threatened and the Scheldt declared free to navigation—measures which might well defeat all the efforts of the new Republic to secure its own recognition by England. In the south, Nice had been occupied and Savoy incorporated with France, and war with Sardinia was imminent.

These challenges to neighbouring Powers were made wider and more emphatic by contemporary decrees of the Convention. On November 19, the protection of France was offered to all nations struggling for their freedom, the cost of the campaign being due from the liberated country. On December 15, it was further decreed that Liberty, as interpreted by the French, should be compulsory within the sphere thus conquered. The year closed with the King on trial for his life. On December 31, Pitt made the ominous declaration that England would never with indifference see France "either directly or indirectly the sovereign of the Low Countries, or general arbiter of the rights and liberties of Europe."

Pitt's language towards revolutionary France was such as every European sovereign was prepared to hold, and such as in most cases would have been echoed by the vast majority of his people. In Germany, and in the Netherlands, a brief experience of the French invaders stifled the nascent enthusiasm for the Rights of Man. The leaders of the Revolution were already perplexed by the problem of finding employment at a distance for a military rabble which they dared not suffer to return. On the Continent, however, only three Powers could oppose France, and all three were absorbed in Poland. In 1793, therefore, a State which was still disorganized could, almost with impunity, challenge Europe. The feeble hostility of foreign Powers would only confirm the Revolution. A collective effort great enough to bring France to reason, and inspired by sufficient wisdom to render her future tolerable,

Influence of the Eastern Question.

was out of the question. She and the existing system of Europe seemed to be committed to an inevitable but unhopeful war.

On January 21, 1793, the extremist minority in the Convention procured the judicial murder of the King. Prussian troops were already in Poland, and two days later Prussia and Russia signed a new treaty of Partition. The inception and fulfilment of this compact form perhaps the most loathsome chapter in the history of pre-revolutionary Europe. Catharine had gained power in Poland by professing tenderness for the national rights of the reactionary nobles; Frederick William, by posing as the champion of reform. Both Powers and Austria denounced the assault upon monarchy in France. While Austria and Prussia took up arms against the Revolution, and Russia made herself supreme in Poland, all three were ready for partition. Prussia secretly agreed with Russia to betray Austria, whose design to purchase Bavaria with the Netherlands was impeded by the conquest of the Netherlands by France. Prussia and Russia then assigned to themselves far vaster annexations than Austria had ever contemplated. Prussia claimed the great city of Danzig, Thorn, a strong fortress, and the district surrounding Posen, while Russia quietly annexed an enormous area which brought her frontier and the Austrian into contact. As the year went on, Frederick William insulted the Poles by pretending that his motive was the restraint of revolution, while Catharine compelled a mutilated Diet, at least by their silence, to sanction the dismemberment of their country. Austria, loudly denouncing the fraud upon herself, was compelled by circumstances to gratify Russia by continuing the struggle in the West. Such was the foundation of the coalition of which England now became a member.

Second Partition of Poland.

On January 24, the French representative in London was expelled from England as a suspected alien. A week later, the Republic declared war against England and the Dutch. Early in March, she added Spain to the long list of her foes. Belgium, meanwhile, where the forcible introduction of revolutionary institutions

Peril of France.

had provoked a national hatred of France, found her army incorporated with the French. For the overthrow of the established governments of Europe, France decreed a levy of more than half a million men. By the close of February, Dumouriez, aided by the unexhausted credit of the Rights of Man, was master of southern Holland. An Austrian counterstroke, however, forced him to fall back on Belgium, and defeat at Neerwinden drove him out of Brussels. Preferring the Austrians to the Jacobins of Paris, he then proposed to co-operate in suppressing the Revolution, but the convinced Republicans in his army rendered the scheme abortive. Meanwhile the French had compelled the Rhinelanders to vote for annexation. In July, however, they were driven by the Prussians from Mainz, while in the north Valenciennes fell, and in other fields the armies of Spain and of Sardinia triumphantly invaded France. The misfortunes of the Republic were crowned by the revolt of the Vendée, whose peasants steadfastly resisted the conscription, and threatened to divide the nation. At a time when Lyons, Bordeaux and Marseilles were rebels against Paris, only the firm defence of Nantes prevented the Vendéens from carrying much of the north and west.

Treason and invasion found their natural antidote in ever greater violence. In March, the Jacobin extremists quitted Paris to make their adherents masters of the villages and towns. In April, a Committee of Public Safety was established, and in May, a fixed price enacted for the sale of corn. Early in June, the extremists captured the Convention, and soon the star of Danton paled before that of Robespierre. In July, the great Committee of Public Safety gained the dictatorship of France. In August, under the influence of Carnot, the armies of the Republic began to be reorganized from top to bottom. Officers of noble birth were declared incapable of serving, while by the new expedient of a *levée en masse* all other Frenchmen became potential soldiers. Under this decree 450,000 young men were eventually called to the colours.

Progress of the Revolution.

In the Terror, the increased powers of the State were ruthlessly used against every foe of the extremists. The assassination of one of their number, Marat, was made a pretext to exterminate the Opposition. Marie Antoinette and Philip of Orleans shared the fate of scores of Deputies, and thousands of Vendéens, while the abortive revolt of Lyons was punished by the destruction of a great part of the town. The temper of the Terrorists showed itself in their attempt to pacify the Vendée by drowning its inhabitants by bargefuls in the Loire. A new calendar, dating from the foundation of the Republic on September 22, 1792, divided the year into months named after the expected weather and reminded mankind that the Revolution had inaugurated a new era. In Brumaire and Frimaire of the year II, the local Terrorists put down the old religion. The Archbishop of Paris abjured Christianity; his cathedral was dedicated to the worship of reason; all the churches of the capital were closed, and thousands of provincial communes followed suit.

French Recovery.

Meanwhile the energy of Carnot and of the Committee had gone far towards making appointed by the Committee had gone far towards making the Republic safe against invasion. Down to the autumn of 1793, the Austrians and Prussians were prevented only by their mutual jealousies and by Poland from crushing their raw opponents. The northern army, aided by English, Dutch and Hanoverian contingents, was prevented from marching on Paris mainly by the resolve of its constituent members to attack only what each of them designed to keep. In November, however, the strength inherent in the Revolution began to show itself. As the desperate campaign of the Vendéens proved, France was a martial nation, and her manhood had now been entrusted to energetic men for her defence against invaders.

The New Men: Bonaparte.

Unrestrained by precedent or respect for private rights, these organizers of victory could punish freely within the army and as freely provide for its maintenance and for its command by men of talent. Pichegru and Hoche, young men promoted from the ranks, drove the Austrians and Prussians across the Rhine.

Jourdan, a veteran of the American war, had already saved Maubeuge and closed the road to Paris. The Sardinians were likewise driven back. At the close of the year 1793, the Revolution had almost quenched in blood the domestic revolts against its power, while, of five invading armies, only that of Spain had held its ground. Toulon, one of the revolted cities, had summoned to its aid the English blockading fleet, but the intruders had been driven out. In the siege of Toulon by the French, accident and his outspoken Republicanism had secured the command of the artillery for Captain Napoleon Bonaparte, then aged twenty-three. He emerged a general of brigade, a rank not high enough to check the appalling massacre with which the victors punished the rebellion of the town. That Toulon gave Bonaparte his chance to rise, and that here he met Desaix, Junot, Marmont, Suchet and Victor may well have been the most pregnant events of this tormented year.

In 1794, France once again found powerful though unconscious allies in the Poles. While Kosciusko and his colleagues in national resistance were learning that for the moment their cause was hopeless, a spontaneous revolt suddenly drove out the Russians. Prussia thereupon abandoned the West in order to throw her main strength into territories which she expected to retain. England in vain attempted to hold her to a recent treaty for a vigorous attack on France. At first successful, Frederick William ignominiously failed before Warsaw, while fear of his success impelled both Austria and Russia to unlimited exertions for invasion. Suvórov, with his wonted speed and directness, led against Warsaw an army that had been collected for a possible attack upon the Turks. Near the capital, Kosciusko was defeated and captured by the former Russian garrison, and early in November Suvórov entered Warsaw. Catharine had triumphed so completely that it remained only for the partitioning Powers to divide the helpless country, and to abolish everything that could recall its independence.

Poland and France.

The distraction of their enemies in Poland, and their

own increasing strength, enabled the French in 1794 to rival the successes of Condé and Turenne. While the Prussians were still active, the renewed march on Paris had been compelled to halt. After mid-summer, the battle of Fleurus made Pichegru master of the Netherlands, and in the autumn, Jourdan stood firmly on the Rhine. Against the Sardinians and Spaniards the French also gained successes, though their fleet was crushed by Howe off Ushant on the first of June. It was clear that on land their national armies, with the new tactics of incessant activity and massed attack, were superior to anything that Europe could bring against them. The crowning triumph of the campaign was gained by Pichegru in Holland, where an amazing winter campaign laid the whole country, by no means unwillingly, at his feet. Moreau with the cavalry rode over the ice to seize the fleet, and the way was clear for the Batavian Republic.

French Triumph in the Low Countries.

The diminution of internal war, and the expulsion of the alien invaders, rendered possible a reaction against violence in France. Robespierre, indeed, used his victory over the atheistic extremists and the followers of Danton only to continue the Terror. Danton himself followed the atheists to the scaffold, and the law of 22 Prairial placed every head in France at the mercy of the revolutionary tribunal. The theatrical restoration of a vague religion by the Festival of the Supreme Being indicated Robespierre's dislike of atheism rather than a return to a milder rule. The tribunal now dispatched some 200 victims every week. Robespierre, however, was in no sense necessary to his country, and the victory of Fleurus emboldened the extremists and the moderates in Paris to combine to overthrow him. On July 28 (10 Thermidor), after some days of general confusion, he and his associates were beheaded. The nation, enslaved for two years by a small but well-organized minority, rallied with unspeakable relief to the moderates of the Convention against the extremist Thermidorians who had rid the world of Robespierre. Before the end of the year, the machinery of the Terror had been destroyed, and

Moderation in France.

France was in a fair way to be governed by her moderate men.

The year 1795, therefore, offered Europe a reasonable prospect of peace. France had apparently ceased to be either a Power which might easily be conquered or one with which an agreement would be suicidal. Public worship now received from her government a grudging toleration. Some of the confiscated estates were returned to their owners. Risings prompted by starvation were put down, and the Vendéen and Breton rebellions repressed without revenge. A new constitution was in preparation, and rumour even hinted at a monarchy.

The general longing for peace received partial gratification by a treaty with Tuscany, followed in April by the treaty of Basel with Prussia. Frederick William, whose troops had been by far the most formidable opponents of the French on land, now abandoned the left bank of the Rhine, secretly securing a promise of compensation on the right bank for his own trans-Rhenish possessions. Prussia, moreover, was to negotiate further secessions from the Coalition among the lesser German States. In May, the terrorized Dutch laid their country at the feet of France. The Batavian Republic, symmetrically organized, became a mere contributory area to the French army, navy and finances, but the French restrained those of their Dutch adherents who wished to send the Orange party to the guillotine. In June, the death of the captive Dauphin made the legitimist heir his exiled uncle Louis XVIII, a less appealing figure. In July, an Emigrant invasion, supported by England, was defeated at Quiberon, and Spain purchased peace by the cession of San Domingo. So long as the Low Countries remained French, however, England would favour war, while for Austria to lay down her arms would be to renounce her hope of acquiring Bavaria in exchange for Belgium.

France gains Security.

During the campaign of 1795, therefore, a France rising swiftly towards the fullness of her military power opposed a much diminished Coalition. Her enemies, indeed, might

come to terms with Russia, but, so long as Catharine lived, Russian forces would be directed rather against Turkey than against the Revolution. There remained on land only Austria and Sardinia, and offensives in Germany and Italy promised the employment, the plunder and the conquests which were now becoming the dominant desires of France. Luxemburg, despite its encircling ravines, having fallen in June, Jourdan and Pichegru could hope to drive the Austrians towards the Danube. They advanced by Düsseldorf and Mannheim, with terrible devastations, but the timely purchase of Pichegru by the Austrians brought the movement to an end. In the Maritime Alps, victories over the Austrians and Sardinians opened the way to Turin, but the vigour of Augereau and Masséna was foiled by the sluggishness of Schérer.

The Directory.

While revolutionary France was thus proving her superiority to the old Europe in the field, her government was undergoing vital changes. The Rights of Man were upheld, and it was determined that the lands of the Emigrants and clergy should in no case be given back. But only the jealousy of the Convention for the maintenance of its own authority prevented the inauguration of a Constitution in which property should form the indispensable qualification for power. Property-owning Frenchmen might well have devised a monarchy, and the Republicans of the Convention therefore in great measure usurped the place of the electors. On 13 Vendémiare (October 5, 1795) Paris armed to defend its rights, but grapeshot directed by Bonaparte crushed the constitutional insurrection. Bonaparte became the head of the army of the Interior, while on November 3, five Directors were entrusted with the supreme executive of France. They owed their power not to the one-third of the new Legislature which had been freely elected but to the two-thirds which the hated Convention had illegally introduced.

The Legislature, which might expect, after at most three years of life, to possess a majority of freely elected members, now consisted of two Chambers exercising definite powers. But for the conflict at its birth, this constitution of the year

III might have made the country of the Rights of Man a peaceful member of the European circle. Even in England, the nation was weary of the war. The illegal violence of the Convention, however, identified the new government with that which it replaced. Five regicides, of whom the most eminent was Carnot, were made Directors. In the Legislature, the old and the new elements were bitterly opposed, while the extremist agents of the Government were deservedly detested in the country. In self-defence, as well as to make surreptitious fortunes, the men who dominated France must prolong the war and preserve the venom of the Revolution.

Before the campaign of 1796 opened, territorial changes had been determined which must profoundly influence Austria, now the sole land-power opposing France. The Polish question, it was hoped, had been for ever closed by the arrangement of a third Partition. Catharine, whose troops were in possession, and who needed an Austrian alliance to dismember Turkey, was prepared to compensate the Emperor for his disappointment in 1793. Austria revenged herself upon Prussia by assenting to an enlargement of the Russian share, while Prussia therefore was allowed to cushion her eastern provinces with a broad region which included Warsaw. Austria now outflanked Warsaw and grasped both Cracow and Lublin, Russia advancing her western frontier to the middle Niemen and the Bug. The menace of her new neighbourhood to Prussia was at the same time increased by the fact that Courland, whose German barons had long been subject to Russian influence, now flung herself unconditionally at Catharine's feet. Thus safeguarded in the east, and loyally supported by England, Austria could address herself to the recovery of Belgium, which the Convention had converted into nine departments of France.

The Third Partition of Poland.

In their attempt, with only such aid as England, Sardinia and Portugal might afford, to wrest from France the object of her secular ambition, the Habsburgs had the rare good fortune to discover a fine soldier among themselves. The Archduke Charles in Germany completely foiled the plans of the Directory for 1796. Jour-

French Defeats.

dan and Moreau, they designed, should march from the lower and the upper Rhine to join Bonaparte and the army of Italy in a combined invasion of Austria. Jourdan, however, was defeated in Bavaria and driven ignominiously across the Rhine, while Moreau sought safety in Strassburg.

Their failure, with that of an expedition under Hoche to Ireland, threw into fatal prominence Bonaparte's astounding feats in Italy. Arriving at Nice in the early spring, with Berthier, Junot, Marmont and Murat among his staff, Bonaparte found the army ragged and insubordinate, straggling along the narrow coast between the mountains and the English fleet. The enemy was more numerous and held interior lines, but unity was lacking, and the dominant general was an Austrian of seventy-two. While he swiftly disciplined and organized his troops, Bonaparte promised that in a few weeks they should be in Milan, 150 miles away. On April 12 he separated the Austrians from their allies, and, bursting through the mountains, forced Sardinia, on April 28, to sign the armistice of Cherasco. Then, having crossed the Po, he evaded the line of the Ticino, captured the bridge of Lodi over the Adda, and, having driven the Austrians eastwards, turned back to secure Milan. His victories were already enabling him to impose his policy upon the jealous and reluctant Directory, and to turn the devotion of the army from the Revolution to himself. The fatuity of his enemies and his own good fortune had justified that firm faith in his star which for the next eighteen years was destined to remain unbroken.

Bonaparte in Italy.

Sardinia having now concluded peace, Bonaparte might turn unhampered against Mantua, the mainstay of the Austrian power in the Italian plain. While this great fortress was invested, he drove the English from Leghorn and captured vast spoils from them and from the Pope. The French failure in Germany, however, exposed him to a dangerous Austrian attack, but, by withdrawing from Mantua, he thrust his force between two advancing armies, defeating both before they could combine. The

Arcola.

valour of Augereau and Masséna, and the feebleness of another Austrian of seventy, averted a disaster which might well have ended his career. Mantua was again blockaded and the Austrians defeated beyond the Adige, but again their victory in Germany enabled them to move in overwhelming force against the French. Once more, Bonaparte attacked before two armies could combine, and in November a desperate struggle at Arcola ended with his success.

Early in the new year, 1797, the Austrians made yet another effort to relieve their fortress and retain their Italian domain. On the plateau of Rivoli, between the Adige and Lake Garda, Bonaparte crushed the main relief force, and, on February 2, Mantua surrendered, with more than three hundred guns. In the same month, the Pope purchased peace at Tolentino on costly and humiliating terms, while Italy was stripped of her treasures to enrich the troops and Paris. Again the triumphs of Bonaparte contrasted sharply with the failures in other fields. Spain had entered the war on the side of France, but her fleet was shattered by Jervis at St. Vincent. The French armies of the Rhine seemed incapable of the combined action necessary to bring Austria to her knees.

Triumph of Bonaparte.

The Archduke Charles was now set free to drive Bonaparte from Italy. Even an able Habsburg, however, could not make the Austrian army equal to the French. Talent against genius in the chief command; diversity against unity in the racial composition of the ranks; among the officers, favouritism against choice by merit; one firm will against a committee in planning the campaign—all these made it impossible for rivers and mountains to protect Vienna. Striking steadily north-eastwards from the Venetian plain against an outnumbered foe, Napoleon crossed the Tagliamento and the Isonzo, burst into the valley of the Drave as a year earlier into the valley of the Po, and, in a few weeks, approached the Semmering Pass, the highway towards the capital.

Preferring in diplomacy as in battle the profitable course

to the spectacular, he then determined on a halt. Like Jourdan in the previous campaign, he was experiencing the weight of local indignation. His Rhenish colleagues had not moved, and he could not know that they were on the point of moving. For his own career, moreover, it might well prove advantageous that a parvenu in the twenties should gratify the Emperor by his moderation, while none the less contenting his army and dazzling France. The Austrian statesmen knew that, besides Bonaparte's 40,000, they must soon reckon with two armies from the Rhine. Patriotic uprisings of their people might develop into revolution.

Peace of Campo Formio.

As of late in the Eastern Question, so now in the Italian, Partition offered a convenient resource, and Venice might be made to play the part of Poland. By the Preliminaries of Leoben which the young general dared to sign for France (April 18, 1797), the Emperor renounced Belgium and Milan as the price of the Venetian possessions on both sides of the Adriatic. Venice, retaining her islands, was to receive compensation between the Apennines and the Po by annexing the Cispadane Republic, a new protectorate of France.

§ 4. *France and Europe*, 1797–1798

During the summer of 1797, the destinies of the Revolution and of Europe passed more and more under the control of Bonaparte. Master of an invincible army in a conquered and distant land, he was at once bargaining stubbornly with the Austrians, reorganizing northern Italy, revolving schemes for grasping power in the Mediterranean, and watching the troubled course of politics at home. Thanks to his victories and negotiations, France had now no active enemy save the Emigrants and England. Fortune seemed to have shielded her by setting a minor upon the throne of Sweden in 1792, and, four years later, by establishing the insensate Paul I in the place of Catharine the Great. No new opponent therefore need be feared, while the Emigrants had proved their futility, and the British fleet, withdrawn in 1796 from the Mediterranean, was mutinous and perhaps susceptible to the

Revolution. In such a posture of affairs, nothing might be impossible to a resolute French dictator.

Bonaparte's first care was to apply principles apparently revolutionary to Italy and to complete the sacrifice of Venice.

Italy Reorganized.

Having transformed the ancient oligarchy into a democratic client of France, he proceeded in June to make similar though less drastic changes in Genoa, now the Ligurian Republic, while, as a step towards dominion over the Levant, he occupied the Venetian island of Corfu. In July, the earlier thoughts of compensating Venice having faded, he allowed the Cispadane Republic to unite with Lombardy. Much of north-eastern Italy was thus transformed into the Cisalpine Republic, modelled on France and under French protection. Before the year closed, the new State comprised the major portion of the valley of the Po from the Ticino almost to the sea and stretched from the Apennines on the south to embrace the Valtelline on its northern boundary.

Early in September, while this work and his wider schemes still awaited the sanction that only a concluded peace could give, the power of Bonaparte was doubled by a happy stroke in Paris. Hitherto his conduct of an independent foreign policy had been made possible by his distance from the capital, his dazzling series of successes, his boldness in ascribing great strokes and statecraft to the necessities of war, and the fact that he spoke for the army while the Directors could not really speak for France. Power over the nation, indeed, was becoming more and more dependent on the army, and, since May 20, when the Legislature had received a great influx of Moderates, internal discord had grown. Carnot, who desired moderation at home and abroad, gained a like-minded colleague in Barthélemy, thus confronting the three Jacobin Directors with an opposition of two supported by the Legislature and the nation. France, it might seem, was in danger of becoming tranquil, religious, united and perhaps even monarchic, under some ruler who would accept the social changes of the Revolution.

Against such peril to their opinions, to their power, and

possibly to their necks, the three Directors could only invoke the sword. Hoche, leader of a force destined for England, failed to respond and died, but in Bonaparte the Directory found a saviour. The *coup d'état* of 18 Fructidor (September 4, 1797), which his lieutenant Augereau carried through, drove Carnot and Barthélemy into exile, annulled the recent elections and moderate decrees, and made the Directors, for a year at least, despotic. The pretext was a royalist conspiracy; the result, the triumph of Bonaparte and of his schemes. Six weeks later, at Campo Formio, his headquarters beyond the Tagliamento, he reaped the golden harvest of the Austrian wars. Belgium, the Cisalpine Republic, the Ionian Islands, the promise of a German Congress which should yield the frontier of the Rhine—these France gained by allowing the Emperor to annex Venice, Istria and Dalmatia, with Salzburg and a portion of Bavaria.

Bonaparte's *coup d'état*.

As against the Habsburgs, France was now the stronger in that they, like the Hohenzollerns at Basel, had selfishly betrayed the Empire. Since Germany lacked a leader, French influence and ideas could more readily expand across the Rhine. Headed by the feeble Elector of Bavaria and the Palatinate, whose pliancy twenty years earlier had provoked the War of the Bavarian Succession, German princes hastened to curry favour with the Frenchmen of the Revolution.

Only the British fleet seemed to stand between the Directory and complete success. In October, Duncan, whose skill and boldness had brought England through a perilous campaign, crippled the Dutch at Camperdown, and Bonaparte was entrusted with the indispensable invasion. While he bent his genius to the problem of transporting an army across the channel without first securing command of the sea, the German Congress met at Rastatt to compensate the princes injured by the extension of the Republic to the Rhine. Despite the reluctance of the Emperor, it seemed probable that the victory of France would here involve the spoliation of the Church.

France and England.

The new year, 1798, again revealed the aggressive insolence

of the Directory, and the power of the British fleet to check the French scheme of Levantine conquest. Italy was treated not only as a conquered country but as a country too feeble ever to achieve revenge. In February, with marked duplicity and violence, Rome was changed into a Republic, and the aged Pope driven to seek shelter in the north. In March, the Helvetic Republic was proclaimed. Meanwhile the Congress had given France the left bank of the Rhine, but Germany could not view without alarm her obvious design of seizing such sally-ports as Ehrenbreitstein. In April, Bernadotte, at once the least diplomatic and the least provocative of men, was driven from his embassy at Vienna for obeying the insulting injunction of his Government to flaunt the revolutionary colours on the eve of a patriotic fête.

Prospect of War.

Austria, however, was exhausted by her recent war: in Prussia, the new King, Frederick William III, clung to the policy of profitable neutrality: Paul of Russia was as unaccountable as his reputed father, who had outraged Russia in 1762: Sardinia could not resist the French occupation of Turin. It was fortunate for the liberties of Europe that France had proscribed English commerce by an unrevoked decree of 1796, and that her ostentatious preparations for invasion formed a standing challenge to Pitt. To safeguard Naples, Nelson appeared in the Mediterranean, and when, on May 19, Bonaparte at last sailed from Toulon, British sea-power was prepared for battle.

The secret of the new objective had been well kept. The expedition aimed at extending the power of France over Malta, Egypt, and, by a new canal at Suez, over the Red Sea and the Oriental world. England, which could not be invaded, would thus be further starved, and the fame of the conqueror of Egypt would increase his authority in France. The boldness of the scheme no less than the reticence of its contriver forbade contemporaries to divine it, and Bonaparte might well be striking at Naples, Lisbon, England, Scotland, Ireland or Jamaica.

Egyptian Expedition.

The ease of his success might well confirm the faith of

Bonaparte in his star. Crowded and unseaworthy as were the ships for which Nelson vainly waited, they availed for the capture of Malta and the safe transport to Egypt of the army of the East. Having landed on July 1, the French on the following day took Alexandria, and soon proved their decisive superiority to the Mameluke horse who tyrannized over Egypt. At the Pyramids, three weeks after landing, Bonaparte shattered their power, and Cairo made submission. Following the precedents set by France in Belgium, Holland, Switzerland and the Italian States, the conqueror immediately grappled with the task of political reorganization. Save that here he posed as the protector of religion, and even as a Muslim convert, he made the land an Oriental France, showering Western institutions upon her with the vigour of the most forceful of historic men.

Some six weeks from his landing, indeed, he learned that Nelson's crushing victory of the Nile had cut him off from France, but the disaster only roused his energies and he carried his army with him. The Muslim world remained irreconcilable, but the revolt of Cairo in October was put down with an iron hand, and the isolated French were perfectly prepared to brave the vengeance of the Turkish overlord. Their attempt to subjugate Egypt without disturbing the Sultan, however, had failed, and a connection unbroken since the morrow of Pavia had been sacrificed to Bonaparte's designs.

§ 5. *The War of the Second Coalition*, 1798–1801

In Bonaparte's absence, and in great part because of his proceedings, the elements of a new Coalition were already threatening France. England, most vulnerable in her finances, in the lower ranks of her impressed seamen and in Ireland, had successfully overcome the monetary crisis and the naval mutinies of 1797, and the Irish rebellion and French naval expedition of 1798. While Nelson had shaken the French navy and recruits were too few to defend all her subject countries in time of war, France had roused all the antagonism of England by threatening her position in the East. Russia likewise resented both the progress of Revolu-

tion and the intrusion into the sphere of her destined protectorate and was even willing to join with her secular enemies the Turks against the French. At Malta, moreover, Bonaparte had deposed the Knights of St. John, thereby giving bitter personal offence to their crazy patron, Paul I. By sea and land Russian forces were prepared to join the war, and France could not hinder the transport of the Tsar's armies to whatever theatre the Allies might select.

To Austria, the terms of Campo Formio were not those of an enduring peace, and her wounds were inflamed by French domination of the Adriatic from the strongholds of Ancona and Corfu. While Turks and Russians in conjunction moved to deprive France of the Ionian Islands seized in the preceding year, and the English regained Minorca, the Bourbons of Naples dared to attack the French, and even captured Rome. Before the year ended, they had been driven on board Nelson's ships, but the Second Coalition had come definitely into being. France, extended to the Rhine, now disposed of the Low Countries and Switzerland, with much of Italy, while Prussia sought profit in neutrality, but the imposing and mysterious power of Russia gave rise to the highest hopes. Suvórov, the eccentric conqueror of the Turks and Poles, was recalled from unmerited disgrace to take the Italian command.

French Defeats.

The year 1799, indeed, began with the establishment of a Parthenopean Republic amid the ruins of the Bourbon power. Naples received liberty at the price of revolutionary extortion, while Piedmont, whose King had been goaded into abdication, was in revolt against like treatment by the French. The Coalition could therefore count on support in Italy, while, on the Rhine, Russians in British pay were preparing to join the Archduke Charles. When the fighting season came, war raged from the Helder to the Straits of Messina, since the diameter of Europe was now the flank of France. The French were the first to move, but the Archduke defeated Jourdan at Stockach, near Lake Constance (March 25), and drove them across the Rhine. The Congress of Rastatt, where the German princes still pertinaciously bargained with the French for compensa-

tions, was at last driven to disperse, and the murder of two French envoys further inflamed the war.

South of the Alps, two brilliant campaigns, linked only by their results, developed under Bonaparte and Suvórov, who alone could infuse unbounded energy into their men. Without knowing with whom his country was at war, Bonaparte resolved to make Egypt safe against all comers, and victoriously advanced on Syria. In May, Acre was barely saved by British sailors, and Bonaparte began a return march of six-and-twenty days across three hundred miles of burning sand. Early in August, he at last received authentic news from Europe.

Return of Bonaparte.

In Italy, against Moreau and Macdonald, Suvórov was completing that destruction of French power which the Austrians had begun. Milan and Turin fell, the French armies were beaten in the field, and the three new Republics collapsed. While at Naples, with the countenance of Nelson, a royalist Terror raged, in Paris the tottering Directory was armed with brutal powers of infringing private freedom. When the union of six States against her only increased the internal dissensions of France, and her work in Italy was overthrown, it was time for Bonaparte to return. On July 25, he had brilliantly annihilated a Turkish army at Aboukir. Four weeks later, he stealthily quitted Egypt with his staff.

Meanwhile, the tide of French disaster had ceased to flow. In Italy, indeed, Joubert had fallen before Suvórov at Novi (August 15), and with him the hope of holding Piedmont. Austria, however, as of old, claimed the right to use Russia as her tool, and her fatuous strategy almost destroyed Suvórov. Obeying the Tsar's orders to drive the French from Switzerland, in place, as he desired, of entering France, he made an amazing march by the St. Gotthard, only to find Masséna triumphant over the Allies at Zurich. A desperate crossing of the mountains into Germany saved the bulk of the army, but the Russian resentment loosened the Coalition. An Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland, after capturing the whole Dutch fleet, had been defeated, and the disgusted Tsar hastened to recall his

French Recovery.

generals. While the memories of disaster in Italy were thus being effaced by victory in Holland, Switzerland and Egypt, all France was thrilled by the landing of Bonaparte in the south. Wooed by all parties, the hero of Italy and Egypt determined in a fortnight upon a secret union with Sieyès.

18 Brumaire.

Sieyès, a political theorist lately elected a Director, was struggling with the extremists in the hope of saving revolutionary France. Talleyrand and Moreau, his associates; Carnot and Lafayette, his correspondents; Bernadotte, his enemy; Joubert, his now extinguished hope. On November 9, ten days after his reluctant acceptance of Bonaparte, the two conspirators destroyed the existing Constitution. Their *coup d'état*, that of 18 Brumaire, consisted in the eviction of the extremists from the Legislature by armed force, on the pretext of an attempted assassination. The Directors having resigned, Bonaparte, Sieyès and Ducos were appointed provisional Consuls, swore to uphold the Republic. Sieyès soon produced an elaborate draft of a Constitution which revived the principles of 1789, and carefully kept power divided. Bonaparte, who was working eighteen hours a day and dominating all the administration, insisted on the introduction of three Consuls, himself the First, and made the First Consul supreme. Before the year ended, monarchy had in fact returned to France.

The Constitution of the year VIII, which came into force on Christmas Day, 1799, forms a supreme tribute to the political genius of the *de facto* monarch. The futile contrivances of Sieyès were transformed into an instrument perfectly calculated to render Bonaparte the autocrat of a reunited France. First Consul for ten years, he might be re-elected. He and his colleagues were not answerable to any other body, and he alone proclaimed laws and appointed or dismissed officials. Four statesmen who represented his choice created a well-paid *corps* of lifelong Senators, and these in turn selected Legislators and Tribunes. Senate, Legislative and Tribunate furnished lucrative and imposing offices for the men of the Revolution, while none of them could interfere with the

The Consulate.

First Consul's will. The people were flattered by the right to choose by universal suffrage those whom they deemed worthy of public office. A body of real importance, that Council of State without which autocracy is impossible, owed its composition to Bonaparte. A circle of his colleagues exercising legislative and judicial powers placed the highest intelligence of France at the disposal of the State. While the Revolutionaries of all grades were thus provided for, the name of Bonaparte was becoming associated with the idea of clemency to their opponents. France, loving order and weary of Terror and of war, affirmed the Constitution by more than three million votes against some fifteen hundred (February, 1800).

Popular acceptance of the veiled autocracy of Bonaparte marks a stage in the most marvellous and fruitful year that France has ever known. Louis XVIII, and some 145,000 Emigrants, indeed, remained in exile, and England and Austria had rejected overtures for peace. But those who calculated that after ten years' upheaval France must be exhausted, and that the Bourbons must shortly be recalled, lacked all conception of the strength of a united nation marshalled by a single will. Bonaparte gave office to merit, in disregard of party creed. His mere reputation raised high the Government credit, thus remedying the financial distress of France. His keen insight into French necessities produced the system of local administration which has survived all later governmental change. The lingering treason in Normandy and western France was ruthlessly extinguished, and within two months of his arrival at the Tuileries, Bonaparte had imposed a firm censorship upon the Press. It was as master of a willing nation that he set out, early in May, to attempt the reconquest of Italy.

France Transformed.

The struggle with Austria, which, Bonaparte could claim, was forced on France by the enemy, involved, as of old, campaigns beyond the Rhine and Alps. In the spring, Moreau advanced victoriously into Bavaria while Masséna stubbornly defended Genoa against the aged general Melas and the British fleet.

Marengo and Hohenlinden.

Swiftly and secretly, Bonaparte assembled sections of an army in eastern France, concentrated 40,000 men in the Rhone Valley, and crossed the Great St. Bernard between May 15 and 20. Taking the Austrian conquerors of Genoa by surprise, he entered Milan, mastered western Lombardy, crossed the Po, and on June 14 won the anxious and bloody conflict of Marengo. The courage and devotion of Desaix, who was among the slain, had secured the First Consul in power, and had given new life to the terms of Campo Formio. Scarcity in England and the victory of Moreau in Germany seemed to favour an accommodation, but to effect a joint or separate peace a more decisive blow was needed. Austria gained some months by negotiation, but the crushing victory of Moreau at Hohenlinden (December 2, 1800) enabled him to threaten Vienna. In Italy, the French were equally successful. Against England, now formally united with Ireland, even Bonaparte could not make them victorious, but in Paul I they had found an unexpected and valuable ally. Infuriated by the British capture of Malta, which Bonaparte had astutely assigned to him, the Tsar seized British property, revived the Armed Neutrality against British maritime pretensions, and even meditated the dispatch of a host of Cossacks to strike at India by land.

The year 1801, therefore, began with the realization of almost everything that France had dared to hope. Although she was still formally at war with Russia, Bonaparte and the Tsar, now lord of the gateway through the Cancasus, united in plans for overthrowing England. France might look forward to a combination with the northern Powers which would render her formidable if not supreme by sea. The Emperor could fight no longer, and in February made peace at Lunéville for both Austria and the Empire. The Adige and the Rhine resumed their rôle as boundaries. The Habsburgs of Modena and Tuscany were compensated in Breisgau and with Salzburg respectively, while the dispossessed German princes recovered their losses at the expense of the Church. Germany, it was reckoned, lost nearly 25,000 square miles of her best territory

The Peace of Lunéville.

with some 3,500,000 souls, and the Germans clamouring for Church lands thought no subservience to Talleyrand and his colleagues too disgraceful. In mockery of the Second Coalition, the Italian republics were revived, while the new kingdom of Etruria and the restored Sardinia and Naples were alike overshadowed by France.

§ 6. *France and Europe*, 1801–1803

England alone stood between France and world dominion, and it was natural to Bonaparte on the morrow of one triumph to proceed with increased speed and power towards the next. While awaiting the moment for launching an invasion, he counted on co-operating in the Russian march to India and on thus succouring the French in Egypt. The retirement of Pitt in March might well be construed as a proof of weakness in the Power which had borne the financial burden of no less than ten campaigns. Within a few weeks, however, the news arrived that Paul I had been murdered, and that Nelson had successfully assaulted Copenhagen. The Armed Neutrality dissolved, and Alexander I, whom Catharine had desired as her successor, returned to her *entente* with England.

From the Peace of Lunéville onwards, indeed, the year 1801 displayed the French supreme on land and the English by sea, each with small hope of conquest. France followed up her triumph over Austria by asserting her domination over Spain, Naples, Portugal and Holland, and by making a concordat with the Pope. From Amsterdam to Venice, she designed, the shores of Europe should be closed to Britain, while Bonaparte brought his reluctant colleagues and the Pope to a bargain which went far towards rendering France a Catholic country. Years were spent in negotiation, but from July, 1801, it was clear that liberty of conscience would return to France, that the Church lands would not be given back, that the heads of the Government would profess the Christian faith and that they would nominate and pay the bishops. By sacrificing the secularist minority, Bonaparte had attached

France against England.

to his cause both the widespread conviction of the French and the efficient organization of the papacy. The exiled Bourbons keenly felt the blow.

While France thus at once asserted and developed her power, England, under an insignificant Premier, and a half-demented King, gained triumphs on every side. In Egypt the remnants of Bonaparte's army were defeated and driven out, and the Turkish overlordship re-established. Denmark and Sweden paid for the Armed Neutrality with the loss of their West Indies. A hostile Portugal was promptly deprived of Madeira. The British power in India was extended, and a naval convention made with Russia. Each side had therefore many counters in hand wherewith to bargain for the respite which both desired.

British Successes.

Bonaparte, however, could speak for France and her dependents as a master responsible to no one, and his will prevailed over that of the constitutional representatives of Britain. On October 1, the preliminaries were signed in London, but the delight of the nation was checked by the discovery that, excepting Ceylon and Trinidad, they were to renounce all conquests and that little could be done for Europe. The French and Spaniards, indeed, promised to withdraw from Southern Italy, to restore the former state of Portugal, and to recognize an independent republic in the Ionian Isles. But Belgium remained a part of France; Holland, her helpless dependent; western Germany, Switzerland, and much of Italy, contributories to her power. That power, moreover, was still to be excited for the absolute exclusion from French territory of British goods. Peace on such terms could hardly be more sincerely signed by England than was the Peace of Lunéville by her ally.

The Peace of Amiens.

In 1802, England made peace at Amiens, and for some fourteen months Europe remained free from war. Thirteen convulsive years had passed since the outbreak of the Revolution without assuring the triumph either of the new ideas or of the old, and without great progress towards their mutual assimilation. Equality before the law, indeed, remained in

France, and was normally extended to her conquests, and the revolutionary confiscation of estates had been maintained. The power of the Church, however, had begun to reassert itself, and the sovereignty of the people was palpably in danger. The substantial autocracy of Bonaparte, it is true, had been sanctioned by a popular vote, but it arose and might well be perpetuated by violations of the established law. The freedom of the Press and the independence of the law-courts had already in great part disappeared; Fouché and his spies were everywhere; and the domestic and foreign policy of France was habitually determined by a despot. The nation, satiated with glory, desired peace: Bonaparte, for his own interest, intended war. It was easy to predict which of the two would in the immediate future prevail.

From the Peace of Amiens in March, however, almost every month of the year 1802 witnessed some new French triumph.

Progress in France.

In April the Concordat was proclaimed, with articles which gratified the Gallican instincts of the nation. In May, Prussia accepted the French domination in Italy, where the incorporation of Piedmont in the new Italian Republic caused great offence to other Powers. Frederick William's price for his benevolence was a more than fourfold compensation for his cessions on the left bank of the Rhine. At the same time, Bonaparte forced through the legislative bodies his plan for a Legion of Honour, which would enable him to impair the Republican equality of Frenchmen in reward for service to his cause. He was already President of the Italian Republic and the Assemblies had resolved that he should be First Consul for life.

Military opposition headed by Bernadotte proved as futile as royalist or republican, in face of Fouché's police and the voting-papers of the people. Early in August, the Consulate for life was approved by more than three and a half million votes against less than nine thousand, and the Constitution was transformed to make Bonaparte yet more perfectly supreme. Elba was now annexed, and, in the following months, Piedmont, Parma and Piacenza. France, thus

aggrandized, found in the Tuileries a stately court and in the capital a brilliant society which gratified the preference of the nation. Peace with England, which enabled her to reconquer San Domingo from the negroes, had also brought a flood of British travellers to her shores. The nation desired nothing better than to enjoy in quiet the fruits of its long exertions, and to receive from Bonaparte those improvements in internal economic organization which no man was better able to bestow.

§ 7. *The War of the Third Coalition*, 1803–1807

In May, 1803, war between France and England began anew. Since the conclusion of peace at Amiens, the fundamental antagonism between the two Powers had found vent in numberless disputes. French domination in Holland and illegal military intervention in Switzerland were answered by new British armaments and a refusal to give up Malta. It was characteristic of the work of Bonaparte that illegally, by the Act of Mediation, he gave the Swiss a constitution to which democracy could never have attained, and upon which it has been unable to improve, while the result of his action was to make their country an outlying fortress of France. At the same time Germany achieved at Ratisbon, under French and Russian influence, an organization which promised to cripple both her national Habsburg power, to the advantage of France and of the German kinsmen of the Tsar. Ten Electors, among whom Mainz was the sole ecclesiastic, with a reduced Chamber of Princes, now formed the Diet, and a Protestant majority became assured. Baden, Bavaria, Würtemberg, all recently aggrandized, and Saxony might be relied on to provide Bonaparte with allies, and to balance the two Great Powers, even should Russia permit their combination.

When England declared war, therefore, France could draw against her a weapon sheathed since 1795. Besides the familiar plans of trade-war upon the Continent and menace of invasion, together with the harsh imprisonment of British tourists, Bonaparte now broke the Treaty of Basel

by attacking Hanover. Twelve thousand men issuing from Holland conquered the Electorate unopposed, and the German Powers swallowed the insult in silence. Naples was likewise occupied, Spain compelled to give monetary aid, and the United States courted by the sale, at an absurdly inadequate price, of the immense region known as Louisiana. England, meanwhile, conquered Santa Lucia, Tobago, Guiana and Demerara, and proved victorious in the Marátha war, while the negroes of San Domingo regained their island from the French.

Throughout the following year (1804) the war languished for lack of any battlefield upon which the combatants could meet. In the first months, none the less, Bonaparte committed errors which bore fruit in a vast extension of hostilities in the next campaign. By nature peculiarly sensitive to plots or even criticism against himself, he learned that the royalists had formed a new conspiracy. The leaders, including Pichegru, suffered death; Moreau was exiled; and an innocent Bourbon, the Duke of Enghien, was kidnapped in Germany and shot. Enghien's fate roused German feelings, which the seizure of Hanover had left cold, and all Europe shuddered at the crime. France, which was bound to believe Enghien guilty, begged Bonaparte to safeguard her by making his rule hereditary, and in May, he became Napoleon, Emperor of the French. Two of his brothers gained places in the succession; sixteen marshals were created; and the two remaining Consuls took offices imported from the Holy Roman Empire.

Murder of D'Enghien.

Francis II, scenting an Imperial rival, assumed the style of Emperor of Austria, while the Tsar and Gustavus IV of Sweden moved steadily towards war with France. The three and a half million voters, however, approved the new order, while Carnot and Sieyès, who had dared to oppose it, found less than three thousand supporters. Before assuming the purple, the new Emperor had already signalized his ascendancy by bestowing upon France the Civil Code. That nothing might be wanting to

The First Empire.

his dignity, he brought the Pope to Paris for his Coronation, and even suffered the Church to unite him to Josephine Beauharnais, since 1796 his wife by civil law. On December 2, 1804, he placed the crown upon his own head, and then crowned his kneeling consort. Ten days later, Spain entered into the war.

Since the spring of 1804, Pitt, though shaken in health, had carried on the Government of England, and in 1805 he formed a mighty Coalition against France. Without Russia and Austria at the least, it was hopeless to oppose Napoleon on land, and both Powers proved difficult to marshal. Russia demanded Malta, while in Austria the Archduke Charles was the outspoken advocate of peace, and even of a French alliance. In March, however, Napoleon made himself King of Italy, and proceeded to treat the peninsula with such highhandedness as to drive the Tsar and Emperor into the arms of Britain. Sweden and Naples joined the Coalition, and the Tsar resorted even to threats in order to influence Prussia. Napoleon, with his Grand Army concentrated at Boulogne, replied by offering Hanover, and, while Frederick William hesitated, secured the Bavarian alliance.

The Coalition.

Relying upon miscalculations of Napoleon's speed and power, the Austrians and Russians had planned to strike from Italy and Germany against France, and Mack, a great strategist on paper, was concentrating troops at Ulm. In a fortnight, however, the Grand Army marched two hundred miles, and on October 19, Mack was forced to surrender. The French secured some 50,000 prisoners: the advancing Russians recoiled: Vienna offered no defence, and Napoleon pressed on into Moravia to force a decisive battle.

Suddenly, however, the situation altered for the worse. On October 21, the project of invading England had been shattered at Trafalgar, and, a fortnight later, Prussia seemed to have been captured by the Coalition. Her King, who had armed to deny passage through his dominions to the Russians, learned that the French had made light of his neutrality,

Trafalgar and Austerlitz.

and in the crypt at Potsdam he and his consort and the Tsar swore mutual fidelity by the coffin of Frederick the Great. Prussia prepared to win Hanover or some equivalent by dictating terms to France.

The grouping of the Powers, indeed, still remained uncertain. France might defeat them one by one, but she could hardly conquer Europe. Deep cleavages of interest, however, divided the partitioners of Poland, and Napoleon might yet secure one of them as his ally. Talleyrand, agreeing with the Archduke Charles, favoured Austria, but Napoleon vainly strove to secure the Tsar. Then, while the Prussian Haugwitz was befooled by his diplomacy, he cleverly persuaded Francis and Alexander that he dared not face them in the field, and at Austerlitz annihilated both their armies (December 2, 1805). While the Russians could take refuge in flight, Austria was beaten to her knees, and on December 26, the Peace of Pressburg was concluded. Besides the sacrifices of Campo Formio and Lunéville the Emperor ceded Venice to the Italian kingdom and Tyrol to Bavaria, while recognizing Bavaria and Würtemberg as kingdoms and Baden as fully sovereign. Haugwitz had already accepted Hanover as the price of alliance with France.

In 1806, the echoes of Austerlitz still resounded over Europe. The dynasty of Naples, deserted by its allies, took to flight, and the attempt of Sweden and England to deliver Hanover was abandoned. Though he foresaw that Napoleon would in the end be checked by a national movement begun in Spain, Pitt sank and died. Prussia joined in a mutual guarantee with France, and closed her western rivers to British commerce. Upon his relatives Napoleon lavished crowns. His brother Joseph became King of the Two Sicilies; his brother Louis, King of Holland; Murat, married to his sister, Grand Duke of Berg; while marriage connections linked him with the rulers of Würtemberg, Bavaria, and Baden. Talleyrand and Bernadotte became Italian princes; Berthier, Prince of Neuchâtel; while the new imperial dignity was supported by a host of dukes.

Europe after Pressburg.

The next step was, inevitably, to get rid of the old Empire. In July the secondary German Powers were organized into a Confederation of the Rhine, with the Prince Primate of Mainz as their President, and a College of Princes numbering originally nine. The constituent Princes gained greatly in sovereignty at the expense of the nobles and cities, who ceased to be sovereign constitutents of a federation. Austria was already a self-styled empire, and Prussia was contemptuously advised to form a northern counterpart. In August, at Napoleon's behest, the Empire proper dissolved. While he negotiated with England and with Russia, he held south-western Germany with 170,000 men.

While many Germans truckled to the French, and thousands more welcomed their administration, national feeling, notably in Prussia, was wounded by Napoleon's unrestricted domination. His offer of Hanover to England, and Murat's incorporation of three Prussian abbacies with Berg, lessened the hesitations of Frederick William, while the execution of Palm, a bookseller charged with libelling Napoleon, infuriated his people. In September, when England and Russia resolved on continuing the war, Brunswick led 150,000 men against the French.

Downfall of Prussia.

The Prussian army, however, had suffered from the prolonged neutrality of the Prussian State. Its leaders, its arms, and its tactics were antiquated, and its memories of former victories delusive. On October 14, the anniversary of Hochkirch, Napoleon annihilated one Prussian force at Jena while Davout, at Auerstädt near by, gained a still more brilliant triumph. There Brunswick fell, and Blücher could not retrieve the day. The army was dissolved; the fortresses surrendered; Berlin was occupied by the French; the Court, finding Napoleon's terms impossible, fled to Königsberg. Such Prussian feeling as there was found solace in the desperate resistance of Blücher and in the heroism of the Queen, whom Napoleon thought it politic to insult. Saxony, Prussia's unwilling ally, became a kingdom and a member of the Rhenish Confederation.

All hope of salvation rested upon Russia, and Russia had

become entangled in a Turkish war. True to his principles, Napoleon hastened to strike hard at a Power with which he was eager to make peace. On October 21, he had issued the Berlin Decree which in effect outlawed the British Isles, their subjects and their goods. To make the blockade effective Russia must support it, for Russia alone could hope to control the Baltic and the eastern Mediterranean. As King of Italy, moreover, Napoleon feared the power of Austria and Russia could best hold Austria in check. He therefore roused the Poles to assist in an invasion without pledging himself to restore their independence, a pledge which must always form a challenge to the three partitioning Powers. Driving the Russians before them, the French entered Warsaw, and the pursuit, with hard fighting, followed the Narew towards Grodno, until winter broke it off.

The Berlin Decree.

In the early days of 1807, however, fighting continued near Königsberg, and a Russian advance induced Napoleon to attempt a decisive stroke. At Eylau, on February 7, he failed, and although the Russians retreated, only the most desperate efforts retrieved the general situation. The French were in danger of starvation. Prussia, influenced by Hardenberg, rejected terms of peace. Austria refused to be tempted into an alliance. Sweden intervened in Pomerania. England, under Canning, resumed the policy of Pitt. Russia, in closer league with Prussia, designed what was practically a new coalition.

Treaties of Tilsit.

But Napoleon's energy and firmness enabled his cause to surmount the peril. He established the necessary superiority in numbers, captured the rich city of Danzig, and seized upon a Russian error to shatter the enemy at Friedland (June 14, 1807). Eleven days later, it appeared that the mood of an autocrat had flung Russia into the arms of France. Talking together on a raft in the Niemen, Napoleon and Alexander settled the fate of Prussia and of Europe. By the treaties signed at Tilsit early in July, Prussia ceded her lands west of the Elbe to a new kingdom of Westphalia under Napoleon's brother Jerome, while her gains from the

last two Partitions formed in the main a duchy of Warsaw under the King of Saxony. Russia secretly became the ally of France, and both Powers accepted the Continental System of commercial blockade of England. The Tsar, indeed, had rejected Napoleon's suggestion that Prussia should be swept away, and that the Vistula should divide France and her dependencies from Russia. But he found his account in rounding off his Polish territories with Bialystok from the Prussian share, and in receiving a free hand to dismember Turkey and Sweden. His subjects, it is true, could not comprehend the association of the father of Holy Russia with the child of the Revolution, nor did they welcome the closing of the English market to their cheese, nor the monetary confusion that followed. The Tsar, however, dazzled by Napoleon, and happy to exchange unprofitable for profitable war, ignored, not for the last time, the unpopularity of his proceedings and prepared to break with England.

§ 8. *The Napoleonic Empire*, 1807–1809

The Treaties of Tilsit, attained after victories, perils, and exertions hitherto unequalled in his career, brought Napoleon to the zenith of his power. The frontiers of France now approached the Rhine, the Ticino and the Tiber, while over the north-east of Italy Napoleon himself was King. Of her dependencies, Holland extended beyond the Elbe, and the Confederation of the Rhine almost covered the remaining German lands, excepting Prussia, which must support a great French army, and Austria, which alone could hardly brave Napoleon and the Tsar. Switzerland and western Poland were practically French, and Spain was a subservient ally. England, though still unconquered, had lost both Pitt and Nelson; all her European combinations had been foiled, and the System which closed the Continent to a nation that lived by trade might be expected to bring her to her knees.

This unprecedented domination had been achieved, in Napoleon's view, by an intelligent interpretation of the Revolution. Liberty must yield to the needs of the State

as interpreted by Authority; equality must not impede the right of Authority to promote its own servants; only a fanatic would deprive the people of religion, which Authority could use to its own advantage. But rational law, social emancipation, vigorous government, and freedom of career were spread far and wide in Europe, and alien populations, unacquainted with liberty, welcomed them with joy. The essential identity between Napoleon and a Benevolent Despot of the later eighteenth century, or between his Empire and the old aggressive France, however, might for a time be concealed by war and phrases, but it could not long be hid. A few years of peace must show Frenchmen that the Empire was in conflict with the Revolution; and other nations, that their function was merely to fatten France. The world could hardly find its destiny in subservience to the needs of the Napoleonic clan.

True peace, therefore, was impossible both to Napoleon and to his opponents, and his world dominion or downfall offered the only end to war. In 1807, England replied sharply to the Berlin Decree and to the Tilsit plan. A series of Orders in Council forbade neutrals to trade between ports which were closed to British ships, and endeavoured to induce them to bring their cargoes to Britain in defiance of Napoleon's decree. In September, by an act of almost piratical violence, Copenhagen was bombarded and the Danish navy seized. Canning's calculated Terror failed to secure the Danish alliance and tarnished the British reputation with an enduring stain. It none the less partly frustrated Napoleon's design for a composite fleet which might reverse Trafalgar. With this in view, Junot marched through Spain in the autumn, in order to seize the navy of Portugal and to partition the country between Spain and France. By the advice of England, however, the royal family sailed to Brazil, leaving at Napoleon's disposal only the ships of France, Spain, Holland and Italy, together with those of Russia, which now declared war.

England and Copenhagen.

The year, which had witnessed the failure of many British expeditions, but also the capture of Heligoland, the key

to the Elbe, closed with a new attempt by Napoleon to extinguish British trade. By a Decree issued at Milan, he declared that France and her allies might lawfully appropriate any neutral ship which submitted to the emergency procedure of Britain. With his new ally and his new System, he confidently expected the collapse of British power.

'The Continental System.'

On the morrow of her humiliation at Tilsit, however, Prussia had taken steps which might lead at no distant date to a change in the balance of power. Her King, Frederick William III, never rose beyond mediocrity, but in Stein and Hardenberg she possessed statesmen of the foremost rank. Stein, dismissed for counselling resistance, was recalled in October to the Ministry of Home Affairs, and at once set about a drastic reorganization of the Prussian State. As the first and greatest change, the peasant was changed from a serf into a freeman with every prospect of becoming a freeholder, and gained the right to follow any career that he might choose. At the same time Scharnhorst, a peasant's son, made the army a truly national force. Limited by Napoleon's order to 42,000 men, it was able to discard all those officers who had disgraced themselves at and after Jena, and to replace them with men of merit, but not necessarily of noble birth. National service was introduced, and by calling men to the colours only for their period of training, Scharnhorst gave the army a real strength three or four times as great as that prescribed. In 1808, the League of Virtue, formed at Königsberg, began to organize the public spirit of the nation for patriotic ends, while the Prussian towns and their inhabitants were set free from the vexatious limitations upon careers, self-government and trade that had come down from the Middle Ages.

Regeneration of Prussia.

Meanwhile the Allies of Tilsit had each selected a new victim to attack. Their movements were largely determined by the prospect of a partition of Turkey, followed by a march to India, in both of which Austria was expected to share. Napoleon, who counted on gaining Egypt and some islands from the one, and from the

Napoleon and Spain.

other the overthrow of England, claimed compensation in Prussia for the greater aggrandizement of the Tsar. As a preliminary measure, the French invaded Spain; and the Russians, Finland. In each case, the forces of the crown offered little or no resistance, but in each the outraged people took up arms. In Spain, Napoleon so manipulated the discords in the reigning house of Bourbon that, with some pretence of right, he could install his brother Joseph on the throne. The Spanish people, however, rose in blind fury against both the old Government and the new, and in every province local Juntas dared to marshal raw civilians against the troops of France. These were in part motley and unwisely led, and, at midsummer, Europe heard with amazement that 18,000 men had laid down their arms at Baylen.

Saragossa made a notable defence, and, early in August, the arrival of Wellesley's force in Portugal transformed the whole campaign. Junot was fortunate in being allowed to evacuate the country, and Napoleon's patent failure in the Peninsula weakened him at once in Europe and in the world. Profiting by his error, the Tsar reconciled Finland by promising a Constitution, and at the same time hardened his heart against Napoleon's claim to dictate to him in Turkey. Austrian and Prussian disaffection were increased; the desertion of a Spanish contingent from Bernadotte frustrated an invasion of Sweden; Talleyrand worked against his upstart master; England was strengthened in her determination to reject any but a righteous and abiding peace.

In 1808, as always, Napoleon strove by increased energy to master adverse fate. Austria was threatened; the Tsar, assailed at Erfurt, amid a truly imperial display, with every possible appeal to greed or reason. By yielding Finland and the Danubian Principalities to Russia, and by exempting Austria from attack, the alliance of Tilsit was prolonged, and December found Napoleon at Madrid. While in Spain Moore fled before his army, in Prussia, Stein passed into exile at his decree. The new year (1809) began with victory at Corunna and Saragossa, while Swedish hostility

collapsed with the imprisonment by his subjects of their unbalanced King.

To subdue Spain, however, Napoleon had been compelled to recall troops from Prussia, and Austria thus gained an opportunity to rise. During the three years which followed her humiliation at Pressburg, the Habsburg State had experienced a new birth resembling that of Prussia. Her Emperor was at least firm in his hatred of Napoleon, and he was brilliantly served by Metternich in diplomacy, by the Archduke Charles in the reorganization of the army, and by Count Stadion in an emancipation of the people like that of Stein.

Austria against France.

It was a Government supported by the nation and by half a million soldiers that, in April, 1809, dared to confront Napoleon without allies. His miscalculation of the date of their attack gave the Austrians a chance to overwhelm the French, but their slowness and indecision in face of the Rhenish Confederation let the occasion slip. Napoleon, late by a week in arriving, first restored the situation in Bavaria. After five days, the broken Austrians were in flight, and three weeks later Napoleon marched into Vienna. Accepting the gravest hazards in the hope of a complete success, he fought a bloody battle at Aspern, near the capital. Aspern proved indecisive, and the moment for Prussian intervention seemed to have arrived. Frederick William, however, dared not abandon his neutrality, and at Wagram, early in July, Austria suffered a glorious defeat.

Napoleon's campaign in Bavaria and around Vienna won the war, but the Austrian venture left many traces upon the European situation. One army, in Poland, had fought against Poles and Russians; another, in Tyrol, against Bavarians and French. The Tyrolese, led by an innkeeper, the hero Andreas Hofer, made a sustained and inspiring resistance to foreign domination, while in Germany the death of Lieutenant Schill, fighting in the streets of Stralsund, was the end of but one among several patriotic risings. England embraced the Austrian alliance, and in July sent a powerful expedition to the island of Walcheren, in the hope of seizing Antwerp.

Favoured by Napoleon's absence in the east, Wellington resumed his successful career in the Peninsula.

No secondary campaign, however, could stand between Austria and her fate. The Archduke Charles resigned, Stadion gave way to the more pliant Metternich, Canning and Castlereagh quitted office, and in October the Peace of Schönbrunn recorded the apparent downfall of a second Great Power. At the expense of Austria, France established the Illyrian Provinces as a dependency, while Galicia passed to Warsaw and to Russia, and the former Austrian cessions to Bavaria were increased. Henceforward Austria might be reckoned an ally of France.

The collapse of Sweden before the associates of Tilsit had proved no less complete. In September the last king of the House of Vasa, the elderly and feeble Charles XIII, had signed the Treaty of Frederikshamn with Russia, by which the ancient Swedish domain of Finland was ceded to the Tsar. A strange chance soon brought about the adoption of Bernadotte as the Crown Prince of Sweden, whose accession to the Continental System nominally completed the closing of the Baltic to British goods. Russian progress in Turkey, and French in Spain, added to the gloom of a year which the barren victory of Talavera and the capture of a few sugar islands could do little to relieve. It might well seem that military force and diplomatic skill aided by the Continental System would in 1810 give Napoleon and Alexander the mastery of the world.

Collapse of Sweden.

On the Continent of Europe, it is true, national forces of opposition to Napoleon were gathering strength, but Nationality was far from wholly undivided. In parts of Germany and of Italy, in Denmark, Poland and Illyria, considerable populations regarded him as a deliverer, while nowhere save in distant Russia could the elements of uprising organize themselves unchecked. England, with every sea at her disposal, could assemble vast quantities of goods, but her food supply came largely from the Continent, and it was there that her manufactures must find their place of sale. Had Napoleon

The Continental System.

sacrificed the duties on exports and imports, and, realizing that bread was more valuable to England than gold, had he applied the Continental System with unflinching vigour, he might conceivably have dictated peace. Thanks to his errors and to his necessities, however, Europe was placed in a state of semi-siege which roused grave discontent without accomplishing its object. Besides the licensed exceptions to the blockade, a vast system of smuggling filled the Continent with British goods, some of which found entry into France by way of Constantinople. A mounting revenue sustained the courage of his only formidable foe.

§ 9. *The Napoleonic Empire*, 1810–1812

The year 1810 saw England clinging grimly to her foothold in Portugal, and annexing yet more islands overseas, while Napoleon resorted in vain to acts of more desperate violence. To secure the Austrian alliance, and if possible, to endow his Empire with an heir, he quickly followed the divorce of Josephine by espousing Francis' daughter, Marie Louise. Sweden was forced into war with England. Troops largely drawn from Germany were poured into the Peninsula. Country after country was annexed to France—Holland as "the alluvial deposit of French rivers," the Valais, North Germany, as far as the Weser, the Papal States, Parma, the Ligurian Republic and the kingdom of Etruria. At the same time heavy duties on colonial produce were imposed, vast stores of illicit merchandise were seized, and all British manufactures found within the Empire were condemned to be burned in public.

Opposition, none the less, continued, and forces menacing to Bonapartism gathered strength. Wellington at Busaco and Torres Vedras foiled Masséna's invasion of Portugal: Prussia continued to reorganize her administration: Britain survived the failure of her harvest: and the Tsar moved steadily towards a breach with France. His grievances indeed were many. The Continental System pressed heavily upon the Russians: Napoleon was dangerously popular with the Poles: in Germany and Illyria French power drew nearer to regions

jealously watched over by the Tsar: the annexation of Oldenburg, whose reigning House were Alexander's kinsfolk, had been accomplished without asking his consent. It could hardly be denied that the Treaty of Tilsit embodied the idea of an equal partnership between France and Russia, and that all the subsequent action of France had been destructive of that idea. The heir of Catharine the Great could not be the vassal of a parvenu of the Revolution, and no alliance that extinguished hope of Constantinople could be sincerely accepted by the Tsar. The year closed with a ukase which forbade French luxuries to be imported into Russia, while it permitted neutral ships to bring colonial produce to her ports.

In 1811, therefore, a year of general dearth, events were plainly moving towards a breach between east and west.

France against Russia.

Napoleon's ambition was at once gratified and kindled by the birth on March 20 of a son whom he entitled King of Rome. At the same time the discovery by his chemists of the method of extracting sugar from the beet encouraged him to promise the overthrow of England in six months. England, however, continued to protect Sicily, to capture tropical islands, and to draw 300,000 French to the Peninsula. Her naval measures, indeed, involved her in friction with the United States, whose vessels were being captured by hundreds for breaking the Orders in Council or the Berlin and Milan Decrees. Sweden, on the other hand, resenting Napoleon's seizure of Western Pomerania, moved towards the opponents of the Continental System. Russia, meanwhile, freed from her other wars, was, as usual, in a prolonged encounter, gaining the upper hand against the Turks.

The later months of 1811, and the earlier of 1812, witnessed the colossal review of the two camps between which Europe was now divided. In a conflict with Russia,

The German Powers and the War.

France could reckon on the whole-hearted support of Austria, since she could grant rewards in Galicia and on the Danube that would be highly repugnant to the Tsar. Italy, the Rhenish Confederation,

Denmark and the Poles were her supporters, but Prussia long remained uncertain. With well-found fortresses, an army of more than 120,000 men, and a network of protective swamps and rivers, should she not venture all and stand by Russia? Scharnhorst and an ardent party were for war, but in February, 1812, the King accepted the French alliance. Berlin, the fortresses and 20,000 men were placed at Napoleon's disposal, while from Austria 30,000 were provided. Of the 650,000 men who prepared to invade Russia, some 200,000 were of German race.

Against Napoleon was still arranged the unbroken power of Britain. Although hampered by ministerial difficulties and social discontent, and faced with an American war which broke out in June, Castlereagh was able to give invaluable help to Alexander. In May, the young Stratford Canning arranged the Peace of Bucharest, by which the Turks ceded Bessarabia, and the Russian frontier reached the Pruth. Wellington stormed the fortresses which confined him to Portugal, crushed Marmont at Salamanca (July 22), entered Madrid, and, though finally driven back to Portugal, reduced the French armies by 40,000 men. Sweden, since Napoleon refused the demand of Bernadotte for Norway, entered into a secret agreement with the Tsar. Russia herself mustered some 200,000 men, and although these were unwisely separated into two armies, her resolve to shun rash attempts at an offensive greatly improved her prospects. To retreat fighting before the French and their allies was to sacrifice the most populous and wealthy part of Russia, but to stand fast would have given Napoleon his chance to annihilate the defences of the whole. Appealing to the spirit of the nation by an emphatic breach with the influences of the West, the Tsar had dismissed Speranskii, the greatest public servant that his dynasty had ever yet employed. When the sacred soil of his country was invaded, he vowed publicly that he would make no peace while a single enemy remained in Russia. To him and to his people, this was a holy war.

Russia's Allies.

The irruption began on June 24. Four days later Vilna

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fell, and there Napoleon remained until the middle of July.

Russia Invaded.

Meanwhile the Tsar had resolved to fall back to Vitebsk on the Düna, a spot distant from Vilna, about one-third as far as Moscow. Napoleon followed, but the Russians retreated to Smolensk, the strong fortress on the Dnieper, and the half-way house between Vilna and Moscow. Although their strategy was that by which Peter the Great a century earlier had destroyed Charles XII, and that by which Wellington had foiled Junot in 1808, it was imposed by Barclay, a foreigner, and by sheer necessity, upon a critical society, a disappointed army and a reluctant Tsar.

The evacuation of Smolensk, on August 18, compelled the transfer of the command to Kutusov, who, though aged and lethargic, was a Russian and would risk a battle. Disregarding his own waning numbers, Napoleon declined to draw rein at Smolensk, and, after covering more than half the journey thence to Moscow, he came upon Kutusov at Borodino. There, on September 7, a tremendous soldiers' battle with some 100,000 casualties drove the Russians beyond Moscow whence the vast majority of the citizens also took flight. A week later, Napoleon made his entry, and the work of plundering began. Expelled for a time by an enormous conflagration, he did not finally quit Moscow until October 18, having vainly offered peace. He designed only to winter at Smolensk, in preparation for the next campaign.

Frost and famine, however, did even more than the enemy to destroy his army. To remain in Russia became impossible,

The Retreat from Moscow.

and only the terror of his name enabled him with a small remnant to recross the Beresina (November 26–29). Three weeks later, when he himself arrived in Paris, Russia was freed from the Grand Army of which no more than the sixth part remained intact. At a cost of some 200,000 men, the Russians had put half a million of the invaders out of action, and had captured a thousand guns. The Prussian General, York, ventured to arrange with Russia that his *corps* should be considered neutral. The political situation, no less than the military, clearly called for the exercise of Napoleon's greatest powers.

§ 10. *The Fall of Napoleon*, 1813–1814

In France, indeed, the mere appearance of the Emperor still sufficed. The reception of a false report of his death had shown that his power, perhaps even his dynasty, would not outlast his life. To him, however, the Senate did not refuse another 100,000 men besides the 250,000 of the ordinary conscription. In Spain he had 200,000; his troops occupied Berlin and the fortresses of northern Germany; his alliances, including that with Prussia, were still unbroken, and, even without Austria and Prussia, he could assemble an army five times as numerous as the Tsar's. France, indeed, cried out for peace, and while sedulously arming, he resolved upon negotiation.

New Effort by France.

In 1813, therefore, the fate of Europe turned on Alexander. Many of his subjects, Kutusov among them, held that the expulsion of "the French and the twelve nations with them" was enough, and that alien "Europe" should be left to her own devices. The Tsar, however, regarded himself as called on to make a new crusade against evil incarnate in Napoleon, while Stein and the poet Arndt moved him to deliver the downtrodden Germans. To rouse Germany indeed was the only safe way of warding off a new French invasion, and only by overthrowing Napoleon could the Tsar be sure of Poland. Aided by a popular uprising in eastern Prussia, he prevailed on Frederick William to revolt. For the first time in history, a Prussian King appealed to his people, and his five million subjects, guided by Scharnhorst, answered with 270,000 men. At the same time, Austria under Metternich assumed a neutral attitude, and prepared to bargain under arms for her own territorial restoration and a solid peace.

Europe against France.

For the sake of his throne, which he counted lost if he should fail to dazzle France, Napoleon abjured concession, and strove like a demi-god for victory. He swiftly organized a new Grand Army half a million strong, and though neither the 150,000 horses lost in Russia nor their riders could be replaced, it was still of high calibre.

Napoleon in Saxony.

Forbidden by the swift Russian onset and the Prussian uprising to meet the enemy on the Vistula, he courted battle in Saxony, whose King had refused to join either side. At Lützen, on May 2, he won a hard-fought victory, which brought Saxony and Denmark to his side. Another, eighteen days later, at Bautzen, threatened to dissolve the Coalition, but weakness in cavalry robbed him of its fruits.

Realizing the defects of his own force more clearly than those of the enemy, he unwisely proposed an armistice, and, during June and July, both sides armed and negotiated without fighting. At Vittoria, however, on June 21, Wellington captured 143 guns and enormous booty, and drove King Joseph's army beyond the Pyrenees, thus compelling Napoleon to send Soult against him. The balance, others saw clearly, lay with Austria, and Austria secretly pledged herself to join the Allies, if Napoleon should refuse her terms. She demanded the restoration of the Illyrian Provinces, the dissolution of Warsaw and the Rhenish Confederation, the renunciation by France of the 1810 annexations in Germany, and compensation to Prussia for what she had lost at Tilsit. Her conference with the belligerents at Prague was rendered futile by the firmness of Napoleon, and on August 12 war blazed up anew.

Napoleon could dispose in Germany of nearly 700,000 men. The Allies, who now included Austria, confronted him with a still larger force. The new Coalition was no less clumsy than its predecessors, but it comprised constituents whose armies were inspired by a burning hatred of the French. Scharnhorst, wounded at Lützen, had died of overstrain, but the fighting spirit of Prussia was incarnate in Blücher, an untiring veteran of seventy-two. While he triumphantly expelled the French right wing from Silesia, the northern army under Bernadotte shielded Berlin and checked the left. In the centre, Napoleon, with inferior numbers, gained a great victory at Dresden, only to lose its advantages through the downfall of Vandamme at Kulm. Berlin was again saved by a Prussian victory over Ney at Dennewitz; Bavaria joined the Allies; and the situation of

Leipzig.

Napoleon at Dresden began to bear an ominous resemblance to his plight at Moscow eleven months before.

But for Blücher, Napoleon might have maintained himself in Saxony, since the other Allied commanders deemed it their highest duty to avoid meeting him in the field. Blücher's energy, however, brought about the gigantic encounter at Leipzig, in which the three allied nations fought under their sovereigns' eyes. On October 16, the French checked their advance, but Napoleon wasted the following day in a vain appeal to Austria. On the 18th, he fought against odds of two to one, and during the day some 5,000 Saxons and Würtembergers went over. Yet Blücher alone was victorious, and the Allies learned with surprise next morning that Napoleon was in retreat. More than 100,000 men had fallen, and when, a fortnight later, the French fought their way across the Rhine, they were only some 70,000 strong. Fourteen months of warfare had cost them a million men, all their German allies, and the advantage of fighting on foreign soil, while the Dutch and the Italians were about to throw off their domination. Despite the American War, England was still mistress of Canada and of the seas, and Wellington, with 80,000 men, was invading southern France. Napoleon, none the less, refused to be content with the natural frontiers of the country, and the year closed with an Allied invasion by way of Basel.

If by negotiating Napoleon could have secured Belgium, the left bank of the Rhine, Savoy and Nice for France, nothing but insensate dynastic ambition could account for his refusal. In man-power the Allies now surpassed him by five or six to one, and they were dominated by the Tsar, who was resolved to enter Paris. Frederick William, indeed, was less resolute than his people: Metternich had no desire to see Russia too strong: Bernadotte was far from eager to invade France: and the chief general, Schwarzenberg, was pessimistic. But the memory of Napoleon's tyranny over Europe powerfully cemented the Coalition: Blücher supplied unfailing energy in the field: Paris appeared to be defenceless: and the exhausted nation had been taught merely to admire their Emperor.

France Invaded.

Outside France all went well for the Allies. In January Danzig fell; Murat, King of Naples, declared against Napoleon, and Bernadotte was gratified by the Treaty of Kiel by which Denmark exchanged Norway for Swedish Germany. Early in February, the Allies, once again unified by England, offered the frontiers of 1791. Napoleon, surprised by the untimely onset of their armies, had met them within 120 miles of Paris and had suffered defeat. Yet he declined the offer, and in five days (February 10–14) inflicted upon Blücher and his comrades five stinging blows which drove them headlong across the Marne. Then, moving upon the main army, he gained victories at Montereau and Troyes, which caused it to seek shelter behind the Aube and to contemplate evacuating France. On March 1, however, the four Great Powers bound themselves at Chaumont to fight on until the French should abandon all their conquests. The disparity of force between the combatants was now too great for even Napoleon to redress. A desperate battle at Laon on March 9 and 10 sealed his fate. The Prussians from Holland joined with Blücher; the main army disregarded Napoleon's threat to their communications; and on March 31, Paris looked on curiously as the monarchs of Russia and Prussia passed within her gates.

Campaign of 1814.

The decisive word for France must now be spoken by the Tsar. Under the influence of Talleyrand, he declared for a Bourbon restoration, undertaking never to negotiate with any Bonaparte. Talleyrand thereupon induced the Senate to depose Napoleon, and his marshals procured his abdication. On April 13, he accepted banishment to Elba, with a liberal pension and three Italian duchies for his wife. Within a week, Wellington was victorious at Toulouse, and Genoa surrendered to the English. A month later, reactionary Terror ascended the Spanish throne in Ferdinand VII, and the Inquisition was re-established. France received constitutional monarchy by Charter, and Louis XVIII, corpulent, gouty and unenterprising, appeared by no means ill-fitted to preside during a period of transition. The four million

Restoration in France and Spain.

peasant proprietors were to retain the lands appropriated at the Revolution, but France was to become Catholic, and immense power still resided in the Crown.

The Bourbons, it might be claimed, had brought their country freedom from invasion and a rule moderate as compared with that of Spain. The danger of reaction, however, showed itself in the attitude of the King's brother and heir, Charles of Artois, and in the revengeful Emigrants around the throne. The Treaty of Paris (May 30), moreover, confined the expansion of France from her boundarics of 1792 to the addition of a few enclaves and small frontier extensions which, with the western portion of Savoy, added some 450,000 souls to her population. Mauritius, St. Lucia and Tobago were taken from her, and she renounced the sovereignty over her stations in India. Malta was recognized as British. The restored monarchy, desired by few, and based on no firm principle, thus began its career by wounding the feelings of the nation, and both economy and sentiment caused it to continue by disappointing the hopes of the army. Meanwhile a great Congress to provide for the future of Europe had assembled at Vienna.

§ 11. *The Reconstruction of Europe*, 1814–1815

The autumn and winter of 1814–15 were made memorable by the progress of England and the United States towards peace, and by the progress of the Congress Powers towards war. The struggle in America had turned to the advantage of the English, who captured Washington and burned the Capitol. In December, peace was made at Ghent, England accepting, in practice though not in theory, restrictions upon her right of searching neutral ships. Meanwhile Vienna was the scene of an unprecedented assembly of kings and ministers, to determine, amid brilliant festivities, the boundaries of the several States and the fate of Napoleon's allies. The Tsar's pretensions in Poland, and the Prussian claim to Saxony, formed questions of the greatest difficulty, and the consequent cleavage between the allies of Chaumont was adroitly turned by Talleyrand to the advantage of France.

While in fact Europe regarded France as dangerous, and planned to hem her in by a barrier of powerful States, in theory she was a Bourbon monarchy which had expelled Napoleon, and as such was entitled to act as a Great Power in the work of reconstruction. Talleyrand and his audience, the Tsar, Castlereagh, Hardenberg and Metternich chief among them, were indeed not ignorant that Napoleon's career had long been followed with enthusiasm by the great majority of Frenchmen, nor that the Bourbon throne was already in danger from their dislike. Louis XVIII, however, was their protégé and they could not penalize his country without thereby weakening his position. In the formal meetings, therefore, the theory of Talleyrand prevailed, while the divergent interests of the Allies forbade them from privately uniting to disown it.

Talleyrand, the most subtle diplomatist of them all, soon advanced from sufferance to an intimate share in their disputes. Thanks to his efforts, and to the policy of partition which during the war of Liberation had united the three eastern Powers, the Congress was changed from a ratifying instrument of the decisions of four into a battleground of five, and on January 3, 1815, France joined with Austria and England in a secret league against the Russian and Prussian schemes. Meanwhile the Bourbons were becoming more and more unpopular, and plots were rife for establishing Napoleon, Orleans or the King of Rome upon the throne. By February 6, however, Castlereagh regarded the territorial arrangements north of the Alps as settled. Soon afterwards, Wellington took his place.

By the end of February, indeed, the outlines of the structure of post-Napoleonic Europe had in the main been firmly drawn.

Restoration in Europe.

Five Powers had attained to an acknowledged pre-eminence in the decision of questions which affected all. To four of them, which had lavished blood and treasure upon delivering Europe from Napoleon, large compensations had been given. The three Eastern Powers divided Poland between them: Prussia receiving also much of Saxony and vast provinces on both banks of the

Rhine, while Austria was to dominate northern Italy. England acquired islands which promised wealth and trade and held the keys of the Elbe, the Mediterranean and the Adriatic. She likewise secured indirect satisfactions through the enlargement of Hanover, the emancipation of the Low Countries and the prospect of the abolition of the slave-trade.

France, for more than twenty years the bugbear of Europe, had accepted a row of obstacles barring her wonted path. Holland, Belgium and Luxemburg were now united; Prussia, in great strength, brought across the Rhine; Switzerland neutralized; Italy protected by Austria and by a reinforced Sardinia. Germany was at least in a fair way to form a Confederation. The new Europe, simplified in its territorial relationships, in its communications by river, and in its diplomatic bonds, would be watched over by the Powers in periodic meetings. This meant the permanent extinction of Napoleon, and on March 1 he disembarked at Cannes.

The Hundred Days.

During his brief sojourn at Elba, both Italy and France had been quivering with hatred at the nature of the monarchic Restoration. While Murat challenged Louis XVIII under arms, Fouché was plotting to overthrow him. Napoleon believed that the return of his veterans from their foreign prisons would provide him with an army, and that, by returning to the principles of 1799, he could head the national reaction. An amazing progress through France proved him right, and his Additional Act of April 23 established two Chambers, ministerial responsibility, and Press freedom. Two hundred thousand veterans were at his disposal, but he dared not take prompt measures of compulsion in a nation weary of war.

War with collective Europe, however, could not be avoided. In January and February the conciliatory diplomacy of Castlereagh had done much to bring the Powers together, and the good fortune that the autocrats of Europe were in conclave was crowned by the presence of Wellington at Vienna. Napoleon's rule was too recent and himself too formidable for his pacific offers to be entertained. On March 13, the eight Powers

The Campaign of 1815.

which had signed the Peace of Paris united in proclaiming him a covenant breaker and an outlaw. Twelve days later, the four Allies of Chaumont pledged themselves to maintain 600,000 men until he should be rendered harmless. While the Vienna Congress continued to redraw the map of Europe, Wellington, the sole invader who had not robbed the French, set out to create a force for their reconquest.

The united resources of Europe were beyond doubt greater than those of France. But the English veterans had been shipped across the Atlantic; the Russians had gone home; Austria was occupied with Italy and Murat; Poland, Saxony and Belgium contained highly doubtful populations. By the autumn Napoleon might have made himself invincible.

The spring, therefore, witnessed a furious race in armaments between Napoleon and the Allies. While Wellington and Blücher collected troops in Belgium and Rhenish Prussia, and Murat was driven from Italy, into France, the Vendée took up arms for the Bourbons, and the new Liberal Chamber formed a constant embarrassment to a ruler whose every fibre was autocratic. On June 15, however, Napoleon surprised the enemy near Charleroi, and secured an excellent position for defeating Wellington and Blücher in turn. Next day, with inferior numbers, he drove Blücher from Ligny, while Ney fought indecisively against Wellington at Quatre Bras.

The immediate fate of Europe, as it proved, turned upon the chance that a reserve *corps* under D'Erlon made a mistake which saved Blücher from annihilation. The army of a chief whose one idea was to fight Napoleon on every possible occasion, retreated north to Wavre, when ordinary men might have turned eastward towards their base. He could therefore promise Wellington the army *corps* that he required in order to stand fast at Mont St. Jean and cover Brussels. The struggle of June 18, known as Waterloo, was fought for many hours between Napoleon, who would have acted otherwise had he suspected Blücher's intervention, and Wellington, who counted upon it before engaging. When at last it came, it drew off reserves which might have prevented the final

downfall of the French, and it provided cavalry which turned the retreat into a rout.

Constitutional France hastened to profit by the Allies' declaration that they were fighting against Napoleon alone. The Emperor was compelled to abdicate, and Wellington forced the hand of the Chambers and of the Allies by encouraging Louis to return. With two armies before Paris, and two more across the frontier, it was hopeless for the nation to resist. On July 7, the Allies entered Paris, followed next day by Louis XVIII. On July 15, Napoleon embarked upon a British ship. He had been 137 days in France.

PART VI

RECONSTRUCTED EUROPE (1815–1848)

§ 1. *Restoration*, 1815–1818

Again the task of safeguarding the future of Europe devolved on the Allies. Nine days before Waterloo, the Final Act of the Vienna Congress had been signed by all the eight Powers excepting Spain. (No mention was therein made of weighty questions which Napoleon's downfall was unlikely to bring forward—disarmament, the revolt of Spanish America, the maritime supremacy of England, the fate of the Christian nations in Turkey, the rights of nationalities.) The guiding principle, as was inevitable in the circumstances of the case, was the restoration of a balance of power between the European States. This, however, had been threatened in the campaign of Waterloo, and in making peace with France the former conclusions must receive revision. For four months, while some 900,000 soldiers earned the hatred of her people, their masters debated on the terms to be extorted from her.

Thanks mainly to the Tsar, Wellington and Castlereagh, France was neither dismembered nor mulcted in excessive sums of money. The Second Treaty of Paris (November 20, 1815) left her substantially undisturbed in the frontiers attained before the Revolution. She lost the small extensions granted in 1814, notably western Savoy, which now passed to Sardinia. The works of art pillaged by Napoleon must be returned, and 150,000 men under Wellington were to form an army of occupation paid by France. Napoleon, by taxing foreign countries, had left her without a debt, and his former victims claimed that she should now compensate their people and pay for

Settlement in France.

fortresses to hem her in. On the Continent at least, the settlement of Paris, like the settlement of Utrecht, put an end to her supremacy but not necessarily to her pre-eminence.

Greater security for the future lay in the depletion of French man-power, and in the new bond which now united the Allies.

The Holy Alliance.

Before the end of September, the Tsar, who found himself again in Paris at the head of his army, had inaugurated a Holy Alliance for the maintenance of peace and for the government of Europe in accordance with the law of Christ. To this declaration of principle every Continental sovereign except the Sultan and the Pope subscribed, while the Prince Regent by an appreciative letter extricated England from the embarrassment of either accepting or rejecting the invitation.

Although to its author the Alliance was not, as the Americans supposed, "a mere hypocritical fraud," it was calculated to support benevolent despotism against the claim to self-government by the people, and Christian Powers against those of other faiths. A Tsar, however sincere, could hardly fail to draw from it encouragement in any future conflict with the Poles or Turks, or with the spirit of revolution. More precise, and perhaps more promising, was the Quadruple Alliance signed on November 20 by the remaining Great Powers for upholding the settlement made with France. Neither Napoleon, now a prisoner at St. Helena, nor any of his family was ever to ascend the throne, and the Allies were to meet at fixed periods to promote the peace and prosperity of Europe.

Within a few years, these Alliances had gained the reputation of a conspiracy of governments against their subjects, framed to promote reaction and to prevent the development of freedom. Their authors, however, had for many months been engaged in showering constitutions upon Europe. The Tsar had promised to preserve the liberties of Finland, and to grant national institutions to the Poles. Austria and Prussia had accepted the policy of distinctive Polish institutions, and Cracow, the sole fragment of Poland which retained its independence, was organized as a republic. Prussia,

indeed, issuing resplendent from the transforming hands of Stein, was regarded as the leader of the Liberals, and the German arrangement sanctioned at Vienna provided for a Constitution in each of the thirty-nine States of the Confederation. Belgium, which the Powers had attached to Holland, and Genoa, which they had attached to Sardinia, were endowed with constitutional rights, while those lately acquired by Norway, France and Spain were assured of their approval.

Only two States had passed unshaken through the storms of twenty years—Britain, which enjoyed a Constitution, and Russia, whose Tsar was in love with the idea. The year 1815, therefore, might well suggest to Europe the dawn of ordered liberty and peace. In 1818 it could be claimed that perhaps the design of a universal alliance for the peace and happiness of the world had never been so far realized as in the last four years.

Reaction in France.

The first preoccupation of the nascent European Concert must inevitably be found in France. Louis XVIII, sustained by foreign bayonets and compelled to sign away French territories and French millions, seemed likely to become the centre of a civil war. The Ultras, headed by the heir to the throne, were determined to recover all that they and their fathers had lost in the Revolution, while their opponents stood firmly by the nationalization of the soil, the centralized administration of the kingdom, and the new restraints on the monarch and the clergy. Fouché and Talleyrand were driven from office, the white cockade of the Bourbons became the emblem of a Reign of Terror, and Ney was put to death. Richelieu, who reluctantly became Premier to propitiate the Allies and thus to save the frontier fortresses for France, could not reduce to reason the aggressive reactionaries of the Chamber.

In 1816, a year of general gloom, the Powers insisted upon a more moderate policy. The Crown ventured, by decree, to dissolve the Chamber and to reduce its membership. Having thus secured a majority, Ministers proceeded to limit the franchise so drastically that the electors formed a plutocracy a hundred thousand strong. Confronted thus with a

stable and practicable government and at the same time with the possibility of a revolt against the occupation, the Allies withdrew their troops, and before the close of 1818 France had regained her freedom.

Three years after the settlement at Paris, the character of the new Europe had become sufficiently apparent. The quarter of a century which separated the outbreak of the French Revolution from the overthrow of Napoleon had converted the feeling of race into the political principle of Nationality. In earlier ages, men had been easier to govern if their language, their traditions and their religion were not ignored. Now they were beginning to claim that no government which ignored these idiosyncrasies was valid, and many would soon demand that to every people must be granted a government of its own choice. Constituted authority was thus opposed by natural rights; the Holy Alliance by the Liberal Movement; Restoration by Revolution; and the achievements of the weak Spanish and Prussian peoples against Napoleon warned all sovereigns that tremendous forces were latent within their States.

Nationality.

Metternich, as minister of a Power which Nationality must threaten with disintegration, naturally took the lead in a coalition of continental rulers against their common danger. Among them, four enjoyed a predominance which the recent convulsions had increased. Austria herself, the Power which had dared to attack Napoleon single-handed, was freed from her troublesome and distant possessions in Belgium and the Breisgau, and aggrandized in Italy and Poland. In comparison with her condition under Joseph II, she was compact, well organized, and strong in diplomacy and under arms. Prussia possessed new and admirable institutions, and new and valuable provinces, but lacked the courage and insight to turn them to the best account. Failing to lead the German Liberal movement, she resorted to mere repression at home, and in foreign policy allowed her fears to make her always subservient either to Austria or to Russia.

In France, the moderate government was threatened on the one hand by aggressive reactionaries, on the other, by the

resentful votaries of the Revolution, and the danger was ever present that the nation, reduced when others were aggrandized, might seek relief in war. Russia, an unknown factor, linked by Poland to the European system, was credited with boundless resources and with ambitions bounded merely by the conscience of the Tsar. With only the weakened Turks between himself and as much of Asia as he chose to take, with an army maintained on principle at the strength of the Prussian and Austrian combined, with vast influence over the princes of Germany and Scandinavia, and with sincere though shifting notions of his mission, Alexander was a source of immense anxiety to the European Powers.

Fortunately for the Continent at this crisis, England continued an active participation in her affairs. Her powerful voice was raised for the observance of treaties and the maintenance of peace, and in her the opponents of unlimited reaction could hope to find a stay. In the series of Congresses in which the Great Powers endeavoured to watch over Europe the participation of a relatively disinterested and constitutional member must be beyond all price.

§ 2. *Government by Congress*, 1818–1823

At Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 Wellington and Castlereagh contrived to defeat Alexander's project of a general union of States to put down any uprising. The four Powers renewed their Quadruple Alliance for observing France, but invited her to join in declaring for the maintenance of an intimate union designed to uphold the settlement of Europe. The Concert of Europe thus appeared to be developing in comprehensiveness while consolidating itself with the lapse of time. The two succeeding years, however, confronted it with problems which revealed its inherent weakness.

Austria, indeed, desired peace and the maintenance of the treaties, but demanded that the German system, as well as the European, should be preserved unchanged.

The Carlsbad Decrees.

England, unrivalled as a manufacturing and colonial Power, grew more and more averse from interference to repress liberty abroad. Russia,

painfully aware of her failure to reconcile the Poles or to preserve her own army from revolutionary infection, took alarm at seditious manifestations in Germany, and drew Prussia towards reaction. France seemed to be on the verge of revolution. In 1819, Metternich was therefore able to commit the German Federation to the so-called Carlsbad Decrees. These provided in effect that the Diet, in which Austria was omnipotent, should direct the German States to repress revolutionary tendencies in education, in secret societies, or in the Press. They were followed by an agreement that no further German Constitutions should be granted. Metternich based this prohibition of progress upon the Treaties of Vienna and of Paris, and England protested, but in vain.

Early in 1820, however, reaction as formulated by Alexander received a temporary check. The Spanish army, wearied by a Bourbon monarchy which restored even the Inquisition, forced the ultra-Liberal Constitution of 1812 upon the King, who even professed that this anti-clerical and almost anti-monarchical movement had his sincere approval. Soon afterwards the Duke of Berry, who stood third in succession to Louis' crown, was assassinated, and the crime was ascribed to the French Liberals. The Tsar, shocked into outspoken reaction, proposed that the five Powers should interfere at Madrid. But while England objected to the principle of such an intervention, Austria and France did not desire the march of a Russian army through their dominions, and for the time being the Spanish Liberal Government was unassailed.

Liberalism in Spain.

In July, however, the army of Naples compelled its Bourbon King to accept the Spanish Constitution. Metternich, thus attacked in his Italian sphere of influence, claimed a European mandate to interfere, and strove to overcome the opposition of England by means of a conference at Troppau. There the three absolutist Powers attempted to frame a rule which should compel members of the European Alliance to interfere against every revolution. At a further Conference held at Laibach in 1821, they again

Repression in Italy.

assumed an attitude repugnant to the principles of France and England. Austria received her mandate, and the Neapolitan Constitution was promptly overthrown.

But Castlereagh, in full agreement with Canning, had been impelled to declare that the "overbearing and conquering character" of the French Revolution differentiated it from subsequent movements in the interior of States, though these also might be morally contagious. The alliance to which England was a party was formed, he maintained, to oppose Revolution as militant within France, not as inherent in democratic principles. It was never intended as a union for the government of the world. The game of public safety could not best be played by a false pretence that all States think alike upon all subjects, or that it is possible to determine in advance on what conditions one shall interfere by force in the internal affairs of another, or that such forcible interference is often likely to profit either party. To preserve the Low Countries, the military barrier of Europe, England might act more promptly than perhaps upon any other motive, but always with due regard to her popular and national constitution. "We shall be found in our place when actual danger menaces the system of Europe; but this country cannot and will not act upon abstract and speculative principles of precaution."

Policy of England.

These words, which formulate the policy of non-intervention, frustrating the Tsar's project of a general Christian government, came from a Minister profoundly desirous of peace upon the Continent, and fearful of the spirit of treason and its disaffection which was widespread among the lower orders at home. They were prompted by a belief that Revolution in Spain and even in France would no longer endanger Europe, since Germany now for internal purposes formed one whole, and Russia was only too formidable to the rest. They reflect the tacit assumption that since England would in no extremity invite or accept foreign interference, its duty was to refrain from offering it, save in immediate self-defence. Henceforward the question what was or what

was not " a British interest " became more than ever momentous for Europe.

In 1821, when the death of Napoleon removed one source of disquietude from Europe, the strength of the Concert was tested by simultaneous revolts in the Danubian provinces of Turkey, in Greece and in Piedmont. Italian affairs were generally recognized as the province of Metternich, and an Austrian army swiftly repressed the Piedmontese. A new King, Charles Albert, was installed, and the triumph of reaction over revolution was complete. The rebellion of Slavs and Greeks against the Sultan, followed as it was by massacres at Constantinople and elsewhere, raised questions of a different order. It was difficult for the Protector of the Russian Church to refrain from assisting his co-religionists in throwing off the Moslem yoke, and difficult for any Tsar to renounce the resulting aggrandizement. In this case, therefore, Alexander was strongly drawn towards revolution. Britain, on the other hand, regarded the maintenance of Turkey as a practical consideration of the greatest moment, since its disruption would give Russia Asia, south-eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, and an unquestioned predominance by land. She therefore agreed with Metternich to invoke the conservative principles of the alliance, and, while a war of mutual extermination went on in Greece, the Tsar awaited the decision of a congress.

The Concert of Europe.

At Verona, in October, 1822, however, the Powers met solely to discuss the question of Spain. Before their meeting, Metternich had secured a personal ascendancy over the Tsar, and the death of Castlereagh had placed the direction of British policy in the bolder hands of Canning. The result was that no collective action was resolved on as against the ultra-Liberalism of Spain, but that all the Powers save England denounced the Spanish Constitution. The Russians were not brought into the Peninsula, but in April, 1823, France, now in the throes of reaction, marched an army into Spain. Her attempt to force a tyrant upon a people already weary of

The Congress of Verona.

democracy succeeded with unexpected ease. Canning, jealous for the prestige of Britain, was goaded into restless opposition to the despotic cause. He denounced France in the Commons, appealed to the spirit of the nation, threatened war if Portugal or the Colonies were touched, and sent consuls to those States in Spanish America which had revolted when Napoleon subjugated Spain. He even sounded the United States with a view to a joint declaration on their behalf.

The hint bore fruit in the statement of policy known as the Monroe doctrine, by which the President declared that America was no longer to be regarded by the Old World as a field for colonization, and that interference with the new political liberty of her Latin communities would be resented by the United States. A nation of some ten millions, scattered over a small fraction of the New World, thus defied at once the Holy Alliance, Russia, which held the undefined territory of Alaska, and England herself, the Power most likely to enlarge her great American possessions. This rejection of a Concert of the civilized world was based upon the fundamental difference between European and American ideals, and supplemented, as against the Continental Powers, that difference between their institutions and the British which Castlereagh and Canning had already emphasized. The year 1823, therefore, destroyed the hope that victory over Napoleon might give rise to a permanent union of the Christian States for the preservation of peace.

The Monroe Doctrine.

§ 3. *Failure of the European Concert*, 1823–1829

The two remaining years of Alexander's life witnessed a series of diplomatic reverses inflicted upon his principles by Canning. Early in 1824, the Tsar invited the Powers to unite in forcing upon the Turks a scheme for the settlement of Greece. Canning averted the proposed Congress. In the question of Spanish America, indeed, he not only frustrated a Congress but recognized the chief republics as independent, thus drawing them towards England and away from the United States. Portugal, where the monarchy was in danger from an abso-

lutist faction and from France, was adroitly protected against both, and British influence confirmed. Thus, in spite of the accession of the reactionary Charles X in France (September, 1824), the league of autocrats made no progress, while Russia and Poland were infested with societies for promoting revolution. In December, 1825, Alexander died, a disappointed man.

Alexander, however, although impressionable, and driven by circumstances towards reaction, had remained an idealist and a Liberal at least in name. His early death gave Russia to his younger brother Nicholas I, a Tsar of giant strength and stature, but by temperament and training rather a Prussian colonel than the brain and soul of the most formidable empire in the world. A military revolt gave the impulse to his reign, which was directed towards perfecting the discipline of his people, and withdrawing them from the contaminating influence of Europe. Both within and without Russia, he was the consistent foe of revolution. He might be expected, none the less, to support the Greek rebels against the Sultan, whose powerful ally, the Pasha of Egypt, was credited with a plan for depopulating the Morea and replacing its inhabitants with blacks. To prevent Russia from absorbing first Turkey and then Greece, Wellington personally negotiated with the Tsar the Protocol of St. Petersburg, an arrangement for procuring their reconciliation on the basis of limited Greek independence. This, though welcomed by France, failed through the refusal of the German Powers to countenance rebellion ; and, although the Sultan yielded on other questions to the Tsar, the year closed with the danger of a Russo-Turkish struggle undispelled.

Nicholas I of Russia.

At the other extremity of Europe, Canning had gained his object without war. In 1825 he had procured the peaceful severance from Portugal of the constitutional empire of Brazil, and, in December, 1826, he sent troops to protect the new constitutional kingdom of Portugal from reactionary attack. The absolutist uncle of the infant queen, Dom Miguel, although he had the moral

Portugal and Brazil.

support of almost the whole Continent, was for the time being a fugitive at Vienna.

In 1827, when Canning became Prime Minister, the Liberal tide in Europe continued to flow. French feeling showed itself deeply disturbed by a reaction which recalled the Jesuits, muzzled the Press and dissolved the National Guard. The Greeks, though outmatched by the Egyptian army, maintained the struggle with a heroism that promised to arouse an irresistible sympathy among the European peoples. Capodistrias, formerly a notable Liberal servant of Alexander, accepted the presidency of their national assembly in March. Dom Miguel determined to swear adhesion to the Portuguese Constitution. Austria and Prussia, indeed, persisted in rejecting the Protocol of St. Petersburg, but in June it became the Treaty of London between the three remaining Powers. Their union paved the way, after the untimely death of Canning, for the impromptu battle of Navarino, which destroyed the Turkish and Egyptian fleets (October, 1827). Navarino cut off the invading army from its base and thus saved the Greeks. It helped the electorate in France to inflict a resounding defeat upon reaction. But it shattered the traditional British friendship with the Sultan, and encouraged his traditional enemy the Tsar to embark upon a Turkish war.

Liberalism in Europe.

The year 1828 thus found Europe in confusion, the one outstanding certainty being that her government by a concert of the Powers had failed. England under Wellington clung to the integrity of Turkey. Metternich sought above all else to restrain the Tsar. France, from diverse motives, was pro-Greek. Russia, having triumphantly vindicated against Persia her steady advance in the Caucasus, took up the challenge of the furious Sultan with abundant promises of moderation in what seemed likely to prove a brief and unexacting campaign. Russian armies invaded Turkish territory on both sides of the Black Sea, but the stubborn defence of Shumla gave Metternich's diplomacy its opportunity and even brought the invaders into grave peril. To prevent Greece from becoming a dependency of

Turkish War.

Russia, Metternich now desired that she should become a fully sovereign State, and Turkish valour helped towards this end. When, in 1829, Diebitsch won the war by boldly marching on Adrianople, the London Conference had already pronounced for an autonomous but tributary Greece, reaching to the Arta-Volo line and protected by the Powers. The Peace of Adrianople, a blow from which it seemed impossible that the Turkish empire could recover, gave Russia a grip on the Danube at its mouth, together with ports on the eastern shore of the Black Sea, and far-reaching rights of trade and navigation. Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia, moreover, became fully autonomous under her protection, and the treaty included the arrangements of the London Conference for Greece.

§ 4. *The Revolution of July and its Effects*, 1830–1834

While Greece gained freedom, in Portugal and in France reaction had achieved ominous successes. Dom Miguel, with the goodwill of the people, seized the Portuguese throne in 1829, and established absolutism and even Terror. Wellington disclaimed any right to intervene. At the same time, Charles X entrusted the government of France to Polignac, who prepared to deal in the spirit of an Emigrant with the chartered rights of the nation. The year 1830 found reaction triumphant in almost every European State, and in the great majority aggressive. France, indeed, possessed a Liberal Parliament, but to capture the national imagination her government seized Algiers and prepared to abandon her Turkish ally to Russia in return for a free hand on the Rhine. South of the Alps and of the Pyrenees, all over central Europe, Scandinavia and Russia, the sovereigns were the sworn foes of Liberalism, and in England, where a new industrial nation unrepresented in Parliament was growing up, a Tory field-marshal ruled. Yet the fifteen years of peace had given men leisure to reflect upon their natural rights, to breathe the historical and romantic atmosphere of a new literature and to be thrilled with sympathy for the Greeks, the

Italians and the Poles. In 1830 their demand for freedom threatened to overthrow the monarchical framework of all Europe.

Revolution broke out almost simultaneously in Brussels and in Paris. The midsummer elections had completely disappointed the hopes of Polignac and of Charles X. To escape the embarrassment of a Liberal Parliament, the Crown issued Ordinances dissolving the new Chamber, altering the electoral law, and suspending the freedom of the Press. Opposition was neither expected nor prepared for, and in three days (July 27–29) the people of Paris drove the helpless monarch into exile. The Parliament, however, assumed the direction of the Revolution, and within ten days its moderate character was affirmed. Louis Philippe, descended through the Orleans line from Louis XIII, accepted a royal power shorn of its right to make laws and decrees and to control the Press, while the Catholic faith was disestablished. His birth and his conspicuous moderation went far towards reconciling Europe to the expulsion of a dynasty which it had placed upon the throne. Metternich forbore to form a new alliance against France; Nicholas merely armed and delayed his recognition; Wellington, who gave place to the Whigs in November, welcomed in Talleyrand the advocate of cordial co-operation.

Revolution in France.

A good understanding with England was the more necessary that in August the Belgians had expelled the troops of their Dutch sovereign from Brussels. This defiance of Europe would become a thousand times more provocative if it produced either a republic or a union with France. By declaring against both, Louis Philippe restrained the more hot-headed Belgians and Frenchmen and deprived Russia and even England of any ground for war. In December, a conference of the Powers in London declared for Belgian independence. Meanwhile the virtual triumph of the Greeks and the irresistible risings in France and Belgium had awakened echoes all over Europe. At the end of November the Poles, with formidable unanimity,

Risings in Belgium and Poland.

rose against the Tsar. Their rebellion swiftly reacted upon the French and Belgian movements, to which it owed its inspiration, and which it in turn protected, by occupying the attention of the eastern Powers. Only the moderation of Louis Philippe, whom England steadily supported, prevented the new year from witnessing further revolutions in the West. Thanks to the co-operation of two Powers which in regard to Belgium are inevitably rivals, the project of a neutralized State under a non-French monarchy approached fulfilment, while the only fresh movements in 1831 were abortive risings in Italy.

The morrow of the July Revolution, indeed, widened the cleavage of Europe between a constitutionalist France and England and an absolutist remainder, while everywhere the established governments triumphed over rebellion. After the disastrous premiership of Wellington had illustrated the defects of ministerial changes, England returned to Canning's principles as expounded by Palmerston. So long as successive administrations entrusted the Foreign Office to his powerful hands, British interests and Liberalism in Europe were assured of a champion who, like Canning, could restrain the unconstitutional interference of the court and marshal the opinion of the nation. The triumph of Reform in 1832 gave to the middle class a political supremacy like that which they were securing in the economic world and at the same time promised to confer upon the Whigs an indefinite tenure of power.

Palmerston.

At the same time Louis Philippe, menaced on the one side by partisans of the evicted dynasties and on the other by advocates of a republic, was compelled to base his throne upon the wealthy electors of the middle class, and, in close accord with England, to pursue a policy of peace. Thanks to his attitude, and to Palmerston's skill and patience, the thorny Belgian question approached its solution in July, 1831, without a general war. France had been brought to renounce a rectification of her frontier or a Belgian succession; the remaining Great Powers, their arrangements of 1815; the Belgians, the inclusion of

Belgian Independence.

Luxemburg ; while Leopold of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, an English protégé, had been generally approved as king. The Dutch, indeed, prepared to reconquer the country, but after an initial victory were restrained by the armed diplomacy of the Powers. The London Conference decided to impose terms upon the two nations, and in November the Belgians consented to form an independent and neutralized State within the indicated limits. The consent of Holland and the ratification by the eastern autocrats remained to be secured.

In their own domains, Metternich and the Tsar had been victorious over revolution. Central Italy, inspired by hopes of French assistance, rose against its Dukes and against the Pope, but Austrian troops caused the movement swiftly to subside. Gregory XVI at Rome, where Jesuit influence revived, and Charles Albert in Piedmont, began their reign as Metternich's disciples. The Poles had dared to depose the Romanov dynasty, but found no general comparable with Diebitsch, or after his death from cholera, with Paskevitch, the conqueror of Persia. While France and England, absorbed in their own peaceful revolutions, gave them no assistance, Prussia and Austria facilitated the operations of the Russian armies. In September, Paskevitch stormed Warsaw, and the collapse of the insurrection enabled the Tsar once more to contemplate intervention in the West. In spite of the protests of France and England, the Polish constitution was abrogated, and Paskevitch inaugurated as Governor the alternative policy of favouring the peasants as against the nobles, and of assimilating the country to Russia. The Poles had perhaps saved the Belgian revolution, but their rising left the three partitioning Powers united champions of reaction. In the summer of 1832, the German Diet, inspired by Metternich, imposed on all its members the duty of refusing constitutional concessions, and attacked the freedom of Universities, of public meeting, and of the Press. In Germany, as in Italy and Russia, secret societies offered the sole resort for champions of the Rights of Man.

Repression in Italy, Poland and Germany.

The troubled year 1832 witnessed other moves in the

struggle between Liberalism and reaction. The strong man of France, Casimir Périer, before his death from cholera in May, seized and held Ancona as a defiance of Metternich's claim to exclusive influence in Italy. Hungary and Transylvania showed signs of insubordination. Switzerland was divided into two opposing camps. The Peninsula approached the verge of a double civil war. In Spain, the Neapolitan queen Cristina championed Liberalism and the succession of her daughter Isabel against the claims of the King's brother, the absolutist Don Carlos. In Portugal Dom Pedro, who had renounced the throne of Brazil, endeavoured with the help of French and British mercenaries to drive out Dom Miguel and to make Maria queen.

Disturbances in Europe.

The stubborn refusal of Holland to accept the terms of the Powers for the emancipation of Belgium compelled them to resort to force. In December, Antwerp capitulated to the French, and a blockade by the French and British fleets helped to bring the Dutch to reason. Early in 1833 they agreed to cease hostilities against the Belgians, who retained the chief parts of Luxemburg and Limburg until a definite peace should be concluded.

The year 1833, memorable in Europe for the formation of the German customs union or *Zollverein*, and in the history of humanity, for the resolve of England to emancipate her slaves, was marked by the further progress of hostility between Eastern absolutism and the constitutional Powers of the West. In September, the profit brought by the Polish and German disturbances was triumphantly netted by Metternich. The two Emperors and the Prussian Crown Prince met at Münchengrätz, and agreed on the principle of mutual support in their external or internal difficulties. They further secretly resolved to maintain the integrity of Turkey, while if this should prove impossible, Austria and Russia undertook to act in concert.

Europe Divided.

The ægis of a triple league was thus thrown over the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, which Russia had secretly concluded with the Sultan in July. In return for Russian assistance in negotiating peace with rebellious Egypt, Turkey had become

practically a vassal State, pledged to close the Dardanelles against any European Power with which Russia might be at war. France and England could only issue unavailing protests and view with deepening suspicion every further Russian move.

In 1834, however, Palmerston seized an opportunity of replying in kind to the virtual alliance of the three absolutist Powers. Thanks to the utter inefficiency of his supporters, Dom Miguel had been driven from Lisbon, while in Spain Don Carlos claimed that his brother's death had made him the lawful king. The Carlist army of the north endangered the regency of Cristina, and in April Spain joined with England, Portugal and France in a constitutionalist Quadruple Alliance. Although the eastern Powers recalled their ambassadors from Madrid, the alliance procured the downfall of Dom Miguel, and the Carlists proved unable to overthrow the regency by war.

§ 5. *Europe and the Eastern Question*, 1835–1846

For five years (1835–39) the situation of Europe underwent but little change. Feebler than his lethargic predecessor, Ferdinand II as Emperor only prolonged the rule of Metternich. Prussian taste condemned any disturbance of the King's declining years by clamour for reform. In Russia, where the iron Tsar struggled with the task of paternal government, though conscious of his impotence to accomplish necessary innovations, patriots took pleasure in believing that their country surpassed the West, as harmony surpasses force, and in urging that throughout the empire one rule, one language and one religion should be established. The severance of Hanover from England consequent upon the accession of Victoria in 1837 was instantly followed by the suppression of the Hanoverian Constitution. In France, the Orleanist monarchy, timid from the nature of its origin, survived the fall of ministries and rebellions, and could claim to have reduced the country to order by parliamentary means. While the French steadily pursued the conquest of Algiers and carried through a war with Mexico, the English were absorbed in the Far East, Canada and Afghanistan, and the Whig predominance seemed only to be enhanced by the short-lived

victories of their opponents. Belgian independence was at last recognized by Holland. In Spain and Portugal the constitutional cause triumphed.

Over all western Europe, institutions of an English type thus prevailed. In the adjacent Rhineland, however, the new supremacy of Prussia gave rise to a conflict between Church and State which transcended political divisions. The Church would marry a Catholic bride to a Protestant only if assured of the right to claim their children, while Prussian law gave the father an inalienable control over their upbringing. The State which had gone far towards amalgamating its own Lutherans and Calvinists found the coercion of a Pope beyond its power.

The stability of the European system was once again to be destroyed by the Eastern question. The integrity of Turkey served to prevent a collision between Austria and Russia and also between England and France. The absolutist rivals, indeed, might resort to partition, but the distant constitutional Powers could not contemplate such a plan. Now that France, through Algiers, held the western Mediterranean, England was more than ever determined that by adding Egypt she should not dominate the whole. It proved impossible, however, to restrain the Sultan from attacking Mehemet Ali, the ruler of Egypt, whom the French regarded as a destined instrument of their own. The Egyptian victory was complete, and Europe was confronted with the danger that, under the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, Russia would act alone. Nicholas, intent on preserving the absolutist alliance and breaking up the opposition, offered, however, to forgo his treaty rights, and for a moment it seemed that the five Powers would impose a collective settlement.

Mehemet Ali.

To France, the coercion of Mehemet Ali was the defeat of all her hopes, and under Thiers she attempted to take an independent course. She had, however, rated the power of Mehemet too high, and the skill and courage of Palmerston too low. In July, 1840, she was suddenly confronted with the Treaty of London, by

The Treaty of London.

which the four Powers had agreed to enforce a settlement on the basis of moderate compensation for the victor. Mehemet, indeed, stood firm, and Thiers prepared for war, but French ebullient nationalism was answered by German, and the *Wacht am Rhein* was a warning that the war would not be an affair of governments alone.

Louis Philippe checked the policy of adventure, and Mehemet was driven from Syria by the Allies. Early in 1841, he submitted to the Sultan and received the hereditary pashalik of Egypt, and in July, France in effect submitted also, by consenting to rejoin the Concert. When the five Powers concurred in restoring peace within the Turkish empire, which undertook to close the Dardanelles to all of them in time of war, the triumph of Palmerston was complete. He had brought Russia to renounce her protectorate by allowing the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi to remain unrenewed; he had prevented France from establishing herself upon the road to India; he had made the Eastern question European, and secured for England an unrivalled authority at Constantinople, and all this without recourse to war. It was part of the price that England must pay for party government that he was immediately replaced by Aberdeen.

Meanwhile, important though isolated events had occurred which could not leave European history unaffected. The marriage of Victoria with a prince of the House which had already given the Belgians a king tended to influence English policy in favour of Germany and to revive the waning authority of the crown over foreign affairs. The accession of the romantic absolutist Frederick William IV promised rather to inflame than to allay the demand for a Prussian constitution, and for an attempt to place his kingdom at the head of the German national movement. In Spain, the Liberal general Espartero, with the steady support of England, attained to power. The throne of Louis Philippe remained unshaken by an attempt of Napoleon's nephew to win over France, but in December, 1840, the reburial of the Emperor at *Les Invalides* thrilled his people with contempt for their *bourgeois* and pacific king.

Peaceful Progress.

For five years from her acceptance of the Egyptian settlement, however, France preserved at least a nominal *entente* with England, while railways and questions of religion took the place in men's minds which in more stirring and perhaps less happy times foreign politics are wont to claim. England, victorious in China, Afghanistan and India, aspired to become the workshop of the world, while France, Belgium and Germany were seeking to follow in her steps.

PART VII

NATIONALITY AND THE GREAT WAR (1846–1924)

§ 1. *The Movements of* 1846–1848

In 1846, the surface of Europe, never wholly calm, was again disturbed by sudden storms. The stability which had long been the ideal of Metternich and the Tsar was even in their domains preserved only by constant vigilance and victory over the scattered but increasing progressive forces. Kossuth in Hungary, the educated class in Prussia, the new and superb literary artists in Russia voiced through various channels the demand for increased freedom. In Germany and in Italy alike, Liberalism and Nationality were inseparable, and the resentment against the French threat to the Rhine in 1840, no less than the growth of Italian secret societies and patriotic writings, gave a warning which no statesman could safely disregard. Absolutism, however, supported by the Church, treated national movements as sinful, and provided no constitutional safety-valve to guard against explosion. Early in 1846, indeed, Austria and Russia combined to punish a Polish rising by occupying Cracow, the last surviving remnant of free Poland. So long as the government of Prussia clung to absolutism, the military power of the eastern monarchs seemed secure against revolution.

In the West, a stationary condition was less possible and should have been less desired. Although in England, and still more in France, the electorates were small, the representative principle was established. These countries, too, were the first to feel that quickening of the national pulse which followed on the widespread construction of railways. England under Peel was fortunate in finding a Tory leader who dared to

repeal the Corn Laws, and that at a moment when the increased comfort due to other causes was ascribed by the people to what Parliament had done. In July, 1846, the Whigs returned to office, confronting the Chartists with a ministry of those who had widened the franchise and who pressed for the cheapening of food. To the dismay of the court, Palmerston, the incarnation of public opinion, returned to the Foreign Office.

Decline of Louis Philippe.

While England had thus adapted her government to the new conditions, in France no similar evolution had been taking place. The throne of Louis Philippe rested upon a compromise, dictated by the needs of 1830, between the divine right of kings and the sovereignty of the people. To preserve it, the national aspirations of France had been sacrificed in 1840, and the ministry of Guizot had since yielded to England in questions affecting Tahiti, Morocco and Spain. Timorous and strictly constitutional by nature, but painfully aware that the death of the heir apparent had shaken what hold they had on a generation which was learning to adore Napoleon, king and minister clutched at the opportunity of a facile success abroad. In October, 1846, breaking an agreement with England, the Infanta of Spain was married to the King's fifth son, at the same time that Queen Isabel espoused a husband from whom no heir was expected. Palmerston and the court were furious; the *Entente* could hardly survive; Metternich, defying the Treaties of Vienna, annexed Cracow, and in 1847 struck at Italian Liberalism by laying hands upon Ferrara. At a moment when central Europe at least was plainly on the verge of a far-reaching struggle for greater freedom, France joined with Austria in assisting the *Sonderbund*, an armed Catholic minority in Switzerland, in its endeavour to subvert the constitution.

In 1847, indeed, wide regions of Europe approached or attempted revolution. Prussia received from Frederick William IV a constitution which united her eight provincial Diets into one, to meet at the royal pleasure and to determine new taxation. Such beggarly concessions could only further increase the agitation

New Ideas in Europe.

to which the augmented freedom of the Press was giving vent. Throughout Germany, moreover, the feelings of the educated classes were deeply stirred by the question of Danish rule over their kinsmen in Slesvig and in Holstein, then the most prominent problem raised by the German national movement. In Switzerland and Portugal, thanks to Palmerston, the mutinous forces of reaction were subdued.

In absolutist Europe, however, with which Guizot threatened to associate France, the established order was in peril. Italy, where Pius IX offered the unwonted spectacle of a Liberal Pope, became the battlefield between Metternich and the new ideas. Eager to avert an outbreak, and not reluctant to retaliate against Metternich's habitual emission of advice, Russell and Palmerston publicly advised the Italian sovereigns to grant constitutions to their people.

In January, 1848, Milan vainly rose against the Austrians, and Sicily and Naples successfully against the Bourbons. In February, it seemed that the Two Sicilies, the Papal States, Tuscany and Sardinia were to enjoy constitutions, and Metternich placed Lombardy and Venice under martial law. At that moment, the sudden collapse of the Orleans monarchy swept every important State save England and Russia into the throes of revolution.

The occasion of the European convulsion was as trivial and accidental as its causes were permanent and deep. A banquet in Paris forbidden, popular resentment against Guizot shared by the military, the aged and dejected King cowed by an insurrection, his impulsive abdication and flight—and the government of France was seized by the boldest citizens at hand. The Second Republic was born of a spirit of contagious idealism which found vent in the endeavour by the State to organize work for all. While the French, sympathetically aided by Palmerston, strove to arrange their affairs without propaganda or interference from abroad, their February Revolution roused general imitation. In March, western Germany demanded a national assembly; Vienna rose; Metternich fled; the demands of Austria, Hungary and several German

The Second Republic.

States were conceded: the King of Prussia yielded to the rebels of Berlin; Milan and Venice drove out the Austrians; and Charles Albert of Sardinia ventured upon war. On the last day of the month, a preliminary National Assembly met at Frankfort, and a Liberal and united Germany seemed to be at hand.

For a few weeks, established Europe might seem shattered, but soon the planlessness of the insurrections became clear.

Europe in Revolution.

The German Liberals desired freedom and national unity without knowing whether Austria should or should not be included in the commonwealth which they aspired to create. If, as tradition dictated, she remained German, a federation comprising two Great Powers could hardly be closely woven; and if, as the majority wished, her non-German provinces were shut out, the co-operation of the King of Prussia must be won. Frederick William had indeed declared that Prussia was merged in Germany, but a phrase extorted by insurrection could hardly weigh against his convictions that God, not the mob, conferred royalty, and that a fatherland without Austria was unthinkable. The influence of the Tsar, who stood armed to support authority, had also to be taken into account.

Early in May, indeed, Prussian troops supported the German rebels of Slesvig and Holstein against the victorious Danes; and Prussia, while preparing a constituent assembly of her own, sent a large contingent to the National Parliament at Frankfort. At the same time, however, she put down a Polish insurrection in Posen, and her conservative elements began to recover from the first shock of revolution. In France and Austria, a reaction also set in. Before the end of June, the French Government had disclaimed the duty of finding work for all, and had restored order in the capital through a military dictator. At Vienna, a new revolt against inadequate concessions drove the Emperor into flight, but in June his arms were victorious both in Italy and in Bohemia. While at Frankfort the popular Archduke John was appointed Administrator of the nascent Empire, a great Croatian,

Reaction in Europe.

Jellachich, roused his fellow-Slavs against Hungary, to them a tyrant, though to the Emperor a rebel State.

In August, German nationalism suffered a severe defeat when British and Russian influence and the threatening attitude of Sweden nullified the success of the Prussian and Federal armies against the Danes. The Truce of Malmoe presaged the abandonment of the rebels in Slesvig and Holstein to the authority of their Danish lord. The autumn witnessed the flight of the Pope before the revolution, and brought fresh convulsions in the Austrian empire, but revealed in Schwarzenberg a minister adequate to the situation. In November, Vienna was reduced to obedience by the army. In December, the half-demented Ferdinand transferred the crown to his nephew Francis Joseph, a youth who had no past to live down, and whose hands were fettered by no oath to respect the Hungarian constitution. At the same time, Frederick William dissolved the Prussian national assembly, and conferred upon his subjects a constitution of his own. While in Austria authority was preparing for a new effort, in Prussia revolution had given rise only to moderate reform.

At Frankfort, meanwhile, the German National Assembly had accomplished much in the field of ideas, but little towards embodying the ideas in practice. Predominantly of the educated middle class, and elected on the basis of population by a Germany which comprised Slesvig, German Austria and the provinces of which Danzig and Königsberg were the chief towns, the members had declared for a close-knit federal State in which every individual should enjoy important fundamental rights. All were to be equal before the law, free from arbitrary arrest, entitled to utter their opinions and to assemble in public meeting. Every federal unit was to have a representative constitution with responsible government, and Germany must have a fleet and army in which every citizen was liable to serve. This noble conception was shattered by the Austrian anomaly and the political backwardness of Prussia, while in France the new Republican constitution was entrusted by five million voters to the presidency of a Bonaparte.

Liberalism in Germany.

§ 2. *Reaction and European War*, 1849–1856

The year 1849, indeed, was filled with the triumphs of authority over nationality and revolution. Frederick William early declined to receive the imperial crown at the hands of the Frankfort assembly—a decision which showed that German Liberalism had failed.

Restoration in Central Europe.

Fresh disturbances by the despairing revolutionaries of Saxony, Baden and the Palatinate were soon repressed by Prussian troops. Meanwhile Austria, since March 4 a constitutional State by imperial decree, crushed opposition in Italy, and summoned Russian aid against the new Hungarian republic of Kossuth. Standing as they did for democracy, the Hungarians might well have rallied to their cause the Slavonic Liberals and the Great Powers of the West. They secured only a few Polish volunteers, and the combined forces of Croatia, Austria and Russia proved irresistible. Kossuth and others fled to Turkey, where France and England could protect them; the army surrendered to the Russians; the victims of the Austrian vengeance under Haynau included thirteen generals put to death. Everywhere triumphant in her own dominions and in her sphere of influence, Austria reasserted her leadership of Germany by the convention of Olmütz with Prussia (November, 1850). Backed by the German Diet and by Russia, Austria had shielded the Hessian tyrant against his subjects, and Prussia had tamely acquiesced. The restoration of the old Confederation and a secret mutual guarantee with Prussia (May, 1851) promised to make Austrian hegemony permanent, and, in December, Schwarzenberg abolished the constitution. Throughout Germany and Italy, as well as in her own dominions, Austria was once more the supporter of altars and of thrones.

The general reassertion of monarchical authority in Europe was completed by the failure of the German rising in Slesvig and in Holstein. In a continent still mainly rural, the superiority of trained over untrained armies and officials had done much to restore the kings, but their victory was

made more swift and stable by the rally of the propertied classes to their side. In no country was reaction more violent than in France, where property was widely diffused, and where the costly social experiments of 1848 had increased the desire of its holders for firm government and order. There also, as in other lands, orthodox feeling had been shocked by the anti-Christian tenets associated with revolution. Public opinion therefore favoured the Prince President in his efforts to diminish the Republican party and to establish his personal power. Assured of the support of the clericals, for French bayonets protected the Pope in Rome, idolized in the provinces, both as a Bonaparte and as the foe of socialism, he ended his conflict with the impracticable and unpopular Assembly by a well-planned *coup d'état*. On the anniversary of Austerlitz, Paris learned that the Assembly was dissolved, universal suffrage re-established, and the electors convoked to vote upon constitutional revision. Opposition was either prevented or punished by arrests, and 7,500,000 votes against 640,000 gave the Prince President the right to draw up the constitution. Thousands of Republicans were exiled, and perhaps 1,200 killed or wounded, but France as a whole approved the new Napoleonic Empire which, in defiance of the Treaty of Chaumont, was proclaimed in November, 1852. This retained manhood suffrage, the gift of the February Revolution, and established a senate, a chamber and ministerial responsibility, but it was so contrived that the Emperor's will was law.

An Empire born in treason, however justifiable, against the constitution, and baptized in the blood of the Republicans, felt the incessant need of visible triumphs to sustain its prestige and power. Within France, Napoleon did much to stir industry and promote communications. Without, he found a clearer field through the fall of Palmerston, charged with a premature approval of the *coup d'état*, and the untimely death of Schwarzenberg. To please the Catholics and uphold the dignity of France, he had maintained the rights of the Latin Christians against the Greeks in the use of the Holy Places at Jerusalem,

The Third Empire.

thus daring to oppose the Tsar. In 1853, this comparatively trivial quarrel gave place to a reopening of the Eastern question which threatened a general European war.

Nicholas, lord of a great fortress at Sevastopol and therefore doubly formidable against Turkey, thought that the time had come to rule at Constantinople by way of a partition. Foiled in this design by a civil rebuff from England, he endeavoured to overawe the Sultan into conceding a virtual protectorate over the Greek Christians who formed the great majority of his European subjects. Again England blocked the way, since her ambassador, Stratford de Redcliffe, exposed the importance of the plan and nerved the Sultan to refuse compliance. A complete withdrawal of the Russian claims, however, would have destroyed the insinuating advances of many years, and this the Tsar could not consent to do. In the long controversy Napoleon firmly stood by England. While to his subjects she was the natural enemy, he, from personal gratitude and political acumen, resolutely made the *entente* the basis of his system, and strove to efface the memory of the Beresina rather than that of Waterloo.

The Crimean War.

The Russian advance to the Danube evoked a war with Turkey, and the destruction of a Turkish squadron at Sinope (November 30, 1853) involved the western Powers. In 1854, however, France and England failed to win German or Scandinavian allies, and without them found Russia hard indeed to reach. A bold attack on the Crimea began with the victory of the Alma, but Sevastopol was not taken and through the grim winter of Balaklava and of Inkerman it was rather the Allies who were besieged.

In 1855, with Palmerston Premier and the moderate Alexander on the Russian throne, war and negotiation were vigorously pursued, and, while Austria still hesitated, Cavour added her enemy Sardinia to the Allies. At last Sevastopol fell, but French weariness of the war, and the capture of Kars by the Russians made peace unavoidable, and, in Asia, indecisive. The

The Congress of Paris.

Congress of Paris of 1856, none the less, brought Turkey within the European circle, ended the claims of Russia to a special position as against her, and closed the Black Sea to warlike use. The question most likely to disturb the peace of Europe had been re-entrusted to the Concert of the Powers. England, lamentably deficient in generalship, had acquired a deep distrust of continental expeditions, but she had crippled Russia and preserved the Turk. Napoleon, from a crowned adventurer, had become the man of Europe.

§ 3. *Napoleon III and Europe*, 1856–1865

Thanks to Napoleon III, the European peace and enforced stability which many who beheld the Great Exhibition of 1851 believed would be perpetual had been exchanged for an era of movement and of war. The Congress of Paris, it is true, had freed the navigation of the Danube and had improved the laws which govern war by sea, and, in 1857, no Power took advantage of the Indian Mutiny to embarrass England. It soon became impossible, however, to foresee which part of Europe would next become the scene of an upheaval due to the cosmopolitan sympathy or the dynastic ambition of the Emperor of the French.

In 1858, favouring the Russian policy against the English, he overcame the artificial division between Wallachia and Moldavia, thus paving the way for a single Roumanian State.

Moved by Cavour, in 1859 he let loose a war between Austria and Sardinia, which his victorious intervention turned into a war of Italian liberation. Within two months of his rupture with Austria, Magenta and Solferino had been won. Prussia, however, threatened eastern France, and soon Napoleon attempted to stop short on terms arranged personally with Francis Joseph at Villafranca (July 11). Sardinia, which France hoped to use as an ally, was to receive Lombardy, and Italy was to form a confederation presided over by another protégé of France, the Pope.

The terms of Villafranca, which drove Cavour from office,

bore witness both to Napoleon's ingenuity and to his fears.

United. Italy.

As a devoted Catholic, upheld by clericals, he must support the Temporal Power, while he was bound also to the nationalists, its irreconcilable opponents. The scheme offered something to both, while rescuing France from a war which made Prussia fearful for the Rhine and England for Portsmouth and London, while the rising tide of Italian nationality threatened to place a strong Mediterranean Power on the frontier of France. The autumn of 1859 brought this last peril very near. Encouraged by Palmerston, Gladstone and Russell, Central Italy moved irresistibly towards Sardinia, and, to gain compensation from Sardinia, Napoleon was forced to restrict the Temporal Power to Rome. In 1860, he gained Savoy and Nice from Cavour, who had returned to office, but Garibaldi, the hero of a desperate resistance in 1849, suddenly laid all the South at the feet of the Italian King. The skill and insight of Cavour, who paid with his life for his exertions, preserved the French alliance for Victor Emmanuel, who in February, 1861, became monarch of all the peninsula except Venetia and Rome.

Meanwhile Napoleon continued to perplex the world. At the moment when he was infuriating the English court and ministry by his stealthy aggrandizement in the Alps, he was braving the displeasure of his people by negotiating with Cobden a treaty for free trade (January, 1860). As a set-off, he increased the powers and privileges of the Chambers. In the same year, he intervened with credit and with profit to check the massacres of Christians in Syria. The outbreak of the American civil war in 1861 tempted him to a very different intervention. French subjects, like those of other European States, had money claims which Mexico refused to pay, and France joined with Spain and England in an expedition to bring President Juarez to reason. Napoleon looked for prestige from a successful display of force, and the temporary —perhaps the permanent—suspension of the Monroe doctrine offered an opportunity of checking Anglo-Saxon progress by setting up a powerful Latin State. The French therefore

The Mexican Adventure.

remained in Mexico when their allies retired. To propitiate Austria and the Church, the Archduke Maximilian was crowned, and in a few years Napoleon found himself pursuing the interests of a Habsburg emperor against a fugitive republic.

While the early stages of the American civil war demanded the anxious scrutiny of every maritime Power, the continent of Europe was suffering rapid change. In 1861, Russia proved that the collapse of her stationary system in the Crimea had taught her to carry out the long-delayed emancipation of her serfs. The terms unhappily compelled the village communities to purchase at too high a price an area inadequate to support the population, whose natural increase must inevitably render the situation worse. The gift of legal liberty, however, was accompanied by westernizing reforms in local government, military service, education and judicial administration which made Russia far more European than before.

Emancipation in Russia.

At the same time, united Italy survived Cavour, and secured admission to the European circle. She recalled Mazzini, with whom republican nationalism was a religion, and captured Garibaldi, who took up arms to capture Rome. To put down brigandage in the south and poverty everywhere, to expel the French from Rome and the Austrians from Venice, to maintain a centralized monarchy in the classic land of small republics—these were stupendous tasks, but before 1864 they had been unflinchingly confronted. While King Otho was driven from Greece, Victor Emmanuel gained his reward for having merged Sardinia in Italy.

Italy.

Of surpassing moment for the future was the contemporary change in Prussia. With the accession in 1861 of William I, Regent since 1858, the throne was filled by a steadfast Hohenzollern, loyal to the monarchical ideals of his House. Determined that the army should become in truth "the people under arms," he demanded that 63,000 recruits instead of 40,000 should join the colours every year, and that reservists should do duty for five years

Bismarck in Prussia.

instead of two. Thus a nation of eighteen millions would be able to mobilize nearly 500,000 men, and those the best-drilled and, in musketry, the best-armed force in Europe. After a long conflict, the electors in 1862 returned a majority of nearly two to one against the plan. As the sole alternative to abdication, the King offered his confidence to Bismarck (September, 1862).

The new minister was a Prussian squire of giant strength and stature, genial or menacing at will, and famous for his conservative opinions. An old Parliamentarian, he despised all democrats, while his diplomatic career at Frankfort, St. Petersburg and Paris had taught him to despise also the Russian character and the Napoleonic *régime*, and to regard Austria as the enemy. With his wonted courage and incomparable force, he plunged into the struggle with the recalcitrant Diet and with Vienna.

To uphold the King in carrying out the army scheme without a budget, he formed his ministry from the tiny group of Conservatives, to whom Austria was a Power to be respected. Resting on the army, he steered Prussia swiftly towards a goal which neither her King nor her Parliament nor her people at first desired to reach.

In 1863 he won Russia, checked France, foiled Austria, and yet prepared with her the enterprise which he intended should issue in her ruin. The year began with a sudden rising of the Poles, outraged by the terrible Russian conscription, and hopeful of help from Austria, which for two years had shown a new sympathy towards her own non-German peoples. England under Palmerston and Russell wished well to the anti-Russian rising, and the French Emperor and people were thrilled with enthusiasm for the Polish cause. While the three Powers meditated a joint remonstrance with Russia against the suppression of a Constitution which the Vienna treaties had guaranteed, Bismarck promptly joined with the Tsar in putting down the insurrection.

Polish Insurrection.

Rather than yield to foreign intervention in what she regarded as a purely domestic sphere, Russia was prepared

to face a new Crimean war. Her own nationalists, always bellicose against the Poles, were roused to fury by Katkov and his Moscow newspaper. Without appreciable sacrifice, Bismarck had gained an *entente* with Russia, and divided Napoleon and the Tsar, while France was seriously displeased that England refused to engage in intervention. At the same time, the Prussian statesman raised his master's prestige by inducing him to decline the Austrian invitation to join in a revision of the German Confederation. After thirteen years, the memory of Olmütz was thus erased. Prussia even found herself courted by Austria, a Power now intent on frustrating Napoleon's proposal of a Congress which might question her dominion over Venice.

Rise of Prussia.

The moment was favourable for a bold and far-seeing Prussian to extract the maximum of profit from the question of the Danish duchies, which had entered upon a new and burning phase. German national feeling demanded that both Slesvig and Holstein should pass from Christian IX to the Duke of Augustenburg, and that they should form a unit of the German Confederation. Danish national feeling demanded and Christian IX decreed that Slesvig should share the Danish constitution, while Holstein remained merely a fief of the Danish crown. Austria wished the distant duchies to become under Augustenburg a satellite of her own, while Bismarck designed to secure Kiel and Altona for Prussia, to present Prussia as the champion of German Nationalism and to put Austria thoroughly in the wrong.

The Danish Duchies.

The course which he followed was dictated by a unique penetration into the motives and character of every other Power. Opposed at the outset by his king, his party and the Germans as a whole, he brought about the invasion of Denmark by Austria and Prussia in January, 1864. Ten months before, Christian's daughter had married the heir of England, but England could give little aid without France, and Napoleon, embarrassed in Mexico and disappointed of a Congress, avenged

War for Slesvig and Holstein.

in kind the British refusal to engage with him in Poland. The pan-Scandinavian sentiment on which Denmark had relied failed to bring her the alliance of Sweden, and after a few months' warfare and debate, the duchies passed under joint Austrian and Prussian rule. Bismarck had thus procured a hostage from Austria at the moment when he defeated her design to enter the *Zollverein*. It would be easy for such an artist to turn the joint occupation to the exclusive advantage of his State.

For collective Europe, Bismarck's triumph in 1864 marks a distinct reverse of fortune. The dismemberment of Denmark, it is true, was simultaneous with the transfer by Britain of the Ionian Islands to Greece and with the adoption by the Powers, assembled at Geneva, of a Convention giving rules for war. But in sharp contrast with the Turkish settlement of 1856, the Danish question had been in effect transferred from the control of the Great Powers as a whole to that of Austria and Prussia. The Treaty of London of 1852 had been vainly invoked both against and for the Danes before the struggle and at a conference during a truce. The German Powers which signed it had broken it for their own gain. The star of Napoleon, the friend of international discussion for the benefit of other peoples besides his own, was visibly paling before that of Bismarck, in essence a new Frederick the Great. With Britain more and more deeply engaged in domestic problems and in her growing empire, the outlook for the Continent was dark.

A Blow to Europe.

§ 4. *Bismarck and the German Empire*, 1865–1871

In 1865, while the United States marked the end of their civil war by demanding the withdrawal of the French from Mexico, Bismarck prepared to bring Germany under the unchallenged sway of Prussia. To Napoleon, the patron of Italy, the thought of a united Germany must be abhorrent; the secondary German States preferred Austria to Prussia; Prussians themselves were not prepared to conquer leadership by shedding German blood. But Bismarck patched up a

temporary arrangement with Austria, laid hands on Kiel, and in a personal meeting with Napoleon persuaded him that the approaching struggle would leave Germany balanced between two equal Powers, Italy endowed with Venice, and France compensated with Belgium or the Rhine. In April, 1866, therefore, he gained, with Napoleon's sanction, an alliance with Italy for war against Austria if it should break out within three months.

It remained only to rouse the Prussian King and people and to make Austria appear the aggressor. When the Italian treaty was little more than two months old these problems had been solved. The people of Prussia, like their fellow-Germans, remained opposed to war, but the army could be relied on, and Bismarck ventured everything on its success. In June, Austria and the secondary States took the field, only to find the political strategy of Bismarck and the military strategy of Moltke irresistible. After three weeks, a vast encounter near Königgrätz in north-eastern Bohemia broke the Austrian and Saxon force, and left the Prussians free to march upon Vienna. Austrian victories over Italy by land and sea, and easy Prussian triumphs against Hanover, Baden, Würtemberg and Bavaria scarcely affected the issue of this Seven Weeks War.

Downfall of Austria.

The most hardly tried combatant was Bismarck, who had successively to encounter his own king, Napoleon, the Austrian and Italian diplomatists and the Tsar. He was everywhere victorious. The King consented to violate all his instincts by dethroning his weaker fellow-German princes and leaving Austria and Saxony unhumiliated and intact. Napoleon's threatened intervention was averted, and his consent secured to the aggrandizement of Prussia north of the river Main. Austria yielded Venice and her place in the German Confederation, while Italy accepted a most unfavourable frontier-line. The Tsar remained the friend of an aggrandized military Prussia on his flank which had answered his demand for a Congress by threatening war and domestic insurrection. The architect of the North German Confederation won over his own Diet

The North German Confederation.

by his success and the south German States by revealing Napoleon's demands for compensation. At a cost of less than 4,000 lives and less than £3,000,000, Prussia had driven Austria from Germany, secured Hanover and Schleswig-Holstein for herself, and won an overwhelming preponderance in a league which left little more than Baden, Bavaria and Würtemberg outside. The Treaty of Prague, signed with Austria in August, provided for free popular votes in the districts ceded,—the sole compliment paid to the efforts of Napoleon.

Next year, while Austria came to a working understanding with Hungary as an independent and allied kingdom, the main outlines of Bismarck's scheme for a North German Confederation were translated into fact. The new Germany, for it was hardly less than that, was so organized as to combine the maximum contentment of all its members with the firm establishment of Prussian power. The Prussian King was its hereditary chief and its supreme war-lord, the contingent of every constituent State being embodied in the Prussian army. Foreign policy also lay in his hand, and the Federal Chancellor was of his appointing. Coinage and customs dues, posts and telegraphs, law and communications were to be uniform throughout the Confederation. In the Federal Council, which alone could propose new laws, Prussia had only seventeen members out of forty-three, while the Diet was chosen by universal suffrage, one member being assigned to every 100,000 souls. For the extension of the area of the Confederation and the development of its internal powers, Bismarck wisely trusted to the future. He had already concluded treaties of alliance with the southern German States, on whose armies, modelled on the Prussian system, he counted for his projected war with France.

While Prussia and Italy thus profited by their victory, and Austria by her defeat, Napoleon was seeking feverishly to conciliate his capital by some renewal of the national prestige. In January, 1867, he moved further towards the ideal of a Liberal Empire, extending the rights of the Deputies, but retaining Rouher, his reactionary minister of state. Disappointed of

Embarrassment of Napoleon.

Belgium, he next accepted a Dutch offer to sell Luxemburg. Prussia, however, interposed, and a London Conference neutralized the duchy under the guarantee of the Powers. Such prestige as a brilliant Exhibition may secure was clouded at the close of June by the news that Maximilian of Mexico had been put to death. Prussia declined to discuss with him the promised vote in Schleswig-Holstein. Turning to the Clericals for fresh support, he won a facile but fatal success. In November, the French defeated Garibaldi at Mentana and maintained the Pope in Rome. This violation of Nationality proved the Emperor's ostentatious Liberalism false and strengthened the Republican Opposition. It further made an Italian alliance impossible, thus frustrating a league of Austria, Italy and France to check the military preponderance of Prussia.

War between France and the Confederation was now widely recognized as only a question of time. Bismarck overrating, as he afterwards confessed, the military power of France, was determined to wait until the contingents of Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein and Hesse were brought up to the Prussian level, and until at the chosen moment France could be made the aggressor. Napoleon, ageing and tortured by disease, was fighting a doubtful battle for his dynasty against the rising Republican and Socialistic tide in France. The pacificism of the Opposition frustrated the Prussianizing of the army, while the decree of Papal Infallibility of 1869 augmented the perplexities of a Liberal Emperor compelled to lean upon a Gallican church and to protect an absolute Pope.

The elections of May, 1869, gave the Government a majority of less than 1,100,000 votes, while in Paris it was defeated by more than three to one. Napoleon attempted to remove the implied distrust by the grant of institutions resembling the English Parliament but without real ministerial responsibility. As a constitutional sovereign he turned from Rouher to Ollivier, a disinterested Republican, who, early in 1870, vainly proposed to Bismarck to disarm. In May, however, France approved of the new institutions by nearly five to

one. The Empire seemed secure, and war far distant; though the appointment of the Duc de Gramont to the Foreign Office led to conversations with Austria and a concerted plan of campaign.

Early in July, however, the Spanish question took a threatening turn. Since the days of Dom Miguel and the Carlists, the Peninsula had been the scene of constant agitation. In 1868, Queen Isabella, a friend of France, had been driven from her throne, which was offered by the King-maker, Marshal Prim, to Leopold, a Catholic Hohenzollern. In the resolve of France never to endure Prussian monarchy on both her flanks Bismarck perceived his opportunity. France, indeed, gained a diplomatic victory, for in face of her protests the father of Prince Leopold decided to withdraw the candidature of his son.

The Spanish Succession Question.

During the crisis, however, both French and Germans had been skilfully excited, and Bismarck's opportunity was not lost by the extinction of its cause. By threatening resignation, he could control the King, who had no reason for expecting war, while German opinion responded to his adroit manipulation of the Press. In France, Emperor and Minister were for peace, but for its own future the dynasty must stand for the national honour, which demanded some concession from Prussia or else war. France therefore pressed the King to guarantee that the Hohenzollern candidature should never be resumed. The reply was a courteous but firm refusal, based on a fine distinction between the affairs of the royal family and those of the Prussian State. As telegraphed to Bismarck, this seemed to him and to the army leaders with him to extinguish hope of war. By garbling the telegram, however, and publishing it throughout Europe, he produced the calculated explosion. On the evening of July 13, crowds in Berlin were clamouring to be led to Paris, and the King's telegram which reached Paris next day made war certain. England vainly strove to quell the storm. A few days sufficed to range all Germany on the side of Prussia, and to enable Bismarck, skilfully mixing forgery and fact,

to present France to the world as guilty of unprovoked aggression.

Germany against Franco.

Bismarck knew well that his master now disposed of twice the military power with which Austria and her associates had been struck down, and that war with France had been thought out for thirty years. He understood far better than any other statesman the diplomatic isolation of his foe. Austria, though favourable to Napoleon, would be impeded by the apathy of Hungary; Italy, by the French connection with the Pope; Britain, by her interest in severing France from Belgium; Denmark, by the influence of the Tsar; Russia, by dynastic ties with Prussia, by their common interests in Poland, and by hope of recovering freedom to make warlike use of the Black Sea. In the Crimea, Italy and Mexico, France had proved that she had not kept pace with Germany in the study of war, and that against Moltke victories that might win her allies were unthinkable.

Morality apart, Bismarck therefore risked but little in his stroke for German unity and power. He struck with a speed and a success which convinced Europe for nearly half a century that the new Germany was irresistible. The French effort, directed by a wavering invalid, to cross the Rhine and rouse allies died away in the first days of August, and an unbroken series of defeats showed France powerless to repel invasion. The prestige of the dynasty forbade Napoleon to quit the front until, on September 2, he capitulated with his army at Sedan. Since Bazaine, now commander-in-chief, was hopelessly blockaded in Metz, a month's fighting had destroyed the French armies, and Bismarck would gladly have made peace.

With a wise instinct, however, the French preferred to proclaim a Republic and to improvise a war of self-defence. Their courage and sacrifice made a national *renaissance* possible and averted further revolution. Inspired by Gambetta and his fellow-pacifists, France defied the German rule of terror and proved Moltke's calculations false. Strassburg, Metz, Orleans, Dijon, Amiens fell, combat after combat was

lost, but the valour of the French was undeniable, and Paris, besieged since September 20, maintained a brave defence. The Germans, however, were treating Alsace and German-speaking Lorraine as their own ; Italy had annexed the Pope's dominions ; Russia denounced the provisions of 1856 regarding the Black Sea ; and Thiers failed by personal solicitation to win help from any foreign Power.

The German Empire.

The completion of the German triumph, therefore, was postponed only until the first days of the new year. At Versailles, on January 18, 1871, Bismarck, as the new Imperial Chancellor, proclaimed his master German Emperor. Their common victory over France had brought the kings and princes to acclaim the expansion of the North German Confederation into a hereditary empire under Prussia. Ten days later, at the approach of actual starvation, Paris fell. A National Assembly at Bordeaux established Thiers in power, but his desperate bargaining with Bismarck could not avert the sacrifice of Alsace excepting Belfort, of eastern Lorraine with Metz, and of 5,000,000,000 francs payable within four years.

The Commune.

With a four years' occupation of France in prospect, the German forces looked on while the revolutionaries and socialists of the capital rose in the insurrection of the Commune. The definite treaty had been signed at Frankfort before Paris, more severely scarred than by the Germans, capitulated to the French.

§ 5. *Bismarck and Europe*, 1871–1878

France, which had often defied vast coalitions, had thus collapsed before a single Power. Small as had been the time and sacrifice demanded, her conquest had sufficed to change the general structure of Europe. In France, the Republic, precarious for several years, gradually gathered strength, while in Germany Particularism slowly gave place to unity. Austria accepted the verdict of 1866, and turned from Italy and Germany towards the Balkans. Russia, sanctioned by Europe in her revolt for freedom in the Black Sea, resumed

her designs against the Turkish empire. Italy, with Rome as her capital, sought to become the sixth Great Power of Europe. With England the interests of her world-wide empire became more and more predominant, and a stable and peaceful Europe the great desideratum.

Bismarck, harnessing the force of German nationality to the car of Prussia, safeguarded order by establishing a strong central Power where weakness had formerly tempted attack, and for more than forty years only small wars arising from the Eastern question disturbed the peace of Europe. "There is no balance of power in Europe," the third German Emperor could not unjustly claim, "except me and my twenty-five *corps*." Under the hegemony of a Germany ever increasing in numbers, wealth and force, Europe as a whole followed the lead of England in dominating and westernizing the outer world. Aided by invention after invention, industry and commerce grew beyond all earlier dreams, and with them Socialism among the newly created millions and armaments among the mutually suspicious States.

Transformation of Europe.

From the Peace of Frankfort to his fall in 1890, Bismarck remained the arbiter of Europe. Bred in a feeble Prussia, he perhaps never fully realized the tremendous power of the Germany which he had rendered one. His policy was largely based on fear. To the eastward lay a gigantic State which, despite all common interests and carefully cultivated dynastic friendships, inherited the ancient feud between the Teuton and the Slav. Russia long remained a Power which could threaten Germany, while her own backwardness and distances protected her from equal harm. She must therefore be propitiated with unfailing care, but Germany could not be suffered to rely upon a Power to which she herself could never be indispensable. Russian expansion in Asia, where she would encounter England, would best suit German plans. France, thanks to the cessions which the military men would not forego, must be reckoned permanently hostile. She must, therefore, be kept from finding any sincere ally. Bismarck encouraged her

Bismarck's System.

to become an unstable Republic surrounded by monarchies and to engage in colonial rivalry with England.

Austria was by nature Russia's rival. If hostile to Germany, she was a dangerous neighbour; if friendly, then for reasons of race and trade, her safest and most serviceable ally. Could Italy be won, her alliance would remove a source of Austrian weakness and assist in the control of France. With a purely Continental Germany in mind, Bismarck devoted his amazing fertility of resource and diplomatic skill to the achievement of these aims, and seldom without success. He administered a State which in 1871 surpassed France by five million souls and which increased its superiority every year, while England could always be relied on to oppose at least her influence to any war of mere revenge.

In 1872, when the British acceptance of the *Alabama* verdict formed a triumph for arbitration, the new German Empire succeeded in establishing a friendly understanding with Austria and with Russia. The so-called League of the Three Emperors, an *entente* dating from their meeting in September, gave an impressive sanction to the Europe refashioned by Bismarck. To all appearance, a new Holy Alliance had arisen, directed from Berlin.

League of the Three Emperors.

No one could suppose, however, that Austria would forget in a moment the humiliation of 1866, nor Russia her virtual displacement from the hegemony of Continental Europe, while within the new Empire the aggrandizement of Prussia and the triumph of centralization roused discontent and even opposition. The adherents of an infallible Papacy, moreover, could not whole-heartedly rejoice at the overthrow of two Catholic Empires by a predominantly Protestant State, while the Tsar, assailed for his treatment of the Polish Catholics, would welcome an attack on Rome.

Opposition in Germany.

From 1873, therefore, Bismarck was for several years engaged in a struggle with the Catholic party, which opposed the unrestricted triumph of the State, favoured monarchy in France and viewed anti-papal Italy with detestation.

Penal laws against the Orders and the ecclesiastical authorities, however, failed to break the resistance of the Catholics, who massed behind the Centre party in the Diet a full third of the German people. In 1875, while this so-called *Kulturkampf* was at its height, a sudden threat by Germany to a France which was recovering too swiftly from the war brought evidence that neither Russia nor England would countenance her further spoliation. Disraeli, Premier since 1874, did not shrink from the task of bridling the new Bonaparte, and struck at one of the pillars of his policy by an approach to Russia.

With a Europe thus by no means wholly tractable, with German Catholics mutinous and Socialism progressing, with Poles, Guelfs, Schleswig Danes and Alsatians irreconcilable, with vast necessities of economic, political and legal change before Germany could be really one, Bismarck had every reason for temporary sincerity when he described his country as a satiated State. Consolidation and security rather than expansion must be his policy for many years, and he turned his back upon temptation whether in the Near East or across the sea. In 1876, he refused to promise to stand neutral while Russia conquered Austria, and Russia declined his offer of a free hand in the Balkans at the price of guaranteeing Alsace and Lorraine.

In 1878, therefore, Germany abstained from intervention in the Eastern question, although in recognition of her prestige the Congress for its settlement assembled at Berlin. Within twenty years of the rescue of the Turk in the Crimea, he had again been on the verge of overthrow by Russia. In 1875 his subjects in Herzegovina rebelled. Lack of Turkish force allowed the movement to spread to Bosnia. Next year, Serbia and Montenegro threatened war. The Bulgarians round Philippopolis slaughtered their officials, and at midsummer London received horrible accounts of systematic massacres by way of revenge. While Gladstone demanded the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, they restored their authority and declined to reduce its sphere. An irresistible

Russia against Turkey.

wave of sympathy with her co-religionists swept through Russia. Austria secretly promised her neutrality, and Roumania, her alliance, and in April, 1877, Russia declared war.

In nine weeks, it had been calculated, the Russians could reach Constantinople. The defence of Plevna, however, made the time ten months, and meanwhile policy had prevailed over sentiment in England. That no Russian army should freely march through Syria to Suez was accepted as a British interest requiring the integrity of Turkey. In February, 1878, therefore, Disraeli dispatched the fleet, and the Treaty of San Stefano between the Tsar and Sultan was met by threats of war.

The Treaty, indeed, replaced European Turkey by a congeries of small States which would bring Russian influence to the gates of Adrianople. Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro were to become independent; Bulgaria, virtually a large protectorate of Russia; Bosnia and Herzegovina, autonomous dependencies; while the Dobrudscha together with Kars and Batoum and £45,000,000 were to be ceded to Roumania and Russia, the Dobrudscha as the price of Bessarabia. Against a peace so grasping Austria joined with England; 7,000 Indian troops were brought to Malta; and, by the end of May, Russia had consented to the arbitrament of a Congress at Berlin.

The Congress owed its existence to the will of a single statesman, Disraeli, and met primarily to deal with a single problem, Bulgaria. In assigning to the half-savage Bulgars a territory stretching from the Danube to the Ægean and to the borders of Albania, Russia had clearly indicated her confidence that the ruling hand would be her own. By threatening war, England succeeded in retaining the line of the Balkans as the military frontier of the Turk. Concessions had indeed to be made to the victors in a stubborn war, but Russia was kept far from her goal, the Mediterranean, and the collective authority of the Powers over the Eastern question was again asserted. Russia gained Bessarabia, Kars and Batoum;

The Berlin Congress.

Austria occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina; a much diminished Bulgaria moved towards independence; and England, resolved to fortify herself in the eastern Mediterranean while respecting in Syria and Egypt the susceptibilities of France, received Cyprus from the Turk. Thus while the Balkan States had made some progress, Turkey in Europe survived, and England had again successfully stemmed the advance of Russia.

§ 6. *Bismarck and Europe*, 1879–1890

The Russians, protesting that they had spent 100,000 men and £100,000,000 on an illusion, visited their resentment upon Bismarck, whose presidency had falsified their hopes. The *entente* of the Three Emperors became a memory when the Tsar threatened William I with war and his ministers contemplated joining hands with France. In 1879, therefore, Bismarck negotiated for a defensive alliance with Austria, and forced his master to concur. Both Powers stood pledged to uphold the Berlin settlement, and to assist each other if attacked by Russia. The alliance won general approval and lasted as long as the Austrian State. Its immediate effect was to lower the tone of Russia.

In March, 1881, the Tsar, surnamed the Liberator, but for more than half his reign a patron of reaction, was murdered in his capital, and a bitter foe of German influence succeeded to his throne. Anti-Germanism in Russia, however, has often been directed against the German ruling class in Baltic Russia or around the Tsar, while sparing the German Empire. Alexander III rather helped than hindered the new *entente* with Germany and Austria which Bismarck was now attempting to create, and in June the Three Emperors bound themselves to common action in the Balkans. Their league expressly contemplated the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria, and a Bulgaria whose southern frontier should approach Adrianople. This triumph of Bismarck's efforts to fortify Germany and to ensure peace was followed by solemn engagements with Serbia and with Italy. Men-

aced by Russian patronage of the Bulgars, her hereditary foes, Serbia accepted Austrian control in foreign policy, being promised freedom to extend her frontier southward, and, like Roumania, to assume the status of a kingdom.

Italy at the same time was impelled to take a step which modified the European system. Encouraged by Germany and England, the French had in 1881 established a protectorate over Tunis—a proceeding which the northern neighbour of their new possession was certain to resent. In May, 1882, therefore, she joined Germany and Austria in a secret Triple Alliance for mutual defence against aggression.

The Triple Alliance.

For some years Bismarck's well-buttressed edifice of peace in Europe proved stable. It gained strength from a secret alliance for defence between Austria and the Hohenzollern ruler of Roumania (1883), a compact which associated the Triple Alliance with a considerable non-Slav State. Next year, the secret league of the Three Emperors was prolonged. Since 1882, France had been affronted by the British occupation of Egypt, while England and Russia found an Asiatic Egypt in the mountains of Afghanistan. Turkey was looking to Germany to reform her army ; in France the Ferry ministry of 1883–5 was friendly to Berlin ; England, fearful lest Germany should in Egypt or in Asia support her rival, accepted her colonial expansion ; a Conference on the Congo question assembled at Berlin. Bismarck had mastered Europe by diplomacy as completely as ever Napoleon by war.

Europe under Bismarck.

In 1885, however, a disturbance in the Balkans again imperilled European peace. During September, the Battenberg ruler of Bulgaria was swept into a revolutionary movement for union with the southern Bulgar lands. Russia, which now saw in Bulgaria an obstacle rather than a tool, sternly condemned his action, but England broke up the hostile concert of the Powers. The new State vindicated its existence by triumphantly repelling a Serbian invasion, and by compelling Austria to shield her protégé.

Bulgaria.

The Battenberg prince, none the less, dared not persist in his defiance of the Tsar, who in 1886 drove him from his throne and prepared to occupy the country.

All the Great Powers save France had joined in forcing Greece to refrain from war, and all save England had acquiesced in the Tsar's declaration that the port of Batoum was no longer to be considered free. Austria, however, now broke loose from Germany to challenge Russia, and the Russian Nationalists cried out for an approach to France. The danger of explosion was the greater that a fiery charlatan, General Boulanger, had captured the imagination of Paris. But England supported Germany; Boulanger menaced the Republic and fell from power; in Russia the peace party won the Tsar; and, in 1887, a secret "treaty of reinsurance" between Germany and Russia replaced the moribund league.

The "Reinsurance" Treaty.

Germany now stood pledged to neutrality if Austria should attack Russia, and to an *entente* with Russia in the Balkans, thus purchasing the neutrality of Russia, if herself attacked by France. At the same time a network of agreements linked England and the partners in the Triple Alliance in an association for maintaining the existing state of Europe. In Mediterranean questions this received the co-partnership of Spain. Russia and Austria remained on the brink of war, but Germany armed and argued, and the fatal plunge was averted. In defiance of Russia, Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, a grandson of Louis Philippe, remained the elected ruler of Bulgaria, and Austria thus gained a new ally.

Basing his system on true facts and sound reason, and applying it with incomparable skill, Bismarck had kept peace between the Powers for seventeen years. The task, however, became steadily more severe. He was aided, indeed, by the fact that, copying the German model, the nations of the Continent were creating national armies too precious to be used saved for their vital needs. The prestige of the German army and of the British fleet also prevented peace from being lightly broken, while the dualism of Austria-Hungary acted as a check upon

European Development.

adventure. But in France and Russia nationalism had gained ground; Italy, with unquenched ambitions, was now the Great Power of the Mediterranean; the Eastern question had found no true solution; and the growth of mankind in power and numbers was causing the problems of Europe to be engulfed in the wider problems of the world.

§ 7. *The Dual Alliance*, 1890–1898

The German nation, vastly more active, rich and numerous than at its union, naturally aspired to become a great world-power. In William II an Emperor succeeded who proposed to gratify its aspiration, and to whom it was naturally repugnant that a minister should be the real steersman of the State. Undeterred by the obvious gravitation of France towards Russia, he light-heartedly drove Bismarck out of office, and the German people raised no protest when their idol was thus overthrown. Power passed from one firm hand into the hands of various men and groups, with the Emperor sharing in the leadership and sometimes complicating policy by indiscretions. Desiring peace, and believing that its best foundation was an invincible German army, regarding himself as the divinely-appointed leader of a chosen people, he lent the sanction of his name and power to schemes which were individually possible of attainment but collectively dangerous in the extreme, and the cautious work of Bismarck was gradually undone. In 1890 the Emperor and Caprivi allowed the Reinsurance Treaty to expire.

William II.

So long as Germany remained predominantly a continental Power, England naturally turned to her for support against her imperial rivals France and Russia. The German colonies, moreover, welcomed foreign merchants, while the French followed their ancient practice of restriction. Court and racial relationships also influenced policy, prompting England towards an *entente* with Germany, and, more than once, to overtures for an alliance.

Germany, indeed, had no desire to run the risk of a war on

land with Russia for the furtherance of English policy overseas, but she gladly accepted English help in her colonial expansion in return for diplomatic service. In 1890 she purchased Heligoland, the key of the Elbe and of the projected Kiel Canal, but a tiny island, at the price of an African concession so vast as to suggest complicity with England and to drive Russia into the arms of France. Military conversations between the two States were followed in 1891 by a close diplomatic accord, and by the close of 1893 the Dual Alliance was in being. Its avowed object was to maintain the European equilibrium which the union of Austria, Germany, and Italy had jeopardized, and its chief provision bound France and Russia in case of war to combat Germany with more than two million men, her first line then numbering less than 550,000.

Germany and England.

Russia had been slow in concluding an alliance which was passionately desired by France. The Tsar had little sympathy with a changeable Republic, whose citizens were in the main adherents of the Pope or hostile to religion. Germany, however, appeared to be supporting England and courting the favour of the Poles, while she showed sympathy with the Lutherans and Jews whom Russian Nationalism had attacked. Bismarck, moreover, had closed the money-market of Berlin to Russian loans, and an alliance would open that of Paris. The German Emperor seemed highly Anglophil, and his growing influence at Constantinople was ominous for Russian aspirations.

The Dual Alliance.

The alliance, moreover, contained no hint of an attack on the existing order, and might be interpreted by Russia as enabling her to restrain the aggressiveness of France. In 1900, when the Tsar gave to his ally a map on which her frontier was traced in diamonds, it was remarked that that frontier excluded Alsace and Lorraine. German diplomatists at St. Petersburg continued to use the tone of affectionate familiarity which expressed the traditional relations between the Hohenzollerns and their Romanov kinsmen. In 1894, a war of tariffs between the two countries was ended, and

German trade with Russia grew greater year by year. In 1895, both countries joined with France in preserving the integrity of China after her disastrous struggle with Japan.

Between the chief Powers, war after war was averted by diplomatic means. With the growth of wealth, population and communications, "incidents" in all parts of the world kept Europe in a state of fear, while the vast advance of Germany and the internal discord of Russia threatened to disturb the newly-established balance of power. The Dreyfus case in France (1894) pointed to corruption in the army and Clerical intrigue; the Jameson raid into the Transvaal (1895) threw doubts on the uprightness of the British colonial administration; massacre after massacre in Armenia incriminated the Turk; a violent Presidential message regarding Venezuela brought England and the United States within sight of war (1896), at a time when England and France were escaping from a perilous dispute regarding Siam.

Peace Preserved.

Europe, however, passed safely each successive crisis, and in 1897 proved in an Eastern question that her Concert still survived. The long-standing feud between Moslems and Christians in Crete had brought forth massacre and civil war until the Powers stepped in. Although Germany and England favoured different solutions, the Sultan was forced to grant autonomy, and the Cretans to refrain from union with Greece. A Greek attack upon Turkey, moreover, was prevented by the Powers from resulting in the dismemberment of Greece, while Austria and Russia created an *entente* which promised to prevent an upheaval in the Balkans. Their concord was the more welcome that Bulgaria had recently abandoned Austria for Russia, the Roman Catholic Ferdinand accepting Greek baptism for his infant heir.

§ 8. *The Changes of* 1898–1905

The following year, 1898, proved epoch-making for the structure of the society of nations and for the fortunes of the

leading States. Owing to their interest in Cuba, the United States, for the first time since their independence, waged war against a continental Power. Their easy triumph over Spain resulted in their retention, for a time at least, of dominion over Cuba and the Philippines, while England, it was held, had frustrated European intervention. A new Great Power had thus entered the sphere of world politics, and that with a novel friendliness towards its mother-country.

The United States against Spain.

While the war continued, the Tsar, Nicholas II, issued a rescript to the world denouncing the intolerable weight of armaments, and inviting a Peace Congress to consider measures of relief. The world, indeed, was ever discovering new points of conflict. China seemed to be succeeding Africa as a subject of competitive partition, and in this very year Russia, France and England seized upon Chinese naval stations under cover of a ninety-nine years' lease. At the same time the English conquest of the Sudan provoked France to appear in the valley of the Upper Nile, and the meeting of Kitchener and Marchand at Fashoda filled their two countries with thoughts of war. Germany, meanwhile, was fast developing those schemes of development in the Near East which were to link Bagdad with Berlin, to make the Sultan in effect her vassal, and William II the protector of the Moslem world. This ideal, thwarting several vital interests of Russia, was pursued side by side with that of a strong fighting fleet, which could not fail to give alarm to England.

The Hague Conference.

In 1899, moreover, when the First Peace Conference assembled at the Hague, Germany frustrated its purpose by almost scornfully refusing to disarm. The creation of a standing court of arbitration promised but a scanty solace to the millions who must spend the best years of their youth in barracks, or to the burdened taxpayers of Europe. Something had been gained, however, by the mere conjunction of twenty-eight nations to discuss their common welfare, and pacifists could argue that unrestricted armaments must prove so costly that no

The Boer War.

great people would complete its financial ruin by a war. In the autumn, none the less, the world was shocked to see England in arms against two Boer republics in South Africa, and the surprise changed into delighted amazement when her forces suffered a succession of defeats. The war was interpreted as a wanton attack upon small free nations by the greatest empire in the world for the sake of their mineral wealth, and when, early in 1900, the crime appeared to be successful, hatred of England reached its highest point. Her sea-power, however, rendered intervention hopeless, and although the struggle was prolonged until 1902, the States of Europe gave the Boers no help.

The revelation of her military weakness and moral isolation had left on the mind of England impressions which the rally of her colonies to her assistance could not efface. Her empire, indeed, was more splendid than ever before, and the envy of other nations was tempered by their freedom to trade within its confines, and by their perception that it was in no sense armed for conquest. In imperial expansion, however, as in industry and commerce, her old monopoly had passed away. Russia, France, the United States, Germany and Japan had become formidable rivals whose rate of progress had in several cases surpassed her own. In Asia, notably, the completion of the trans-Siberian railway marked an immense advance for Russia. Rich, scattered and detested, England would court attack if she persistently remained in isolation. At the dawn of the twentieth century, therefore, she resolved to seek allies.

Isolation of England.

The conditions of her quest were far from adverse. The weakness of her army and the instability of her policy due to party victories and defeats were both lessened for the time being by the war, and in the new king, Edward VII, she possessed a unique ambassador and adviser. The Continent continued to be divided between two clear-cut groups, and her influence over Italy would enhance the value of her association with either. Russia, however, she regarded as an alien tyranny

English Overtures to Germany.

bent on conquering India; Germany, as a kindred people, competitive indeed, but not antagonistic. That *entente* between England, Germany, and the United States which Cecil Rhodes bequeathed a fortune to promote might well seem the most hopeful guarantee of that world-peace which a satiated State desired.

In 1901, Chamberlain made overtures to Germany, but without success. A decision which eventually brought down three empires owed much to Bismarck's *Thoughts and Recollections*, advocating an *entente* with Russia, and to the calculation of a purblind Foreign Office potentate, Von Holstein, that Chamberlain's talk of turning to the enemy was bluff. England had the reputation of making cat's paws of continental Powers, and Germany felt within herself the energy for a far higher function in the world. Only the year before, she had led the armed forces of civilization to Peking, and Von Tirpitz counted on giving her a navy which could match with that of Britain.

History, however, swiftly proved the German reasoning fallacious. Russia, robbed of liberty and impoverished by the tsardom, turned in despair to strikes, assassinations and massacres of the Jews. England in 1902 revealed herself as the ally of Japan. Early in 1904, the value of the alliance became apparent, for Japan, secured against naval intervention, dared to make war on Russia. As the year wore on, Europe was astounded by her unvarying success on land and sea, while Germans refused at first to credit the *entente* of Russia's ally with England. The labours of British friends of France, of whom the foremost was the King, had, none the less, succeeded in changing the recent hatred into a feeling which permitted a political *rapprochement*. Following on a similar agreement between France and Italy, the two countries smoothed away their differences in all parts of the globe. England received a free hand in Egypt; France, in Morocco; and after nearly two centuries of disputation, the French fishing-rights in Newfoundland were defined.

England, Japan and France.

In 1905, when the Japanese victory over Russia was

complete, and the tsardom tottered on the brink of revolution, Germany felt free to test the value of the new *entente*. The ground chosen was Morocco, where she might contend that her economic interests were endangered by the forward policy of France and Spain. The method was an ostentatious visit of the Emperor to Tangier, plain threats of war, and demands, which proved successful, for a Conference of the Powers and for the dismissal of the Foreign Minister Delcassé. Among the earliest results of the German action was the inauguration of military conversations between France and England, remembering 1870.

The Morocco Question.

While war thus threatened in the West, much that was hopeful for the future had occurred elsewhere. The United States, in the person of President Roosevelt, had secured by mediation both the assent of France and Germany to a conference, and a treaty of peace between Russia and Japan. Sweden, far stronger than Norway in the field, but respecting the unanimity of a people, had consented to the dissolution of their union, and a Danish prince had been elected king. The Tsar, faced with revolution, had endowed Russia with a constitution, and had restored the liberties of Finland. The Sultan had been forced by naval pressure from the Powers to allow some check upon the chronic disturbances in Macedonia. In England, a change of ministry had entrusted foreign affairs to Sir Edward Grey, a statesman upon whose integrity and goodwill towards Europe all Powers became accustomed to rely.

European Progress.

§ 9. *The Triple Entente*, 1906–1908

In 1906, the Moroccan Conference met at Algeciras and proved conclusively the strength of the *Entente*. France and Spain continued to police Morocco, but only as the mandatories of the Powers. The danger of a German naval base on the Atlantic was thus averted, and peace maintained by diplomatic means. Although the Triple Alliance had brought Germany a less active support than that which France had

received from her associates, she could claim to have vindicated in Morocco the independence of the Sultan and the principle of the open door.

The Algeciras Conference, none the less, had as its most conspicuous result a check to Germany inflicted by the hand of England. However unreliable, the rumour that she had promised France to land 100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein, could not fail to encourage the French people and to exasperate the German. To the Berlin government, the British attitude was the more ominous that, for the first time for twenty years, a strong Liberal ministry had now been placed in power. In 1906, moreover, the assembling of an Imperial Conference and the grant of full colonial freedom to the Boers suggested the triumph of British policy in a region where German methods had conspicuously failed. Distrusting every Power save such as she could dominate, but increasing every year in wealth and population, Germany replied by multiplying more and more her armaments and propaganda. While the Government demanded a strong navy to secure respect, and an enormous army for defence, Germans everywhere were proclaiming their country invincible in peace or war. Commerce and politics, they declared, could no longer be divided. England and Russia found themselves confronted with the prospect of a veiled protectorate of Turkey, threatening by means of railways to hold Egypt and Persia at its mercy, and perhaps to dominate south-western Asia and Mohammedans throughout the world.

German Activities.

To German statesmen the shock was great when, in 1907, the cleavage between England and Russia seemed suddenly to have been closed. The fidelity of the army had preserved the tsardom from being submerged by the revolution, but the detested and ruinous struggle with Japan had checked the forward policy in Asia. British statecraft favoured an approach to a defeated rival when both Powers were threatened by a third, and in August, 1907, gave Russia a free hand in northern Persia in return for security for India. The integrity of Persia was to be

England and Russia.

preserved, and the south-east to remain under the exclusive influence of England.

Two years earlier, the Tsar had given his signature, soon afterwards recalled, to a compact binding Russia to Germany. Now Russia, France and England were members of a Triple *Entente* which was closely connected with Japan. If internal changes in the Powers were disregarded, it would appear that five years' diplomacy had brought about a European revolution, and that the future for German hegemony was dark. Attack, however, on a country armed to the teeth and notoriously unsurpassed in war, was inconceivable. England, by continental standards, had no army; Russia had received her quietus for many years; France had welcomed the Russian alliance with an enthusiasm that told of the intensity of her fears. In 1907, at the Hague, when the Republics of Latin America were received by the European Powers as equals, Germany scouted all proposals for disarmament. Contempt for the military power of the *Entente* was plainly visible in the action of Germany and her chief ally in the momentous summer of 1908.

In July, 1908, the Young Turk conspirators secured sufficient support within the Turkish army to force the Sultan to grant a constitution. Turkey, it seemed, had at last reformed herself on western lines, and all pretext for interference by the Powers had vanished. For a moment, the mainstay of German influence over Turkey was thought also to have perished with the Sultan's power. Early in October, however, Austria, now swayed by Baron Aehrenthal, announced that she had annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in defiance of the Treaty of Berlin, while Ferdinand of Bulgaria proclaimed his independence.

Austria and the Slavs.

These insults to the Concert of the Powers were condemned by England for their lawlessness, and by Russia, for their treachery towards herself. Turkish and Italian public opinion was inflamed. To Serbia, since 1903 Russia's client, they spelt the ruin of her hopes and the grave peril of her independence. Austria

Russian Defeat.

would now rule a majority of the Serbian race, and, with Bulgaria, might at any time encompass her destruction. She dared to arm, but Russia was too weak to risk a war. Austria, with the support of Germany, refused a Congress, and, rather than provoke a general conflict, the *Entente* persuaded Serbia to submit. The breach of the Berlin Treaty was condoned by the signatory Powers, but nothing could disguise the victory of armaments over law. Germany could still regard herself as the mistress of the Continent, while her ally appeared as a renascent State. The tsardom, and the Slavonic cause in general, had suffered a humiliation comparable with that inflicted by Japan.

§ 10. *England and the German Peril*, 1908–1914

To England, whose new Premier, Asquith, was an Imperialist Liberal, the events of 1908 were doubly unwelcome as proving the existing order insecure. This she strove to fortify by numerous agreements, attempting a kind of Pragmatic Sanction for the established world. Japan was by this time pledged to defend India; Russia, the Middle East; France, the Mediterranean; and in 1908 the riparian States guaranteed their respective holdings on the North Sea coasts. Without a pause in German naval armament, however, she could not feel secure, and her long endeavours to obtain it had only produced acceleration. Her Government, intent on costly social reforms on German models, was forced by public opinion to face the cost of additional *Dreadnoughts*, and, year after year, the odds in a naval war with Germany became a theme of unceasing public calculation. Germans declared that their fleet was necessary for the protection of their commerce and for the increase of their diplomatic influence, and that no one dreamed of rivalling England on the sea. As time went on, however, Britons could not refrain from asking why in that case the ships were built rather for strength than speed, and in such numbers as to necessitate recourse to loans and to force England to accelerate her own construction. A generation which had seen Japan create a fleet with borrowed money for immediate

use, and which had not forgotten how the German Empire had come into being, could not feel entirely safe, and the German menace contributed not a little to preserve the Triple *Entente* and to unite the British Empire.

In 1909, indeed, France and Germany agreed to co-operate in Morocco, and in 1910 the Russian and German Emperors met at Potsdam, and came to terms with regard to railways in northern Persia and towards Bagdad. This breach in that hostile encirclement of which Germany complained was amply repaired next year, when a furious quarrel raged about Morocco. Since the Algeciras Conference, the policy of Germany towards Morocco had been tortuous and obscure, while France, with the right to be seconded by England, had moved in the direction of a protectorate. Now Germany suddenly declared that the Act of Algeciras had lost its force, and that she had sent a gunboat to protect her nationals at Agadir.

The Morocco Question.

To the British Government, this resort to force, suggesting a German port or province in Morocco, seemed to thrust all domestic difficulties into the background, and to call for instant readiness for war. As the gunboat remained, and Germany demanded huge cessions in equatorial Africa as the price of its withdrawal, Lloyd George, who could not be suspected of imperialism, asserted in a public speech the resolve of England not to be disregarded. Germany deeply resented the challenge but immediately abated her demands, and a financial panic warned her that her people dreaded war. After four months of almost daily debate with France, she yielded Morocco in return for cessions on the Congo. Italy had taken advantage of the crisis to seize Tripoli, but Russia, as in 1908, failed to obtain from Turkey the right to send warships through the Straits.

The crisis of 1911 had proved that, with the support of England, France could negotiate with Germany on equal terms. Deeply resentful, the German people accepted a new Navy Law, which added a third squadron, always in commission, to the High Seas fleet. Faced with the prospect of being forced within

The German Navy.

a few years to provide seventy *Dreadnoughts* and 170,000 men, England sent Haldane to Berlin on a mission of conciliation. This failed to modify the Navy Law, but inaugurated a period in which the two Powers gave mutual information as to their construction and accepted 8 : 5 as the normal ratio between their fleets.

The persistent challenge to England, however, strengthened the opinion formed by many in 1906 or even earlier that Germany intended European war. It was to meet a danger, not to prepare an attack, that precautionary steps were taken by the threatened Powers. England concentrated her fleet in the North Sea; France, in the Mediterranean. Holland was induced to refrain from fortifying the Scheldt as heavily as Germany desired. Belgium, near whose frontier Germany constructed an enormous station for the detrainment of troops, concerted with the British War Office measures to meet invasion. Russia, which had refrained from making roads in Poland as the best answer to the German railway network on its border, resolved at the request of France to move her base of concentration so far forward as to be able to come swiftly into action. France, whose population remained almost stationary while the victors of 1870 gained almost a million every year, could only set against a vast increase of the German active army the wasteful expedient of a longer term. England, as slow to prepare for defence by land as she was swift by sea, did something to fill the ranks of Haldane's Territorials and to drill volunteers in the Universities and public schools. All this activity could be interpreted rightly as mere precaution or wrongly as preparation to attack.

Precautions against Germany.

In 1913, Germany resorted to a special war levy, designed to bring in £50,000,000. This coincided with the enlargement of the Kiel Canal so that her *Dreadnoughts* could pass in safety between the bay of Heligoland and the Baltic. France answered with a third year of service with the colours, and keen observers prophesied that 1914 would bring war.

The race in armaments, however, coincided with a series

of attempts at peaceful co-operation. After the tension of 1911, the two succeeding years were in western Europe almost calm. In the Balkans, on the other hand, Serbs and Bulgars, Greeks and Montenegrins had, with the sympathy of Russia, united for a common onslaught on the Turk. October, 1912, was filled with victories, and the Greeks outstripped the Bulgars in the race for Salonika. While the Bulgarian army failed to reach Constantinople, however, the Serbs marched through Albania, and their demand for an outlet on the Adriatic threatened to range the Triple Alliance against both them and the *Entente*. To France, the Balkan or any other war was unattractive, and the efforts of England, well seconded by Germany, prevented Austria and Russia from recourse to arms.

The Balkan Wars.

Under Enver Bey, however, the Turks insisted on continuing the struggle, and although they lost Adrianople and accepted a drastic partition, the mutual hatred of the victors brought them better terms. In June, 1913, a second Balkan war began with a Bulgarian attack upon the Serbs and Greeks. Roumania seized the opportunity of profit, and Adrianople was recovered by the Turks. Early in August, Bulgaria accepted a ruthless peace, excluding her from the Ægean and from the lower Danube.

Although Germany declined to act against Serbia, and encouraged the refusal of Roumania to submit the treaty to the Powers, she professed to regard the Balkan wars as a defeat of the Teutonic cause by Slavdom and as the prelude to a more dangerous attack. It was true that the geographical position of Serbia now hampered the Berlin to Bagdad scheme, and that Serbian racial aspirations conflicted with the rule of Austria over several millions of her subject Slavs. Whether dominated by cupidity or by fear, Germany raised the peace strength of her army by 170,000 men, levied £50,000,000 for defence, and sanctioned the plan by which a future war should begin by an attack on France through Belgium. England, she assumed, would send her Expeditionary Force, while Italy

The Position of Germany.

at the worst would stand aside. Even if Belgium defended her neutrality, the Germans counted on so swiftly overwhelming France as to win the war before any external force could intervene.

This not ill-founded confidence in their own preponderance in the field disposes of the hypothesis that they armed in fear, at least of an attack in the near future. As they were well aware, each of the Powers of the *Entente* was embarrassed with domestic difficulties which threatened seriously to reduce its strength. England continued to give concrete proofs of her desire to work with her in peaceful co-operation. It was possible, however, that the successor of the aged Francis Joseph would inherit neither his authority nor his goodwill, and that Russia, France and Belgium would all increase in military power.

German industry and commerce were experiencing something of a check; Russia was threatening to break her economic chains; the financial aspect of the Navy Law and army increase was unpleasing. A successful war would do for Germany in the world what Bismarck's wars had done for her in Europe, and if war came soon, she was confident that it would be successful. Three centuries of Hohenzollern history taught that empire came by vast armaments and sudden war. The German people had learned to regard itself as matchless in every sphere, and cool observers noted an ugly temper at Berlin.

In the first months of 1914, St. Petersburg appeared no less excited than Berlin. Russia, like Germany, felt herself hemmed in by hostile Powers, which denied her that commanding situation in the world which had once been hers and which she believed to be still her due. A German king ruled in Roumania; a German queen exercised great influence in Greece; Germany disposed of Austria and Turkey, and, it was believed, of Sweden; in the Middle and the Far East German rivals had appeared. The Russian press was no less violent than the German, and to the German increases of armaments Russia attempted to reply in kind. With England she initiated naval conversations

The Position of Russia.

on joint action in a German war, and the knowledge that a future danger was preparing might well influence the Germans to anticipate it by attack. France, on the other hand, took no step which was not clearly necessary for self-defence, while Grey continued to prove himself one of those rare statesmen whose chief motive is general goodwill. Agreements satisfying Germany in Africa and in the Middle East were prepared for signature, and the sole outstanding problem was the German naval threat.

§ 11. *The Great War*, 1914–1918

On June 28, 1914, the heir to the Austrian throne and his wife were murdered at Serajevo in Bosnia by Southern Slavs.

Austria and Serbs.

Austria elected to regard the crime as a proof that Serbia must be reduced to impotence, and this Berlin approved. Russia, it was well known, regarded Serbia as England regarded Belgium, but Berlin calculated that, as in 1909, she would accept defeat. On July 23, the Serbians were summoned to comply with demands annihilating their independence or to face war with Austria forty-eight hours later. The Austrian ultimatum was in reality addressed to Russia, since without Russian aid Serbia could not resist. It was answered by submission on every point except the claim of Austria to supervise the Serbian measures of repression. The Austrian minister immediately left Belgrade.

England, meanwhile, was labouring for mediation, but Germany declined to interfere. Austrian mobilization

Europe Involved.

brought on Russian, compelling Germany either to support or to restrain her ally. England, fettered by no agreement, but impelled by honour and interest to preserve Belgium and the northern coast of France, rallied all other Powers to the cause of settlement by negotiation. On the afternoon of July 31, however, Germany sent Russia an ultimatum which signified war next day, making at the same time demands on France which compelled her mobilization. It was impossible longer to conceal the fact that the German plan involved the coercion

of Belgium, and this, begun on August 4, at once decided England to interfere. Within eight days the Austrian threat to Serbia had thus involved five other Powers in war. Montenegro and Japan hastened to join in; Roumania and Italy remained neutral.

War widely Applauded.

The Armageddon long predicted but thrice at least escaped was accepted very differently by the peoples. In England, accustomed to look on at struggles overseas, its vastness was not promptly apprehended, but party divisions vanished as of old in presence of a danger to the State. The British Empire, too, held firm, India, Ireland, and a great majority of the Boers embracing the common cause. France faced the threat to her existence with courage and determination, while in Germany war was greeted with a joyous patriotic outburst which rivalled that of Vienna, when Serbia refused complete surrender. Russia was not behind the German Powers in general fervour. To the Slavs, the war was a crusade, the more attractive that it offered hopes of national regeneration and of freedom. The Central Powers counted on annexations along the Baltic, in the Balkans, beyond the Rhine and across the seas, while their hegemony would be restored in Europe and extended into Asia. Their opponents hoped to regain their lost provinces, to realize their racial aspirations, and, above all, to be freed from that menace to their independence which, since Bismarck's triumph, had continually increased.

Prospects of the War.

The war resembled, in a more populous and powerful world, those wars of one Power against a coalition to which Europe had been accustomed in the days of Louis XIV, Frederick and Napoleon. Germany, the directing and unifying force, could at first dispose of the resources of about 100,000,000 Europeans against populations more than twice as numerous and supported by their Colonies and by troops from Africa and Asia. The Allies, moreover, could draw material from every quarter of the globe, since they possessed a great preponderance at sea. Superiority in preparation and in military skill, the advantage of the inner lines and of fighting on foreign soil,

above all unity of control—these factors were in the aggressor's favour, and these she must use to snatch victory while her enemies were still untrained.

The German plan was thoroughly prepared, and came perilously near realization. Overwhelming Belgian resistance and the northern counter-offensive movements of the French, the German right drove the French left and the British Expeditionary Force before it, and attempted to envelop and destroy the whole French line. Five weeks from Austria's declaration against Serbia, the Belgian government had fled to Antwerp and the French to Bordeaux, while the Russian onslaught into Eastern Prussia had cost Russia one-fourth of all her armies in the field. Fearing for the *morale* of Berlin, however, the Germans had transferred troops from west to east, and by vacillating between two conceptions in the west, had fatally compromised their plan. "Make the right wing strong" had been its author's dying exclamation, but Moltke vainly attempted victory also on his left.

Failure of the German Plan.

Having checked the Germans in Lorraine, Joffre ceased to retreat before their right, and early in September drove them across the Marne. On the Aisne, however, they stood fast, placing Belgium and industrial northern France under a rule of terror, while in a prolonged and desperate battle the outnumbered British saved the Channel ports. Russia, meanwhile, aided by the disaffection of the Slavonic conscripts opposing her, was crushing the Austrian armies, and had even foiled a German thrust at Warsaw. The adhesion of Turkey to the Central Powers, however, while it inflamed her zeal, doomed her to dangerous isolation from her allies.

When the year 1914 ended, five months of warfare, costly beyond all precedent in blood and treasure, and waged in the air and beneath the water, as well as on land and sea, found two great hosts entrenched from the Swiss frontier to the Channel coast. They had proved that on land prepared defence could cope with heavy odds, that fortresses had largely lost their value, that disease no longer need be dreaded more than battle, and that nothing had yet imperilled British

supremacy at sea. How long the nations could bear the expenditure and slaughter, time alone could show.

Early in 1915, while the Russians pressed on in Galicia, and the Allies continued vainly to attack the German lines, each side attempted something new. While British and French ships strove to force their way to Constantinople, the Germans declared a submarine blockade of Britain, and endeavoured to break the Allies' line by using poison gas. The thrust towards Constantinople was continued by the armies, and Gallipoli became the scene of a crowded and endless battle. None of the new expedients prospered, and the destruction of the *Lusitania* with nearly 1,200 lives damaged the German cause throughout the world. In May, after long bargaining with both sides, Italy declared war on Austria, but her accession, which hardened the Austrian resistance, was offset by a series of disasters to the Russian arms.

The Campaign of 1915.

Recognizing that a decision in the west was unobtainable, the Germans had reverted to the more legitimate strategy of a crushing blow at Russia. Their conquest of Galicia, Poland, Courland and Lithuania, and the failure of the Allies in Gallipoli and France, brought Bulgaria to the side of the apparent victor. Serbia collapsed, and the Allies could only reply by seizing Salonika.

Britain meanwhile had gained the necessary time to transform herself into a military Power, and Germany could win the war only by gaining her consent or that of France to peace. In February, 1916, Falkenhayn struck at Verdun, hoping thus to shatter the strongest buttress of the French, or at least to render its defence so costly as to bleed them into submission. The assault was pressed for many months, and the peril of Verdun hastened on the series of Allied attacks known as the battle of the Somme. Meanwhile, an encounter between the British and German fleets off Jutland had confirmed the naval supremacy of the Allies, and at the end of August Roumania embraced their cause. A weak ally thus replaced a convenient neutral and only brought new disaster. When the year closed,

The Campaign of 1916.

the Germans were in Bucharest, but at Verdun the French had triumphed.

Three fierce campaigns had only enlarged the hold of Germany upon the Continent, while her opponents' sea-power had caused scarcity among her people and the downfall of her empire overseas. Mistress of Belgium, Poland, Serbia, Wallachia, Courland and north-eastern France, but suspecting that victory was beyond her power, she now made overtures for peace, while President Wilson attempted general reconciliation. The Allies, however, were confident that 1917 would see the Germans crushed by offensives west and east, since they had made progress on the Somme and could now supply Russia with munitions. They firmly declared that Prussian militarism must be destroyed, and its unrepentant leaders answered by ordering their submarines to sink ships without restraint. War with the United States followed, but the Germans, with some initial justification, counted on starving Britain long before an untrained Power could intervene.

Germany suggests Peace.

While the Americans armed with boundless energy, the Old World combatants fought on with changing fortune. Russia was weary of the war. In the spring, the Tsar was forced to abdicate, and the failure of a costly offensive threatened French *morale*. Later Allied offensives in the west brought no results comparable with the disaster of Caporetto to the Italians and the total collapse of Russia. The submarine menace, however, was declining, while the attacks on Turkey from the south had given the British Bagdad and Jerusalem. As in 1762, however, an incalculable change in Russia had secured the German rear, and despite their dread of naval failure, they might still hope to conquer peace. The *morale* of their allies, however, was plainly shaken, and their own people knew America far too well to underrate the value of her intervention. If a rich nation 100,000,000 strong could pour in troops, only a miracle could give victory to the war-worn Central Powers.

The Campaign of 1917.

The year 1917, for all its varied fortune, left the strategic

situation in its essence little changed, but transformed the moral issues. Hitherto, Germany had fought for her pre-war ideals; the Allies, to destroy her militarism and its supports. Her victory would have given her the hegemony of Europe, with widened boundaries, a dependent monarchy in Poland, and a great colonial empire. Her defeat meant great concessions to nationality and some to policy, the restoration and compensation of her victims, and the expulsion of the Turk from Europe. Now, however, President Wilson demanded a new world-system, in which boundaries should conform to the will of the inhabitants, and States, abjuring great standing armies, should be leagued together for the peaceful progress of the world.

American Intervention.

While the American intervention was thus associated with the idea of a League of Nations, the Russian revolution was captured by the Bolsheviks for the doctrines attributed to the German Socialist Karl Marx. Bolshevik rule in Russia was organized by their leader, Lenin, in support of the theory that the proletariat is the nation, that private property is an abuse and religion a delusion, and that until the proletariat reaches full consciousness of itself, the dictatorship of its champions must be established.

Bolshevism in Russia.

The ideals of Wilson and of Lenin penetrated a Germany which was wearying of isolation and of war, and in which some sections were ripe to learn democracy from the one and some sections communism from the other. At the same time, the visits of the Allied aircraft and the diffusion of the Allied propaganda may well have produced upon Germans the effects which they had anticipated from the use of similar agencies against the Allies. The manufacturing ascendancy of their enemies at last appeared to be established, and "tanks" had shaken their confidence in the field.

Germany in Victory and Defeat.

In 1918, however, Germany sealed its triumph in the east and prepared a great offensive in the west. The Peace of Brest-Litowsk in February formed a drastic partition of

Russia. At the end of March, the British were driven back on Amiens with enormous loss, and a fortnight later they suffered a lesser disaster farther north. In May, the Germans imposed peace upon Roumania, took Sevastopol, and drove back the French to a line forty miles from Paris, while steadily bombarding the city with long-range guns. In June, on the other hand, the Austrian offensive failed to dislodge the Italians and their allies, while masses of partly-trained Americans crossed the Atlantic unmolested.

The German strategy was embarrassed by lack of numbers and of time, but the position in France seemed critical when, on July 15, Hindenburg struck at Rheims. Rheims, however, remained untaken, and the unity of command which the Allies owed to their earlier disasters now received brilliant vindication. Foch, the new Generalissimo, retorted with a resounding success, and the Allied counter-offensive continued on every front until the enemy laid down their arms. Early in August, German *morale* showed signs of weakening; in September, Austria made overtures for peace and Bulgaria surrendered; in October, Ludendorff, the architect of German victory, resigned, while the fleet mutinied, Austria sued for peace and Turkey laid down her arms; in November, William II fled to Holland, and on the morning of the 11th an armistice was proclaimed. Ten days later, the German fleet steamed into captivity. In a war which cost ten million lives the western democracies had triumphed.

§ 12. *Problems of the Peace*

It remained for the assembled wisdom of the world to reconstruct the shattered framework of Europe east of the Rhine and to dispose of the regions conquered from Germany and from the Turk. In Germany herself a Republic had been proclaimed, and while the country was still blockaded, the new government was struggling against social revolution. Italy, which had expended nearly three-fifths of her total wealth, and lived in dread of an upheaval, was entitled to make territorial demands which her allies found it as difficult to grant as to evade. Austria had dissolved into republics,

Austrian, Hungarian and Czecho-Slovak, while her Southern Slavs were ready to join Serbia in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croatians and Slovenes. On grounds of race, Roumania was entitled to a great expansion, and the Poles to union and independence.

Russia presented an amazing problem. Moscow was in the hands of Lenin and his party, whose principles were incompatible with national rule as practised by other States. Russia they regarded as the pioneer in a world-revolution, which should result in a federation of Republics organized on communistic lines. The subject peoples of the Tsars, Finns and Estonians, Letts and Lithuanians, even the Ruthenian inhabitants of the Ukraine demanded, however, like the Poles, to have national governments of their own, while various Conservative leaders fought for the mastery of Russia. The Allies, misjudging the Russian situation as of old, blockaded the country and supported various opponents of the Revolution, in the belief that Bolshevism would shortly fall. Outside Europe, the problem of meeting local needs without an intolerable expansion of the British Empire seemed to defy solution. It was certain that the destinies of Europe would be more than ever determined from outside. The United States had vastly increased their wealth and influence, while Japan, likewise enriched by the world war, was generally accepted as a new Great Power.

The Peace Conference.

In January, 1919, a great Peace Conference met at Paris. Clemenceau and Lloyd George, the soul of the French and British effort, and President Wilson, who to serve humanity had poured in American assistance, formed its directing brain. Could they, consistently with justice, prepare a true reconciliation, like that of Federals and Confederates or that of Boer and Briton? or must the new settlement be based on force, as by the Congress of Vienna? With the collapse of the Hohenzollerns and the surrender of their fleet, England and America had achieved safety, but the French, with Germans in twice their numbers across the frontier, could feel no similar assurance. Germany, indeed, dominated the peace as she had dominated the war,

Bismarck's ruthless violence, the browbeating of forty years, the scientific ruin of France and the innumerable crimes against her people—all these forbade that mutual goodwill which alone makes true peace possible.

Failing a triumph of humanity for which man was not yet ripe, great steps were swiftly taken towards a better social order. To prevent war and to advance civilization, such Powers as might possess the indispensable goodwill were formed into a permanent League of Nations, and conquered territories inhabited by backward races were placed under its supervision.

The League of Nations.

As the outcome of prolonged debate, Nationality, or Self-determination, became the basis of the new Europe, with a few special modifications. Free peoples in States of their own choosing might, it was felt, be trusted to make the world safe for democracy, the watch-word of the American intervention. On this principle France, balked of the Rhine, her only safe strategic frontier, received Alsace and Lorraine, while to make good her losses, the coalfields of the Saar were detached from Germany for fifteen years at least. The German army was reduced to 100,000 volunteers, the navy and aerial fleet almost to nothing; the right bank of the Rhine was to remain unfortified to a breadth of more than thirty miles, and it was made impossible for the Austrians to attach their country to the German *Reich*. On certain frontiers popular votes were arranged for, and these gave Malmédy to Belgium, Northern Slesvig to Denmark, and part of Upper Silesia to Poland, a State which reached the sea at Danzig, now a detached republic. Germany also surrendered her colonies, her commercial fleet and the port of Memel, and accepted a colossal and indeterminate load of reparations. Payment was enforceable by military occupation, with bridgeheads across the Rhine.

Self-determination.

After suffering for half a century from a frontier which violated Italian racial unity to profit Austria, Italy now obtained the converse, and her claims on the shores of the Adriatic conflicted sharply with those of the Southern Slavs. While these joined Serbs, Croats and Slovenes into Jugo-

Slavia with some 12,000,000 souls, and Roumania expanded into a State of 17,000,000, Hungary found herself reduced to 7,500,000, and Bulgaria, disarmed and deprived of her littoral on the Ægean, numbered 5,000,000 only. The fate of Turkey, and, conversely, the reward of Greece, remained to be determined later, but England, as a mandatory of the League of Nations, took Mesopotamia and Palestine into her charge. Syria fell likewise to France and German Africa mainly to Belgium, France and Britain, but the hope that the United States would undertake Armenia was doomed to disappointment.

Europe after the War.

While the statesmen toiled at Paris, the nations of Europe passed from a brief delirium at the return of peace to the reconstruction of normal life. Victors and vanquished alike had proved that civilized man could endure torments such as dwarfed those of any preceding war. It remained to be seen how far the general upheaval had unfitted him for peace.

The return of the armies to civil life was accomplished with amazing speed, but the repair of devastated areas and the repatriation of exiled civilians proved harder tasks, and the recovery of social equilibrium hardest of all. For years no government in Europe felt secure, while Russia continued to menace the stability of all the former dominions of the Tsar and of vast areas in Europe and Asia ruled by other States. Crowned autocracy, indeed, had disappeared from Europe, and Italy and England were the only European Great Powers in which Monarchy in form survived. Democracy, however, was no longer so purely political as of old. The war had demonstrated the immense power of the State and its duty to take the lives of its subjects under its protection. This demonstration, and the impoverishment due to four years of destruction, caused inevitably a strong drift towards that Socialism which had conspicuously failed to prevent or terminate the war. Socialism, taking various forms and rousing various reactions, constituted a disturbing element all over Europe.

In presence of this and other dangers, it was inevitable

that, for a time at least, the Supreme Council of the Allies should remain in being. England, far more than any other State, had triumphed in the later stages of the war, adding to her navy, her factories and her credit an army which grew powerful on every front, and on several conquered almost without aid. It was natural, therefore, that her Premier should take the lead in Europe, and highly unfortunate that he should prove less capable in peace than in war of divining the path to victory and persuading the Allies to take it. After several failures, government by Conference broke down, but at Washington a scheme for partial naval disarmament was carried through.

Government by Conference.

The influence of the United States, indeed, remained immense, but their policy reverted to that of severance from Europe, tempered by philanthropic intervention to combat plague and famine. To this attitude must be attributed in great part the palpable failure of the Allies to solve effectively the Eastern question. No Power felt strong enough to assume that control over Armenia as a mandatory of the League of Nations which the United States declined, and Greece proved too weak to maintain the hold upon western Asia Minor which the Peace Conference assigned as her reward. In these regions the Turks, now a democracy in arms, dared to defy Europe. The Greeks, after an unsuccessful offensive, were driven out of Asia, and for a moment the Allied occupation of Constantinople and of a neutralized zone round the Sea of Marmora seemed likely to be challenged by force. After infinite haggling, however, the Turks concluded peace, and for its greater stability many of their subjects and those of Greece suffered mutual deportation. In 1923 Turkey thus became a national Asiatic State of perhaps 10,000,000 people, holding Thrace and Adrianople, but proclaiming its guiding principles by making its capital Angora. In November, 1922, moreover, the Sultanate ceased to exist, the last Sultan's successor becoming only Caliph, the head of the Mohammedan Church. Early in 1924 the Caliphate was also swept away. The Straits remain definitely open to the commerce of the world.

The Eastern Question.

A defect in the foundations of Near Eastern peace is that its terms have been drawn up without the concurrence of the greatest population whom it concerns. The dark shadow of Russia, indeed, has clouded every step in the post-war settlement of Europe. To western nations, the Bolsheviks appeared to be a gang of cosmopolitan ruffians, who murdered the Tsar and his family, withdrew Russia from the common cause, persecuted the Church, pillaged and massacred their opponents by tens of thousands and declared world-wide war against the principles upon which civilized government is based. Abhorrence, however, should not have prompted interference, save with irresistible force and with the resolve to remain in control of Russia until she could set up a stable and acceptable administration of her own.

The Russian Question.

Such an undertaking, costly and hazardous at any time, was impossible to democracies confronted with the tremendous burdens left them by the war, and with a thousand pressing problems nearer home. Their statesmen, persuaded that with small support the Bolsheviks' opponents could overthrow them, unhappily assisted various champions of a reaction which the masses dreaded even more than the tyranny of Moscow. Their onslaughts served only to identify Lenin and his friends with the Russian Revolution, which had increased the peasants' holdings, and with the Russian Empire, in which patriots still believed. Foreign attack gave cohesion, and its overthrow gave prestige, to a party whose programme violated several of the deepest instincts of the people over which by a strange chance it found itself for the moment supreme. Kornilov, Koltchak, Judenitch, Denikin, Wrangel—all served to arm Lenin against the " bourgeois " in Russia and throughout the world.

In 1920, Poland seemed about to be submerged by Russian force, but her victory taught the Bolsheviks to respect all the western Border States, while the appalling impoverishment of Russia forced her rulers towards moderation. The spectacle of her ruin under Communism confounded Socialists throughout the world, and compelled Lenin, by a New

Economic Policy, to give private enterprise far wider scope. When he died, early in 1924, his party had lost its unanimity, and despite their recognition by the Labour Government of Britain, their dictatorship in Russia appeared unlikely to endure for many years.

Dislocated Exchanges.

Russia had first succumbed to a disease widespread in post-war Europe—the devaluation of the currency, with its attendant social convulsions. Reckless printing of paper money, loans without adequate fresh taxation, reparation payments and other abnormal features of the time brought about depreciations in the value of money which made the *assignats* of the French Revolution seem relatively stable. In Germany, the greatest sufferer from fiscal error, the mark sank to one thousand millionth of its normal power of purchase. The industrialists made great fortunes; the national debt vanished; trade became mere gambling; work was discouraged; the middle class was largely pauperized.

Although some countries, notably those neutral in the war and England, attained stability, each year witnessed some fresh break in the exchanges, and commerce was often made impossible. The uncertainty regarding the great payments due from the Central Powers to the Allies and from the Allies to one another further affected credit, while dread of Socialism frequently disturbed men's minds. This led in Italy to the outbreak of Fascismo, a counter-Terror organized by individualists to preserve the existing order against violent attack, while several States found it necessary to suspend their democratic constitutions.

Settlement of Europe.

For some years, none the less, Europe as a whole made appreciable progress towards well-being. By the close of 1921, it was clear that new States with a reasonable prospect of stability had been established in Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Jugo-Slavia and Czecho-Slovakia, while the German and Hungarian Republics had defeated both Communist and royalist attacks. France and Belgium had already done wonders towards reconstruction, and England, which had

prudently anticipated post-war claims by an immense extension of the franchise and by the drastic taxation of the rich, ended a weary history of blood and crime by making Catholic Ireland a Free State. Next year, Austria, a small and distressed republic of 6,000,000 people, was powerfully aided towards recovery by good offices and loans from several Powers.

In 1923, however, the progress of Europe was rudely interrupted by a dispute regarding reparations. Failing to receive from Germany all that was due in kind or any adequate contribution towards her vast outlay on the devastated areas, France insisted upon seizing pledges which should frustrate a permanent evasion. She therefore marched troops into the industrial region of the Ruhr. Her paralysing grip on this mainspring of German economic life focused the attention of Europe upon certain incontrovertible facts. On the one hand, France, at least for the time being, was inordinately strong, being mistress of the most powerful army and aerial navy in the world, and allied, in the fashion of Louis XIV, with a cohort of smaller States. On the other hand, her future was dubious, for the promised defensive alliance with England and the United States had fallen through, her finances were unsound, and on her flank Germany remained united, hostile, and more and more preponderant in population.

France and Germany.

The occupation of the Ruhr provoked a passive resistance by Germany which completed the ruin of her finances, while further disordering those of France. Attempts to organize a Separatist movement in the Rhineland during the winter of 1923–24 only showed that the spirit which had prompted the Germans of Central Schleswig, East Prussia and Upper Silesia to vote for remaining in the Fatherland was shared by their western brethren. Even monarchist Bavaria, with its tradition of dislike for Prussia, remained inseparable from the German *Reich*.

The first five years of peace, then, brought two international wars to European States with hosts of hardly less violent internal and external conflicts. The hopes of many, therefore,

clung the closer to the nascent League of Nations, which alone promised to avert hasty quarrels and to cherish fraternal feeling throughout the world. As of old, however, the bloodiest struggle had not banished self-reliance and suspicion from mankind, and in 1920 the United States struck an almost mortal blow at the League by refusing to become a member. France, moreover, would not suffer Germany to be admitted, while Russia remained under the dominion of men pledged to universal revolution. With the steady support of England, however, the new organization grew into something like a Parliament of the human race. With a fixed Secretariat at Geneva, a standing Council, a periodical Assembly, and, since 1922, a permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, the League forms a conspicuous monument to the common interest of its members in promoting universal welfare. It is bound to uphold the principle that armaments should be reduced to the lowest point consistent with national safety, and that international obligations should be backed by general force. Aggression against one member is aggression against all, and any threat of war concerns the League. Between members, arbitration is compulsory, and all new treaties must be published. Regions may for special reasons be placed under the surveillance of the Council, and some of the keenest brains in the world are constantly devising means for combating disease, the more flagrant vices, and oppression of every kind. The application of publicity to any State action which may affect the general welfare and the permanent mobilization of moral force are new expedients full of promise for mankind, and only the support of public opinion is required to enable the Council to create machinery for extinguishing aggressive war.

The League of Nations.

The membership of the League, indeed, has steadily increased. Originating in the Allies and thirteen neutrals, by June 1, 1922, it had enlisted forty-six States as supporters of the Court of Justice. Abyssinia, Hungary and Ireland have since secured admission, the members in 1924 outnumbering those who stand aloof by

Italy and Greece.

nearly eight to one. In 1923, however, its structure was threatened at its weakest point by a quarrel between a Great Power and a secondary State. Charged by Italy, a fellow-member of the League, with injury necessitating prompt and humiliating redress, Greece invoked the intervention of the Council, but Italy refused recourse to law. The general indignation did not prevent the strong State from vindicating by diplomacy and force her claim against the weak. Her action reminded the world of the difficulty of inducing an ambitious Power to acquiesce sincerely in guaranteeing the existing territorial distribution and acknowledging the right of foreigners to intrude in questions of its armaments or honour. To quit the League, on the other hand, would have been to range herself with States which either are deemed unfit to enter it or which claim that their interests and ideals are non-European. The incident had at least shown the need for a stronger organization, if Europe, and indeed the world, is to inaugurate the rule of law. It is none the less no small gain that with the fall of Germany force has received a check and that a vast majority among the nations stand pledged to co-operate for justice.

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